Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1977

Monell v. Deptartment of Social Services of the City of New York
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Courts Commons

Recommended Citation
Monell v. Deptartment of Social Services of the City of New York. Supreme Court Case Files Collection.
Box 44. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

No. 75-1914
Jane Monell et al., Petitioners,

Recirculated:-------

On Writ of Certiorari tothe United States Court
Department of Social Services of
of Appeals for the Secthe City of New York et al.
ond Circuit.
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~
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'-l/7/1r
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J,

MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department
~ ~
of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of tM.., ,.,~ ___ _ ~
New York, commenced this action under 42 U.S. C.§ 1983 ~ L_ -~
in July 197}.1 The gravamen of the complaint was that the ~~~
Board and the Department had as a matter of ?fficial policy ~
.
.
1J ~....
compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of
absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. 2 IAA_ ~
---The complaint was amended on September 14, 1972 to allege a claim ~
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42. , U. S. C.
§ 2000e ( 1970 ed., and Supp. V). The District Court held that the 1972 ~
amendments to Title VII did not apply retroactively to discrimination
,I
suffered prior to those amendments even when an action challenging such ~
prior discrimination was pending on the date of the amendments. :394
~~
F. Supp. 853, 856 (SDNY 1975). This holding was affirmed on appeaL -...-~
532 F. 2d 259, 261-262 (CA2 1976). Although petitioners sought certiorari on the Title VII issue as well as the § 1983 claim, we restricted
rz:J- •
our grant of certiorari to the latter issue. 429 U.S. 1071.
~
2
The plaintiffs alleged that New York had a eitywide policy of forcing
~
women to take maternity leave after the fifth month of pregnancy unless
-L_ ' ~
a city physician and head of an employee's agency allowed up to an ~ ~ ~
additional two months of work. Amended Complaint 128, App. 13-14. """""'-. f ~
The defendants did not deny this, but stated that this policy had been
changed after suit was instituted. Answer ,113, App. 32-33. The plain- ~
tiffs further alleged that the Board had a policy of requiring women to
take maternity clave after the seventh month of pregnancy unless that #.-. _ '#':.
month fell in the last month of the school year, in which case the teacher ....,..- ~
1

L_ _ .

1.,;,.

4..,/ _

J ,
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Cf. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632'
(1974). The suit sought injunctive relief and back pay for
periods of unlawful forced leave. Named as defendants in the
action were the Department and its Commissioner, the Board
and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor.
In each case, the individual defendants were sued solely in
their official capacities. 8
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York held moot petitioners'
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief since the city of
New York and the Board, after the filing of the complaint, had
changed their policies relating to maternity leaves so that no
pregnant employee would have to take leave unless she was
medically unable to continue to perform her job. 394 F.
Supp. 853, 855. No one now challenges this conclusion. The
court did conclude. however, tha.t the acts complained of
were unconstitutional under LaFleur, supra. 394 F. Supp.,
at 855. Nonetheless plaintiff's prayers for back pay were
denied because any such damages would come ultimately from
the City of New York and. therefore, to hold otherwise would
be to "circumvent" the immunity conferred on municipalities
by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). See 394 F. Supp.,
at 855.
On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the·
Board of Education~ was not a "municipality" within the
meaning of Monroe v. Pape, supra, and that, in any event, the
District Court had erred in barring a damage award against
the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rejected both contentions. The Court first
could remain through the end of the school term. Amended Complaint
~~ 39, 42, 4.5, App. 18-19, 21. ThiR alleg~tion was denied. Answer
~118, 22, App. 35-37.
3 Amended Complaint f24, App. 11-12.
t Petitioners conceded that the Department of Social Services enjoys the
same status as New York City for Monroe purposes. See 532 F. 2d, at
263.
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held that the Board of Education was not a person under
§ 1983 because "it performs a vital governmental function ... ,
and, significantly, while it has the right to determine how the
funds appropriated to it shall be spent ... , it has no final
say in deciding what its appropriations shall be." 532 F. 2d
259, 263 (1976) (citation omitted). The individual defendants, however, were "persons" under ~ 1983, even when sued
solely in their official capacities. Id. , at 264. Yet, because a
damage award would "have to be paid by a city that was held
not to be amenable to such an action in Monroe v. Pape," a
damage action against officials sued in their official capacities
could not proceed. !d. , at 265.
We granted certiorari in this case, 429 U.S. 1071, to consider
"Whether local governmental officials and/ or local independent school boards are "persons" within the meaning
of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature
of back pay is sought against them in their official
capacities?" Pet. for Cert. 8.
Although, after plenary consideration, we ha.ve decided the
merits of over a score of cases brought under ~ 1983 in
which the principal defendant was a school board 5-and,
r. Milliken v. B1·adlcy , 4il3 U. S. 267 (1977); Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (1977); Vorchheimer v. School District
of Philadelphia, 430 U. S. 703 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Board v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974);
Bradley v. School Board of th e City of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696 (1974);
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974); Keyes v.
School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); San Antonio School District v .
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971); Northcross v. City of Memphis Board
of Education, 397 U. S. 232 (1970); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish
School Board, 396 U. S. 226 (1969); Alexander v. Holmes County Board
of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District,
395 U. S. 621 (1969) ; Tinker v. D es Moines Independent School District,
393 U. S. 503 (1969); M om·on v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U. S. 450
(1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (1968); Green v.
County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430 (1968); School
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indeed, in some of which § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U. S. C. ~ 1343, provided the only basis for jurisdiction6-we indicated in Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 279 (1977), last Term that the question
presented here was open and would be decided "another day."
That other day has come and we now overrule M omoe v. J:.ape,
supra, insoi:a;,r as it holds that local governments are wholly
immune from suit under§ 1983. 7
I

In Monroe v. Pape, we held that "Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of
[ § 1983] ." 36.? U. S., at 187. The sole basis for this conclusion was an inference drawn from Congress' rejection of the
"Sherman amendment" to the Civil Rights Act of 1871-the
precursor of § 1983- which would have held a municipal corporation liable for damage done to the person or property of
its inhabitants by private persons "riotously and tumultuously
assembled." 8 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 749 (1871)
(hereinafter "Globe"). Although the Sherman amendment
did not seek to amend § 1 of the Act, which is now § Hl83, and
Dist1ict of Abington Township v. Sthempp, 374 U . S. 203 (19<33) ; Goss v .
Board of Edu-;ation, 373 U. S. 683 (1963); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 (1963) ; Orlrans Parish School Board v. Bush, 365 U. S.
569 (1961); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 4R3 (1!)54).
6
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 636 (1974);
App., Keyes v. School District No.1, 0. T. 1972, No. 71-507, p . 4a; App.,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 0. T. 1970, No.
281, p. 465a; Pcti1ion for Certiorari, Northcross v. Board of Education,
0. T. 1969, No. 1136, p. 3; Tinker v. Des Moines Indr pendent School
District, 393 U. S. 503, 504 (1969); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373
U.S. 668,671 (1963).
7 See Part II, infra, for a discussion of the effect of this opinion on
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412
U. S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693 (1973); and
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
8 We expressly declined to consider "policy considerations" for or
against municipal liability. See 365 U. S., at 191.
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although the nature of the obligation created by that amendment wa.s vastly different from that created by § 1, the Court
nonetheless concluded in Monroe that Congress must have
meant to exclude municipa1 corporations from the coverage of
§ 1 because "the House [in voting against the Sherma.n amendment] had solemnly decided that in their judgment Congress
had no constitutional power to impose any obl1'gation upon
county and town organizations, the mere instrumentality for
the administration of state law." 365 U. S., at 190 ( em11hasis
added), quoting Globe, at 804 (Rep. Poland). This statement,
we thought, showed that Congress doubted its "constitutional
power . . . to impose civil liability on municipalities." 365
U. S., at 190 (emphasis added), and that such doubt would
have extended to any type of civilliability.n
A fresh analysis of debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
and pa.r ticularly of the case law which each side mustered in
its support, shows, hovvever, that M onToe incorrectly equated
the "obligation" of which Representative Poland spoke '"ith
"civil liability."
A. An Overview
There are three distinct stages in the legislative consideration of the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
On March 28, 1871, Representative Shellabarger, acting for
a House select committee, reported H. R. 320, a bill "to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution and for other purposes." H. R. 320 contained
four sections. Section 1, now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
was the subject of only limited debate and was passed without
9 Mr ..Justice Douglas, the author of Monroe, has suggested that the
municipal exclusion might more properly rest on a theory that Congress
sought to prevent the financial ruin that civil rights liability might impose
on municipalities. Soc C£ty of Kenosha v. Br-uno , supra, 11. 7, at 517-520
(1973). However, this view has never been shared by the Court, see
Monroe v. Pape, supra, n. 7, at 190; Moor v. County of Alameda, supra,
n. 7, at 708, and tho debates do not support this position.
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amendment. 10 Sections 2 through 4 dealt primarily with the
"other purpose" of suppressing Ku Klux Klan violence in
the southern States. 11 The wisdom and constitutionality of
these sections-not§ 1, now§ 1983-was the subject of almost
all congressional debate and each of these sections was
amended. The House finished its initial debates on H. R.
320 on April 7, 1871 and one week later the Senate also voted
out a bil1. 12 Again, debate on § 1 of the bill was limited and
that section was passed as introduced.
Immediately prior to the vote on H. R. 320 in the Senate,
Renator Sherman introduced his amendment.n This was not
an amendment to ~ 1 of the bill. but was to be added as § 7 a.t
th e end of the bill. Under the Senate rules, no discussion of
tho amendment was allowed and , although attempts were
made to amend the amendment, it was passed as introduced.
In this form , the amendment did not place liability on municipal corporations, but made any inhabitant of a municipality
liable for damage inflicted by persons "riotously or tumultuously assembled." 1 4
The House refused to acquiesce in a number of amendments made by the Senate, including the Sherman amendment, and the respective versions of H. R. 320 were there10

Globe, at 522.
Briefly, § 2 created certain frderal crimes in addition to those defined
in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act , 14 Stat. 27, each aimed primarily at
the Ku Klux Klan. Section ~ providrd that the President could send the
m ilitia into any State wracked with Klan violence . Finally, § 4 provided
for suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in enumerated circumstances,
again primarily those thought to obtain where Klan violence was rampant.
See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sc~ .. App., at 335-336 (1871) (hereinafter
"Globe App.") .
12
Globe, at 709.
13 See id., at 663, quoted in Appendix, infra, at - .
I { Ibid .
An action for rrcovr r~· of damagrs was to be in the federal
courts and denomin atrd as a suit ngainst the county, city, or parish in
which tho damage had occurrrd. Ibid. Exrrution of the judgment was
not to run against the property of the government unit, however, but
against the private property of any inhabitant. Ibid .
11
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fore sent to a conference committee. Section 1 of the bill,
however, was not a subject of this conference since, as noted,
it was passed verbatim as introduced in both Houses of
Congress.
On April 18, 1871, the first conference committee completed
its work on H. R. 320. The main features of the conference
committee draft of the Sherman amendment were these: 15
First, a cause of action was given to persons injured by
"any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled
together; . . . with intent to deprive any person of any
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for
exercising such right. or by reason of his race, color, or
previous condition of servitude . . . . "
Second, the act provided that the action would be aga.inst ,
the county, city, or parish in which the riot had occurred and )
that it could be maintained by either ' the person injured or
his legal representative. Third. unlike the amendment as
)
proposed. the conference substitute made the government
)
defendant liable on the judgment if it was not satisfied against
individual defend9,nts who had committed the violence. If
a municipality were liable, the judgment against it could be
collected
"by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or
any other proceeding in aid of execution or applicable
to the enforcement of judgments against municipal corporations; and such judgment [would become] a lien
as well upon all moneys in the treasury of such county,
city, or parish, as upon the other property thereof."

.l

In the ensuing debate on the first conference report, which
was the first debate of any kind on the Sherman amendment,
Senator Sherman explained tha.t the purpose of his amendment was to enlist the aid of persons of property in the en15

See Globe, at 749 and 755, quotrd in Appendix, infra, at - .
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forcement of the civil rights laws by making their property
"responsible" for Ku Klux Klan damage. 16 Statutes drafted
on a similar theory, he st,ated, had long been in force in
Engla.nd and were in force in 1871 in a number of States. 17
Nonetheless there were critical differences between the conference substitute and exta.nt state and English statutes: the
conference substitute, unlike most state riot statutes, lacked
a short sta.tnte of limitations and imposed liability on the government defendant whether or not it had notice of the impending riot, whether or not the municipality was authorized to
exercise a police power, whether or not it exerted all reasonable efforts to stop the riot, and whether or not the rioters
were caught and punished. 18
The first conference substitute passed the Senate but was
rejected by the House. House opponents, within whose ranks
"Let the people of property in the southern States understand that if
they will not make the hue and cry and take the necessary steps to put
down lawless violence in those States their property will be holden responsible, and the effect will be most wholesome." Globe, at 761.
Senator Sherman was apparently unconcerned that the conference committee substitute, unlike the original amendment, did not place liability
for riot damage directly on the property of the well-to-do, but instead
placed it on the local government. Presumably he assumed that taxes
would be leYied against the property of the inhabitants to make the locality
whole.
17 According to Senator Sherman, the law had originally been adopted in
England immediately after the Norman Conquest and had most recently
been promulgated as the law of 7 & 8 Ceo. IV, ch. 31. See Globe, at 760.
During the course of the debates, it appeared that Kentucky, Marylru1d,
Massachusetts, and New York had similar laws. See id., at 751 (Rep.
Shellabarger); id., at 762 (Sen. Stevenson); id., at 771 (Sen. Thurman);
id., at 792 (Rep. Butler). Such a municipal liability was apparently
common throughout New England. See id., at 761 (Sen. Sherman).
1 s In the Sena.tc, opponents, including a number of Senators who had
voted for § 1 of the bill, criticised the Sherman amendment as an imperfect
and impolitic rendering of the state statutes. Moreover, as drafted, the
conference substitute could be construed to protect rights that were not
protected by the Const.itution. A complete critique was given by Senator
Thurman. See Globe, at 770-772.
16
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were some who had supported § 1, were concerned with
whether the Federal Government consistent with the Constitution could obliga.t e municipal corporations to keep the peace
if those corporations were neither so obligated nor so authorized by their state chartC'rs and, therefore. were unwilling to
impose damage liability for nonperformance of a duty which
Congress could not require municipalities to perform. This
concern is reflected in Representative Poland's statement that
is quoted in M onroe. 10
Because the House rejected the first conference report a
second conference was called and it duly issued its report.
The second conference substitute for the Sherman amendment
abandoned municipal liability and, instead, made "any person or persons having knowledge [that a conspiracy to violate
.civil rights was afoot l, and having power to prevent or aid
in preventing the same," who did not attempt to stop the
same, liable to any person injured by the conspiracy. 20 The
amendment in this form was adopted by both Houses of Congress and is now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1986.
The meaning of the legislative history sketched above can
most readily be developed by first considering the debate on
the report of the first conference committee. This debate
shows conclusively that the constitutional objections raised
against the Sherman amendment would not have prohibited
congressional creation of a civil remedy against state municipal corporations that infringed federal rights. Because § 1 of
the Civil Rights Act does not state expressly that municipal
corporations come within its ambit, it is finally necessary to
interpret § 1 to confirm that such corporations were indeed
intended to be covered.

B. Debate on the First Conference Report
The style of argument adopted by both proponents and
opponents of the Sherman amendment in both Houses of
19
20

See 365 U.S., at 190, quoted at p. 5, supra.
Soe Globe, at 804, quoted in Appendix, infra, at-.
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Congress was largely legal, with frequent references to cases
decided by this Court and the supreme courts of the several
States. Proponents of the Sherman amendment did not, however, discuss in detail the argument in favor of its constitutionality. Nonetheless, it is possible to piece together such an
argument from the debates on the first conference report and
those on § 2 of the civil rights bill, which, because it allowed
the Federal Government to prosecute crimes "in the states,"
had also raised questions of federal power. The account of
Representative Shellabarger, the House sponsor of H. R. 320,
is the most complete.
Shellabarger began his discussion of H. R. 320 by stating
that "there is a domain of constitutional law involved in the
right consideration of this measure which is wholly unexplored." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess .. App., at 67 (1871)
(hereinafter "Globe App."). There were analogies, however.
With respect to the meaning of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly its Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Shellabarger relied on the statement of Mr. Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 (CCED Pa.
1825), which defined the privileges protected by Art. IV:
"'What these fundamental privilC'gcs are[.] it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They
may, however, be all comprehended under the following
general heads: protection by the Government;'"Mark that" 'protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety . . . . ' " Globe App., at 69 (emphasis added),
quoting 4 Wash. C. C., at 380.
Having concluded that citizens were owed protection, 21
Opponents of the Sherman amendment agreed that both protection
and equal protection were guaranteed by t.he Fourteenth Amendment. See
Globe, at 758 (Sen. Tmmbull) ; id., at 772 (Srn. Thurman); id., at 791
21

75-1914-0PINION
MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES

11

Shellabarger then considered Congress' role in providing that
protection. Here again there were precedents:
"[Congress has always] assumed to enforce, as against
the States, and also persons, every one of the provisions
of the Constitution. Most of the provisions of the Con·
stitution which restrain and directly relate to the States,
such as those in f Art. T. ~ 10.1 relate to the divisions of
the political powers of the State and General Governments. . . . These prohibitions upon political powers of
the States are ali of such nature that they can be, and
even have been, ... enforced by the courts of the United
States declaring voicl all State acts of encroachment on
Federal powers. Thus, and thus sufficiently, has the
United States 'enforced' these provisions of the Constitution. But there arc some that are not of this class.
These are where the court secures the rights or the liabilities of persons within the States, as between such persons
and the States.
"These three are: first, that as to fugitives from justice [221 : second, that as to fugitives from service, (or
slaves [231 ; ) third. that declaring that the 'citizens of each
(Rep. Wilbrd) . And tlw Snprrme Cnnrt of Indiana had ~o held in giving
effort to the Civil Ri ght~ Art of 1S66. Scr Sm ith v. M oody, 26 Ind. 299
(1866) (foll owing Coryell). onr of thrrr ~tntc snpremr ronrt rnses refrrred
to in Globe App., nt 6S (Rrp. Shrllabn.rgcr). MorroYrr, ~ 2 of the 1871
Art as pnsscd, unlike § 1. prosrrntrd prrROllR wbo violated fr drral rights
whether or not that viol~tion wns under color of official anthorit~', apparently on the theorv th1l Kn Klux I\:lnn violence was infringing the right of
protection defined by C01-yell.
22
U.S. Canst., Art. IV,§ 2, cl. 2:
"A Person charged in any State with Trenl'on, Felon~'· or other Crime, who
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shnll on Demand
of the executive Authority of the Stn,te from which he fl ed, be delivered
up, to be removed to the State having .Jurisdietion of the Crime."
23
I d., cl. 3:
"No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Lnws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Lnw or Regulation
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State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.' [241
"And, sir, every onC' of theRe-the only provisions 'vhcrc
it was deemed that legislation was required to enforce the
constitutional provisions-the only three where the rights
or liabilities of persons in the States, as between these persons and the States, are directly provided for, Congress
has by legislation affirmatively interfered to protect ...
such persons." Globe App., at 69-70.
Of legislation mentioned by Shellabarger, the closest analog
of the Sherman amendment. ironically, was the statute implementing the fugitives from justice and fugitive slave provisions
of Art. IV- thC' Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302-the
constitutionality of which had been sustained in 1842, in Prigg
v. Pennsylvam·a, 16 Pet. 539. There, Mr. Justice Story,
writing for the Court, held that Art. IV gave slaveowners a
federal right to the unhindered possession of their slaves in
whatever State such slaves might be found. 16 Pet., at 612.
Because state process for recovering runaway slaves might be
inadequate or even hostile to the rights of the slaveowner,
thC' right intended to be conferred could be negated if left to
state implementation. !d., at 614. Thus, since the Constitution guaranteed the right and this in turn required a remedy,
Story held it to be a "natural inference" that Congress had
the power itself to ensure an appropriate (in the Necessary
and Proper Clause sense) remedy for the right. !d., at 615.
Building on Prigg, Shellabarger argued that a remedy
against municipalities and counties was an appropriate method
for ensuring the protection which the Fourteenth Amendment
made every citizen's federal right. 25 This much was clear from
therein, be di~chargrd from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due."
24
I d., cl. 1.
25 See Globe, at 751.
Sec also id., at 760 (Sen. Sherman) (" If a State
may .. . pass a law making a county ... responsible for a riot in order
to deter such crime, then we may pass the same remedies . . . . ").
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the adoption of such statutes by the several Sta.tes as devices
for suppressing riot.~G Thus, said Shellabarger, the only serious question remaining was "whether, since a county is an
integer or part of a State, the United States can impose upon
it, as such, any obligations to keep the peace in obedience to
United States laws." 27 This he answered affirmatively, citing
Board of Commissioners v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376 (1861),
the first of many cases ~ upholding the power of federal courts
to enforce the Contract Clause against municipalities." 0
The most complete statement of the constitutional argument
of the House opponents of the Sherman amendment-whose
views are particularly important since only the House voted
down the amendment-was that of Representative Blair: 30
"The proposition known as the Sherman amendment ... is entirely new. It is altogether without a pre8

ld., at 751; seen. 17, supra.
Globe, at 751 (emphasis added). Compare this statement with Representative Poland's remark upon which our holding in Monroe was based.
Sor p. 5, supra.
28 Src, e. g., GPlpcke v. City of Dubuque. 1 Wall. 175 (1864); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy , 4 id., 535 (1867): Rigos v. Joh nson County , G
id., 166 (1868); Weber v. Lee County, 6 id., 210 (1868); Supervisors v.
Rogers, 7 id., 175 (1869); Benbow v. Iowa City, 7 id., 313 (1869); Supervisors v. Durant , 9 id., 41.'5 (1870). See grncrall~· C. Frtirman, History of
the Supreme Court of tho United States: Reconstruction and Reunion,
1i<6-i-1888, chs. 17-18 (1971).
29 See Globe, at 751-752.
30 Others taking a view similar to Representative Blair's included:
Representative Willard, sec icl., at 791; Representative Poland, see id., at
794: Representative Burchard, see id., at 795; Representative Farnsworth,
see id., at 799. Representative Willard also took a somewhat different
position. He thought t lmt the Constitution would not allow the Federal
Government to dictate the manner in which a. State fulfilled its obligation
of protection. That is, he thought it a matter of state discretion whether
it delegated the pe:tcekeeping power to a municipal or county corporation,
to a sheriff, etc. He did not doubt, however, that the Federal Government
could impose on the States the obligation imposed by the Sherman amendment, and presumably he would have enforced the amendment against a
26

27
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cedent in this country. . . . That amendment cla.ims the
power in the General Government to go into the States
of this Union and lay such obligations as it may please
upon the municipalities, which are the creations of the
States alone. . . .
" ... [H]ere it is proposed, not to carry into effect an
obligation which rests upon the municipality, but to
create tha.t obligation, and that is the provision I am
unifblo to assen t {o. T he parallel of the hundred does not
in tho least meet the case. The power that laid the
obligation upon the hundred first put the duty upon the
hundred that it should perform in that regard, and failing
to meet the obligation which had been laid upon it, it was
very proper that it should suffC'r damage for its neglect ....
" ... [T]here are certain rights and duties that belong
to the States, ... there are certain powers that inhere in
the State governments. They create these municipalities,
they say what their powers shall be and what their ohl i~a 
tions shall bz¥, If the Government of the United States
can step in and add to those obligations, may it not
utterly destroy the municipality? If it can say that it
shall be liable for damages occurring from a riot, . . .
where r will] its power ... stop and wha.t obligations ...
might{ it] not lay upon a municipality . . . .
"Now, only the other day, the Supreme Court . . .
decided rin Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871)1 that
there is no power in the Government of the United States,
under its authority to tax, to tax the salary of a State
officer. Why? Simply because the power to tax involves
the power to destroy, and it was not the intent to give
the Government of the United States power to destroy
the government of the States in any respect. It was held
also in the case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania [ 16 Pet. 539'
municipal corporntion to which t.hc peacekeeping obligation had been
ddC'gatrd . See id .. at 791.
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(1842)] that it is not within the power of the Congress
of the United States to lay duties upon a State officer;
that we cannot command a State officer to do any duty
whatever, as such; and I ask ... the difference between
that and commanding a municipality with is equally the·
creature of the State, to perform a duty." Globe, at 795.
While House debate primarily concerned the question
whether Congress had the power to require municipalities to·
keep the peace, opponents of the Sherman amendment in the
Senate primarily questioned the constitutionality of the judgment lien created by the Sherman amendment, a lien which
ran against all money and property of a defendant municipality, including property held for public purposes, such as
jails or courthouses. Opponents argued 31 that such a lien once
entered would have the effect of making it impossible for the
municipality to function, since no one would trade with it.
Moreover, everyone knew that sound policy prevented execution against public property since this too was needed if local
government was to survive. 32 Thus, whereas constitutional
objection in the House had rested on potential danger to the
independence of the Staks if the Federal Government were
allowed to mandate the duties of state instrumentalities or
officers, objection in the Senate rested on the actual probability
that municipal government would be extinguished if ever ma.de
subject to the lien.
The position of the Senate oppo'nents, although not relevant
to the question whether municipalities could be sued under
§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act, 33 nonethelef's underscores the fact
31

See, e. g., Globe, at 762 (Sen. Stevenson); id., at 763 (Sen. Casserly).
Sec. e. g., ibid. Opponrnts were correct thnt publir propcrt~· was
grnernlly immune from rxcrut ion. Sec Meriwether v. Garrett. 102 U. S.
472, 501, 513 (1880); The Pmtector, 20 F. 207 (CCD Mn F~. 1894); 2
Dillon, Municipal Corporal.ion~ §§ 4-15-4-±6 (1873 ed.).
33
Execution in suits under § 1, like all other civil suits in fedrral courts
in 1871, would have been governed by state proccdurcH under the process
"

2
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that opponents of the Sherman amendment were arguing
primarily that the Constitution, in Blair's words, did not
"inten[d] to give the Government of the United States power
to destroy the government of the States," and yet, somehow,
proponents of the Sherman amendment were intending to·
exercise just such a power. To understand why this was soand, more important, why § 1 of the civil rights bill did not
threaten the government of the States in an impermissible
manner-it is necessary to examine the cases cited by opponents of the Sherman amendment.
The first case is Prigg v. Pennsylvania, supra, which had also
been cited by Shellabarger in support of the Sherman amendment. See p. 12, supra. In addition to confirming a broad
federa.l power to enforce federal rights against the States. Mr.
Justice Story in Prigg held that Congress could not insist that
the States create an adequate remedy for a federal right:
"[Art. IVl is found in the national Constitution, and not
in that of any state. It does not point out any state
functionaries, or any state action to carry its provisions
into effect. The states cannot, therefore, be compelled to
enforce them; and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of interpretation, to insist
that states are bound to provide means to carry into effect
the duties of the national government . . . . " 16 Pet.,
at 615- 616.
Indeed, Story suggested that those parts of the Act of 1793·
which conferred jurisdiction on local magistrates to assist in
the arrest and return of slaves were unconstitutional, see id., .
at 622, a proposition with which other Justices a.greed. 3 '
acts of 1792 and 1828. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275; Act
of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278.
34 "The state officers mentioned in the law [of 1793] are not bound to
execute the duties imposed upon them by Congress, unless they choose to
do so, or are required to do so by a law of the state; and the state
legislature has the power, if it thinks proper, to prohibit them. The act
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The principle enunciated in Prigg was applied in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861). There . the Court was
asked to require Dennison, the Governor of Ohio, to hand
over Lago, a fugitive from justice wanted in Kentucky, as
required by § 1 of the Act of 1793, 35 s~tpra, which implemented
Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, t>f the Constitution. Chief Justice Taney,
writing for a unanimous Court, refused to enforce that section
·Of the Act:
"[W]e think it clear, that the Federal Government, under
the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it; for if it possessed this power, it might overload
the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and
disable him from performing his obligations to the State,
and might impose on him duties of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to which he was elevated by
the State." 24 How., at 107-108.
Although no one cited Dennison by name, the principle
expressed there by Chief Justice Taney was well known to
of 1793, therefore, must depend altogether for its exerution upon the offi()ers of the United States named in it." 16 Pet., at 630 (Taney, C ..T.).
Mr. Justice McLean agreed that "[a]s a general principle" it was true
"that Congres~ had no powN to impose dntirs on state officers, as
provided in the act [of 1793] ," but he wondered whether the "positive"
obligation created by the Fugitive Slave Clause did not create an exception. See id., at 664-665.
35
"Be it enacted ... That whenever the executive authority of any state
in the Union ... shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice ...
and shall moreover produce a copy of an indictment found ... charging
the person so demanded, with having committed treason, felony or other
crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the
state ... from whence the person so charged fled, it shall be the duty of
the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person shall
have fled, to cause him or her to be arrested and secured . . . and to ·
cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent [of the demanding state]
when he shall appear . . . . " 1 Stat. 302.
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Members of Congress. 36 Reasoning identical to Taney's-that
maintenance of the federal structure of the Nation was inconsistent with allowing Congress any power which might be used
to impede the States from carrying out programs within their
"legitimate spheres" of power, for if Congress had such power,
it would inevitably override the independence of the States
in violation of the federal plan of the Constitution 37-had
provided the ground for the Court's decision in Collector v.
Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871), to which Blair and many others
referred,:~s in which the Court held that the Federal Government could not subject the salary of a state officer to a general
income tax. Although Day and Dennison were the only
Supreme Court cases setting a limit on the enumerated powers
of the Federal Government, a, series of state supreme court
cases ~ in the mid-1860's had invalidated ~ federal tax on the
process of state courts for the same reasons Dennison had
invalidated the Act of 1793 :md these cases were cited with
approval by opponents of the amendment. 40
Prigg obviously prohibited Congress from insisting that
state officers or instrumentalities keep the peace. But it
stands for only the narrow proposition for which it was cited
9

:w "The Suprrmc Court of the Unitrrl. Statrs has rl.rcirl.rcl repeatedly that
Congrrss rnn impose no duty on a State officer." Globr, at 799 (Rep.
Farnsworth). Scr also id .. at 788-789 (Rep. Kerr).
37 This is the principle of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Whent. 316 ( 1819),
applied to protect States from fedcrn l interference in the same mnnner the
Federal Government was protected from state interference ..
38 Ser, e. (!., Globe, nt 764 (Sen. Davis): ibid. (Sen. Cnsserly); id., 772
(Sen. Thmman) (reciting logic of Day): id., nt 777 (Sen. Frelinghuysen);
id .. a.t 788-789 (Rep. Kerr) (reciting logic of Day); id., at 793 (Rep.
Polnnd); id., at 799 (Rep. Farnsworth) (nlso rcciti11g logic of Day).
=<u Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 276 (1864): Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19
Wis. 369 (1865); Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505 (1867); Union Bank v.
Hill, 3 Cold. (43 Tenn.) 325 (1866); Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385 (1867).
40
Sec Globr, at. 764 (Sen. Davis): ibid. (Sen. Casserlcy). See also T.
Cooley, Constitutional Limitntions .,-:.483--'"484 (1R71 eel.).

')
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I

by Representative Blair: that the Federal Government cannot
compel a state government, agency, or officer to provide a
remedy, either executive or judicial, for a federal right.
Therefore, equally obviously, Prigg has no bearing whatsoever
on the question whether a federal court could award damages
under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act against a state agency or
officer that violated a federal right, since when a federal court
makes a damage award under that section, the positive government action required to implement the federal right is carried
out by that court, not by an agency or officer of the State.
The limits of the principle of Dennison and Day are somewhat more difficult to discern as a matter of logic but more
apparent as a matter of history. It must be remembered that
Dennison a.nd Day coexisted with vigorous federal judicial
enforcement of the Contract Clause. Thus, federal judicial
enforcement of express limits on state power found in the
Constitution, at least so long as interpretation of constitutional limits was left in the hands of the judiciary, apparently
was seen to create no threat to federalism. Since § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act simply conferred jurisdiction on the federal
courts to enforce § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-a situation precisely analogous to the grant of diversity jurisdiction
under which the Contract Clause was enforced against municipalities--there is no reason to suppose that opponents of the
Sherman amendment would have found any constitutional
barrier to § 1 suits aga.i nst municipalities.
Indeed, opponents expressly distinguished between imposing
a.n obligation to keep the peace and merely imposing civil
liability for damages on a municipality that was obligated by
state law to keep the peace, but which had not in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Poland, for
example, reasoning from Contract Clause precedents, indicated
that a federal law that sought only to hold a municipality
liable for using its authorized powers in violation of the

11 "~' 0j'1
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Constitution-which is as far as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
went-would be constitutional:
"I presume . . . that where a State had imposed a duty
[to keep the peace] upon [a] municipality ... an action
would be allowed to be maintained against them in the
courts of the United States under the ordinary restrictions
as to jurisdiction. But enforcing a liability, existing by
their own contract, or by a State la.w, in the courts, is a
very widely different thing from devolving a new duty or
liability upon them by the national Government, which
has no power either to create or destroy them, and no
power or coutrol over them whatever." Globe, at 794.
Representative Burchard agreed:
"[T]here is no duty imposed by the Constitution of the
United States, or usually by State laws, upon a county to
protect the people of that county against the commission
of the offenses herein enumerated, such as the burning of
buildings or any other injury to property or injury to
person. Police powers are not conferred upon counties as
corporations; they are conferred upon cities that have
qualified legislative power. And so far as cities are concerned, where the equal protection required to be afforded
by a State is imposed upon a city by State laws, perhaps
the United States courts could enforce its performance. But counties ... do not have any control of the
police . . . ." I d., at 795.
That those who voted for § 1 of the Civil Rights Act, but
against the Sherman amendment, would not have thought § 1
unconstitutional if it applied to municipalities is also confirmed
by c~msidering what exactly those votin_s; for § 1 had a,Eproved.
Section 1 without question could be used to obtain a damage
judgment against state or municipal officials who violated
federal constitutional rights while acting under color of law!t
41

See, e. g., Globe, at 334 (Rep. Hoar); id., at 365 (Rep. Arthur); id.,.

I
{
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However, for Prigg-Dennison-Da.y purporses, as Blair and
others recognized, 42 tlwre was no distinction of constitutional
magnitude between officers and agents-including corpora.te
agents-of the Sta.te: both were state instrumentalities and
the State could be imprdcd no matter over which sort of
instrumentality the Federal Government sought to assert its
power. Dennison and Day, after all, were not suits a.gninst
municipalities but against officers and Blair was quite conscious
that he >vas extending Prigg by applying it to municipal
corpora.tions.4 :' Nonetheless. Senator Thurman. who gave the
most exhaustive critique of.~ l-inter alia complaining that it
would be applied to state officers, see Globe, at 217-and who
opposed both § 1 and the Sherman amendment, the latter on
Prigg grounds, agreed unequivocally that § 1 was constitutional.H Those who voted for § 1 must similarly have believed
in its constitutionality def'pite Prigg, Dennison, and Da.y.
In sum, there is no basis in holdings of this Court, the
common understandi1;g of the bar, or the debates to find in the ~
Constitution as interpreted in Pn:gg, Dennison, or Day a bar to
Federal Government power to enforce the Fourteenth ~ndat 367-368 (Rep. Sheldon): id .. n,t 385 (Rep. Lewis); Globe App., at 217
(Sc•n. Thurman). In addition, officers were included among those who
could be sued nndrr the second conference substitute for ihe Sherman
Amendment. Sec Globe, nt 805 (exchnnge bet.ween Rep. Wilbrd and Rep.
Shellabrrrger). There werr no constitutional objections to the second
rC'port.
42 See Globe, nt 795 (Rep. Blnir); id., at 788 (Rep. Kerr) ; id., at 795
(Rep. Burchard); id., at 799 (Rep. Fa.rnsworth).
<:l "fW]e ca.n not commru1el a State officer to do any duty whn,tcver, as
surh; and I ask ... the difference between that and commanding a municipality .... " Globe, at 795.
41 Sec Globe App., at 216-217, qnoted, infra, at n. 45.
In 1879, moreOVPr, when the question of t.he limit~ of the Prigg principle was squarely
prcscnt0d in Ex pdrte Virainia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880), this Court held that
Dennison and Day and the principle of federali;;m for which they stand
did not prohibit federal enforcement of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
through suits directed to st.ate officers. Sec 100 U. S., at 345-348.
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ment against the States, or their agents, officers, instrumen-~
talities, or subdivisions, tl~ederal judicial action even
though such enforcement would necessarily involve sanctions
against officers or instrumentalities which violated that
Amendment.
C. Debate on § 1 of the Civil Rights Bill
From the foregoing discussion, it is readily apparent that
nothing said in debate on the Sherman amendment would
have prevented holding a municipality liable under § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question remains, however, whether the
general language describing those to be liable under § 1-"any
person"-covers more than natural persons. An examination
of the debate on § 1 and application of appropriate rules of
construction shows unequivoca.lly that § 1 was intended to
cover legal as well as natural persons.
Representative Shellaharger was the first to explain the
function of § 1 :
"[Section 1] not only provides a civil remedy for persons
whose former condition may have been that of slaves,
but also to all people where, under color of State law,
they or any of them may be deprived of rights to which
they are entitled under the Constitution by reason and
virtue of their national citizenship." Globe App., at 68.
By extending a remedy to all people, including whites, § 1
went beyond the mischief to which the remaining sections
of the 1871 Act were addressed. Representative SheHabargcr
also stated without reservation that the constitutionality of
~ 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 rontrollrd the constitutionality of § 1 of the 1871 Act, and that the former had been
approved by "the supreme courts of at least three States of
this Union" and by Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting on circuit, who
had concluded "We have no doubt of the constitutionality of
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every provision of this act." Ibid. He then went on to
describe how the courts would and should interpret § 1:
"This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of
human liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes a.re liberally and beneficently construed. It would be most
strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the
rule of interpretation. As has been again and again decided by your own Supreme Court of the United States,
and everywhere else where there is wise judicial interpretation, tho largest latitude consistent with the words
employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes
and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and
defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the
people. . . . Chief .Justice Jay and also Story say:
"''Where a power is rcmedial in its nature there is
much reason to contend that it ought to be construed
liberally, and it is generally adopted in the interpretation
of laws.'-1 Story on Constitution, sec. 420.'' Globe App.,
at 68.
The sentiments expressed in Representative Shellabarger's
opening speech were echoed by Senator Edmunds, the manager of H. R. 320 in the Senate:
"The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to,
as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the
United States when they are assailed by any Rtate law or
under color of any State law. and it is merely carrying
out the principles of the civil rights bill rof 18661' which
have since becomr a part of the Constitution." Globe. at
568.
"rSection 1 isl so vrry simple and really rc0nacting the
Constitution." ld., at 560.
And he agreed that the bill "~ecurer edl the rights of white
men as much as of colored men." Id., at 696.
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In both Houses, statements of the supporters of § 1 corroborated that Congress in enacting j 1 intended to exercise
the entirety of its power to enforce § 1 of the Fourteenth
"--,
-Amendmcnt.:;n=-

-

45

Representative Bingham, thl' author of § 1 of the Fourt<:'Cnth Amendment, for example, declared thr hill's purpose to be "the enforcement .. .
of the Constitution on behalf of every individual citizen of the Republic .. .
to the extent of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution." Globe
App., at 81. He continurd:
"The States never had the righL, though they had the power, to inflict
wrongs upon free citizens by :l drnial of the full protection of the lawR . . . .
'\ndl the Sta tcR did deny to citizens the C(lllHl protection of the lawR, they
did deny the rights of citizens under the Constitution, and except to the
extent of the l'xprrR:> limitations upon tlw States, as I have shown, the
ritizrn had no rC'medy. . . . They took propert~' without compl'nsation,
and he had no remedy. They restncted lhe freedom of the press, and he
had no remedy. Th·ey rrstrictrd the freedom of speech, and hr. had no
remedy. They restricted the rights of conscienrl', and he had no remedy. . . . Who dare say, now that the Constitution has been amended,
that the nation cannot by law provide against all such abuses and denials
of right as these in the States and by States, or combinations of per:·mns ?"
Id., at 85.

r

Representative Perry, commenting on Cong11ess' action in passing the civil
rights bill also stated:
"Now, by our action on this bill we have asserted as fully as we can
U$Sert the mischief intended to be remedied. We have a<~~ertrd ns clearly
as we can a<iBert our belief that it, is the duty of Congress to redress tha.t
mischief. We have also asserted a<~ fully as we ran assert the constitutional
right of Congress to legisl::tte." Globe, at 800.
Sre al~o id .. at 376 (Rep. Lowe); id., at 428-429 (Rep. Bratty); id.,
at 448 (Rep. Butler); id., nt 475-477 (Rep. Dawe~); id., nt 578-579 (Sen.
Tmmbull); id., at 609 (Sen. Pool); Globe App., id., at 182 (Rep. Mcrrur).
Other supporters were quite clear that § 1 of the act extended a. remedy
not only where a State had passed an unconstitutional statute, but also
w~ere officers of the State refused to carry ont the law:
"But the chief complaint is [that] by a systematic maladministration of
[state law], or a neglect or refu~al to enforce their provisions, a portion of
the people are denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a state
of fa.rts is clearly made out, I believe [§ 5 of tho Fourteenth Amendment] empowers Congress to step in and provide for doing justice to those
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Since the debates show that Congress intended to exercise
its full power under the Fourteenth Amendment and, further,
that c ongress intended the stat ute to Be construed broadly in
favor of persons injured in their constitutional rights, there
is no reason to suppose that municipal corporations would
have been excluded from the sweep of§ 1. Cf., e. g .. Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347 (1880); Horne Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 286-287, 294- 296 (1913). One
need not rely on this inference alone, however. for the debates
show that Members of Congress underPtood "persons" to
include municipal corporations.
Representative Bingham, for example, in discussing § 1 of
the bill, explained that he had drafted § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment with the case of Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243
(1834), espPcia.lly in mind. "In rthatl case the city had taken
private property for public use, without compensation . . . ,
and there was no redress for the wrong . . . . " Globe App.,
at 84 (emphasis added). Bingham's further remarks clearly
indicate his view that such takings as ha.d occurred in Barron
persm•s who arc thus denied equal protertion." Globe App., at 153 (J\Tr.
Garfield). Sec also Monroe v. Pape, snpm, n. 7, at 171-187.
Importantly for our inquiry, even the opponents of § 1 agreed that it was
constitutional a.nd, further, th3t it represented an attempt to exercise the
full power conferred by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Senator
Thurman, who gave the most exh3ustive ('ritique of§ 1, said:
"This section relnJes wholly to civil suits. . . . Its whole effect is to give
to the Federal Judiciary that which now doeR not belon~ to it-a jurisdiction that may be constitutionally conferred upon it, I grant, but that has
never yet been conferred upon it. 1t authorizes any person who is deprived
of any right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Com:titution of
tho United States, to bring an action aga.inst the wrongdoer in the Federal
cour1s, and that without any limit whatsoever as to the amount in
controversy ....

"I 'l']here is no limitation 10hatsoever upon the terms that are employed
rin the bill], and they are as comprehensive as can be used."

at 216-217 (emphasis added).

Glob<' App.,
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would be redressable under § 1 of the bill. See id., at 85.
More generally, and as Bingham's remarks confirm, § 1 of the
bill would logically be the vehicle by which Congress provided
redress for takings, since that section provided the only civil
remedy coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment and that
Amendment unequivocally prohibited uncompensated takings.46 Given this purpose. it beggars reason to suppose that
Congress would have exempted municipalities from suit,
insisting instead that compensation for a taking come from an
officer in his individual capacity rather than from the government unit that had the benefit of the property taken. 47
~
In addition, by 1871 , it was well understood that corporaI'~-~~ ... ~
ti QE_s should be treated as na~ural persons for virtually all pur~ Jr ~
poses of con§...t illitionaf andstatutory an®'s1~ This had not
~
always been B<f Wtlc'if t1hs=c'o'i1?thrsi"consitrered the question , ,
,,
of the status of corporations, Chief Justice Marshall, writing
112.J~~
for the Court, denied that corporations "as such" were persons I~
as that term was used in Art. III and the Judiciary Act of
1789. See Bank of th e United Sta.tes v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61,
86 (1809). 48 By 1844. howev0r, thE' f5 r1'eaux doctrine was
unhesitatingly abandoned:
" [A l corporation crcat0d by and rloing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes
as a person, although an artificial person, ... capable of
being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a
natural person." Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497,
558 (1844) (emphasis arldC'd). discusscrl in Globe, at 752.
46 Sec Story, Cormnentarirs on the Constitution of the United States
§ 1956 (Cooley ed. 1873) .
47
Indred 1.he federal courts found no obstacle to awards of damages
against municipalities for rornmon-law takings. See Sumner v. Philadelphia, 21 F. CnR. 392 (CCED Pn. 11\73) (No. 13,611) (awarditlg dam ~1 gcs
of $2,273.36 and costs of $346.35 against the city of Philadelphia).
•s N onethclPss, suits could bP brought in federal court if the natural
persons who were members of the corporation were of diverse citizenship
from the other parties to the litigation. See 5 Cranch, at !H.
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And only two years before the debates on the Civil Rights
Act, in Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, 121 (1869), the
Letson principle was automatically and without discussion
extended to municipal corporations. Under this doctrine,
municipal corporations were routinely sued in the federal
courts ~o and this fact was well known to Members of
Congress. 5°
That the "usual" mraning of the word person would extend
to municipal corporations is also evidenced by an Act of
Congress which had been passed only months before the Civil
Rights Act was passed. This Act provided that
"in all acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person' may
extend and be applied to bodies politic a.nd corporate ... unless the context shows that such words were
intended to be used in a more limited senserJ ." Act of
Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
Municipal corporations in 1871 were included within the
phrase "bodies politic and corporate" 51 and, accordingly, the
"plain meaning" of § 1 is that local government bodies were
to be included within the ambit of the persons who could be
sued under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. Indeed. a Circuit
Judge, writing in 1873 in what is apparently the first reported
See n. 28, supra.
See, e. g., Globe, 777 (Rrn . Shcrm~n); id., at 7r52 (Rrp. Slwllab~rgrr) ("rount.ic~. ritirs, and corporations of all sorto:, after ~rraxs of
judicial conflict, haw brcomr thormw:hly r'='tnbli ~ hrcl to br nn indi1•idual or
person or entity of thr prrmnal rxistcncr. of whirh, ns n. citir,rn, indi,·iclunl, or inhabitant., thr United RtntrR Constitntion does tnke note anr! rndow
with farult~· to sur nnd br ~urd in thr courts of tlw Unitrd Stntcs.").
51 See Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Parle, 18 F. Cas . 393, 394
(CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,336); 2 Kent's Commentarirs ·*278--x-279 (12th
0. W. Holmes eel. 1R78). R0c [dso United Stat('S v. Maw-ir:c , 2 Brock. 96,
109 (CC Va. 1823) (l\far~hall. C ..T.) ("The Unitrd States is n govrrnmrnt,
and, ronscqnently, n boclr pol it ir and corporate"); Briof for Prtitioncr in
Monroe v. Pape, 0. T. HJ60, No. 30. App'R. D and E (collrrtinr.; Rtnte
stntntrs which, in 1871, drfinccl municipal corporations a~ bodirs politic
and corp0rate).
49

50
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case under § 1, read the Dictiona.ry Act in precisely this way
in a case involving a corporate plaintiff and a municipal
defendant. 52 See Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,
18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,336). 5 ''
II

Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend
"~'The rourt also noted that tlwre was no diRrcrnible reason why persons
injmrcl by municipal corporniion,Q shonld not be able to recover. See 18
F. C:~s., at 394.
"''In considering ihc effrct of the Act of Feb. 25, 1871 in Monroe, howr\·cr . .Tustir<' Dom~h~. appn rently foru~ing on the word "may," sta,ted: "thiR
drfinition [of person] is merely an allowable, not a mandatory, one." 365
U. S., at 191. A review of the legislative history of the Dictionary Act
shows tllis conclusion to be incorrect.
There is no express reference in the legislative history to the definition of
pen,on, but Senator Trumbull, the Act's sponsor, discusRrd thP phrase
"words importing the masculine gender may be applird to females,"
( Pmphnsis addrd), which immectiately precedes tho definition o.f person, and
l"tatcd:
"The only objrct. r of ihe Act l is to get riel of a great de:tl of Yerbosity
in our statutes by providing that when the words 'he' is user! it shall
includ<' fem11lcs as well as mllles[] ." Congressional Globe, 41st Cong., 3d
Sess., 77.5 (.Tan. 27, 1871) (emphasis a.clded).
Thus, in Trumbull's view the word "may" meant "shall." Such a mandatory URC of the extended mmJJings of the worcls definrd by iho Act
i:l also required for it to perform its inLeuded fnncLion-to be a guide
to "rules of construction" of Acts of Congress. See id., a.t 775 (Remarks
of Sen. Trumbull). Were the defined words "a.llowabie, rbut.] not mandatory" constructions, as Monroe suggests, there would be no "rules" at all.
Instead, Congress must have intended the definitions of the Art to apply
across-the-board exrept where the Act Qy its Lerms called for a. dcvia,tion
from this practicc-"[whrrc] ihe context shows that rdefinedl words
were to he u~ed in a more limited sense." Certainly ihis is how the
Northwestern Fertilizing court viewed the matter. Since there is nothing
in the "context" of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act rnlling for n restricted
interpretation of the word "person," the language of that section should
prima facie be construed to include "bodies politic" among the entities that
could be sued.
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municipalities and other local government units to be in luded
among those persons to whom ~ 1983 applies. 5 " Local overning bodies, therefore. can be Rurd dirrctly under . 983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief t least in those
situa.tions where as hrre the action of tho m mc1pn 1ty that is
alleged to be unc;-gtitut im1al implements or executes a' holic
s a em_; m , <[._ man_2_e, regulation. or ecision officially adopted
and promulgated '!2.;y that body's officers. Moreover, since the
to;-ichst~e-;Rhe ~ 1983 action ag;inst a government body is
an allegation that official policy or official action is to blame
for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution,
unwritten practices or 'predilection ~ whi.ch have by forcC' of
time and consistent application m!ystalizcd into official policy
can also, on an appropriate' factual showi.ng/r. provide a basis
There is certainly no constitutional impediment to surh liabilit~· "The
Tenth Amcnclmrnt's rr~rrvation of nrmdrlrgat.od powrrR to thr Statr~ i~ nol
impliented by n fr-drrnl-romt judgment rnforcing 1he rxprcH~ prohibit ionfl of
unla.wful state conduct rnnrt rd by thr Fourtcrnth Amrndment ." Milliken
v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 207, 291 (1977); r;ee Ex parte Virginia. 100 U. S.
339, 34 7-348 (1880). For 1his reason, National Len.gue o Cities v. Usury,
426 U.S. 83/l (1976), is irrclrvant. to our rons1 crat10n of thi~ rasr. (Nor
iR thrrc anv basi~ for conclndin"' thnt thr EJc,nenth AmrnrlrnrPt i~ a l:iar to
sue
y.
rc, e. g., '1tzpatnc c v. 1 zer,
. , . 44o, 456 (1976);
Lincoln Co y v. Luning, 138 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). Our holding today
is, howevrr, limited to local governmrnt units which arr not con~idcred
part, of the State for~lev~cndment p urposrs. Where this is not
t llc ca~e, "2il"Jma:;-v. "Jo;'aan, 415'"tl . S":1r5t ~1!f74) , nnd Milliken v. Bmdley,
s1~pra, govern the framework for analysis.
55
Given the vnriety of ways that official policy may be clrmon~tratcd, we
do not today attempt to cstnbli8h any firm guidelines for dctrrmining whrn
individunl action cxecutC's or impll'rnents official policy. HoweYCr, given
our conrlm:ion infra thnt Congress did not intcnd to enact a rrgime of
virariouH liability, ilmt wha1C'\'N official nrtion is involvrd mu:;;t hC' ~nffi
ricnt to support a conclu~ion thnt, n. local government it~elf is to hlamo
or i~ at fault.
Po rexa~ple, in Rizzo "· Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), we rrcognized
tha.t. f~t is a cmeial factor in determining whether relief may run against
a party for its alleged participntion in a constitutional tort. Distingui8hing
54
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for suit against a local government. See A ickes v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167- 169 (1970); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252,264-268 (1977).
This conclusion is obviously at odds with some of our
previous decisions. Therefore, we now consider to what extent
previous holdin @:::~ be limited or ov;:ruled.

A
Only one of our cases, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S.
507 (1973), dealt with a situation in which there was an
allegation that official action of a local government was itself
to blame for an alleged violation of constitutional rights. That
the relief approYed by thr lO\\'('r courts in !l.i!zo from that ~anrtioned
by thi;; Court in ;;chool de~q~rr~ation caR<'s, the Court. explained:
"Respondents ... ignore a crit icnl fnrhwl distinction between their case
and thr desegregation caf'es decided by this Court. In the lat,trr, segrr~~
tion imposed by law had bren implrmrnted by state authoritie::; for varying
prriods of time, whereas in 1hr instant. ca~e the Di~trirt Conrt found that
the responsible authorities had played no nffirmntin' pnrt in drprivin~ any
m<'mhers o1 th e two m;pon d<'nt rln~s('R of an:v romhttifional ri~hts. Tho.•e
against whom injunctive rplief \\'1\fi dirertPd in rnses RUCh ns Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Ed?tcation. 402 U. S. 1 (1971),] m d
Brown fv. Board of EduraLion. 347 U.S. 4R3 (1954),] were not administrators and school bonrd members who had in their Pmploy a ~mnll number
of inrlividualR, which lattPr on their own deprived blnrlc st udents of their
constitutional rights to a unitnry srhool sy;;tern. They were nclministrntors
nnd school board members who werr found by tlwir own conduct, in the
administration of the school systrm to hnn denied thosr rights. Herr, the
District. Court found that none of the petitionrrs bnd drprived the
rr;;pondent cln~scs of any ri~hts ;;rrurrd under lhr Con ~ titution. 423 U.S.,
n t. 377 ( emphnsis in original) .

r

However, lwd there been an a ll r~a t,ion and showing th:1t the Mayor of
Philadelphia or the Polire Commis.<>ioner had ronRciou~ly disregnrded steps
t.hnt. mi~ht havr been taken to Rtop uncon~titutional police brutality, d.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-1015 (1976) , or, indeed , a ~howin~ that
RIICh offirinls had npproved or abetted surh brutality as officinl poliry, a.
ra~e for § 198:3 relief ngainst the~e officials and the city might have been
made out.
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allegation was that the city of Kenosha and other Wisconsin
cities had, by city council vote pursuant to state authorizing
legislation, denied liquor licenses to taverns which featured
nude dancing, in violation of both the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amelldment as
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See 412 U. S., at 508; App .. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 0. T.
1972, No. 72--658, p. 11. Under a proper a.nalysis of the
lC'gislative history of ~ 1983, the allegation in City of Kenosha
is sufficient to support a ca.usc of action against the various
cities who were defendants in that case. 56 Since City of
Kenosha is flatly inconsistent with the correct construction of
~ 1983, it is hereby overrulec1." 7
Of course, plaintiffs in City of Kenosha might, not. h:we won on the
mrrits. Cf. California v. LaRue. 409 U.S. 109 (1972). Nonethcle~~. thrre
ir;; no ~uggostion in the pleadings that thr constitutional violations 11llegC'd
were so insubstantial that juriRdir1ion would have bC'en larking. Cf. Bell v.
Ilond, ~27 U. S. 678 (1946): Mt. Ilealthy City Board of Ed . v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274,279 (1977).
7
fi Although "·e havr from timC' to time intim:~ted th:~t stare decisis has
more force in statutory :malysi:;; than in ronRtitut ional acljudiration, sec,
e. (! .. Edelman v. Jordan. S1l])ra. n. 54, at fl71, and n. 14. wr hnYr nrvrr
applied that dortrine mrrhanirall~· to prohibit o1·erruling our rarlier
rrronC'ou,: opinionR dC'trrmining tbr mrnning of st.atuteR. Srr , e. (! .• Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Su/?•ania Inc .. 4~3 U. S. 36, 47-49 (1977);
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas ro .. 2R!5 U. S. 39~, 400 n. 1 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dii:SC'nting) (rollrrting rase~). Nor is this n cn~e whrrc we
should "place on the shouldrrn of CongrC'f'S thr hurdcn of the Court's own
error." Giroum·d v. United States, 328 U. S. Gl, 70 (1940). Sinrc the
modern revival of § 198~ in Monroe v. Pape, we have taken it. upon onrRr!ws, without guidance from Congrr~~. to conQtrur the brond lnngu:1gf' of
§ 19. 3 in light, of its histor~·. rC'nson, and purpoRr. SeC'. e. g., Pierson v.
Rau, 3il6 U.S. 547 (1907): Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974). If
we were justified in tre::~ting § 19R~ in thitl way without ~reking rongres,:ional guidance--and nothing f'uggC'sts thnt we were not or that CongrCRs
\YOu!d have us do othcnl'i~e--we arc cqtwlly ju~tifird in correcting our own
mistakes, cf. United States v. Reliable 'l'ran~fr'r Co., Inc., 421 U. S. 397,
400 (1975), csprcially whrre a;;; herr our mi:;takcn int{'rprctation of§ 1983
limits Congress' undrniablc and princip:1l purpose of creating a civil rrmcdy
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B

Despite our conclusion that !If on roe v. Pape, supra., incorrectly held that cities ran never he subjected to ~ 1983liability,
the judgment in Monroe need not be questioned. The only
issue terore the C'OurtG tF"nt
was whether municipalities
could be held liable on a respondPat superior theory-by which
,\·as appa.rcntly meant (and which we now usc to mean)
liability imposed on employers without regard to their fault or
blame-for the torts of thc'ITcmp1oyees. 58 And we shall now
explain. Monroe was correct insofar as it held that Con gr_css ~
did not intend municipalities to be held vicariously liable on
such a t1ie0rY.'!rn- We ~);gin with the language of ~ 1983 as passed:
"[A lny person who, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation. custom, or usage of any State, shall

case

for constitutional violations. Cf. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 2:35, 241 (1970).
58 Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted in di~~ent in Monro!' that the complaint
alle)!Cd that "it is the cuo;tom of the rchicago Police] Dep~rtment to arrest
and conftne individuals for prolonged period<> on 'open' chnr!l:C'S for interrogation, with the purpose of inducing incriminating stntrmrnts, exhibiting
itR prisonrrs for identification, holding them incommunicado while police
oiJirers investigate their activities, and punishing thrm by impri~omncnt
without judicial trial." 365 U. S., at 204. While this allegation rould be
liberally constmed to enrompaf:s an allegation that tho cu~tom of the
Police Department had cry:>t:tllized into its official policy, the plaintiffs in
Monroe did not so interpret their own complaint. Instead, they proceeded
on a respondeat superior theory in tclw District Court, ~ec App., Monroe v.
Pape, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. :30, in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, see id., at 31-32, and in this Court, see Brief for Petitioner,
Momoe v. Pape, 0. T. 1960, No. :39, pp. 21-22.
50 Our decision in Moor v. County of Alameda, supra. n. 7, ::;t:mds on the
mmo footing- as our decision regarding municipal liabili ly in Monroe, since
the only quc~iion in Moor as in Monroe was whether the county was liable
under a respondeat superior theory for tho torts of its police oiJicers.
Nothing wo say today afferts tho conclusion reached in Moor, sec 411 U.S.,
at 703-704, that 42 U. S. C. § 1988 cannot be uoed to create a federal cause
of action where § 1983 does not otherwise provide one.

r
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subject, or cause to be subjected, any person ... to the
deprivation of a.ny rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution of the United ~·Hates, shall. n.ny such
law, statuk, ordinance. regulation. custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the
party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . . " Globe App., at 335
(emphasis added).
The italicized language plainly imposes liability on a government body that, under color of some official policy, "causes" an
employee to violate another's constitutional rights. At the
same time, that language cannot be easily read to impose
l~biliiy vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of
t1le"existence oT an employer-employee relationship with a
tortfeasor. Indeed, the fact that Congress did specifically
provide that A's tort bf'ca.me B's liability if B cavsC'd A to
subject another to a tortious act suggests that Congress did not
intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation n·as
absent. 60
60 Support, for Rnch n conrlu~ion can be found in the legi~lntive history.
As we have indicated, there is virtnnlly no di~f'USSion or § 1 or the Civil
TiightH Act. Again, howrw·r, C'ongrrss' tre~1lmrnt of the Slwrmnn nmendmcnt gives a clue to whetlwr it would htwe de~irrd to imposr respondeat
superior liability.
Certninly the Sherman amrndment went. Yery far toward imposing
vicarious liability on a community for the tortiouF< or criminal conduct of
Rome of its citizens. Nonethrle;;s, it is important. to recognizr that the
leg.1l basis for such li3bility was not Pome sort of respondeat superior theory
but. ~ t ~the J,Jart of the_community in its exercise of its peace-keeping
powers:1j()flii'Tor Sherman, for example, de~rribed tile purpose of his
amendment in terms of negligent or \vilfull failure to keep the peace. See
Globe., at 761. See also Globe, at. 756 (municipalities are liable if "they
fail to perform the duty or protection") (Sen. Edmunds); id., 3t 751-752
(duty to provide protection limited to tho~e cases in which a riot was
"committed tumultuously in the fnce of the community" :md where community was guilty of "negl-ect." of its duty to protect). But, as we ha.v£>
already noted, sre p. 8, supra, Sherman's amendment was poorly drafted
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Equally important, creation of a federal law of respondeat
superior where state law did not impose such an obligation
would raise all the constitutional problems associated with the
obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress chose not
to impose because it thought such an obligation unconstitutional. To this day, there is no agreed basis for imposing
vicarious liability on an employer for the torts of an employee
when the employer is not at fault for negligent hiring, improper
training, or inadequate control or direction of his employees. 61
See W. Prosser, Law of Torts, § 69, at 459 (4th ed. 1971).
Nonetheless, 1wo justifications tend to stand out. First is the
commonsense notion that no matter how blameless an employer appears to be in an individual case, accidents might
nonetheless be reduced if employers had to bear the cost of
accidents. See, e. g., ibid.; 2 F. Harper & F. James. The Law
and many congres~mrn ~pokr against it. not. only on constitutional grounds,
buL also becnnse, as drnftrd , it. impo~rd a form of strict or vicnrions liability
on the citizens of an affrrtrd community. See Globe, at 761 (Sen.
Stevens); id, at 771 (Sen. Tlmnnan); id., at 788 (Rep. Kerr); id .. at 791
(Rep. Willard). WhilP the first conferpnce substitute was rPjrcted principnlly on constitutional grounds. iL is plain from thP text of the second
confrrenco substitute, sro Appendix. infra, at-, which was E'nn.rted ns § 6
of tho 1871 Act and is now codifird as 42 U.S. C. § 1986, thnt a. majority of
Congress rejeet•ed strict liability eVf'n whilr nrcrpting the bnsic principle
thnt the inhabitants of a community were bow1d to providt' aid to the
targets of Kn Klux violence if thry wrrc nwnre of impending violence and
had tho power to intervene. St rict\~r s[waking, of cour:::e, the fact that
Congr~s refused to impo~r vicnrious li ability on a. community for the
wrongs of a few private ritizrns dors not. ronclu~ively rstnblish that it
would similarly haVf' rrfused to impoRe respondeat supe11·or liability.
NonethelC':'s, when this hiRtory is combined with tho absence of any
language in § 1983 which can ca-=;ily be construed to crente respondeat
superior liability, the inference that Congress did not intend to impose
vicarious liability is quite stron!<.
61 Whrrr there is fault in hiring, training, or direction, that fnult is the
bnRiR for liability under thr common law, sec 2 F. Harper & F . .James, The
Lnw of Tort.:o , § 26.1, at 1362-1363 (1956), not the fault of the cmployeetortfeasor vicariou~ly applied to the Pmployer .
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of Torts,§ 26.3, at 1368-1369 (1956). Second is the argument
that the cost of accidents should be spread to the community
as a whole on an insurance theory. See, e. g., id:, ~ 26.5; W.
Prosser, supm, at 459.
The first justification is of the same sort that was offered for
the Sherman amendment: "The obligation to make compensation for injury resulting from riot is, by arbitrary enactment of
statutes, affirmatory law, and the reason of passing the statute
is to secure a more perfect police regulation." Globe, at 777
(Sen. Frelinghuysen). This justification was obviously insufficient to sustain the amendment against constitutional attack
and there is no reason to suppose that a more general liability
imposed for a similar reason would have been thought less
constitutionally objectionable. The second justification was
similarly put forward as a justification for the Sherman
amendment: "we do not look upon [the Sherman amendment]
as a punishment . . . . It is a mutual insurance." !d., at
702 (Rep. Butler). Again, this justification was insufficient
to sustain the amendment and, indeed, it would appear to be
objectionable not only on Prigg-Dennison-Day grounds but
also on the ground that the Constitution nowhere creates a
right to insurance. 62

c
Finally, it is necessary to comment briefly on our decision in
Aldin(J!r v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). There we held that
pendent party j uriscTiction predicated on 28 U.S. C. ~ 1343 (3),
the jurisdictional counterpart of § 1983, would be inconsistent
62

A third justification, often cited but which on examinntion is insufficient to justify the doctrine of respondeat s1tperior, see, e. g., 2 F. H arper &
F . James, supra, n. 61, § 26.3, is that liability follows the right to rontrol
the actions of a tortfeasor. By our deri~ion in Rizzo v. Goode, supm,
n. 5,5, we would appear to bave derided that the mere right to control
without any control or direction haviug been exercif'ed and without any
failure to supervise is not enough to support § 1983 liability. Sor 423
U. S., at 370-371.
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with Congress' refusal to create a cause of action against local
governments. Sec 427 U. S., at 16-17. Our conclusion today
that Congress did indeed intend to create a. cause of action
against such governments is squa.rely inconsistent wjth the
ra,t?'o decidendi of ~ ldi r!JJ._('r. Moreover, although we today
conclude that <fon!!ress did not impose respondeat superior
liability on local governments. the legislative history of the
Civil Ri hts Act evinces no congressional hostility to federal
n ee ,
court enforcement o sta c- aw c a1ms.
history iS to t he contrary. Scr p. 20, supra.
Accordingly, we conclude that the question of pendent party
jurisdiction decided in Aldinger, supra, and not before us here,
must now be considered open for re-examination in an
appropriate case.

III
Given our conclusion that local government bodies can be
sued directly unrler ~ 1983 for all forms of relief, there remains
the quflRtion what official immunity these bodie;are entitled
to. O.&Jousl.Y. municipal entities cannot be entitled to an
absolute immunity, lest our decision that ~uch bodies are
suh.i('ct to suit under ~ 1983 "be drained of m('aning." Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232. 248 (1974). Moreover, a grant of
absolute immnnity to local government bodies sued for inflictin~ constitutional deprivations is not warranted under the
approach we have consistently taken in determining whether
and to what extent a given type of defendant is entitled to
immunity in a ~ 1983 action-namely "a considered inquiry
into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at
common law and the interests behind it," Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U. S. 400, 421 (1976). Although th;-co-mmon law once
afforded municipal bodies immunity in the performance of
their "governmental'' functions,n:l this doctrine has not received
t.hc repeated and consistent approval given the principle of
(;:l

See E. McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 53.24 (:3d rev. cd. 1977).

~
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judicial and quasi-judicial imnmnity,C·' but instead "[flor \vell
over a century ... has been subjected to vigorous criticism,"
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 984 (4th eel. 1971).e5
Indeed, this Court has described the tenet of absolute municipal immunity for the performance of governmental functions
as "a rule of law that is inherently unsound." Indian Towing
Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955). Dissatisfa.ction
with the rule has resulted in "a minor avalanche of decisions
repudiating municipal immunity," W. Prosser, supra, a.t 985,
as a consequence of which
"the majority rule appeaJ's to be, that in the absence of a
statute granting immunity, a municipality is liable for its
negligence in the same manner as a. private person or
corporation. The common-law doctrine of sovereign or
governnwnta.l immunity once asserted by the city. as a
defense in actions against it based on tort, wonlcl appear
to obtain in this country only in a minority of states."
E. McQuillin, Mun icipal Corporations § 53.02 at 104 (3d
rev. eel. 1977) (footnotes omitted).
At present, it appears that no more than 11 States continue
strictly to adhere to the old common-Jaw rule. SeeP. Harley
& B. Wasinger, Government Immunity: Despotic Mantle
Stump v. Sparkman, U. S. - - (No. 76-1750, March 28, 1078);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872); Randall v. Brigham, 7
Wall. 523 ( 1869) .
65 "The sovereign or governmentrd immunity doctrine, holding that the
state, its subdivisions m1d municipal entities, may not be hrld liable for
tort.ious acts, was never completely aceepted by the courts, its underlying
principle being deemed contrary to the basic concept of the law of to-rts
tha.t liability follows negligence, as well as foreign to the spirit of the
constitutiona.l guarantee that every person is entitled to n. legal remedy for
injuries he may receive in his person or property. As a result, the trend
of judicial decisions was ahvays to restrict, rather than to expand, the
doctrine of municipal immunity." E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations
~ 53.02 at 104 (3d rev. ed. 1977) (footnotes omitted).
64
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or Creature of Necessity, 16 Washburn L. Rev. 12, 34-53
(1976). What sapped vitality remains of the largely repudiated common-law rule of absolute municipal immunity provides a clearly inadequate basisTor adopting that rule in the
§ 1983 context in the face of our determination that Congress
intended to allow § 1983 suits directly against municipal
bodies.
Since the question of the nature of officia.l immunity to be
afforded local government bodies has been neither extensively
briefed by the parties nor addressed by the courts below, we
express no views n its scope beyond holding that municipal
bo 1es sued under§ 1983 are not entitled to absolute immunity.
Cf. Bivens v. Si."C Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
389. 397-398 (1971).

-

IV
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is
Reversed.
APPENDIX
As proposed, the Sherman amendment was as follows:
"That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building,
barn, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; and if such offense was committed to
deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to
deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by
reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or
parish in which any of the said offenses shall be com-
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, mitted shall be liable to pay full compensation to the
person or persons damnified by such offense if living, or to
his widow or legal representative if dead; a.nd such compensation may be recovered by such person or his representative by a suit in any court of the United States of
competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense
was committed, to be in the name of the person injured,
or his legal representative, and against said county, city,
or parish. And execution may be issued on a judgment
rendered in such suit and may be levied upon any property, real or personal. of any person in said county, city,
or parish, and the said county, city, or parish may recover
the full amount of such judgment, costs, and interest,
from any person or persons engaged as principle or
accessory in such riot in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction." Globe. at 663.
The complete text of the first conference substitute for the
Sherman amendment is:
"That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop. building,
barn , or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed. wholly or in
part, by any persons riotously ancl tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with
force and violence be whipped. scourged, wounded, or
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, with intent to deprive any person of any
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for
exercising such right. or by reason of his race, color, or
previous conditions of servitude, in every such casr the
county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses
shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such offense, if
living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead; and

)
/
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such compensation may be recovered in an action on the
case by such person or his rcprcsenta.tive in any court of
the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district
in which the offense was committed, such action to be in
the name of the person injured, or his legal representative,
and against said county, city, or pa.rish; and in which
action any of the parties committing such acts may be
joined as defendants. And any payment of any judgment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plaintiff in such action, may, if not satisfied by the individual
defendant therein within two months next after the '
recovery of such judgment upon execution duly issued
against such individual defendant in such judgment, and
returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, be enforced )
against such county, city, or parish, by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding
in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of
judgments against municipal corporations; and such judgment shall be a lien as well upon all moneys in the
treasury of such county, city, or pa.rish , as upon the other
property thereof. And the court in any such action may
on motion cause additional parties to be made therein
prior to issue joined, to the end that justice may be done.
And the said county, city, or parish may recover the
full amount of such judgment, by it paid, with costs and
interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal
or accessory in such riot, in an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish,
so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plaintiff's
rights under such judgment." Globe, at 749 and 755.
The relevant text of the second conference substitute for the
Sherman amendment is as follows:
"r A lny person or persons, having knowledge that any of
the wrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in the
second section of this act are about to be committed, and
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having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same,
shall neglect or refuse so to do, a.nd such wrongful act
shall be committed, such person or persons shall be liable
to the person injured, or his legal representative." Globe,
at 804 (emphasis added).
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~ frt~ Petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department
rt.,.,_ ~..... ,. .._

of Social Services and the Board of Education of tlw City of

~-c.~
.J: ew York, commenced tltis action under 42 U.S. C.~ 1983

He •. _ o

_ J~ \ 971. 1 The gravamen of the complaint was that the

., ~ '

oa~ the Department had as a matter of official policy
pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of
w~u ~ absence before such leaves were required for nwdiral reasons. 2
comp~llrd

1/-.

~

1 The romphint was amrnctcd on Srptcmbcr 14, 1972 to allegra rlaim
undrr Title VII of the 1954 Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U. Fl. C.
~
§ 2000e (1970 ed., Supp. V). The District Court held thnL the Hl72
~
amendments to Title VII did not apply retroartively to di•<erim111ation
~•••U~C~
suffered prior to those nmendmrnl~ eYen when an artion challenging ~uch
.J_
7':.,.
prior di~crimination was pending on the date of the amendments . :394
P'O ~ C..~
F. Snpp. 853, 856 (SDNY 1975). This holding was alfirm"d on appeal.
~~~~ ..JIL~.
532 F. 2d 259, 261-262 (CA2 1976). Althongh petiliourr~ sought certiorari on the Tit le VII issue ns well as the § 1983 claim, we rc.'•ricted
~
~ my grant of certiorari to thr la1ter is,.ue. 429 U.S. 1071.
11
- I ~ ~he plaintiff~ allNSed that the rity had a ritywide policy of forcing
~
A_
. " women to take maternity lea\'(' after the fifth month of prrgnaucy.
~ ....c.caA""""- Amended Complaint ~ .28, .App. 13-14. The ddm1d mts did nol deny this,
~
but stated that this policy had been rhnn~ed after suit was instituted.
Answer ~ 13, App. 32-33. The plaintiffs furthrr allrged th:1t tlw Bonrd
J- 'Ja'
,. _
"
~\l' polir~eq~
i
women lo tnke maternit)' leave aftrr the ::;ryenth
""0
.C •~•·K1th 01 peg n-: 11 r~s that month fell in the last month of the school
year, in which cnse the teneher ro11ld r<'muin t hrough the end of lhc ~f'hool
term. Amended Complaint
39, 42, 45, App. 18-19, 21. This allegation was denied. Answer 1117, 18, App. 35.
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Cf. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632
(1974). The suit sought injunctive relief and backpay for

periods of unlawful forced leave. Named a.s defendants in the
action were the Department and its Commissioner, the Board
and its Chancellor, and the city of Now York and .its Ma.yor.
In each casr, the individual defendants were sued solely in
their official capacitics. 3
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court
for the Southern District of Nc'v York held moot petitioners'
cla..ims for injunctive and drclaratory relief since the city of
New York and the Board, after the filing of the complaint, had
changrd their policies relating to maternity leaves so that no
11regnant employer would have to take leave unless she was
medically unable to continue to perform her job. 394 F.
Rupp. 853, 855. No one now challenges this conclusion. The
court did concludr. howrvcr. that the acts complained of
were unconstitutional undPr LaFleur, SUJJra. ::394 F. Sup]).,
at 8fl.). Noncthclrsfl plaintiff'fl prayers for backpay were
dr:niC'd hPcan::;e anv such damages would come ultimately from
tlw city of New York and. thrrefore, to hold otherwise would
lw to "circumvrnt" the immunity conferrrd on municipalities
h y M onror v. Papc, 36fl r. R. 167 (] 961). Sec 394 F. Supp. ,
at R55.
On appeal, prtitionrrs rrne"·ecl their arguments that the
Board of Education 4 was not a "municipality" within the
meaning of 111 onroe v. Pape, supra, and that, in any event, the
District Court had rrrrd in barring a damage award against
the individual defenclan ts. The C'ourt of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rejrctecl both contentions, however. The court
first held that the Board of Education was not a person under
~ 1983 because "it performs a vita] governmental function ... ,
and, significantly, whiJr it has the right to determine how the

,r

a Amrnd rd Complaint
24, App. 11-12.
• Pctitionrrs ronccdrd thnt thr Drpnrtmcnt of Roci:tl Scn·ircs rnjoy~ thr
same status as New York City for Monro e purpos~. Sec 532 F. 2d , at
263 .

t.....~ H.-.-
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funds appropriated to it shall be spent . . . , it has no final ~.• JL~
say in deciding what its appropriations sha.ll be." 532 F. 2d
259, 263 (1976). The individual defendants, however, were
"persons" under ~ 1983, even when sued solely in their official
capacities. I d., at 264. Yet, because a damage award would
"have to be paid by a city that was held not to be amenable
to such an action in Monroe v. Pape," a damage action against 4......, ....,_, c.A. vr.
officials sued in their official capacities could not proceed. I d., ~.,.(~
• at 265.
;.~.,;~
I

~;.:4-

~

~··~4b.-;J\

Our grant of certiorari in this case, 429 U. S. 1071. Vi'as ~ ~_qt.
limited to the question:
~~Col ~~ --- • - ...
"Whether local p;m·ernmcntal officials and/ or local inde,...~
51
pendent r school boards arc "persons" within the meaning ~ c...l Jtc.c..:.,
of 42 U. S. C'. ~ HJ83 when NFlitable relief in the nature ~ ~
~ Contrury to prtitionen;' char:l.Ctrrization of 1hP Board's Ft:11ns, the
appeal" rourt i'uggei'1rd thnt thr Board is not in fflrt. indcprndrnt. See
532 F. 2rl. nt 263-2()4. The fnrlnnl h:JI'i~ for t.hil' ronrlm:ion iR not
nppnrrnt-the i"umm:1rv jurlgmrnt mo1ions did not nrldrri'~ thr i~~uP. If,
ns I suggr~t. wr overml•r Monroe. t.hc drprndrn1/inrlrprnrlrnl di ~ tinrtion
makes no diffrrcnrr. If, howc\'Pr. we do not O\'ern1lc Monroe. hut mrrely
limit. its rerrrh short of !'<chool hoards, \\'e will be frrred with 1hr farturrl and
legal qurrgmire of distin~ui~hing betwrrn Yarious typrs of school ho:-~rds.
Indeed , one of the hr~1 re;l.~ons to O\'rrrule Monro!! outright i~ to avoid
having to mrrke such di~t inrtions.
1 frankly do 110t undPr~t nnd Bill'~ 8U ,ttgr~t ion in Part Ill-:\ of hi'
mpmnmnrlum that somr ol'l10ol board~ mny he simpl:v· :1ggrrgat ion~ of
indh·idllrrls with no r·0rporat" exio;;trnrr. I know of no suf'h r;1~r :Jll(!
wmtlrl i'Uppose that, if it r'\i"ts, 1hrn 1he indi1·irhwls mu~l i'1ill hr ~mnr
sort of strrte offirerl' :111d 1hr bo:ncl :1 st :!1 P ngenry. Tn cit hrr ra~r. suf'h
a hybrid lc~nl rnti1y II'Ollid be n. nonpet·son 11ndrr Mo117'oe's theory of
~ l!) .q~ sinre 1hr dch:~lrs !ll'P \ ' C'l')' denr 1hal thr ron~titution;tl infirmity
perrci\·ed in the Shrrman Amrndmrnt ran to all i'tntr inst111ment;1litirs,
rcgardles-=; of lr:z;:-~1 fonn. See infra. :1t pp.~ . .).fr.}.'f
In any ea~r , I agree with Hi111h:-~t wr shoultl not :~tlempt to di~tinguish
hct WCf'n those types of board that may br sued and those that m:1y not.
In my judgment, however, thi~-; argues for allowing :11! hoards to hr ~urrl.
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of back r>!LY is sought against them in their official
capacitic;?l' Pet.. at 8.
For analytic purpoSC'f', thiR question is best considered as two:
1. Whether local indepf'ndent school boards are "persons" within the rnC'aning of§ 1983?
2. If local indepcnd<>nt school boards are not such persons, what actions against officials in their official capacities will be considNcd actions against the school board
"in fact" (if any) with tlw result that such actions are also
barred hy Monroe v. Pape, supra?

IY

Obviously, if we hold that independent school boards may be
suC'd in their corporate names under § 1983, tlwre is 110 need
to reach the SC'conrl question. If, however. we hold that school
boards may not be sued in their corporate names, then we
must grapple with the f!UC'stion whether school officials can
be Stled only in their personal capacities or whether it is
possible to adopt the theory of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
6!'il (1973). and Milliken v. Bradley,- U. S . - (1977)
(Milliken II), or possibly some other theory. to allow a
bifurcation between equitable and declaratory relief, on the
one hand, and damage actions on the other.
Before addressing the first qurstion, it is important to note
that the decisi.Q.n on thr first question logically determines the
answer to the §Qrond.
Monroe stands for the principle that this Court is bound
to recognize any limitations however archaic or erroneous put
on § 1983 by the Congress that enacted it. As a matter of
logic, this view of our function in § 1983 cases cannot be made
to vary with the type of relief sought in a particular § 1983
suit. Nor is there anything "in the legislative history discussed in Monroe, or in the language actually used by Congress, [which suggests] that the generic word 1person' in § 1983
was intended to have a bifurcated application to municipal
corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought

I
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against them." ° City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513
( Hl73). Moreov0r. tlw "historic construction" theory is
apparently to be maintain0d even though we now know what
M omoe ( 0rroneously. src Part II, infra) says the 1871 CongrC'SS did not kno'": That Congress has plenary constitutional
power-unlimited by tlw Tenth Amendment. sec Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U. S. 330. 347-348 (1880); Milliken v. Bradley,
ngainst state and local governments under § 5 of the Four~- U. S. - , (Hl77) (Milliken II) 1-to authorize suits
against state and local govNnmcnts under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
hi~tory or l:mgnagr of § Hl~~
that Rurh a bifurrat ion ran be arhieYed simply h~· rrdrn ft ing a
complaint to name official" in their official capacity rathrr than thr rorporntc rntity of which thr? rtrr official~.
1 "Fin:tlly, there is no mrrit to the petitioners' cl:lim~ ilwt thr rrlicf
ordrred here ,·iolntr'l tlw Trn t h Amrndmrnt and grnPral prinriplrs of
f<'drralism. The Tenth Amrndmrnt'~ rr~rn·at ion of nondrlrg:1trd powrrs
to the Statrs is not impliratrc! hy a frdrral court judgmrnt rnforring the
exprrss prohibitinP.R of unl:nl'fnl ~tate conduct cn:trtrd h~· the Fourteenth
Amendmrnt." 45 U.S. L. W., at 4880.
For this renRon, National League of Citirs v. Usury, 426 U.S. ~:n (1976),
is irrelrvant to our considrra t ion oft his ":lSe.
Nor is thrrr :tny ba~is for r.onrluding that the 1~71 Congrri's had
Ele,·enth Arnendmrnt prohlrms in mind. That Congrc,.:: knr1Y that
municipalitirs were rm1tinrly ~urd in federal courts, f'rr p. 17 and n. 32,
infra. Sec al~o Lincoln C'ou.nty v. Luning. 133 U.S. 529, 580 ( lROO) ("With
regard to the [Eicvcnth Amrndment] objrction, it may he ob.<crYed that
tho records of this court for the la~t. thirty yearR arc full of suits against
counties. . . . [This] juri~dirtion of thr Circuit court:;: i:o beyond question"). In any casr, we now know that, the Eleventh Amendment
rstnblishcs no limits on lcgi~Jation adoptrd under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
"[T]ho Eleyenth Amendment., :tnd the prinriplc of strtte sovereignty
whirh it embodies . . . arr nccr:osarib• lirnit<'d by the rHforcrmrnt provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amt'ndmrnt. . . . We think that C'ongrc~s
may, in drtermining what if' appropriate lrgi~lation for thr pnrpo~e of
enforcing the provisions of the Fonrtrcnt h Amendmrnt, pr01·idr for 11rivatc
suits against States or st.: ttc officials which nrc ron;;titution;tlly impermisHihle in other conte:-.is ." Fitzpat1'ick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976).
0

A fortiori. nothing in thr legishtivr

suggr~ts

I
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Applying the historic construction theory to 1871 practice
in representative capacity actions, it is quite clear that at
least some official capacity suits against municipal officers
would be barred were municipalities "as such" not suable
unrler § 1983. In 1871, official capacity suits against municipal officers were conreptualized as suits against the body corpora.t e of the municipality. Se<', e. (!., Thompson v. United
States, 103 U. S. 480, 483-484 (1881) (citing many cases).
Anrl, while this "subject ... is not free from casuistry because
of the natural, even if unronscious, pressure to escape from
tlw doctrine of sov<'reign immunity," 9 a lawyer of the 1870's
would likely have assunwd that a suit against a.n officialwhethrr or not styled as an official capacity suit-which
"d<'manded relief calling for an assC'rtion of "·hat was unquestionably official authority." 10 was a suit against the government unit of which the officer was an agent. 11
If. th erefore. WC' arr to tak<:- Monroe and City of Kenosha
seriously. relief under § 198R would have to be limite to decbratory relief, amag;<'s against the offi.rcr p<'rsonally, ~nd
that form of injunctivr relief which could be givC'n against an
officer in his personal capacity. However. we have obviously
paid little heC'd to these dictates of Monroe and Kenosha.
Instead, in Edelma.n 12 and in Milliken II, we have felt free
to expand injunctive relief to the limit of the federal courts'
constitutional power as we now undNstand it. But, if Congress in 1871 had any idea at all about tl1e complex problems

-

8nyder v. Buck, 340 1T. R. 1.'5, 2!) (19!i0) (Frnnkfurt<'f . .T .. rli;;.~t'ntin~).
10 Larson v. Domrstic: c~ Fm·!'i(Jn Comm!'rrr Cnr]J., 3:17 U. R. 6R2. 729
9

(Hl49) (AnpPndix to opi11ion of Frnnkfnrter . .T.).
11 Sec ibid. nnd rn>'rR rolll'rt.cd thrrein.
There would appnrPntly have
bern ::t limited CXCP]1t.ion 1o thi" prinriplc for those' in Rtflnr<'s in which
mnndnmu ronld ~ivo nll th<' rcqn<'f'i rd relirf. Rcr Thomp son v. United

States. 103 U .S. 480,485 (1881) .
12 The Court trcnt('d Ed!'lman [lS n

im·olving a right of action
implied under the Constitutim1, but plnintiffR in fact plead § 1983. See
Appendix in No. 72-1410, at 5 (Compl[lint ,f3 (b)) .
r::tR('
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of government immunity from suit, capacity of defendant
parties, and scope of permissible relief, that idea was certainly
not that of Edelman and Milliken II.
The plain thrust of the analysis above is that. were we to
hold school boards exempt from suit under ~ - 1983, we would
as a matter of logic and history overrule many if not all of our
school dese c ation decisions, since virtually aU these cases
~ ate "relief ca11ing or an assertion of what [is] uooues~-7
tionably o.tlic.i~uthotity." Nor can our earlier school board
cases be reconciled by adopting an "Eleventh Amendment
analogy" as suggestrd by the Court of Appcals.'"n The 1871
Con~ress certainly had no Eleventh Amendment analogy in
mind tzb and therefore it would be indulging in anachronistic
brute force for us to adopt such a theory if we arc serious
about maintaining Monroe's "historic understanding" theory
of § 198.1 interpretation. Moreover. even on Bill's. I submit
rrroneous (sec pp. 10- 2q.I 1·n fra). analysis that Congress
did not
impose civil rights liability on local government agencies lest
federal remedies sap limited municipal resourcrs. it is logically ~
impossible to draw a line between damagc.s a.ncl the massive
s§nd§i}f~e!G![]Y:§:nr sc]1ool :cases: fo/ e. g .. busing or
magnet schools. Cf. 20 U. 8. C. ~ 1601 (a) (1970 ed .. Supp.
V) ("Congress finrls that the process of eliminating or preventing minority group isolation and improving the quality of
education for all children often involves the expenditure of
additional funds to which local educational agencies do not
havr access"). Alternatively. if the court below is correct and
we arc in fact free to substitute our prcsrnt views for those of
the 1871 Congress. the justification for this must be that we
interpret § 1983 to be an effort by Congress to exercise the full
of its power under ~ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. On
this view. there is no continued vitality to Monroe, since that
case put the municipal cxrmption exclusively on the ground

---

l 2n

See 5::!2 F. 2d, at 265-266.

12 1>

See P:ut. U, infra. Sec

nl~o

n. 7, supra .
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of legislative history which was said to show that Congress
doubted its constitutional power to put obligations on municipalities. See Part II, infra.
In short, 1 think there is already an clement of "casuistry"
in om ~ 198:3 am'llysis and that we would only compound that
clement if in the future we insist that municipalities, and by
extension school boards, arc exempt from suit while continuing to allow complete injunctive relief in official capacity suits.
Rather than adopt such a course, ~think we would do better
~
to ..recogniz£> what is in fact the case: That Congress in 1871
did indeed intend to create a cause of action against munici-~-~
palities and to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to
;-a·c~.i••(
implement that cause of action. Monroe must, of course. be
overnlled to the extent it holds otherwiSe. '!'his aoes not -He-.
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that municipalitiPs ha\"C' n ddC'nSC' to both clamagC's and
in.i11nctive relief whC'n an officer acts "under color of" its bws
lmt in a way that is in fact unauthorizC'd by thC' mnniripality.

n
In Monroe v. Pa7Je, 36f) U. S. 167. 187 (1961), we held that
"Congress did not nndC'rtnkC' to bring municipal corporations
within the ambit of f~ Hl83l." The solP basis for this conclusion was an illfercmcC' rlra wn from Congrec:s' rcjertion of the
"Sherman a.mC'ndment" to the Civil Rights Act of 1871-the
prC'rursor of ~ 1!)83-which would have hP1d a municipal corporation liable for damage donC' to thC' JWrson or prope-rty of
its inhabitants by private persons "riotously and tmnnltuously assembled." 12 c Cong. Glob<.>. 42d Cong .. 1st Srss .. 749
(1871) (herC'inaftcr "Globe"). Although the RhC'rman
amendment did not seck to amend § 1 of the Art. which is now
~ 1083. a.ncl although tlw nature of the obligation created by
that amendmC'nt wHs vastly different from that created by ~ 1,
we nonetheless ro11cluderl that Congress must have meant to
excludC' municipal corporations from the coverage of § 1
b<"ca.use "the Hous<" fin voting against the amendme1it] had
solemnly dcciclcd that in their judgment Congress had no constitutional pow0r to impose any obligation upon county and
town organizations, thC' mere instrumentality for the administration of st.ate law." 36f) U. S., at 190 ( cm1)hasis added),
quoting Globe, at 804 (remarks of R ep. Poland). This statement. in our view, showed that Congress doubted its "constitutional power ... to impose civil liabilitu on municipalitics." ~6!) U. R.. 2t 190 ( 0mphasis added), and that such doubt
would ha.ve exte-nded to nny type of ciYilliability.13
tzc We expressly declinrd to ronsidrr "policv considerations" for or
Dg~inf<t

muniripal liability. Srr 36.'i U. 8., at. 191.
Mr . .Tustire DouJ!laS. thr author of l'v!onroe, has

RUJ!Q;<'~trd that the
mnniripal exrlusion might more propnrly rrRt on a throry th:1t Conp:re~s
son~J;ht to prev<'nt the finanrial ruin that rivil rights liabilit~· might imposr
on muniripalitirs. Scr City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 lT. S. 507, 517-520
13
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An analysis of debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and
particularly of the case law which each side mustered in its
support, shows, ho\\·ever, that we improperly equated the
"obligation" of which Representative Poland spoke with "civil
liability."
A. An Overview
There are three distinct stages in the legislative consideration of the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
On March 28. 1871, Representative Shellabarger, acting for
a House select commiUee, reported H. R. 320, a bill "to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution and for other purposes." H. R. 320 contained
four sections. Section 1. now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
was the subject of only limitBd debate and was passed without
amendment. 14 Rections 2 t.hrough 4 dealt primarily with the
"other purpose[]" of suppressin~ Ku Klux Klan violence in
the southern States. 1r. The wisdom and constitutionality of
tlwse sections-not § 1, now § 1983-was the subject of almost
all con~ressioanl dPhate and each of these sections was
amendPd. The HOltse finished its initial debates on H. R.
320 on April 7, 1871 and one wC'ek lat0r the Renate also voted
out a bill. 16 Again. debate on § 1 of the bill was limited and
that section was passed as introduced.
( 1973) . However, this view haR ne' rr been shared by the Court, sre
Monroe v. Pape, S11pra. 36.'i U. S., at 190: Moor v. Cmmty of Alamcdn,
411 U. S. 593. 70R (1973), and there i~ not one l'hred of ,:upporf for i his
Yiew in the debat.N>.
H Globf', at. 522.
15 Brirfty, §2 rrf'ated rf'riain federal rrime" in addifon io iho;;e defined
in § 2 of the lR6o Civil Right" Art, 14 Stnt. 27, earh aimed primarily a,t
thr, Ku Klux Klnn. RE>ction 3 provided thnt 1lH' Pre~idrnt rould send tlw
militia into :my St<'ltr wrarked with Klnn Yiolenre. Finall~·. ~ 4 provided
for su,:pen>:ion of the writ of ha hen>: rorpuR in enumerated rircumshwres,
a~ain primarily tho:::e thought to obtain where Klan violenee was rampant.
See Globe App., at. 335-336.
10
Globf', at 709.
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Immediately prior to the vote in the Sena.te, after time for·
discussion had expired, Senator Sherman introduced his·
amendment. 17 I emphasize that this was not an amendment
to ~ 1 of the bill, but was to be added as § 7 at the end of
the bill. Under the Senate rules, no discussion of the amendment was aJlowed and, although attempts were made to
amend the amendment. it was passed as introduced. In this.
form. the amendment did not place liability on the municipal
corporation. but made any inhabitant of the municipality
liable for the damage inflicted by persons "riotously or tumultuously assembled." 18
The House refuf'ecl to acquiesce in a numbC'r of amendments made by the Senate, including the Sherman amendment, and the respective versions of H. R 320 were therefore sen~ to a conference committee. Section 1 of the bill,
however, was not a subject of this conference since. as noted,
it was passed verbatim as introduced in both Houses of
Congress.
On April 18, 1871, the first conference committee completed
its work on H. R. 320. The main features of the conference
rommittee draft of thC' Sherman amendment were these. ~
First. a cause of action was given to persons injured by
"any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled
together. with intent to deprive any person of any right
conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the
United States. or to deter him or punish him for exercising such right. or bv reason of his race, color or previous
condition of servitude .... "
1

See id., at 663, quoted in Apprndix, infm.
Globe, at 663. An nction for recovery of rlnmflgc~ wn~ to he in the
fedrrnl courts and dcnominntcd as n suit rtgninst. tllC' countv , r-it~· . or p:triBh
in whi<'h the damnge had orrnrrecl. Tln:d. Exrrn1 ion of 1hr jnclgmrnt was
not to run against t.he propert~· of thr gonmunrnt nnit, howcYcr, hut
againRt the private property of nny inhnbitnnt. lbid.
19
Sec Globe, at 755, qnoN'cl in Appendix, infra.
17

18
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RC'cond, the act provided that the action would be against
the county. citv, or pari:::h in which the riot had occurred and
that it con]d he maintained by either the person injured or
his legal representative. Fnlike the amendment as proposed,
however, the conferenre :o.nbstitute made the 1-!:0vernment
drfendant Jiable on the judgment if it was not satisfied against
individnal defendants who had committed the vioknce. If
a municipality were liable. the judgment against it could be
collectrd
"by exPrution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment. or
any other proce<>ding in aid of execution or applicable
to th~ enforcemrnt of .iudp.;ments against municipal corporations; anrl such jndgment [would become 1 a lien
as well upon all moneys in the treasury of such connty,
city, or parish, as upon the other property thereof."
In the Pnsuing debate> on thf' first conff'renre report, which
was the first rl<>batc of any kind on the Sherman amendment,
Rf'nator Sherman explainer! that the purpose of his amendm<>nt was to enlist the aid of persons of property in the enforf'cment of the civil rights laws by making their property
"responsible" for Ku Klux Klan damage. 20 Statutes drafted
on a similar theory, hP stated, had long been in force in
England and werf' in force in 1871 in a number of the States. 21
N onetrrless thNe wrre critical differences between the con2 0 "Let the people of proprrty in the southern States undrrstand that if
they will not makr the hur and cry and take the nece~>sa ry steps to put
down lawless violrnee i11 those States their property will be holden rr~pon
sible, and the efTrct will be most wholesome." Globe, at 761.
Senator Sherman was apparrntly unconcemed that the conferCllce committee substilute, unlike the original amendment, did not place liability
for riot damnge directly on the property of t.he well-to-do, but instead
placed it on the local government. Presumably he assumed that taxes
would be le,·ied against the property of the inhabitants to make the loeality
whole.
21 According to Senator Sherman, the law had originally been adopted in
Engl:md immediately after the Norman Conquest ttnd had most recently
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fNence substitute and extant state and English statutes: the
conff'rence substitut0. unlike most state riot statutes, lacked
a short statute of limitations and imposed liability on the governml'nt defendant whether or not it had notice of the impending riot, whether or not the municipality was authorized to
exrrcise a police powf'r, wlwther or not it exrrted all rl'asonablc efforts to stop tlw riot. and whether or not the riokrs
were raught and pun ish eel.
Tn the Senate. opponents. including a. number of Renators
who had voted for § 1 of the hill, criticised the amendment as
an imperfect and impolitic rendering of the state statutes.
Moreover, as drafted. the conferencr substitute' could be
construed to protect rights that were not protected by tbe
C'or>stitution. 2 2 However, their major argument was that the
lien creatrd by the amendment, which would have made it
impossible for a municipality to conduct its normal business,
violated an implicit limit on Congress' pmYer under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Notwithstanding tbese objections,
the Renate voted to adopt the report of the first conference
rommittee.
Debate in the House raised similar points to that in the
Senate. except that House opponent..<;, within whose ranks
were a1Po som<' who had supportrd § 1, were more concerned
with the quec:;tion whether the Federal Government consistent
with the Constitution could obligate municipal corporations to
keep the peace if those corporations were neither so obligated
nor so authori11ed by their state charters. This concern, as
been promnlgatrd as the law of 7 & 8 Geo. IV, rh. :n. SeP Globr, at 760.
During the cour~e of the cteb~ttcs, it appearrd that Kentucky, Maryland,
Masf:achusctts, and New York had similar laws. ~re id., at 751 (Rep.
Shellabarger); id., at 762 (Sen . Steven~on); id., at 771 (Sen. Thunnan);
id., at 791 (Rep. Butler). Snch a municipal liability was apparently
common throughout New England. See id., at 761 (Sen. Sherman).
22
Senator Thmman gave the most complete eri1ique of the conference
substitute, showing that it was Rbominably drafted. See Globr, at 770772.
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will be developed in Part II-B, infra, was simply another facet
of the lien problem discussed in the Senate and is the branch
of the opponents' argument which Representative Poland was
addressing in his statement that is quoted in M onroe. 23
Because the House rejected the first conference report a
SC'cond confrrencr "·as calkd and it duly issued its report.
The second conference substitute for the Sherman amendment
abannoned municipal liability and, instead, made "any person or persons having kno"·kdge [that a conspiracy to violate
civil rights was afoot]. and having power to prevent or aid
in preventing the samC'." '"ho did not attempt to stop the
same, liahle to any person injured by the conspiracy. 2 • The
amendment in this fom1 was adopted by both Houses of Congress and is now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1986.
The meaning of the lPgislative history sketched above can
most readHy be devC'lopC'd by first considering the debate on
the report of the first conference committe<'. This debate
shows conclusively that thC' constitutional objections raised
against the Sherman amC'nnmC'nt would not have prohibited
congressional creation of a civil remedy against state municipal coq)orations that infringed fPderal rights. Because § 1 of
the Civil Rights Act doC's not state expressly that municipal
corporations comC' within its amhit, it is finally necessary to
intC'rprct ~ 1 to confirm that such corporations were indeC'd
intended to be covered.
B. Debate on the First ConfNence Report
The style of argument adopted by both proponents and
om)onents of the Sherman amendment in both Houses of
Congress was largdy that of a lrgal brief, with frequent references to cascs drcided by this Court or by the supreme courts
of the several Statrs. Proponents of the Shennan amendment did not, howevC'r, discuss in dC'ta.il the argument in favor
2 '1
24

Sec 365 U.S., at 190, fluotrd nt p. 9, supra.
See Globe, at 804.
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of its constitutionality. Nonetheless, it is possible to piece
together such an argument from the dcbates on the first conference report and those on § 2 of the civil rights bill, which
because it allowed the Federal Government to prosecute
crimes "in the states" had also raised questions of federal
power. The account of Reprcsentative Shellabarger, the
House sponsor of IT. R. 320. is the most complete.
Shclla.barger began his discussion of § 2 by stating that
"there is a domain of constitutional law involved in the right
consideration of this measure which is wholly unrxplored."
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., at 67 (1871) (hereinafter "Globe App."). There were analogies, however.
Vlith respect to the meaning of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly its Privilcges or Immunities Clause,
Shellabarger relied on thc statcmcnt of Mr. Justice Wa~hing
ton in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 (CCED Pa.
1825), which defined the privileges protected hy Art. TV:
"'What these fundamental privilcges are it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They
may, however, bc all comprehended under the following
gencral heads: protection by the Government';".Ma.rk that" 'protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property
of every kind. and to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety .. .'" C:lobc App .. at 69 (emphasis added), quoting 4 Wash. C. C .. at 380.
Having concludrd that citizens were owed protcction/ 5
2

~ Opponent.!:' of the Rhrrm:m amrndmrnt ngrrrd t.hat both protrction
and equal protcrtion were gnnrantrrd by thr Fomtrrnth Amendmrnt. See
Globe, nt 758 (Sen. Tmmbuii); id .. nt. 772 (Sen. Thmmnn); id .. nt 777
(Sen . Frrlinghuysrn); id .. nt 700 (Rrp. \Vill:ml) . And thr Snprrmr Court
of Tndinnn. hnd so held in giving rfferl to the Civil Right" Art of 1866.
See Smith v. Moodu. 26 Ind. 29!1 (186fl) (following Cm·yell), rC'fC'nrd to in
Globe App., nt 68 (Rep . Shellabarger). Moreo\·er, § 2 of the 1871 Act as
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Shellabarger then considered Congress' role in providing that
protection. Here again there were precccl en ts:
"rCongress has always] assumed to enforce, as against
the States, and also persons, every one of tho provisions
of the Constitution. Most of the provisions of the Constitution which restrain and directly relate to the States,
such as those in rArt. T, § 10,1 relate to the divisions of
the political powers of the State and General Government. . . . These prohibitions upon political powers of
tho States are all of such nature that they can be. and
even have hren, ... enforced by the courts of the United
States declaring void all State acts of encroachment on
Feckral powers. Thus. and thus sufficiently, has the
United States 'rnforcecl' these provisions of the Constitution. But thrre arc some that arc not of this class.
These are where the court secures the rights or thr liabilities of prrsons within the State's, as between such prrsons
and the Stat<:'s.
"These are three: first, that as to fugitives from justice (261 ; second, that as to fugitives from service, (or
slaves (271 ; ) third, that declaring that the 'citiz<'ns of each
passed, unlike § 1. prosecuted persons who violated federal rights whether
or not that violation was under color of official authority, apparently on
the theory that Ku Klux Klan violence wns infringing the right of
protection defined by Coryell.
26 U.S. Canst., Art. IV,§ 2, rl. 2:
"A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on DPmand
of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be deli1·ered
up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of tho Crime."
27 Id., cL 3:
"No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws th ereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation
therein, be discharged from such SerYice or Labor, but shall be deli1·ered
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Sen ire or Labour may be due."

,,
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State shaH be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.' [281
And, sir, every one of these-the only provisions where
it was deemed that legislation was required to enforce the
constitutional provisions-tlw only three where the rights
or liabilities of persons in the States. as between these persons and the States. are directly provided for, Congress
has by legislation affirmatively interfered to protect ...
such persons." Globe App., at 69-70.
Of legislation mentioned by Shellabarger, the closest analog
of the Sherman f!mendment, ironically, was the statute implementin~ the fugitives from justice and fugitive slave provisions
of Art. IV-the Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7. 1 Stat. 301-the
constitutiona.l ity of '<vhich had been sustained in 1842. in Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet . . 539. There. Mr. Justice Story,
writing for the Court. held that Art. IV gave slaveowners a
federal right to the unhindered possession of their slaves in
whatever State such slaves might be found. 16 Pet., at 611 .
Because state process for recovering; runaway slaves might be
inadequate or indeed hostile to the rights of the sla.veowner,
the right intended to be conferred could be negated if left to
state implementation. !d., at 614. Thus, since the Constitution guaranteed the right and this in turn required a remedy,
Story held it to be a "natural inference" that Congress had
the power itself to ensure an appropriate (in the Necessary
and Proper Clause sense) remedy for the right. !d., at 615.
Building on Prigg, Shellabarger argued that a remedy
against municipalities and counties was an appropriate method
for ensuring the protection which the Fourteenth Amendment
made every citizen's federal right. 29 This much was clear from
the adoption of such statutes by the several States as devices
for suppressing riot. 30 Thus, said Shellabarger, the only seri!d., cl. 1.
Globe, at 751.
30 Ibid.; sec n. 21, supra.
28

2

u See
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ous question remaining was "whether, since a county is an
integer or part of a state, the United States can impose upon
it, as such, amy obligation to keep the peace in obedience to
United States laws." s, This he answered affirmatively, citing
Board of Commissioners v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376 (1861),
the first of many cases a2 upholding the power of federal courts
to enforce the Contract Clause against municipalities. 33
The most complete statement of the constitutional argument
of the House opponents of the Sherman amendment-whose
views are particularly important since only the House voted
down the amendment-was that of Representative Blair: '14
"The proposition known as the Sherma:ri"'l:Uilendment ... is entirely new. It is altogether without a prerodent in this country. . . . The amendment claims the
power in the General Government to go into the States
of this Union and lay such obligations as it may please
upon the municipalitiC's, which are the crC'ations of the
States alone.
31 Globe, at 751 (emphasiR added).
Comp:trC' thi~ statemrnt with Representative Poland's remark upon which our holclinl!: in M on me was based.

Sec p. 9, supra.
32 See, e. g., Gilman v. City of Shebowan , 2 Bln,ck 510 (1863); Von IT offman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (1867); Riggs v . .Johnson County, 6
id., 166 (1868); Weber v. Lee County, 6 id., 210 (1R6R); Snpervisors v.
Rogers, 7 id., 175 (1869); Benbow v. Iowa City, 7 id., 313 (1869); SupPrvisors v. Durant, 9 id., 415 (1870).
33 See Globe, at 7.51-752.
34 Reprrsentative Wiltard
t.o ok a somrwhat differC'nt position. He
thon11:ht thnt tho Constitntion would not allow the Federal Oovernmcnt to
dict.'lte tlw mannrr in which ~~ 8tnte fulfilkd its obligntion of protrction.
That is, he thought it a. matter of ~tatr dis(·retion whether it delegated
the pcnr.ckcrpinl!: power ton muniripnl or !'ounty rorpomtion, to a. ~heriff ,
rt c. Hr did not donbt.. howcYrr. t h:t t tlw Feder::ll C:ovPrnmrnt rould
im.ro~e on the States the ohligrr.tion impo~d hv the Rhrrman amendment,
and preRumrrbly he would have enforrrd t.he amendment against a municipal corpora.t ion t.o which the pcacckrepinl!: oblig~~tion had been dclcg.'ltecl.
Sec Globe, at 791.
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" ... [H]ero it is proposed, not to carry into effect an
obligation which rests upon the municipality, but to·
create that obligation, and that is the provision I am
unable to assent to ....
" ... fTllwre are crrtain rights an<i duties that belong
to the States, ... tlwre ar<' CC'Tiain powers that inhere in
the State government. They create these municipalities,
they say what their powers shall be and what their obligations shall be. If the Government of the United States
can step in and add to those obligations, may it not
utterly <iestroy th<' municipality? 1f it can say that it
shall be liable for damagrs occurring from a riot, . . .
where [ willl its power ... stop and what obliga.tions ...
might fit l not lay upon a municipality.
"Now, only the othrr day, the Supreme Court . . .
decided fin Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871) l tha.t
there is no power in the Govrrnment of the United States,
under its authority to tax, to tax the salary of a Rtate
officer. Why? Simply because the power to tax involves
the power to oe1'troy. and it was not the intrnt to give
the Government of the United States power to destroy
the !!Overnment of the Rtatcs in any respect. It was held
also in the ca.se of Prip;g ?'S. Prnnsylvania f16 Pet. 539
(1843) l that it is not within the power of the Congress
of thf' Unikd Staks to lav duties 11pon a Rtatc offic0r;
that we eannot command a State offieer to do an~' duty
whatever, as such; and I ask ... the differencr brtwern
that and <'omml'l ncling a municipality with is equally the
crf'ature of thr Stat", to perform a duty." Globe. at 795.
While House debate primarily coneerned the question
whether Congress had the power to require municipalities to
keep the peace, opponents of the Sherman amendment in the
Senate primarily questioned the constitutionality of the judgment lien crrated hy the Sherman amendment, a lien which
ran agai.nst all money and property of a defendant munici-

I
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pallty, including property held for public purposes, such as
jails or courthouses. Opponents argued 35 that such a lien once
entered would have the effect of making it impossible for the
municipality to function, since no one would trade with it.
Moreover, everyone knew that sound policy prevented execution against public property since this too was needed if local
government was to survive. 36 (This is the only point being
made by Congressmen Farnsworth and Kerr, whose speeches
are quoted by Bill, at 7-8. In addition, Farnsworth's constitutional objection was based on Day and Kerr's analysis
applied to both municipalities and officers. Thus, if Kerr is
credited, then § 1 of the Act would alsCAJ2ea~mconstitutional,
which no one thought it was, see pp. ~ infra). Thus,
whereas constitutional objection in the House had rested on
potential danger to the independence of the States if the
Federal Government were allowed to mandate the duties of
state officers, objection in the Senate rested on the actual
probability that municipal government would be extinguished
if ever made subject to the lien.
I must stress at this point that I have to say that ,llill is
simply wrong in asserting, at 8, that "the tort remedy created
by the Act would have seriously compromised [municipal
financial stability] in a way which the contract cases, familiar
to Congress, . . . did not." He forgets that the enforcement
of contracts by the federal courts
"led to a lively resistance in Iowa and then in Missouri;
more limited conflicts occurred elsewhere in the MidWest, and even in up-State New York. The clash with
Iowa in the '60's, and that with Missouri in the '70's, were
See, e. g., Globe, at 762 (Sen. Stevenson); id., at 763 (Sen. Casserly ) .
See, e. g., id., at 763 (Sen. Casserly). Opponents were clearly correct
that public property was generally immune from execution. See M e:riwethet v. Gatrett, 102 U. S. 472, 513 (1880); The Protectot, 20 F. 207
(CCD Mass. 1884); 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations §§ 445--446 (1873
ed.).
35

36
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comparable to the well-known episodes of defiance by
the Virginin court under Spencer Roane . . . ." C.
Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United
States, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-1888, pt. 1, at
919 (1971).
The reason for this unrest was often that the bonds being
enforced were for enormous sums, were often fraudulently
obtained or passed in a manner not in accord with state lawbut w0re nonetheless enforced in federal courtl-and often
put great financial burdens on the issuing municipalities,
frequently ending in municipal bankruptcy. Sec id., at
918-1009.
If all this was constitutional and acquiesced in by the 1871
Congress-and it clearly was-it is difficult to see how tort
liability would be unronstitutional simply because it might
force a municipality to pay a lot of damages. The only way
to reconcile these facts, which were notorious. with what was
said about the lien remedy is to recognize that the Sherman
amendment's lien attached to all money and property, whether
or not that money or property was needed to discharge the
judgment. thereby disabling the municipality from providing
essential public functions. As I undrrstand it, not even bankrupt communities were stripped of the ability to perform
public functions, and similarly the judgments of federal courts
under the Process Acts (see n. ~6a, infra)-which would have
included a judgment under § 1 of the 1871 Actr-would not
have prevented municipalities from discharging essential
public functions. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472
(1880) . I submit, therefore, that no inference with respect to
the constitutionality of tort remedies executed under the
Process Acts can be drawn from the unprecedented and almost
punitive remedy imposed by the Sherman amendment. Certainly a judgment was not unconstitutional simply because it
was large.
The position of the Senate opponents, although not relevant
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to the question whether municipalities could be sued under
§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act, 36a nonetheless underscores the fact
that opponents of the Sherman amendment were arguing
primarily tha.t the Constitution, in Blair's words, did not
"inten[d] to give the Government of the United States power
to destroy the government of the States," and yet, somehow,
proponents of the Sherman amendment were intending to
exercise just such a power. To understand why this was soand, more important, why § 1 of the civil rights bill did not
threaten the government of the States in an impermissible
manner-it is necessary to examine the cases cited by opponents of the Sherman amendment.
The first case is Prigg v. Pennsylvania, supra, which had also
been cited by Shelh1ba.rger in support of the Sherman amendment. In addition to confirming a broad federal power to
enforce federa.l rights aga.inst the States, Mr. Ju stice Story in
Prigg held that Congress could not insist that the States createan adequate remedy for a federal right:

"r Art. IV] is found in the national constitution, and not
in that of any state. It does not point out any state,
functionaries, or any state action to carry its provisions,
into effect. The states cannot, therefore, be compelled to·
enforce them; and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of interpretation to insist
that states are bounrl to provide means to carry into· effect
th~ duties of the national govcrnment."
16 Pet., at 615616.
Indeed, Story suggestPd that those parts of the Act of 1793
which conferred jurisdiction on local magistrates to assist in
36 11. Execution in suits under § 1. like n,U other civil suits in federal courts
in 1871 , would have been governed by state procedures under the process
acts of 1792 and 1828. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275; Act
of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278.
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the arrest and return of slaves were unconstitutional, see id.,
at 622, a proposition with which other Justices agreed. 37
The principle enunciated in Priog was appli<'d in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861). There, the Court was
asked to require Dennison, the Governor of Ohio, to hand
over Lago, a fugitive from justire wanted in Kentucky, as
r<'quired by§ 1 of the Act of 1793, 38 supra, which implemented
Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. Chief Justice Taney,
writing for a unanimous Court, refused to enforce that section
of the Act:
"rwJ e think it clear. that the Federal Government, und0r
tho Constitution. has no power to impose on a, State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it: for if it possessed this power, it might overload
the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and
disable him from performin~ his obligations to the State,
37

"The state offirers mentioned in the Jaw fof 1793] arc not bound to
execute the dutirs imposrd upon thrm by Congress, uniM'l thr~· rhoosr to
do so, or are reqnirrd to do so by a law of the f'iatc; and the state
Jcgislaturr has the power if it thinkR proper, to prohibit. thrm. The Art
of 1793, thereforr, mu"t drprnd ['!]together for itR CWf'lll ion upon thr officers of the Unitrd Statrs n[lmrd in it." lG Pet.. :1t 630 (Tane~·. C . .T.).
Mr. Justice McL>an agreed that "[als a general principle" it was true
that, "that Congre&~ had no J10wcr to impose dut ics on Rtatc offircr~, as
provided in the art of 1793] ," hut he wondetwl whether thr "posit i\·e"
obligation crrated bv the Fugitive ~bYe Clau"c did not rrratr nn Pxrcption. Rce id., at 664-665.
38 "Be it enacted ... That whenever the executi\·e authority of an~· ~lute
in the Union ... shall drmnnd any perso11 as a. fugitivr from juPtiec ...
and shall moreover produce a copy of an indictment found ... charging
the person so dcmandrd, with hn,ing committed trejl,oon, felony or other
crime, certified as authentic hy the gowrnor or chief mngistratc of the
state ... from whcncr the prl"'on so rhnrgcd fled, it .ohall be thr duty of
the executive authority of the state or territor~' to which ~nrh prr,on ~hall
have fled, to cause him or her to be nrrcstc(l and flcrnrcd . . . and to
cause the fugitive to be dcliwrcd to such ngent [of the dem:mding state]
when he shall appear ... " 1 Stat. 302.

r
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and might impose on him duties of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to which he was elevated by
the State." 24 Hmv., at 107-108.
Although no one cited Dennison by name, the principle
expressed there by Chief Justice Taney was well known to
Members of CongrPss.~ 0 Reasoning identical to Taney'sthat maintenance of the federal structure of the Nation was
inconsistent with allowing Congress any power which might be
used to impede the States from carrying out programs within
their "legitimate spheres" of power, for, if it had such power,
it would inevitably override the independence of the States
in violation of the federal plan of the Constitution 40-had
provided the ground for the Court's decision in Collector v.
Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871), to which Blair and many others
referred, 41 in which the Court held that the Federal Government could not subject the salary of a state officer to a general
income tax. Although Day and Dennison were the only
Supreme Court cases SC'tting a limit on the enumerated powers
of the Federal Government. a series of state supreme court
cases 42 in the mid-1860's had invalidated a f<'deral tax on the
proce!;!S of state courts for the same reasons Dennison had
invalirlated the Act of 1793 and these cases were cited with
approval by opponents of the amendment. 43
Representative Farnsworth, for example, stated the holding of Dennison without mentioning it by na.me. See Globe, at 799.
4 0 This is tho principle of McCulloch v. Ma1'yland, 4 Wheat. 315 (1819),
applied to protect States from f<'deral interference in tho &lme mann<'r the
Federal Government was protected from state interference.
41 Soc, e. g., Globe, at 764 (Sen. Davis); id., at 761, 772 (Sen. Thurman); id., at 777 (Sen. Frelinghuysen); id., at 788-789 (Rep. Kerr)
(reciting logic of Day); id., at 793 (Rep. Poland); id., at 799 (Rep.
Farnsworth) (al~o reciting logic of Day).
42 Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 279 (1854); Jones v. Estate of KP-ep, 19
Wis. 369 (1865); Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505 (1867); Union Bank v.
Ifill, 3 Cold. (43 Tenn.) 325 (1866); Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385 (1857).
4 3 See Globe, at 764 (Sen. Davis); id., (Sen. Casscrlcy).
See also T.
Cooky, Constitutional Limitations ·X·4s2-·x·4s4 (1871 ed.).
80
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Prigg obviously prohibited Congress from insisting that
state officers or instrumenta.litics keep the peace. But it
stands for only the narrow proposition for which it was cited
by Representative Blair: that the Federal Government cannot
compel a state government, agency, or officer to provide a
remedy, either executive or judicial. for a federal right.
Therefore, equally obviously, Prigg has no bearing whatsoever
on the question whether a federal court could award damages
unc!er § 1 of the 1871 Act against a state agency or officer for
a violation of a fecl0ral right, since when a. federal court makes
a damage award under that section, the positive government
action required to implement the federal right is carried out
by that court, not by an agency or officer of tho StatC'.
The limits of the principle of Dennisorn and Day are somewhat more difficult to discC'J'n as a matter of logic hut more
appa.r ent as a matter of history. It must be remC'mborod that
Dennison and Day coexisted with vigorous foc!eral judicial
enforcement of the Contracts Clause. Thus, fC'dcral judicial
enforcement of express limits on state power found in the
Constitution, at least so long as interpretation of constitutional limits was left in the hands of the judicia.ry, apparently
was seen to create no throat to federalism. Rince ~ 1 of tho
1871 Act simply conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to
enforce § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-a situation precisely analogous to the grant of diversity jurisdiction under
which the Contract Clause was enforced against municipalitie&-there is no reason to suppose that oppon ents of the
Sherman amendment would have found any constitutional
barrier to § 1 suits against municipalities.
Indeed, opponents expressly distinguished between imposing
an obliga.tion to keep the peace and merely imposing civil
liability for damages on a municipality that was obligated by
state law to keep the peace, but which had not in violation of
the Fourteenth' Amendment. Representative Poland, for
example, reasoning from Contract Clause precedents, indicated
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that a federal law that sought only to hold a municipality
liable for using its authorized powers in violation of the
Constitution-which is as far as § 1 of the 1871 Act wentwould be constitutional:
"I presume . . . that where a Sta.t e had imposed a duty
[to keep the peace] upon [a] municipality ... an action
would be allowed to be maintained against them in the
courts of the United States under the ordinary restrictions
as to jurisdiction. But enforcing a liability, existing by
their own contract, or by a State law, in the courts, is a
very widely different thing from devolving a new duty or
liability upon them by the national Government, which
has no power either to create or destroy them, and no
power or control over them whatever." /d., at 794.
Representative Burchard agreed:
"[Tl here is no duty imposed by the Constitution of the
United States. or usually by State laws , upon a county to·
protect the people of that county against the commission
of the offenses herein enumerated, such as the burning of
buildings or any other injury to property or injury to
person. Police powers are not conferred upon counties as
corporations; they are conferred upon cities that have
qualified legislative power. And so far as cities are concerned, where the equal protection required to be afforded
by a State is imposed upon a city by State laws, perhaps
the United States courts could enforce its performance. But counties ... do not have any control of the·
police . . . . " ld., at 795.
Moreover, if D ennison and Day arc read broadly to prohibit
federal courts from directing municipalities or their officers to
the extent needed to enforce federal decrees, they would be in
conflict with many other cases. The power to enforce decrees
against state officers to prevent them from violating the
Constitution or to force them to hand over money or property
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taken or held in violation of the Constitution wa.s repeatedly
exercised by federal courts both before and after 1871, see,
e. g., Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738
(1820); Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 220 (1871) (collecting
cases); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1876),
and, in the same Term in which Dennison was decided, the
Court held contrary to an expansive reading of Dennison or
Day that federal courts could issue mandamus to municipal
officers to enforce judgments in Contract Clause suits, see
Board of Commissioners v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376 ( 1861),
discussed in Globe. at 751-752. The Dennison issue was not
argued in Aspinwall, but if Denm:son was meant to create a
restriction on the power of the federal judiciary, that restriction would be "jurisdictional" and should have been noted sua
sponte. Moreover, if Dennison established such a limit. it
would have overruled Osborn, yet that case was repeatedly
rcnJfirmed by this Court after Dennison was decided. See,
e. g., Davis v. Gray, supra. Indeed, cases applying the principle announced in Aspinwall are legion, seen. 32, supra, yet in
none of them does it appear to have occurred to counsel that
the federal courts lacked power to issue decrees because of the
federalism principle announced in Prig(], Denniso'YI, or Day.
These cases, of course, do not establish that Prigg-Denn?'sonDay did not bar federal judicial decrees against state officers,
"but they have much weight. as they show that rthe PriggDennison-Day l point neither occurred to the bar or the bench;
and that the common understanding of intelligent men rwas
otherwise]." Bank of the United Sta,tes v. Deveaux, 5
Cranch 61, 88 (1809) (Marshall. C. J.). In 1879, moreover,
when the question of the limits of the Prigg principle was
squarely presented in Ex parte Virginia. 100 U. S. 339. this
Court held that Dennison and Day and the pdnciple of federalism for which they stand did not prohibit federal enforcement of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment through suits
directed to state officers. See 100 U. S., at 345-348.
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That those who vot€d for § 1 but against the Sherman
amendment would not haYe thought § 1 unconstitutional if
it applied to municipalities is also confirmed by considering
what exactly thof'e voting for ~ 1 of the civil rights bill had
approved. Srction 1 without question could be used to obtain
a damage judgment against state or municipal officials who
violated federal constitutional rights while acting under color
of law. 44 However, for Prigg-Dennison-Day purposes, as Blair
and others rccognized, 45 there was no distinction of constitutional magnitude between officers and agents-including
corporate agents-of the State: both were state instrumentalities and the State could be impeded no matter over which
sort of instrumentality the Federal Government sought to
assert its power. Denm'son and Day, after all, were not snits
against municipalities but against officers and Blair was quite
conscious that he was extending Prigg by applying it to
municipal corporations.< 0 Nonetheless. Senator Thurman, who
gave the most exhaustive critique of ~ 1-?:nter alia com]1laining that it would be applied to state officers, see Globe, at
217-and who opposed both ~ 1 and the Sherman amC'ndment,
the latter on Prigg grounds. agreed unequivocally tha.t § l was
con.,titutional! 7 Thosr who voted for ~ 1 must similarly have
Sre, e. (J., Globe, nt 3~4 (Rrp. ITonr); id. at ~()5 (Rep. Arthnr); id.,
nt 374-375 (Re11. Lowe); id., nt 385 (Rep. LewiR): Globe App., nt 217
(Sen. Thurmnn); id., nt. 21() (Rrn. Sumner). In nddition, officers were
inrlndcd nmong tho~c who rould be 1<urd nndrr the srcond ronfePence
Rubstitute for the Sherman Amendment. Sec Globr, nt. 805 (exchange
hctwern Rrp. Willnrd nnd Rep. Shrllnbnrger). There were no constitutional objections to the Recond report.
~" Ser Globe, nt 795 (Rrp. Blair): id .. at 7SS (Rep . Krrr); id., nt 79.'i
(Rep. Burchard); id., at 799 (Rrp. Farnsworth).
46
"fViTlc cannot romrnand n stntc oflirer to do an~· duty whatever, as
stlf'h: nnd I ask . . . thr differmrr bet\\'CC'Il that and commanding a municipnlity .... " Globe, at 795.
47 See Globe App., at 216-217. quoted, infra, atffi-82-. .U
44
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believed in its constitutionality despite Prigg, Dennison, and
Day.
Thus, there is no basis in holdings of this Court, the common understanding of the bar, or the debates to find in Prigg,
Dennison, or Day a bar to Federal Government power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against the States, or their
agents, officers, instrumentalities, or subdivisions, through
federal judicial action even though such enforcement would
necessarily involve sanctions against officers or instrumentalities who violated that Amendment.
C. Debate on § 1 of the Civil Rights Bill
From the discussion in Part B, supra, it is readily apparent
that nothing said in debate on the Sherman amendment would
have prevented holding a municipality liahle under § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question remains, however, whether the
general language describing those to he liahle under § 1-"any
person"-covers more than na.tural persons. An examination
of the debate on ~ 1 and application of appropriate rules of
construction shows unequivoca.lly that § l was intended to
cover legal a.s well as natural persons.
1. The Substance of the Debate
The civil rights hill was introduced in the House on
March 28. 1871 hv itR author ::tnd manager. Represcnta.tive
Shellabarger, and he was the first to expla.in the function of
the first section of the hill:
"rsection 1] not onlv provides a civil remedy for persons
whose former condition may have been that of slaveR,
but also to all JWOple where. under color of State law.
they or any of tlwm may he deprived of rights to which
they arc entitled unrlcr the Constitution bv rPason and
virtue of their national citizenship." Globe App .. at 69.
By extending a rf'mcdy to all people. including whites, § 1
went well beyond the mischief to which the remaining sections
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of the 1871 Act, including the Sherman amendment, were
adrlressed.
Although he had advPrted to difficult questions of constitutional law at the outset of his speech, Representative Shellaba.r ger stat<'d without resPrvation that the constitutionality of
~ 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 controlled the constitutionality of ~ 1 of the 1871 Act, and that the former had been approved by "the supreme courts of at least three States of this
Union" and by Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting on circuit;n who
had concluded "We have no doubt of the constitutionality of
every provision of this act." Globe App., at 67. He then
went on to describe how the courts would and should interpret § 1:
"Th is act is remedial, and in aid of the presrrvation of
human liberty a.nd human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and ben<>ficpntly construed. It would be most
strange and , in rivili11rd law. monstrous were this not the
rul<> of interpretation. As has been again ancl again decided by your own Supreme Court of the United States,
and evPrywlwre else where there is wise judicial interpretation, the lar!l;est latitude consistent with the words
employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes
and constitutional provisions as are mea.nt to protect and
ddrnd and p;ive remedies for their wrongs to all the
people. . . . Chid Justirr Jay and also Story say:
" 'Wlwre a power is remedial in its nature there is
m11ch reason to contend that it ought to be construed
liherally, and it is generally ailopted in the interpretation
of laws.' 1 Story on Constitution, sec. 429." Globe
App. , at 67.
The sentiments expressed in Representative Shellabarger's
The reference is to United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (CCD
Ky. 1866) (Swayne, J.) (No. 16,151).
49
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opening speech wer0 cchoed hy Senator Edmunds, the managcr of the civil rip:hts bi1l in tlw Senate:
"The first. section i!" one that I believe nobody objects to,
as defining the rights !"ecnrcd by the Constitution of the
United States when they arc nssailcd by any Rtate law or
under color of any state law, and it is merely carrying
out the prineiplcs of the civil rights biH [of 18661. which
have since become a part of the Constitution. . . . [Section 1 is l so very simple and really reenacting the ConRtitution." Globe. at 569.
And he agreed that the bill "sccurdedl the rights of white
men as much as of colored men." Id., at 696.
In both Houses, stat{:'ments of the supporters of ~ 1 corroboratf'd three points mnck by its managers: (1) that Congress in enacting ~ 1 would cxercise the entirety of its power
under § 5 of the Fomteenth Amendment; (2) that right
thinking required a liberal construction of the jurisdiction
thus confcrrrd on thc federnl courts: and (3) that the constitutionality of ~ 1 followed immediately from the constitutionality of ~ 2 of the 1866 Act under the enforcetnC' nt wovisions of th0 Thirteenth Amendment.
Representative Bingham, the author of ~ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, declared the bill's purpose to
be "the enforcement ... of the Constitution on behalf of
every individual citizen of the Republic ... to the extent of
the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution." Globe
App., at 81. He continued:
"Th0 Stnt0s never had the right, though they had the
power, to inflict wrongs upon freP citi;~,cns bv a. denial
of the full protection of the laws. . . . fA l nd the
States did deuy to citi11e11S the equal protection of the
laws, they did deny the rights of citizens under the Constitution, and except to the extent of the express limitations upon the States . . . , as I have shown, the
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citizen had no remedy. They took property without
compensation, and he had no remedy. They restricted
the freedom of the press, and he had no remedy. They
r<'strirted the frc<'dom of speech. and 11<' had no remedy.
They restricted the rights of conscience. and he had no
remrrly. . . . Who dare say, now that the Constitution
has been amenckd. that the nation cannot by law provide
against all such abw:;es and d<'nials of right as these in
the States and by Rt.ates, or combinations of persons?"
ld .. at 85.
RE'pr<'scntative Perry, commenting on C'ongress' action in
passing thr civil rights bill also stated:
"Now, by our action on this bill we have asserted as
fully as we can assNt the mischief inwnded to be remedird.
\Ve have asserte-d as elearly as we ean assert our belief
that it is the duty of Congr<'SS to r<'drE'ss that mischief.
\Ve have also asserted as fully as we can assert the constitutional right of C'ongrcss to legislate." Globe, at 800.
Other support<'rs Wf'l'f' quite clear that § 1 of the act
<'xtcmk•d a rem<'dy not. cmlv where a Rtate had passed an
unconF~titutional statute. hut also wherr officers of the State
rcfus<'ri to carry out th<' law:
"But the chid complaint is rthat l by a systematic maladministration of rstat(' law l' or a neglect or refusal
to enforce tlwir 1)rovisions. a portion of the people are
<knird equal protection under them. \Vhenever such a
stat<' of facts is clE'arly m1.1.de out, I believe that [§ 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment l empowers C'ongrcss to step
in and provide for doing .iusticc to those persons who are
thns <kniE'd rqual protection." !d., at 153.
Importantly for our inquiry, E'ven the opponents of § 1 agreed
that it wns constitutional and, further, that it represented an
attempt to exercise the full power conferred by § 5 of the
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Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Senator Thurman, who gave
the most exhaustive critique of§ 1, said:
"This section relates wholly to civil suits. . . . Its
whole effect is to give to the Federal Judiciary that which
now does not belong to it-a jurisdiction that may be
constitutionally conferred upon it, I gra.nt, but that has
never yet been conferred upon it. It authorizes any person who is deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity
secured to him by the Constitution of the United States.
to bring an action aga.inst the wrongdoer in the Federal
courts, and that without any l·i mit whatsoever as to the
amount in controversy. . . . fT]here is no limitation
what~oever upon the terms that are employed fin the
billl. and they are as comprehensive as can be user!."
Globe App., at 216-217 (emphasis addect).
2. The Meaning of the Debate
Since the debates show that Con~ress intended to <'Xereise
its full power under the Fourteenth Amendment and , further,
that Congress intender! the statute to be construed broadly in
favor of persons injurPcl in their constitutional rights, there
is no r0ason to suppose that municipal corporations would
have been excluded from the sweep of ~ 1. One need not rely
on this inference alone, however, for the debates show that
Members of Congress might well have understood "persons"
to include municipal corporations.
Representative Bingham. for example, in discussing ~ 1 of
the bill, explained that he had drafted ~ 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment with the case of Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243
(1834), especia.lly in mind. "In that case the city had taken
private property for public use, without compensation ... ,
and there was no redress for the wrong . . . . " Globe App.,
at 84 (emphasis added). Bingham's further remarks clearly
indicate his view that such takings as had occurred in Barron
would be redressable under § 1 of the bill. See 1'd., at 85.
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More generally, and a.s Bingham's remarks confirm, § 1 of the
bill would logica.lly be the vehicle by which Congress provided
redress for takings, since that section provided the only civil
remedy coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment and tha.t
AmP11dment unequivocally prohibited uncompensated takings.50 Given this purpose, it beggars reason to suppose tha.t
Congress would have ex0mpted municipalities from suit,
im:isting instead that compensation for a taking come from an
officer in his individual capacity rather than from the government unit that had the benefit of the property taken. 51
In addition. by 1871. it was well understood that corporationR should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis. This had not
aJways been so. When this Court first considered the question
of the status of corporations, Chief Justice Marshall, writing
for the Court, denied that corporations "as such" were persons
as that te-rm was nsed in Art. III and the Judiciary Act of
1789. 52 See Bank of the Unaed States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch
61, 86 (1809). By 1844, however, the Deveaux doctrine was
unhesitatinp;ly abandoned:
"A corporation crPated by and doing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes
as a person, although an artificial person, ... capable of
being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a
natural perRon." Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497,
558 (1844) (emphasis added), discussed in Globe, at 751.
50 That takings would be covered by § 1 of the Fourtceuth Amendment
was not merely a pet theory of Rep. Bingham, but the general understanding, can be SEl<'n by comparing Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1956 (Cooley ed. 1873).
51 Indeed the federal courts found no obstn,cle to awards of damages
against municipalities for common-law takings. See Sumner v. Philadelphia, 23 F. Cas. 396 (CCED Pa. 1873) (No. 13,611) (awarding damages
of $2,273.36 and costs of $346.35 against the city of Philadelphia).
52
Nonetheless, suits could be brought in federal court if the natural
persons who were members of the corporation were of diverse citizrnship
from the other parties to the litigation. See 5 Cranch, at 91.
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And only two years before the debates on the Civil Rights
Act, in Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, 121 (1869), the
Letson l!rinciple was automatically and without discussion
extended to municipal corporations. Under this doc·trine,
municipal corporations were routinely sued in the federal
courts 53 and this fact was well known to Membrrs of
Congress. 54
That the "usual" me::tninp; of the word person would extend
to municipal corporations is also evidenced by an Act of
Congrrss. the so-called "Dictionary Act," which had hem
passed only months before the Civil Rights Act was passed.
This Act provided that
"in all Acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person' may
rxt0nd and be applied to bodies politic and corporate ... unless the context shows that such words were
intended to lw us0d in a more limited Sf'nscfl." Act of
Frh. 25, 1871, ch. 71, ~ 2, 16 Stat. 431.
Municipnl corporations in 1871 were included within the
phrase "hodirs politic and corporate" sr, and, accordingly, the
no3~

See l" · 7 u. 94, sttpra.
54 See, c. g .. Globe, at 777 (remnrks of 8en. Sherman); id., at 752
(remarks of Rep. Shellabarger) ("rountie8, cities, and rorpor~tions of all
sorts, after ye[lr~ of judicial conflict, have become thoroughly es1 nblished
to be nn i ndiv idn ~ d or perRon or rntity of the personal exiRtence. of whirh,
as a citizen. individnal, or inJ1abitant., the United States Con8ti1u1ion dOf>s
t ake note nnd endow with facnl1:v to Rue and be sued in the rourts of the
United Stf\tf's.") .
" 5 Sec Northwestern FerWizing Co. v. Hyde Pa,rk, 18 F. Cas. 393, 394
(CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10.33fl ): 2 Kent's Commen1arirs ~·278-·Y.·279 (12th
0. W. Holm~o ed 1873). See a!Ao Unitrd States v. Hodson, 10 Wf\11. 39!'5,
407 (1870) (the United Rt ntrR described as a body politic); United
States v. Mauri ce, 2 Brock. 96, 109 (CCx,·x 1823) (Ma.rPhall, C. J.) ("The
United States is a government, and, ronsr(]uently, a body politic and
eorpornte"). IndPed, the thought that bodies politic amt corporate
included govcrnmen1 s was suffiriently common in 1871 t hf\t the draftsmrn
of the Revised United St.atrs Rtatutrs removed the phrnse from the Dirtionary Act. one yenr later to avoid the inconvenience of requiring words
53
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"plain meaning" of § 1 is that local government bodies were

to be included within the ambit of the persons who could be
sned under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. Indeed, a Circuit
Judge, writing in 1873 in what is apparently the first reported
casr, under § 1, read the Dictionary Act in precisely this way
in a caf:e involving a corporate plaintiff and a municipal
defendant. 5 6 See Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,
18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (CCND IlL 1873) (No. 10,336). 57
limitin~ tho rrach of sta.tntes to private corporations. 1 Revision of the
U nitcd Stutes St.ututes 19 (1872).
56 The rourt also relird on "prinriple," noting that tlwrr was no disrrrnihl<' rNtRon why pPrson;; in.inrrrl hy municipal corpor:1tion;; should noi hc
able to rcrover. See 1R F. C:tK. at 394.
57 In ronRidcring the effcrt of tho Dictionary Art in Monroe, however,
.T ust.ice DouglaR, apparrntly focusing on the word "mny," Rt ntcd: "this
drfinition rof perRonl iR mrrrl~· :m :11JowabJo. not. a mnndatOD', one." 365
U. S., at 191. A review of the legiRlntive histor~' of the Dirtionary Act
shows tJ1is ronclu:;:.ion to be inrorrrrt.
Thrre is no exprr~s rrfcrrnre in thr lcgislativr hiRtory to t.hc drfinition of
person, but Senator Trumbull, tho Dirtion:uy Aet'K sponsor, di~cu~sed the
phrn.<:c "wordo; importing the maRrulino gender mny be npplird to femalrs,"
which immedintely precedes that definition, and stntrd:
"Tho onl~r object r of tho art] i!'. to ~rt rid of II grmt drnl of wrbo~ity in
our RtatuteR b~r providin~ that when the word 'he' is usrd it. shall include
femnlr;; ns well n~ mnleRrl" C'ongJ•e:::"ionnl Globr, 41st Con~J:., :)d Scss., 775
(Jrm. 27, 1871) (rmphnRis added).

Thns, in Trumbull's virw t.hr word "mny" mmnt "Rhnll." Snrh n mnnd:1tory use of the extended meanings of tho wordR drfincd by tho Dictionary
Act is also requirPd for it to perform its intrndrd funrtion-to br n guide
to "rules of conl"truction" of Arts of Congresf'. Sec id., at, 77.5 (Remarks
of Sen. Tn1mbull). Were the defined words "ullow:1blr, I butl not mandatory" ronstructions, as Monroe suggeRts, there would be no "rulrs" at all.
InRtend, Congre:::~ mm:.t have intrndrd tho drfinitions of the Dictionary Act
t0 apply nero~R-the-bonrd excrpt whrro the Art by ib trrmR rallrd for a.
deviation from this practice-"rwhNo] tho context showR th:.1t [defmed]
words were to be uRrd in a more limited Rrnsr." Certainly this is how the
N 07'thwestern Fertilizing court viewed the rnattrr. Since there is nothing
in tho "context" of § 1 of tho civil rights bill calling for a restricted
intrrpretation of tho word "person," the language of tha.t section should
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III

~JI!:,~ ~

This Court has not frequently followed stare decisis with the
punctiliousness argued for by Bill. N onethelesR, assuming
that John Harlan was correct that one seeking to set aside
precedent has a heavy burden to bear, that burden is discharged here. In addition, in considering how much weight
Monroe and its progeny ~ll- due, it is useful to keep in mind
that no party briefed the municipal liability issue in M onr;ge.
Nor, indeed'";" did anyone brief the issue in City of Kenosha or
Moor. Indeed, petitioners in Moor did not even challenge
Monroe's holding. See Brief of Petitioner, M oar v. County
of Alameda, at 9. Therefore, with all humility, I suggest that
the arguments resented b amici here and in Part II uprra,
are wholly new an go substantia y eyond anything so far
prcsentedtothe Court.
Moreover, I suggest that one can find ambiguity in the
congressional debates only by attributing to all Members of
Congress, as Bill does. the clearly erroneous beliefs of a few.
If, however. one attributes to Congress an intent to apply the
then recently announced constitutional doctrine of Collector v.
Da.y, supra, which is tlw case cited most frequently in the
debates, the debates become very clear. When a correct constitutional theory, under which the Sherman amendment was
unconstitutional, is available and repeatedly referred to in the
debates, I ask what possible .iustification there can be for
assuming that Congress had some other, erroneous constitutional limit in mind?
Even if a majority does not agree with me that Monroe
should be overruled outright, certainly the error of our ways
is sufficiently clear that Monroe should not be extended to
cover school boards.
The Reconstruction C'ongn'ss tl1at pa'lsf'd the C'ivil Rights
Act of 1871 did not. of conrsc, directly acldreRs th0 qtH'stion
prima facie be construed to inrlnde "hodies politic" among 1he rnt it ir::; that
could be sued.
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whether quasi-munici g~l boJ].ies such a.s school boards were
subject to suit under the Act. Indeed, since public education
was in its rudimentary stages at the time the Act was adopted,
compulsory school attendance being virtually unknown,
Br0wn v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483. 490 (]954), it
would have been most surprising had it done so. Given that
the Dictionary Act of 1871, enacted only months before the
passage of the provision that became ~ 1983, provided that
"in all Acts hPreafwr passed ... the word 'person' may extend
and be applied to hoctics politic and corporate ... unless the
context shows that rthe word wasl intended to be used in a
more limit<'d sense," the only plausible basis for concluding
that the Congress that enflrted ~ 1983 did not envision, and
would not have approved. school boards being sued unctcr
that provision is the reason we found the explicit language
of the Dirtionarv A~"t unpersuasive in Monroe, namely the
rejection of the Sherman a.mendm0nt. With respect to congressionnl nower, there is simply no reason to suppose that
the 1871 CongreRs would have thought itself at a greater
disability in acting to impose obligations on, and reach the
conduct of. quasi-municipal bodies than it was in regulating
the municipa.lities themselves. Thus the demonstration in
Part II that the rejection of the Sherman amendment cannot
be interpreted as evincing a firm congressional decision to
place municipalities outside the ambit of ~ 1983 applies with
at least equal force to the question whether school boards are
subject to suit under that section.
Nor do our cases compel us to exempt school bo s from
suit. Far from It.
s we and anyone in this country who
reads the newspapers knows, the situation is precisely the
contra.ry. We have, after plenary consideration, decided the
merits of well over a score of cases brought under § 1983 in
which the principal defendant was a school board. 58 In a

-
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number of these cases, § 1983. coupled with 28 U. S.C. § 1343,
was the only allegPd basis of jurisdiction. 59 Moreover, the
re ief souO' t ao·a · st the school boards in these cases has not

of Philadelphia. 430 U. S. 703 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Board v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 41'3 U.S. 717 (1074);
Bradlry v. School Board of tlw City of Richmond, 416 U. S. 690 (Ul74);
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 63.2 (1974); Keyes v.
School District No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1970); San Anton-io School Distr'ir,t v.
Rodri(Juez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte· Nfecklenbur(J Board
of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Northr;ross v. City of Mem])his Uoard
of Eduration. 397 U. S. 232 (1970); Cartrr v. West Feliciana Parish
School Board, 396 U. S . .226 (1969); Ale:rander v. Holmes Count11 Board
of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969): Kramer v. Un1:on Free School District,
395 U.S. 6.21 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,
3!13 U.S. 621 (1969); Monrne v. Board of Commissioners, .'{91 U.S. 450
(1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (196S); Green v.
Countu School Board of New Kent Countu, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); District
of Abin(Jton Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Goss v. Board
of Eduration. 3n U.S. 683 (1963); McNeese v. Board of Edncation, 373
U. S. 668 (1!163); Bush v. Or-lPans Parish School Board. 365 U. S. 569
(1961); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (19!'l4).
59 Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 636 (1974);
Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U. S. 189 (1973) , Appendix, at 4a;
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971),
Anpenclix, at 465a; Northrross v. City of Memphis Board of Education,
397 U.S. 232 (1970), Prtition for Certiornri. at 3; Tinker v. Des MoinP.~
Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969); McNeesP v. Board
of Education, 373 U. S. 668, 671 (1963).
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his discussion of the nature of school desegregation suits in
Milliken I{... where he observed:
11
,...
Norma1ly, the plaintiffs in this type of litigation are
students, parents and supporting organizations who desire
to desegregate a school system alleged to be the product,
in whole or in part, of de jure segregative action by the
public school authorities. The princ£pal defendant is
usually the local board of education or school board.
Occasionally the state board of education and state officials are joined as defendants." Milliken v. Bradley, U. S. - , (1977) ( 45 U. S. L. W. 4873, 4880
(June 27, 1977)) (PowELL, J. , concurring) (emphasis
added).
Altl1ough we did not 0xpressly address the jurisdictional
quest,ion of a school board's amenability to suit under ~ 1983
in our previous decisions, too much water has flowed under the
bridge to consider the issue anything but settled. As Chief
Justice Warren said in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370·
U. S. 294 , 307 (1962):
"While we are not bound by previous exercises of jurisdiction in cases in which our power to act was not questioned by was passed sub silentio ... neither should we
disregard the implications of an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper for over [33] years."
Over a century and a half earlier, Chief Justice Marshall rendered a similar admonition. In holding that a corpora.t ion
was capable of bringing suits in federal court under the Judiciary Act of 1789, he reasonedt:
"Such has been the universal understa.n ding on the subject. Repeatedly has this court decided causes between
a corpora.tion and an individual without feeling a doubt
respecting its jurisdiction. Those decisions are not cited
as authority; for they were made without considering this
particular point; but they have much weight, as t,hey
show that this point neither occurred to the bar or the
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bench; and that the common understanding of intelligent
men is [that jurisdiction exists]." Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61,88 (1809).
Congressional action taken in the wake of our decisions, far
from showing any disRatisfaction with our notion that school
boards can be sued under ~ 1083, has presumed that school
boards arc subject to suit under the statute and approved that
principle. In 1972. spurred by a finrling "that the process of
eliminating or preventing minority group isolation and
improving the quality of education for all children often
involves the expenrlitnre of additional funds to which local
educational agencies do not have access," 20 U. S. C.
~ 1601 (a) (1970 ed .. Supp. V), Congress passed the 1972
Emergency School Act. Section 643 (a)(1)(A)(i) of that
Act, 20 U. S. C. ~ 1605 (a) (1) (A) (i) (1970 ed., Supp. V),
authorizes the Assistant Secretary
"to make a grant to, or a contra.ct with, a lotal educational
agency [wlhich is im.plementing a 7Jlan wh:irh has been
undertaken pursuant to a final order issued by a cnurt of
the United States ... which requires the desrgregation of
minority group · Sl'~rcgakd children or faculty in the
elementary and S('Condary f<chools of such agency, or
otherwise r0qnir0s the eliminntion or reclnct.ion of minority group isolation in such f'chools." (Emphasis added.) 60
60

A "!oral edura.tional age>nry" is de>fincd by 20 U. R. C. § 1619 (8) fif'

"a puhli" board of edur~tion or o1hrr public authori1~' lrgallv con~titn1rd
within a. State for Pi1hrr ndmini~tra1 iYr ront.rol or dircd ion of, public
elPmcn1ary or serondar:v srhools in a. rity, rmmty, township. srhool, or
other political snbdiYision of n RU11c, or n frdrrally rr(·ognit~"d Indian
res<'rvation , or mrh rombin~tion of srhool dis1rir1R. or rountics fiR are
rprognizrd in a. Rta1o :u:< ~ n admini~tr[ltiv<' ngcnr~' for it ~ !'Uhlir r\Pmrn1ary
or scrondary srhools , or [I romhinntion of lorn] edura1ional ~crcnrir~: and
includrs any other puhlir insti1n1inn or ngcnry hnvi1~ g adminif'l r[lti,: c rontrol and direction of a puhlir rlrmrn1 ary or secondarv Fwhool l'llld where
respon::;ibility for thr ron1 rol and dirrrtion of Lhe art ivitiC!' in f'nch srhools
which nre to be aRsi~trd m1drr this cha]Jtcr is vr>;trd in an agrnry ~uhor-
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Congress thus clearly recognized that school boards were often
parties to federal school desegregation suits. Since virtually
every federal school desegregation case brought up until the
time the 1972 Emergency School Act was passed was brought,
at least in part, under § 1983, it simply cannot be said that the
federal desegregation suits Congress had in mind were not
brou!!,ht under that provision. In § 718 of the Act, 20 U. S.C.
§ 1617, Congress gave its explicit approval to the institution
of federal desegregation suits against school boaJ·d&-presumably undrr § 1083. That section provides:
"Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the
United States against a local education agency ... for
failure to comply with any provision of this chapter or
for discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin in violation of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, or the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution
of the UnitRct States as they pertain to elementary and
secondary education, the court, in its discretion, upon a
finding that the proceedings were necessary to bring about
compliance, ma.y allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs." (Emphasis added.)
Two years later, Congress found that "the implementation
of deRegregation plans that require extensive student transportation has, in many cases, required local educational agencies to expand rsic] large amounts of funds, thereby depleting
their financial resources . . . . 20 U. S. C. § 1702 (a)(3)
(1970 ed., Supp. V). (Emphasis added.) Congress did not
respond by declaring that school boards were not subject to
suit under § 1983 or any other federal statute, 61 "but simply
dinate to such a board or other authority, the Assistant Secretary ma.y
consider such subordinate agency as a local educational agency for purpose of this chapter."
61 Indeed, Congress. expressly reiterated that a cause of action, cognizable in the federal courts, exists for discrimination in the public school
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flegislated] revised evidentiary standards and remedial priorities to be employed by the courts in deciding such cases."
Brief for National Education Assn. and Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, at 15-16.
Copgres!_ most recently legishted_in light of the fact that
school boards have long been deemed "pesrons" within the
meaning of § 1983 in ena.cting the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Award Act of 1976, 4:?, U. S. C. A. § 1988. That act
allows the award of nttorney's to the prevailing party, other
than the United States. in a number of civil rights actions,
including "any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
sectionR 1981. 1982, 1983, 1985. and 1986 of this title f 42
U. S. C.l .... " The Senate Report on the Act observed:
"[D l efenda.nts in these cases are often state or local
bodies or State or local officials. In such cases it is
intended that the attorneys' fees, like other items of costs,
will be collected either directly from the official, in his
official capacity. from funds of his agency or under his
control. or from the State or local government (whether
or not the agency or government is named as a party)."
Both the Senate and House Reports cited with a.p proval a
number of cases brought under § 1983 in which a school boa.r d
context. 20 U. S. C. §~ 1703, 1706, 1708, 1710, 1718. The Act assumes
that school boards will usually be the defendants in such Rnits. For example,§ 211 of the Art, 20 U. S.C.§ 1710 provides:
"The Aitorney Geneml shall not institute a civil under srrtion 1706 of
this title [ whirb rllows for suit bv both private pa.rticR and the Attorney
General to redress discrimination in public educntion] before h0"(a) gives to ihe approprinte edurntionn.l11grncy notice of the condition
or conditions whirh, in his jndp:mcnt, rollstitute a viohtion of part [the
prohibitions against discrimination in public education]."
Section 219 of the Act, 20 U. S. C. ~ 1718, provides for the termination
of court ordered bming "if the court finds the defendant educational
agency has satisfied the requirementR of the fifth or fourteenth amendments
to the Constitution, whichever is applicable, and will continue to be in
compliance with the requirements thereof."
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was the primary defendant. 02 Congress was thus well aware,
as it was in passing the 1972 Emergency School Aid Act and
the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, that school
boards and other local governmental bodies could be, and very
often were, sued under § 1983. In passing the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awa.rd Act of 1976, Congress affirmatively
built upon this principle and displayed its willingness to hold
those bodies liable for monetary as well as declaratory and
injunctive relief.
Just as Congress' passage of legislation premised on the
assumption that school boards are properly the subject of
civil rights suits, the vast majority of which are brought under
§ 1983, bespeaks its acceptance of that notion, so too does its
persistent refusal to enact legislation limiting the jurisdiction
of the federal courts over school boards. During the heyday
of the furor over busing, both the House and the Senate
refused to adopt bills that would have removed from the federal courts jurisdiction
"to mal\:e any decision, enter any judgment. or issue any
order requiring any school board to make any change in
the racial composition of the student body at a.ny public
school or in any class at any public school to which stnoents are assigned in conformity with a freedom of choice
system, or requiring anv school board to transport any
students from public school to another public school or
62 The Senate Report citNI Bradley v. School Board of the Cit?! of
Richmond, 416 U. S. 696 (Hl74), for thP proposition that nnder thP Art,
counsel's fees could be awarded pendente lite. S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 5.
The Report also cited with approvnl several lower conrt cnses in which
att-orney's fees were awardPd af!;ainst school boards in n.ctions brr)Ught
under § 1983. Ibid. The Hon~c Re11ort., in arldit.ion to approvingl)r citing
Rradley, H. R Rep. No. 94-1558. at 4 nn. 6. 8, n.nd Nortlu;ross v. MPrnphi~
Board of Education, 412 U. S. 427 (1973). id .. at, 6. 9, observed: "Section
1983 is 11tilized to challenge official discrimination. such Hs racial segregation imposed by law. 81'0'Wn v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483
(1954)." !d., at 4.
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from one place to another place or from one school district to another school district or denying to a.ny student
the right. or privilege of attending any public school or
class at any public sehool chosen by the parent of such
student in conformity with a freedom of choice system, or
requiring any school board to close any school nnd transfer the students from the closed school to any other
school for the purpose of alterim: the ra.cial composition
of the student body at any public schooL or precluding
any school board from carrying into effect a.ny provision
of any contract hetween it and any member of the faculty
of any public school it opera.t es specifying the public
school where the mt'mber of the facnlty is to perfonn his
or her duties under tlH' contract." R. 179, 93d Cong .. 1st
Ress .. ~ 1207 (1073): H. R. 159. 92d Cong., 1st Ress.,
~ 1207 (Hl71) (emphasis added) .
Other bills designed <:>ither completely to remove the federal
courts from the school desegre2;ation controversy, S. 287. 03d
Cong., 1st S<:>ss. (1073). or to limit the ability of federal courts
to subject school boards to remedial orders in desegregation
cases, S. 619. 93d Con g .. 1st Sess. (1973): S. 179, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., ~ 3 (a) (1973): H. R. 13534, 92d Cong. , 2d Scss.,
§ 2922 ( 1972) , have similarly failed .
Tn sum, support for the proposition that school boards are
not "persons" subjeet to suit under ~ 1983 cannot be found in
the congressional understanding at the time ~ 1983 was passed,
our subsequent construction of that provision, or t.he congressiona] respons<:> to onr decisions. To the contrary. each of
these considerations compels nreciRf'ly the opposite conclusion.
The only possible justification for holding that school boards
cannot be sued under ~ 1083 is a desire for some modicum of
consistency with Monroe's holding barring§ 1983 suits directly
against municipalities. Yet such an outcome stretches stare
decisis beyond its breaking point by extending a clea.r ly
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erroneous decision at the price, as John sa.id at Conference, of
making ourselves "look like fools."

IV
The following ractical consequences flow from the )receding examin&tion an ana ys1s o ,§ 1 83. Quasi-municipal
bodies such a.s school boards at the very ]east, a.nd, ideally,
municipalities themselves as well, may be sued directly under
~ 1983 for both monetary and injunctive relief when the
l11,Y-nicipalit_y or quasi-municipal body bears a significant
degree o_i respon sibility for a constitutional deprivation. The
most cfear~ cas es are those in which th e unconstitutional
action is taken pursuant to a municipal ordinance or regulation. Because unwritten practices and predilections may, by
force of time and consistent application, crystalize into official
pol~y, these too may provide a basis for direct suit agamst
municipal and quasi-municipal bodies. See Adickes v. S. H.
Kress& Co., 398 U.S. 144,167-169 (1970).
The cornerstone of this approach is tha.t a municipal or
quasi-municipal bony may be directly sued under § 1983 for
any relief necessary to redress a constitutional deprivation
when it bears some blame or fault for the constitutional
infringement. 63 'tfonverse'tv, where the body bears no signifi63 In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), we recor;nizPd that fault is
a crucial factor in drtermining whether relief may run against. a party for
its alleged pn.rticip:ttion in n constitutional tort. Distingnishing the relief
approved by the lower courts in the case at hand from thnt sanctioned by
this Court in school dC's<'gregation cases such as Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), JusTICE HEHNQUIS'r explained:
"Hespondents . . . ignore a critical fn.etual distinction be1w0en their
case and the desegregation cases decided by this Court. In 1he latter,
segregation imposed by law had been implemented by state authorities for
varying periods of time, whereas in the instant C3se the District Court
found that the responsible authorities had played no affirmative part in
depriving a.ny members. of the two respondent, classes of any cons:titutiona.l
rights. Those aga.inst whom injunctive relief was direrted in cases such
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<'ant responsibility for the harm suffered hy a ~ 1083 plaintiff,
it should ~t b~'dcnriously li~hle to SPit under the doctrine
of respondeat sui)(;'ior; for
liability without fault is
precisely analogous to the liability imposed by the Sherman
amendment, which the 1871 Congress refused to impose. This
Co~. ,rt recognized as much in Moor, where we obsrrver! that
"Congress did not intend. as-;;:-;natter of federal law. to
impose vicarious liabilitv on municipalities for violations of
frrkrr>l civil rights hv their 0mployees." 411 U. R.. Dt 710
n. 27 (emphasis in ori~inal).G•

su'cti

nP Swann and Brown were not ndmini~t.rators and s~hool bonrd mrmb"rs
who hnrl in thrir employ a. ~mrtll nnmbrr of individual~, whirh lntter on
their own drprh·rrl black E:tudents of thrir constiutionnl rirrhts to a nnit11ry
srhool Rvstem. Thev wrre administrntor.'> and school board mrlTlhrrs who
were found by their own rondmt in ihe ndministmtion of the ~rhool ~vs
tem to hrtve dfmied those right"R. H<:>re, the Distrirt. Conrt fonnd that
none of the petiiioncrs hnd dcprivrd t.he respondent rhf'SPR of any
rights srrured 1mdcr the Constitution. 423 U. S., at :377 ( rmph~sis in
origii1nl) .
Had the Mayor rmd Polire Commis8ioncr of Phila.delphia br<'n rC'Spnnsiblc
for i he ron::;titutional drprivn.tion~. aR wer<:> the school b0'1 rd~ in 8wann
and Brown, appropriate relief could have order0d against them.
For pmnrses of 11 defendnnt's nmrnnbilit.y to suit, this approach trrats
all constitutional violations perpetrated by a. muPiripaJ or qu:1si-m1miripnl
body, con~il:'tentlv . without regard to the iype of relief that is songht to
redress them. Bill, on the other hand, would permit snits against
municipal officinls in their officinl ca.pa,city where the relief requcstrd is
injunctive only, and would b:u such snits only where monetary relief is
sought. This approach would resnrrect precisely the type of inconsistency
we condemned in Kenosha,.
64 Most lower conr1 s confronted with the is8ne have also fonnd the
dortri11e of respondeat superior inapplirable ton § HJ88 nrtion. Sec Note,
Developm ents in the Law-SPrtion 1988 :mel Feder::JJiPm, 90 IIarv. L.
Rev. 1133, 1207 (1977) : Levin, The Section 1983 Municip ~l] Tmmunity
Doctrine, 65 Geo. L. J. 1483, 1533-1.'>34 (1977). As the Seventh Circuit
recently with respect to monetary relief:
"We arc not aware of a.n y decision which holds a local government
entity liable in money damnges for the constitutional deprivations commit1 ed hy its' agents, indeprnd<:>ntly of any official policy. The principle of
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Thus, municipal and quasi-municipal entities, like govern- )
mental officials, must bear r<'sponsibility for their unconstitu- (_
tional acts. Where injunctive relief is sought. the effect of
this doctrine on extant law wlll be negligible. Virtually all
d<'cisions since Moor ha vc read that case, in effect, simply as
announcing a rule of pleading that prohibits the issuance of
injunctive relief directly against a municipality, and have
permitted any in.iuncti,·e relief necessary to remedy a constitutional violation to issn<" agninst the governmental official
responsible for fonnulating or implementing the unconstitutional act or policy. Wlwre monetary damages are sought
against a municipal body under ~ 1983 to redress a constitutional violation, however, the matter 1s a hit more
complicated.
Undrr casl"s such as Wood v. Strirkland. 420 U. S. 308
(Hl7fi), and Sche?tfr v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974). many
governmental ofuc1als ar0 ; ntitlrd to a qnalifi0d goocl-fa.ith
immunity. which is. in 0ffcct. a def0nsc. At first blush, there
·wonlrl ap1war to he little r0ason to hold municipal and quasimunicipal hodil"'>. as such. to a higl1er standard for safeguarding constitutional rights t,l1an the standarrl the officials who
com1)rlS<> those hodi0s and formulate their policil"s arC' held to.
This initial impn's~ion is huttrcl'sed hv the fact that the
common lg,w g€'n £QlllY affordC'd municipal bodies immunity in
th!" performance ofth cir ' 1governm0nt al" func tions r.G coupled
with the approach WI" have consistently taken in determining
wlwthcr :md to '':hat C'xtcnt a given defendant is entitled to
immlmity in a ~ 19R3 action-nam<"lv "a considcr0d inquiry
into thr immunity historically accorded the relevant official
at common law and the intcrN:ts behind it." Imbl er v. Pacht-

I

-

re.~pondeat .~uperior baR not h rr n :1pplird u11clrr § 19i<1. :1!thnngh it m11~t
be notrd thnt thr opportunit~· to :~pp l~r it to mnni r·ipnl hodir:-: wns foreclosrd by the stntntory intcrprct<t1ion thnt f'nrh bodirs W<'re not snbjrrt
to § 19113 liability." McDonald v. State of Illinois, .557 F. 2d 596, 604

(C-\7 1977).
Gr. Rcc 18 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporatious § li1.24 (3d <:'d. 1963).
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man, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976). However, for two_Easons I
believe tha.t it is both unwise and unwarrantea , at this point,
to a.nnounc~at rUic"""tria t intr"n'iCipal and quasi-municipal'
bodies are entitled to precisely the same type of immunity
afforded governmental officials under Wood and Scheuer ..
~t, the common law of municipal immunity "[fl or well·
over a century ... has been subjected to vigorous criticism."·
W. Prosser. Handbook of the Law of Torts 984 (4th eel. 1971).
As a consequence, there has been ''a minor avalanche of decisions repudiating municipal immunity" that portends "a
radical change in the law. /d., at 985. Second. the policy
considera.tions tha.t underlie the doctrine '""'cllDunicipal immunity differ significantly from the concerns we identified
as the source of the qua.lified p:ood-faith immunity recognized
in Scheuer. Neither of those concerns-" ( 1) the injustice,
particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his
position' to exercise discretion; ror l (2) the danger that the
threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute
his office with the deci.siveness and the judgment required by
the public good" GG_srems particularly poignant where the ·
§ 19R~ defendal1t is a municipal or quasi-municipal body.
With respect to the first concrrn, it could be argued that. far
from being unjust, it is quite fair t,o saddle a governmental
entity that has harmed an individual with the responsibility for
rectifying that harm; for this sprearls the cost of the nnconstitutional action among the members of the polity-those
who reap the benefits of the municipal body's actions and who
are ultimately responsible for them. 67 With respect to the
second concern, "the risk thnt imposing liability unqualified
by an irrununity or goorl-faith defense upon 1mmicipnlities
Seheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. 8. 2~2, 240 (1974).
See Note, Dnmage Rrmrrli<'S Agninst MHnicipnlitirs for Con~ti1ntional
Violations, 89 Hnrv. L. Rr·v. 922, 9.'5fi-958 (1976); Note, Vir:uion~ Li:1bili1y
Under Section 1983, 6 Ind. L. Hev. 509, 515 (1973).
66

67

~ G..-&4.'-'H4o ~

-&~)
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would deter their officials from conscientiously executing their
public duties seems much more attenuated than the risk
attendant to imposing such liability upon the officials themselves." Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for
Constitutional Violations, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 922, 957 (1976)
(a journal whose ~om Bill appa.rently recognizes). Indeed,
it might even be that the imposition of liability directly on
governmental bodies could have a beneficial effect on performance by providing responsible officials with an incentive
to correct abuses.
Given thes0 considerat.ions, the most judicious course is
clearly to permit the lower courts to grapple with the question
of the nature of the immunity municipal and quasi-municipal
bodies are ent1tlrd to when sued for monetary relief under
§ 1983. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
403 U. S. 389, 397-398 (1971). Only a.fter the issue has
received f'nffieient vent.ilation and percolation in the lower
courts will it be meet for our consideration.
APPENDIX
As proposed, the Sherman amendment was as follows:
"That if mi.y house, tenement, cabin, shop, building,
barn, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in
part, by any persons riotously a.nd tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; and if such offense was committed to
deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by
the Constitution aud laws of the United States, or to
deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by
reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or
parish in which any of the said offenses shall be com-

1
.
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mitted shaH be liable to pay full compensation to the
person or persons damnified by such offense if living, or to
his widow or legal representative if dead; and such compensation may bo recovered by such person or his representa.tive by a suit in any court of the United States of
competent .inrisdiction in the district in which the offense
was committed, to be in the name of the person injmed,
or his legal representative, and against said county. city,
or parish. And execution may be issued on a judgment.
rendered in such suit nnd may be levied upon any property, real or personal. of any person in said county, city,
or parish, and the said county, city, or parish may recover
the full amount of such judgment, costs, and intPrest,
from any person or persons engaged as principle or
accessory in such riot in an action in any court of compet.ent jurisdiction." Globe, at 663.
The complete text of the conference substitute for the
Sherman amendment is:
"That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building,
barn, or granary shall be unlRwfully or feloniously demolished. pulled down, burned , or destroyed, wholly or in
part. by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shaH unla.wfully and with
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, with intent to deprive any person of any
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for
exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or
previous conditions of servitude, in every such case the
county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses
shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such offense, if
living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead; and
such compensation may be recovered in an action on the
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case by such person or his representa.tive in any court of
the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district
in which the offense was committed, such action to be in
the name of the person injured, or his legal representative,
and against said county, city, or pa.r ish; and in which
action any of the parties committing such acts ma.y be·
joined as defendants. And any payment of a.ny judgment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plaintiff in such action , may, if not satisfied by the individual
defendant therein within two months next after the
recovery of such judgment upon execution duly issued
against such individual defendant in such judgment, and
returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, be enforced
against such county, city, or parish, by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding
in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of
judgments against municipal corporations; and such judgment shall be a Jien as well upon all moneys in the
treasury of such county, city, or parish, as upon the other
property thereof. And the court in any such action may
on motion cause additional parties to be made therein
prior to issue joined, to the end that justice ma.y be done.
And the said county, city, or parish may recover the
full amount of such judgment, by it paid, with costs and
interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal
or accessory in such riot, in an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish,
so paying, shall also be subrogated to an the plaintiff's
rights under such judgment." Globe, at 755.
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Petitioners, a class of female employees of the Depart~~ ,SA.~
of Social Services and the Board of Education of t.he c)'cy'" ~
New York, commenced this action under 42 U. S. C. § ~ ~ ~
in July 1971.1 The gravamen of the complaint was tha.t the
Board and the Department had as a matter of official p~
compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of
absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. 2
1 The complaint was amended on September 14, 1972 to allege a claim
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act-, as amended, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e ( 1970 ed., and Supp. V). The Dist.rict Court held that the 1972
amendments to Title VII did not apply retroactively to discrimination
suffered prior to those amendments even when an action challenging such
prior discrimination was pending on the date of the amendments. :39'1
F. Supp. 853, 856 (SDNY 1975). This !lclding wn s :~ffirmc d r.n !!fPC:>.!.
532 F. 2d 259, 261-262 (CA3 1976) . Although petitioners sought certiorari on the Title VII issne us well us the § 1983 claim, we restricted
our grant of certiorari to the htter issue. 429 U. S. 1071.
2 The plaintiffs alleged that ~cw York had a citywide policy of forcing
women to take maternit~· le:1.vr after the fifth mont,h of pregnancy unless
a city phy~ician and the head of nn employee's agency allowed up to an I
additiorml t\ro months of work. AmendL·d Complaint ~ 28, App. 13-14.
The defendants did not deny t.his, but stated that this policy had been
change-d after suit was instituted. Answer 1 13, App. 32-33. The plaintiffs further alleged that the Board had a policy of requiring women to
take maternity leave after the seventh month of pregn:mcy tmlcss that I
month fell in the last month of the school year, in which case the t-eacher
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Cf. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632
(19'74). The suit sought injunctive relief and back pay for
periods of unlawful forced leave. Named as defendants in the
~ction were the Department and its Commissioner, the Board
~nd its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor.
In each case, the individual defendants were sued solely in
their official capacities. 3
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York held moot petitioners'
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief since the city of
New York and the Board, after the filing of the complaint, had
.changed their policies relating to maternity leaves so that no
pregnant employee would have to take leave unless she was
medically unable to continue to perform her job. 394 F.
Supp. 853, 855. No one now challenges this conclusion. The
court did conclude, however, that the acts complained of
were unconstitutional under LaFleur, supra. 394 F. Supp.,
at 855. Nonetheless plaintiff's prayers for back pay ·were
. denied because any such damages would come ultimately from
the City of New York and , therefore, to hold otherwise would
' be to "circumvent" the immunity conferred on municipalities
by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See 394 F. Supp.,
at 855.
On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the
-B oard of Education 4 was not a "municipality" within the
meaning of Monroe v. Pape, supra, and that, in any event, the
District Court had erred in barring a damage award against
the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rejected both contentions. The court first \
could remain through the end of the school term. Amended Complaint

'i'l 39, 42, 45, App. 18-19, 21. This allegation was denied. Answer

n 18, 22, App. 35-37.
~Amended

Complaint , 24, App. 11-12.
• Petitioners conceded that the Department of Social Services enjoys the
same status as New York City for Monroe purposes. See 532 F. 2d, at

263.
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held that the Board of Education was not a person under
§ 1983 because "it performs a vital governmental function ... ,
and, significantly, while it has the right to determine how the
funds appropriated to it shall be spent ... , it has no final
say in deciding what its appropriations shall be." 532 F. 2d
·259, 263 (1976) (citation omitted). The individual defendants, however, were "persons" under § 1983, even when sued
f?Olcly in their official capacities. I d., at 264. Yet, because a
damage award would "haYe to be paid by a city that was held
·! lot to be amenable to such an action in Monroe v. Pape," a
damage action against officials sued in their official capacities
cb~ld not proceed. !d., at 265.
We granted certiorari in this case, 429 U.S. 1071, to consider
"Whether local governmental officials and/or local independent school boards are "persons" within the meaning
of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature
of back pay is sought against them in their official
capacities?" Pet. for Cert. 8.
Although, after plenary consideration, we have decided the
merits of over a score of cases brought under § 1983 in
which the principal defendant was a school board 5-and,
5

Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267 (1977); Dayton Board of Educaiton v. Brinkman. 433 U. S. 406 (1977); Vorchheimer v. School District
o/ Philadelphia, 430 U. S. 703 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Board v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974);
Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974);
Cleveland ·Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974); Keyes v.
School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971); Northcross v. City of Memphis Board
of Education, 397 U. S. 232 (1970); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish
School Board, 396 U. S. 226 (1969); Alexander v. Holmes County Board
of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District,
395 U.S. 621 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist1ict,
393 U. S. 503 (1969); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners. 391 U.S. 45()
(1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (1968); Green v.
County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430 (1968); School
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indeed, in some of 'vhich § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U. S. C. § 1343, provided the only basis for jurisdiction6-we indicated in Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977), last Term that the question
presented here was open and would be decided 11 another day."
That other clay has come and we now overrule Monroe v. Pape,
supra, i11sofar as it holds that local governments are wholly
immune from suit under§ 1983. 7
I
In Monroe v. Pape, we held that 11 Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of
[ § 1983] ." 365 U. S., at 187. The sole basis for this conclusion was an inference drawn from Congress' rejection of the
"Sherman amendment" to the bill which became Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13-the precursor of§ 1983-which would
have held a municipal corporation liable for damage done to
the person or property of its inhabitants by private persons
"riotously and tumultuously assembled." 8 Cong. Globe, 42d
·Cong., 1st Sess., 749 (1871) (hereinafter 11 Globe"). Although
-the Sherman amendment did not seek to amend § 1 of the Act,
'District of Abington Township v. Schempp. 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Gas.~ v.
Board of Education, 373 U. S. 683 (1963); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 (1963); Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 365 U. S.
·569 (1961); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8 Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 832, 636 (1974);
App., Keyes v. School District No.1, 0. T. 1972, No. 71-507, p. 4a; App.,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 0. T. 1970, No.
281, p. 465a.; Petition for Certiorari, N orthcross v. Board of Education,
0. T. 1969, No. 1136, p. 3; Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District, 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373
U.S. 668,671 (1963).
1 However, we do affirm Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), insofar
as it holds that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for
rendering municipalities liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of
their employee.il. Sec Part II, infra.
8 We expressly declined to consider "policy considerations" for or
against municipal liability. See 365 U. S., at 191.

I
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which is now § 1983, and although the nature of the obligation
created by that amrndment "·as vastly different from that
created by § 1, the Court nonetheless concluded in Monroe
that Congress must have meant to exclude municipal corporations from the coverage of § 1 because "the House [in voting
against the Sherman amendment] had solemnly decided that
in their judgment Congress had no constitutional power to
impose any obligation upon county and town organizations,
the mere instrumentality for the administration of state law."
365 U. S., at 190 (emphasis added) , quoting Globe , at 804
(Rep. Poland). This statement, we thought, showed that
Congress doubted its "constitutional power ... to impose
civil liability on municipalities," 365 U. S., at 190 (emphasis
added), and tha.t such doubt would have extended to any type
of civil liability. 9
A fresh analysis of debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
and particularly of the case law which each side mustered in
its support, shows, however, that Monroe incorrectly equated
the "obligation" of which Representative Poland spoke with
"c)villiability."
A. An Overview
There are three distinct stages in the legislative consideration of the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
On March 28, 1871, Representative Shellabarger, acting for
a House select committee, reported H. R. 320, a bill "to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution and for other purposes." H. R. 320 contained
four sections. Section 1, now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
was the subject of only limited debate and was passed without
9 Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of Monroe, has suggested that the
municipal exclusion might more properly rest on a theory that Congress
sought to prevent the financial ruin that civil rights liability might impose
on municipalities. Sec City of K enosha v. Bruno, -!12 U. S. 50i , 517- 5::!0
(1973). However, this view has never been shared by the Court, see
Monroe v. Pa.pe, supra, n. 7, at 190; Moor v. County of Alameda, 411
U. S. 693, 708 ( 1973), and the debat·cs do not support this position.
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amendment. 10 Sections 2 through 4 dealt primarily with the
"other purpose" of suppressing Ku Klux Klan violence in
the southern States. 11 The wisdom and constitutionality of
these sections-not § 1, now § 1983-was the subj ect of almost
all congressiona1 debate and each of th ese sections was
amended. The House finished its initial debates on H. R.
·320 on April 7, 1871 and one week later ~he Senate also voted
out a bill.12 Again. debate on § 1 of the bill was limited and
that section was passed as introduced.
Immediately prior to the vote on H. R. 320 in the Senate,
Senator Sherman introduced his amendment. 1 3 This was not
an amendment to § 1 of the bill, but was to be added as § 7 at
the end of the bill. Under the Senate rules, no discussion of
the amendment was allowed and, although attempts were
made to amend the amendment. it was passed as introduced.
·In this form, the amendment did not place liability on municipal corporations, but made a.ny inhabitant of a municipality
liable for damage inflicted by persons "riotously or tumultuously assembled." a
The House refused to acquiesce in a number of amend--ments made by the Senate, including the Sherman amendment, and the respective version~ of H. R. 320 were there1o Globe, at 522.
11 Briefly, § 2 created certain federal crimes in addition to those defined
: in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat.. 27, ea ch aimed primarily a.t
the Ku Klux Klan. Section 3 provided that the President could send the
militia into any State wracked with Klan violence. Finally, § 4 provided
for suspension of the writ. of habens corpus in enumerated circumstances,
again primarily those thought to obtain where Klan violence was rampant.
See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Seos. , App ., at 335- 336 (1871) (hereinafter
!!QJobe App.") .
12 Globe, at 709.
13 See id., at 663, quoted in Appendix, infra, at 41-42.
u Ibid. An action for recovery of damages was to be in the federal
courts and denominated as a suit against the county, city, or parish in
which t-he damage had oc curred. Ibid. Execution of tl1e judgment was
pot to run against the property of the government unit, however, but
ag.ainst the private property of any inhabitant. Ibid.
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fore sent to a conference committee. Section 1 of the bill,
however, was not a subject of this conference since, as noted,
it was passed verbatim as introduced in both Houses of
Congress.
On April 18, 1871, the first conference committee completed
its wc·:k on H. R. 320. The main features of the conference
committee draft of the Sherman amendment were these: 15
First, a cause of action was given to persons injured by
11
any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled
together; ... with intent to deprive any person of any
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of
the United States. or to deter him or punish him for
exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or
previous condition of servitude . . . ."
'Second, the act provided that the action would be against
'the county, city, or parish in which the riot had occurred and
that it could be maintained by either the person injured or
his legal representative. Third, unlike the amendment as
proposed, the conference substitute made the government
defendant liable on the judgment if it was not satisfied against
individual defendants who had committed the violence. If
··a municipality were liable, the judgment against it could be
·collected
uby execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or
any other proceeding in aid of execution or applicable
to -the enforcement of judgments against municipal corporations; and such judgment [would become] a lien
as well upon all moneys in the treasury of such county,
city, or parish, as upon the other property thereof."
In the ensuing debate on the first conference report, which
was the first debate of any kind on the Sherman amendment,
Senator Sherman explained that the purpose of his amendment was to enlist the aid of persons of property in the en1s See Globe, at 749 and 755, quoted in Appendix, infra, at 42-43.
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forcement of the civil rights laws by making their property
"responsible" for Ku Klux Klan damnge. 10 Statutes drafted
on a similar theory, he stated, had long been in force in
England and were in force in 1871 in a number of States.u
Nonetheless there were critical differences between the conference substitute and extant state and English statutes: the
conference substitute, unlike most state riot statutes, lacked
a. short statute of limitations and imposed liability on the government defendant whether or not it had notice of the impending riot, whether or not the municipality was authorized to
exercise a police power, whether or not it exerted all reason-able efforts to stop the riot, and whether or not the rioters
-were caught and punished. 18
The first conference substitute passed the Senate but was
Tejected by the House. House opponents, within whose ranks
16 "Let the people of property in the southern States understand that if
·they will not make the hue and cry :md take the necessary steps to put
down lawless violence in those States their property will be holden responsible, and the effect will be most wholesome." Globe, at 761.
Senator Sherman was app:trently unconcerned that the conference com:mittee substitute, unlike the original amenclmrnt , did not place liability
'for riot damage directly on the property of the well-to-do, but instead
;placed it on the local government. Presumably he assumed that taxes
would be levied against the property of the inhabitants to make the locality
'Whole.
11 According to Senator Sherman, the law had originally been adopted in
England immediately after the Norman Conquest and had most recently
been promulgated as the law of 7 & 8 Geo. IV, ch . 31. See Globe, a.t 760.
During the course of the debates , it appeared that Kentucky, Maryla.nd,
Massachusetts, and New York had simil::Lr laws. See id., at 751 (Rep.
Shellabarger); id., at 762 (Sen. Stevenson); id., at 771 (Sen. Thurman);
id., at 792 (Rep . Dutlr r). Such a. municipal liability was apparently
common throughout New England. See id., at 761 (Sen. Sherman).
18 In the Sena te , opponents, . including a number of Senators who had
voted for § 1 of the bill, criticised the Sherman amendment as an imperfect
and impolitic rendering of the st:tte statutes. Moreover, as drafted, the
conference substitute could be c on ~ trued to protect rights that were not
protected by the Constitution. A complete critique was given by Senator
Thurman. See Globe, at 770-7i2.
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were some who had supported § 1, thought the Federal Government could not, consistent with the Constitution, obligate
municipal corporations to keep the peace if those corporations
were neither so obligated nor so authorized by their state
charters. And, because of this constitutional objection, opponents of the Sherman amendment were unwilling to impose
damage liability for nonperformance of a duty which Congress
could not require municipalities to perform. This position is
reflected in Representative Poland's statement that is quoted
in M onroe. 19
Because the House rejected the first conference report a
second conference was called and it duly issued its report.
The second conference substitute for the Sherman amendment
abandoned municipal liability and, instead, made "any person or persons having knowledge [that a conspiracy to violate
eivil rights was afoot], and having power to prevent or aid
in preventing the same," who did not attempt to stop the
same, liable to any person injured by the conspiracy. 20 The
amendment in this form was adopted by both Houses of Congress and is now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1986.
The meaning of the legislative history sketched above can
most readily be developed by first considering the debate on
the report of the first conference committee. This debate
shows conclusively that the constitutional objections raised
against the Sherman amendment-on which our holding in j
:Monroe was based, seep. 5. supra-would not have prohibited 1
congressional creation of a civil remedy against state municipal corporations that infringed federal rights. Because § 1 of
the Civil Rights Act does not state expressly that municipal
corporations come within its ambit, it is finally necessary to
interpret § 1 to confirm that such corporations were indeed
intended to be included within the "persons" to whom that \
section applies.
19

~0

See 365 U.S., at 190, quoted at p. 5, supra.
See Globe, at 804, quoted in Appendix, infra, at 43.
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B. Debate on the First Conference Report
The style of a.rgument adopted by both proponents and
opponents of the Sherman amendment in both Houses of
Congress was largely legal, with frequent references to cases
decided by this Court and the supreme courts of the several
States. Proponents of the Sherman amendment did not, however, discuss in detail the argument in favor of its constitutionality. Nonetheless, it is possible to piece together such an
argument from the debates on the first conference report and
those on § 2 of the civil rights bill, which, because it allowed
the Federal Government to prosecute crimes "in the states,"
had also raised questions of federal power. The account of
:Representative Shellabarger, the House sj5onsor of H. R. 320,
is the most complete.
Shella.barger began his discussion of H. R 320 by stating
that "there is a domain of constitutionai law involved in the
right consideration of this measure which is wholly unexplored." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., at 67 (1871)
_(hereinafter "Globe App."). There were analogies, however.
With respect to the meaning of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly its Privileges or Immunities Clause,
'Shellabarger relied on the statement of Mr. Justice Washington in Garfield v. Coryell, 4 'iVash. C. C. 371 (CCED Pa.
1825), which defined the privileges protected by Art. IV:
" 'What these fundamental privileges are [ ,] it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They
tnay, however, be all comprehended under the following
general heads: protection by the Government;'"J.l.fark that.,, 'protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety . . . . '" Globe App., at 69 (emphasis added),
quoting 4 Wash. C. C., at 380.
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Having concluded that citizens were owed protcction, 21
Shellabarger then considered Congress' role in providing that
protection. Here aga.in there were precedents:
11
[Congress has always] assumed to enforce, as against
the States, and also persons, every one of the provisions
of the Constitution. Most of the provisions of the Con·
stitution which restrain and directly relate to the States,
such as those in [Art. I, § 10,] relate to the divisions of
the political powers of the State and General Governments. . . . These prohibitions upon political po'l'l·ers of
the States are all of such nature that they can be. and
even have been, ... enforced by the courts of the United
States declaring void all State acts of encroachment on
Federal powers. Thus, and thus sufficiently, has the
United States 'enforced' these provisions of the Constitution. But there are some that are not of this class.
These are where the court secures the rights or the liabilities of persons \vithin the States, as between such persons
and the States.
"These three are: first, that as to fugitives from justice r22 J; second, that as to fugitives from service, (or
Opponents of the Sherman amendment agreed that both protection
and equal protection were guaranteed by the Fourt{!enth Amendment. See
Globe, at 758 (Sen. Trumbull); id ., at 772 (Sen. Thurman); id., at 791
(Rep. Willard). And the Supreme Court of Indiana had so held in giving
effect to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Sec Smith v. Moody , 26 Ind. 299
(1866) . (following Coryell ). one of three state supreme court cases referred
to in Globe App., at 68 (Rep. Shelhba.rger). l\loreover, § 2 of the 1871
Act as passed, unlike § 1, prosecuted prr~on s who violated federal rights
whether or not that violation was nnd r r color of official authority, apparently on the theory that Ku Klux Klan violence was infringing the right of
protection defined by Coryell.
22 U.S. Canst., Art. IV,§ 2, cl. 2:
"A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand
of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."
21
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slaves £231 ; ) third, that declaring that the 'citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.' £241
"And, sir, every one of these-the only provisions where
it was deemed that legislation was required to enforce the
constitutional provisions-the only thr ~e where the right.<;
or liabiliti es of persons in the States, as between these persons and the States, arc directly provided for, Congress
has by legislation affirmatiYely interfered to protect ...
such persons." Globe App., a.t 69-70.
Of legislation mentioned by Shellabarger, the closest analog
of the Sherman amendment, ironically, was the statute implementing the fugitives from justice and fugitive slave provisions
of Art. IV-the Act of Feb. 12. 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302-the
.constitutionality of which had been sustained in 1842, in Prigg
.v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539. There, Mr. Justice Story,
writing for the Court, held that Art. IV gave sla.veowners a
·federal right to the unhindered possession of their slaves in
whatever State such slaves might be found. 16 Pet., at 612.
Because state process for recovering runaway slaves might be
inadequate or even hostile to the rights of the slaveowner,
.the right intended to be conferred could be negated if left to
state implementation. Id ., at 614. Thus, since the Constitution gua.ra.nt.eed the right and this in turn required a. remedy,
Story held it to be a "natural inference" that Congress had
.the power itself to ensure an appropriate (in the Necessary
and Proper Clause sense) remedy for the right. Id., at 615.
Building on Prigg, Shellabarger argued that a remedy
against municipalities and counties >vas an appropriate-andj
23

!d., cl. 3:
''No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
Elicaping into another, shall, in Cousequcncc of any Law or Regulation
therein, be disch:~rged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due."
u !d., cl. 1.
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hence constitutional-method for ensuring the protection
which the Fourteenth Amendment made ('Very citizen's federal
right. 25 This much was clear from the adoption of such
statutes by the several States as devices for suppressing riot.~c
Thus, said Shellabarger, the only serious question remaining
was "whether, since a county is an integer or part of a State,
the United States can impose upon it, as such, any obligations
to keep the peace in obedience to United States laws." 2 ' This
he answered affirmatively. citing Board of Commissioners v.
Aspinwall, 24 How. 376 ( 1861). the first of many cases ~ 8
upholding the po\\'er of federal courts to enforce the Contract
Clause against municipalities.~ 0
The most complete statement of the constitutional argument
of the House opponents of the Sherman amendment--,:v·hose
views are particularly important since only the House voted
down the amendment-,vas that of Representative Blair: 30
"The proposition known as the Sherman amendment ... is entirely new. It is altogether without a pre25 See Globe, at 751.
See also id., at 760 (Sen. Sherman) ("If a State
may ... pass a law making a county ... responsible for a riot in order
to deter such crime, then we may pass the same remedies . . . .").
2c !d., at 751; seen. 17, supra.
27 Globe, at 751 (emphasis added).
Compare this statement with Representative Poland's remark upon which our holding in Monroe was based.
Seep. 5, supra.
28 See, e. g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque. 1 Wall. 175 (1864); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 id .. 535 (1 867) ; Riggs v . Johnson County, 6
id., 166 (1868); Weber v. Lee County, 6 icl., 210 (1868); Supervisors v.
Rogers, 7 id., 175 (1869); Benbow v. Iowa City, 7 id., 313 (1869); Supervisors v. Durant, 9 id., 415 (1870). See generally C. Fairman, History of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction and Reunion,
1864-1888, chs. 17-18 (1971).
29 See Globe, at 751-752.
30 Others taking a view simihr to Repref'entative Blair's included:
Represcnta.tivo Willard, see id., at 791 ; Representative Poland, see id., at
794; Representi~,tive Burchard, sec id ., a.t 795; Representative Famsworth,
see id., at 799. Representative Willard also took a somewhat different

l
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cedent in this country. . . . That amendment claims the
power in the General Governn1cnt to go into the State§
pf this Union and lay such obligations as it may please
upon the municipalities, which are the creations of the
States alone . . . .
" ... [H]ere it is proposed, not to carry into effect an
obligation which rests upon the municipality, but to
position. He thought that the Constitution would not allow the F ederal
(,}overnment to dictMe the mann r r in which n State fulfilled its obligatiQI)
P.f protection. That is, he thought it a matt er of state disc retion whether
tt delega.ted the pen.crkreping power to a muni cipal or county corporatioi),
to a sheriff, etc. He did not doubt, howeYer, that the Federal Gowrnmcnt
could impose on the States the obligation imposed by the Shermnn amenqment, and presumably he would have enforced the amendment against a
municipal corporation to which tJ1e peacekeeping obligation had been
delegat.ed. See id., nt 791.
Opponents of the Shrrman amrndmcnt in the Senate ag rer d with Blair
Jhat Congress had 110 power to pass the Sherman amendment because it
'fell outside limits on national power impli('it in the federal structure of the
{jonstitution, and recognizr d in, e. g., Collector Y. Day, 11 Wall.113 (1871).
How~ver, thr Senate opponrnts focu:<cd not on the amrnclment's attempt
t<> obligate municip a litie ~ to krep thr peaee, but on the lien created by the
1
amendment, which ran against a!? monr.y and property of a, defcn!lant.
municipality, including property held for public purpo ~rs, such as jails or
courthouses. Opponent s argued that such a lien once enterrd would haYe
,the effect of making it impo~ ~ ible for the municipality to function , since no
pne would trade w.ith it.. Sec, e. g., Qlobc, nt 762 (Sen. Stevenson); id.,
at 763 (Sen. Ca::serly). :.Ioreover, 'everyone knew that sound policy
prevented execution against public property since thi,; too was needed if
local government was to 8urvive. Sec, e. g., ibid, See also Meriwether v.
(Jarrett, 102 U. S. 472, 501, 513 (1880) (recognizing principle that public
ro
· · ):tlity not subject to execution); 2 Dillon, ?viunicipal
73 eel.) (~ume).
Corporations §§ 4-15-!-!6
Although the argmnrnt:;; of the Srnntc orponents appear to be a correct
,11nalysis of thrn-controlling eon~titutional and common-law principlrs, their
arguments are not rrlevant to an analy~is of lhc canst it ut ionality of § 1 of
tho Civil Rights Act :o:ince any judgmrnt under that section, as in any civil
suit in the fedcrnl court~ in 1871, would hnw been rnforcrd purHuant. to
state laws under the procr~s acts of 1792 and 1828. Sec Act of Muy 8,
1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 215; Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278.
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create that obligation, and that is the provision I am
unable to assent to. The parallel of the hundred docs not
in the least meet the case. The power that laid the
obligation upon the hundred first put the duty upon the
hundred that it should perform in that regard, and failing
to meet the obligation which had bern laid upon it, it was
very proper that it should suffer dnmage for its neglect . ...
" ... [T]here are certain rights and duties that belong
to the States, ... there are certain powers that inhere in
the State governments. They create these municipalities,
they say what their powers shall be and what their obligations shall be. If the Government of the United States
can step in a.nd add to those obligations, may it not
utterly destroy the municipality? If it can say that it
shall be liable for damages occurring from a riot, . . .
where [will] its power ... stop and what obligations ...
might [it] not lay upon a municipality . . . .
"Now, only the other day, the Supreme Court . . .
decided [in Collector v. Day, 11 \Vall. 113 (1871)] that
there is no power in the Government of the United States,
under its authority to tax, to tax the salary of a State
bfficer. Why? Simply because the pO\YCr to tax involves
the power to destroy, and it was not the intent to give
the Government of the United States power to destroy
the government of the States in any respect. It was held
also in the ·case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania [ 16 Pet. 539
(J842)] that it is not within the power of the Congress
of the United States to lay duties upon a State officer;
that we cannot command a State officer to do any duty
whatever, as such; and I ask ... the difference between
that and commanding a municipality \Yhich is rqually the
creature of the State, to perform a duty." Globe, at 795.
Any attempt to impute a unitary constitutional theory tol
Opponents of the Sherman amendment is. of course. fraught
with difficulties, not the least of which is that most Members
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of Congress did not speak to the issue of the constitutionality
of the amendment. Nonetheless, two con siderations lead us
to conclude that opponents of the Sherman amendment found
it unconstitutional suSStantia]f, bc"ca se of the reasons stated
by eJ!resenta 1ve Bl~r: 1 irs Blair's analysis is precisely
that of Poland'7""whose views were quoted "S authoritative in
Monroe, see p. 5, supra, and that analysis \vas shared in large
part by all House opponents who addressed the constitutionality of the Sherman amcndment. 31 €cin])Blair's exegesis
of the reigning constitutional theory of is day, as we shall
explain, was clearly supported by precedent-albeit precedent
that has not survived, see Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339,
347-348 (1880); Graves v. N ew York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S.
46
9)-and no other o ·e constitutional formula
was advanced by any other participant in the House debates.
Collector v. Day, cited by Blair, was the clearest and, at the
time of the debates, the most recent pronouncement of a
doctrine of coordinate sovereignty tha.t, as Blair stated, placed
limits on even the enumerated po,Yers of the N a.tional Government in favor of protecting State prerogatives. There, the
Court held that the Uuited States could not tax the income of
Day, a Massachusetts state judge, because the independence
of the States within their legitimate spheres would be imperiled
if the instrumentalities through \vhich States executed their
powers were "subject to the control of another and distinct
government." 11 Wall .. at 127. Although the Court in Day
apparently rested this holding in part on the proposition that
the taxing "power acknowledges no limits but the will of
the legislative body imposing the tax," id., at 125-126; cf.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 \Vheat. 316 (1819) , the Court had
in other cases limited other national powers in order to avoid
interference with the States. 3 ~
See n. 30, supra.
In addition to the <'ilses di~russcd in text , see Lane County v. Oregon,
7 Wall. 71, 77, 81 (1869), in which the Court held that the federal legal
31
32
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In Prigg v. Pennsylva.nia, supra, for example, Mr. Justice
Story, in addition to confirming a broad national power to
legislate under the Fugitive Slave Clause, seep. 12, supra, held
that Congress could not "insist that states ... provide means
to carry into efTect the duties of the national government."
16 Pet .. at 615-616. 33 And Mr. Justice McLean agreed that,
"[a]s a general principle," it was true "tha.t Congress had no
power to impose duties on state officers. as provided in the
[Act of 1793, supra]." Konetheless he wondered whether
Congress might not impose "positive" duties on sta.te officers
where a clause of the Constitution, like the Fugitive Slave
Clause, seemed to require affirmative government assistance,
rather than restraint of government, to secure federal rights.
See id., at 664-665.
Had Justice McLean been correct in his suggestion that,
where the Constitution envision ed affirmative government
assistance, the States or their officers or instrumentalities could
be required to provide it. there would have been little doubt
that Congress could have insisted that municipalities afford
by "positive" action the protection 31 owed individuals under
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, any such argument, largely foreclosed by Prigg, was made impossible by the
Court's holding in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861).
There, the Court was asked to require Dennison, the Governor
of Ohio, to hand over Lago, a fugitive from justice wanted in
tender acts shou ld not be construed to require the States to accept taxes
tendered In United States notes since this might interfere with a legitimate
State activity.
3s Chief Judge Taney agreed:
"The state officers mentioned in the l:lw [of 1793] are not bound to
execute the duties imposE'd upon them by Congress , unless they choose to
do so, or are required to do so by a law of the state; and the state
legislature has the power, if it thinks proper, to prohibit thE'm. The act
of 1793, therefore, must depend altogether for its execution upon the offi- (
cers of the United States named in it." 16 Pet., at 630 (Taney, C. J.).
34 See pp. 10-11, and n. 21, supra.
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Kentucky, as required by§ 1 of the Act of 1793.~" supra, which
implemented Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. of the Constitution. Chief
Justice Taney, writing for a unanimous Court, refused to
enforce that section of the Act:
lt[W]e think it clear, that the Federal Government, under
tl:.e Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it; for if it possessed this power, it might overload
the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and
disable him from performing his obligations to the State,
and might impose on him duties of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to which he was elevated by
the State." 24 How., at 107-108.
The rationale of Dennison-that the Nation could not
impose duties on state officers since that might impede States
in their legitimate activities-is obviously identical to that
which animated the decision in Collector v. Day. Sec p. lG,
supra. And, as Blair indicated. municipalities as instrumentalities through which States· executed their policies could be
equally disabled from carrying out State policies if they were
also obligated to carry out federally imposed duties. Although
no one cited Dennison by name. the principle for which it
stands was well known to Members of Congress, 30 many of
"Be it enacted ... That whenever the executive authority of any state
in the Union ... shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice ...
and shall moreover produce a copy of an indictment found ... charging
the person so demanded, with ha,ving committed treason, felony or other
crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the
state ... from whence the person so charged fled, it sha,l! be the duty of
the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person shall
have fled, to cause him or her to be arrested and secured . . . and to
cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent [of the demanding state]
when he shn 1! appear . . . . " 1 Stat. 302.
36 "The Supremr Court of the United States has decided repeatedly that
Congress can impose no duty on a State officer." Globe, at 799 (Rep.
Farnsworth). Sec also id ., at 788-789 (Rep. Kerr).
35
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whom discussed Day 37 as well as a series of state supreme
court cases "8 in the mid-18GO's which had invalidated a fecleml
tax on the process of state courts on the ground that th e tax
threaten ed the independence of a vital state function.:w Thus,
there was ample support for Blair's view that the Sherman
amendment, by putting mtmicipalitirs to the Hobson 's choice
of keepmg the peace or paylllg c1vd damages, attempted to
impose obhgah ons on munJcJpa hbes b mchrectwn that could
not e Impose
irectly. thereby threatenin g to "destroy the
government of the States." Globe, at 795.
If municipal liability under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
created a similar Hobson's choice. we might conclude, as
Monroe did, that Congress could not have intended municipalities to be among the "persons" to which that section
applied. But this is not the case.
The limits on federal power mandated by the doctrine of
coordinate sovereignty are some\vhat difficult to discern as a
matter of logic, but quite apparent as a matter of history. It
must be remembered that the same Court · ·
ndered Day
also vigorously enforced the Contracts ause aga nst municipalities.40 Under the theory of dual olvereignt set out in
Prigg, this is quite understandable. S.~:w.~llill:~~.w.ti~~~
were vindicating the Federal Constitution, they were providing
the " ositive" government action required to protect federal
constitutional rig ts an no questron ·was raise o en IS mg e
States in "positive'' action. Moreover, federal judicial enforce87 See, e. g., Globe, at 764 (Sen. Davis): ibid. (Sen . Casserly); id., 772
(Sen. Thurman) (rec iting logic of Day) ; id., at 777 (Sen. Frelinghuyscn);
id., at 788- 789 (Rep. K err) (reciting logic of Day) ; id ., at 793 (Rep.
Poland); id., at 799 (Rcp. Fam sworth) (also re<'iting logic of Day).
88 Warren v. Paul , 22 Ind . 2il3 (1 ~6-0 ; Jo nes v. Estate of K ee p. 19
Wis. 369 (1865); Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich . 505 (1867); Union Bank v.
Hill, 3 Cold. (43 Tenn.) 325 (1866); Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385 (1867) .
3 9 See Globe, at 764 (Sen. Davis ); ibid . (Sen . Casserlcy).
See abo T.
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations *483-*484 (1871 ed.).
40 See n. 28, supra.

,
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ment of the Constitution's express limits on state po,ver, since
it was done so frequently, must notwithstanding anything said
in Dennison or Day have been permissible, at least so long as
the interpretation of the Constitution was left in the hands of
the judiciary. Si nee § 1 of the Civil Rights Act simply
conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce § 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment-a situation precisely analogous
to the grant of diversity j uriscliction under which the Con tract
Clause was enforced against municipalities-there is no reason
to suppose that opponents of the Sherman amendment \vould
have found any constitutional barrier to § 1 suits against
municipalities.
Indeed, opponents expressly distinguished between imposing
an obligation to keep the peace and merely imposing civil
liability for damages on a municipality that was obligated by
state law to keep the peace, but which had not in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Poland, for
example, reasoning from Contract Clause precedents, indicated
that Congress could constitutionally confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts to entertain suits seeking to hold municipalities
liable for using their authorized powers in violation of the
.Constitution-v•hich is as far as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
.went:
"I presume ... that where a Sta.te had imposed a duty
[to keep the :peace] upon [a] municipality ... an action
would be all~wed to be maintained against them in the
courts of the United States under the ordinary restrictions
as to jurisdiction. But enforcing a liability, existing by
their own contract, or by a State law, in the courts, is a
very widely different thing from devolving a new duty or
liability upon them by the national Government, which
has no power either to create or destroy them, and no
power or control over them whatever." Globe, at 794.
Representative Burchard agreed:
"[T]here is no duty imposed by the Constitution of the
United States, or usually by Sta.te laws, upon a county to
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protect the people of that coun tv against the commission
of the offenses herein enumerated, such as the burning of
buildings or any other injury to property or injury to
person. Police powers are not conferred upon counties as
corporations; they are conferred upon cities that ha.ve
'qualified legislative power. And so fa;,· as cities are con.cerned, where the equal protection required to be afforded
by a State is imposed upon a city by State ln,ws, perhaps
the United States courts could enforce its performance. But COU!;l~ies .. : . do not have any control of the
police . . . ." I d., at 795 .
....

"

·.

That those who voted for § 1 of the Civil Rights Act, but
against the Sherman 'amendment, '~·ould no't have thought § 1
unconstitutional if it applied to municipalities is also confirmed
. by considering what exactly those voting for § 1 had approved.
Section 1 without question could be used to obtain a damage
judgment against state or municipal officials who violated
.federal constitutional rights while acf o m er color of law. 4 1
However, for Prigg-D ennison-Da.y purpors , as Blair and
others recognized ,42 there was no di incti of constitutional
. magnitude between officers and agents- including corporate
.agents-of the State : both were state instrumentalities and
the State could be impeded no matter over which sort of
instrumentality the Federal Government sought to assert its
,power. Dennison and Day, after all , were not suits against
_'municiRalities but against officers and Blair was quite conscious
that he was extending Prigg by applying it to municipal
4 1 See, e. g., Globe, at 334 (Rep. Hoar) ; id., at. 365 (Rep. Arthur); id .,
at 367-368 (Rep. Sheldon) ; id., at 385 (Rep. Lewis) ; Globe App., at 217
~(Sen. Thurman). In addition, officers were included among those who
could be sued under the srcond conference substitute for the Sherman
Amendment. See Globe, at 805 ( cxch~. ngr between Rep. Willard and Rep.
Shellabarger). There were no constitutional obj ections to the second
report.
42 See Globe, at 795 (Rep. Blair); id ., at 788 (Rep. Kerr); id., at 795
~Rep. Burchard) ; id., at 799 (Rep. Farnsworth).
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corporations.~~

Nonetheless, Senator Thurman, who gave the
most exhaustive critique of § l-inter alia. complaining that it
would be applied to state officers. see Globe, at 217-and v;ho
opposed both § 1 and the Sherman amendment, the latter on
Prigg grounds, agreed unequivocally that § 1 was constitutional.44 Those who voted for § 1 must similarly have believed
5n its constitutionality despite Prigg, Dennison, :md Da.y.

C. Debate on § 1 of the Civil Rights Bill
From the foregoing discussion, it is readily apparent that
nothing said in debate on the Sherman amendment would
have prevented holding a municipality liable under§ 1 of the
Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the FourtBenth
Amendm ent. The question remains, however, whether the
general language describing those to be liable under§ 1-"any
person"-covers more than natural persons. An examination
of the debate on § 1 and a.pplication of appropriate rules of
construction shows unequivocally that § 1 was intended to
cover legal as well as natural persons.
Representative Shellabarger was the first to explain the
function of § 1 :
"[Section 1] not only provides a civil remedy for persons
whose former condition may have been that of slaves,
but also to ail people where, under color of State law,
they or any of tJiej';l"'"may be deprived of rights to which
they are entitled under the Constitution by reason and
virtue of their national citizenship." Globe App., at 68.
43 "[W]e cannot command a State officer to do any duty whatever, as
Sllch; and I ask ... the difference between that and commanding :1 municipality ...." Globe, at 795.
44 See Globe App., at 216- 217, quoted, infra, at n. 45.
In 1879, moreover, when the question of the limits of the Priag principle was squarely
presented in Ex parte Fir inia. 100 U.S. 339 (1880), this Court hrld that
Dennison an
ay and the principle of federalism for which they stand
did not prohibit federal enforcement of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
through suits directed to state officers. See 100 U. S., at 345-348.
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By extending a remedy to all people, including whites, § 1
went beyond the mischief to which the remaining sections
of the 1871 Act were addressed. Representative Shellabaq~er
also stated without reservation that the constiTutionality of
§ 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 controlled the constitutionality of § 1 of the 1871 Act, and that the former had been
approved by "the supreme courts of at least three States of
this Union" and by 1\fr. Justice Swayne, sitting on circuit, who
had concluded "We have no doubt of the constitutionality of
every provision of this act." Ibid. He then went on to
describe how the courts would and should interpret § 1:
'"!'his act1rr-;;;1eaial, and in aid of the prcse;-ation of
human liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed. It ·would be most
strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the
rule of interpretation. As has been again and again decided by your own Supreme Court of the United States,
and everywhere else where there is wise judicial interpretation, the largest latitude consistent with the words
employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes
and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and
defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the
people. . . . Chief Justice Jay and also Story say:
"'Where a power is remedial in its nature there is
much reason to contend that it ought to be construed
liberally, and it is generally adopted in the interpretation
of laws.'-1 Story on Constitution, sec. 429." Globe App.,
at 68.
The sentiments expressed in Representative Shellabarger's
opening speech were echoed by Senator Edmunds, the manager of H. R. 320 in the Scnt>.te:
"The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to,
as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the
w
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United States when they are assailed by any State law or
under color of any State law , and it is merely carrying
out the principles of the civil rights bill [of 1866], which
have since become a part of the Constitution." Globe, at
568.
"{Section 1 is] so very simple and re.:t.Uy reenacting the
Constitution." I d., at 569.
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And he agreed that the bill "sccure[ed] the rights of white
men as much as of colored men." I d., at 696.
In both Houses, statements of the supporters of § 1 corroborated that Congress, in enacting § 1, intended to give a
co1nplete remed;; for violations of federally protected c1v1
rights.1 5 M oreover, since municipalities through their official

1
H Representative Bingham, the author of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, declared the bill's purpose to be "the enforcement . . .
of the Constitution on behalf of every individual citizen of the Republic .. .
to the extent of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution." Globe
.App., at 81. He continued:
"The States never had the right , though they had the power, to inflict
wrongs upon free citizens by a denial of the full protection of the laws ... .
[And] the States did deny to citizens the equal protection of the laws, they
.did deny the rights of citizens under the Constitution, and except to the
extent of the express limitations upon the States, as I have shown, the
citizen had no remedy. . . . They took property without cornpen&'ltion,
and he had no remedy. They restricted the freedom of the press, and he
had no remedy. They restricted the freedom of speech, and he had no
remedy. They restricted the rights of conscience, and he had no remedy. . . . Who dare say, now that the Constitution has been amended,
that the nation cannot by la.w pro,·ide aga inst all such abuses and denials
of right as these in the States and by States, or combinations of persons?"
il.d., at 85.
Representative Perry, commenting on Congress' action in passing the civil
·rights bill also stated:
"Now, by our action on this bill we have asserted as fully as we can
:-assert the mischief intended to be remedied. \Ve have asserted as clearly
as we can assert our belief that it is the duty of Congress to redress that
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acts, could equally with natural persons create the harms
intended to be remedied by ~ 1, and, further, since Congress
intended § 1 to be broadly construed, there is no reason to
suppose that municipal corporations would have been excluded
from the sweep of § 1. Cf., e. g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S.
339, 31.6-347 (1880); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles,

I

mischief. We have also a~i"erted as fully as we can assert the constitutional
right of Congress to legislnte." Globe, at 800.
See also id., at 376 (Rep. Lowe); id., at 428-429 (Rep. Beatty); id.,
at 448 (Rep. Butler) ; id., at 475-477 (Rep. Dawes); id ., at 578-579 (Sen.
Trumbull); id., at 609 (Sen. Pool); Globe App., at 182 (Rep. l\1ercur).
Other supporters were quite clear that § 1 of the act. extended a remedy
not only where a State had passed an unconstitutional statute, but also
where officers of the State were deliberately indifferent to the rights of
black citizens:
"But the chief complaint is [that] by a systematic maladministration of
[state law], or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion of
the people are denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a state
of facts is clearly made out, I believe [§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment] empowers Congress to step in and provide for doing justice to those
persons who are thus denied equal protection." Globe App., at 153 (Mr.
Garfield). Sec also Monroe v. Pape, supra, n. 7, at 171-187.
Importantly for our inquiry, even the opponents of § 1 agreed that it. was
con<>titutional and, further. that it repre ~e nted an attempt broadly to
exercise the ower conferred by§ 5 of the Fourteent
mencmen .
Senator 1Urm:m, w o gave 1e most exhaustive critique of § 1, said:
"This section relates wholly to civil suits. . . . Its whole effect is to give
to the F·ederal Judiciary that which now doC';; not belong to it-a jurisdiction that -may be constitutionally conferred upon it, I grant, but that has
never yet been conferred upon it. It authorizes any person who is deprived
of any right, privilege, or immunit~· tiCcured to him by the Constitution of
the United States, to bring an action against the wrongdoer in the Federal
courts, and that without any limit whatsoever as to the amount in
controversy ....

"[T]here is no limitation whatsoever upon the terms that are employed
[in the bill], and they are as comprehensive as can be used." Globe App.,
at 216-217 (emphasis added).

7 7
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227 U.S. 278, 286-287,204-206 (1013). One nerd not rely on
this inference alone, however, for the debates show that Members of Congress understood "persons" to include municipal
corporations.
Representative Bingham, for example, in discussing § 1 of
the bill, explained that he had drafted § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment with the case of Barron v. Baltim
Pet. 243
(1834), especially in mind. "In [that] case t e city hal taken
·private property for )Ublic use, w1t 1ou co ens
n ... ,
an t 1ere was no re ress for t e wrong . . . . " Globe App.,
at 84 (emphasis added). Bingham's further remarks clearly
indicate his view that such takings as had occurred in Barron
would be redressable under § 1 of the bill. See id., a.t 85.
More generally, and as Bingham's remarks confirm, § 1 of the
bill would logically be the vehicle by which Congress provided
that section provided the only civil
redress
·
·
the Fourteenth Amendment and that
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46 See Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
'§ 1956 (Cooley ed. 1873).
41 Indeed the federal courfs found no obstacle to awnrds of dama:;es
~gainst municipalities for common-law takings. See Sumner v. Philadelphia, 23 F. Cas. 392 (CCED Pa. 1873) (No. 13,611) (awa.rding damages
of $2,273.36 and costs of $346.35 against the city of Philadelphia).
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1789. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61,
86 (1809). 48 By 1844, however, the Deveaux doctrine was
unhesitatingly abandoned:
"[A] corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes
as a person, although an artificial person, ... capable of
being treated as a citizen of that s1ate, as much as a
natural person." Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497,
558 (184.4) (emphasis added), discussed in Globe, at 752.
And only two years before the debates on the Civil Rights
Act, in Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 ·wall. 118, 121 (1869), the
Letson principle was automatically and without discussion
extended to municipal corporations. Under this doctrine,
municipal corporations were routinely sued in the federal
courts 49 and this fact was well known to Members of
Congress. 50
That the "usual" meaning of the word person would extend
to municipal corporations is also evidenced by an Act of
Congress which had been passed only months before the Civil
Rights Act was passed. This Act provided tha.t
"in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word 'person' may
extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate ... unless the context shows that such words were
intended to be used in a more limited sense [] ." Act of
Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
Municipal corporations in 1871 were included within the
48 Nonetheless, suits could be brought in federal court if the natural
persons who were members of the corporation were of diverse citizenship
from the other parties to the litigation. See 5 Crunch, at 91.
-t9 See n. 28, supra.
50 See, e. g., Globe, at 777 (Sen. Sherman); id., at 752 (Rep. Shellabarger) ("counties, cities, and corporations of all sorts, after yea.rs of
judicial conflict, have become thoroughly established to be n.n inJi,·idual or
person or entity of the personal existence, of which, as a. citizen, individual, or inhabitant., the United States Constitution docs take note n.nd endow
with faculty to sue and be sued in the courts of the United States.").
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phrase "bodies politic and corporate" 51 and, accordingly, the
"plain meaning" of § 1 is that local government bodies were
to be included within the ambit of the persons who could be
sued under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. Indeed , a Circuit
Judge, ·writing in 1.873 in what is apparently the first reported
case ur.der § 1, read the Dictionary Act in precisely this way
in a case involving a corporate plaintiff and a municipal
defendant."2 See N ortl11cestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,
18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,336). 63
61 See Northwestern Fertilizing Co . v. H yde Park, 18 F . Cas . 393 , 394
(CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,336) ; 2 K ent's Commentaries '-·278-~:· 279 (12th
0 . \V. Holmrs ed. 1873). SeE' ab o Unit ed States v. Mawice, 2 Brock. 96',
1'09 (CC Va. 1823) (1\fnr;;hall , C. J.) ("Th e Unitffi St:~t e::; is a government,
and, con ·equently , a body politi c and corporate" ) ; Brief for Petitioner in
llfonroe v. Pape, 0 . T. 1960, No. 39, App's. D and E (collecting state
statutes which, in 1871, defined municipal corporations as bodies politic
~nd corporate) .
·. 62 The court also noted that there was no discernible reason why persons
injured by municipal corporations should not be able to recover. See 18
F. Cas., at 394.
53 In considE'ring the effrct of the Ad of F eb . 25, 1871 in Monro e, however, Justice Douglas, apparently focusing on the word "may," stat ed : " this
'definition [of person] is merely an allowable, not a mandatory, one." 36.5
·U. S., at 191. A review of the legisla tive history of the Dictionary Act
sbows this conclusion to be incorrect.
There is no express referr nce in the legislative history to the definition of
1person, but Senator Tmmbull, the Act 's spon.sor, di ·cu&;ed the phrase
1
'\vords importing the masculine gender may be applird to females ,"
(emphasis added), which immediately precedes the definition of person, and
,stated:
~'The only obj ect. [of the Act] is to get rid of a great deal of verbosity
·'in our statutes by providing that when the words 'he' is used it shall
· include females as well as malrs[]." Congressional Globe, 41st Cong., 3d
. Sess., 775 (Jan. 27, 1871) (rmphasis added).
Thus, in Trumbull's view t.he word "may" meant "shall." Such a mandatory u ~e of the rxtendcd mc-.:w ings of the words dd incd by the .\ct
is also required for it to pC'rform its intended function-to be a guide
to "rules of construction" of Act · of Cong,re~s . Sec id., at 775 (Remarks
of Sen. Trumbull). Were the defined words " allowable, [but] not ma.nda-
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II
Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend
municipalities and other local government units to be included
among those persons to whom § 1983 applies. 51 Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or mJunctive relief where, as here, the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutioiialimplcmentsor
executes a pollcy statemei~t,orclinail(;, regulation , or decisloi1
officially adopted and promu1gated by '"t!1atbody's oHicffs.
lV!Orcover, alt't'i'Ol7gh the touchstone of the § 1983 action against
a government body is an allegation that o c1al polic is
responsible for a deprivation of rights protec e
y t 1e Constitution, local governments, like every other § 1983 "person,"
tory" constructions, as ~Monroe suggests, there would be no "rules" at all.
Instead, Congress must. ha \'e intended the definitions of the Act to apply
across-the-board except where the Act by its terms called for a deviation
from this practicc-"[where] the context shows that [defined] words
were to be used in a more limited sense." Certainly this is how the
Northwestern Fertilizing court Yiewed the matter. Sin ce there is nothing
in the "context" of § 1 of the Ci\·il Rights Act calling for a restricted
interpretation of the word "person," the language of that section should
prima facie be construed to include "bodies politic" among the entities that
could be sued.
M There is certainly no constitutional impediment 1o muni ci])a] liability.j
"The Tenth Amrndmcnt's reserYation of nondelegatcd power::: to the States
is not implicated by a fedrral-court, judgment enforcing the expre~s prohibitions of unlawful state conduct {'nartcd by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977); see Ex parte Virginia. 100
U. S. 339, 347-348 ( 1 80). For this reason, National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), is irrcle\·ant to our con~ideration of this case.
Nor is there any basis for conrluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a
bar to municipn.l liability. See. e. g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U . S. 445,
456 (1976); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529,530 (1890). Our
holrling todny is, of conr~e, limited 1o local government units which nre not
considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Where
this is not the ca::;e, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 {1974), and Milliken
v. Bradley, supra, govern the framework for analysis.

I
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by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmenta.l "custom" even though such a custom has not received formal
approv,gltErotighthe bO<i'Ys Ofi'i'C'ia1 decisionmaking chann~ls.
As Mr. Justice Harlan recognized: "Congress included custom
and usage [in § 1083] because of persistent :end widespread
discriminatory practices of State officials. . . . Although not
authorized by written la\Y , such practices of state officials could
~ well be ~o _p~m_an(ill.t aJ1<L \Vell setJ;kd as to _constit~ a
'custom oru ag7' with tie fOrce of law." Acli'Ck.es v. S. H.
Kress · o. , 398 . S. 144, 16 - 1 8 ( t0). 55
On the other hand, the language of § 1983, read against
the background of the same legislative history, compels the
~-4---conclusion that Congress did not inte1
icipalit'
e
held liable unless official municipa action f some nature
caused a constitutional tort. In par · - . we conclude tha
a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs
a tortfeasor-or. in other words, a municipality cannot be hel
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat supe1·ior theory.
We begin with the language of § 1983 as passed:
"[A]ny person who, under color of any law,

-

~~~See

also Justice

Frankfurt e r'~

$lntemrnt in Nashville, C. & St. L. R.

/]o. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 363, 369 (1940):
"It would be a narrow concept ion of juri~prudence to confine the notion of
'Jaws' to what is found written on the statute books, and to disregard the
gloss which life has writ ten upon it. Settled :;tatr practice . . . can
establish what is state lnw. The Equal Prot rction Clnu ~ e did not write an
,empty formali sm into tho Coni'titution. Deeply embecldccl tmditional ways
.of carrying out stnte policy, such as tho~e of which petitioner compla ins,
are often tougher and truer law thnn tho dr:1d words of the writt en text."
Moreover, m.Het iY ~cucrol crrote n ,·joht.i(lU...of the C.ons.t.itut.icm"ns we ·
affinned two Terms ngo, where thr Con.-<t itution impo,:e::; :t dut~· on s tate
officials to act, and they are delibcrntrly indifferent to th:1t duty-n form
of inaction which by its nature \\'Ill sclcTOm be olhcw lly adopted or written
local policy-§ 1983 provides an a \'Cnue of rcdr~d . Sec Estelle Y. Gamble,
429 U. S. 97, 104--105 (Hli6) .
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ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall
subject, or c~ tQ be subje~ted, any person ... to the
deprivation of any rights, priVileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution of the United States, shall, a.n y such
law, statute, ordinance, regulation , custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwith standing, be liable to the
party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . ." Globe App., at 335
(emphasis added).
The italicized language plainly imposes liability on a government that, under color of some official policy, "causes" an
employee to violate another's constitutional rights. At the
same time, that language cannot be easily read to impose
liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of
the existence of an employer-employee relation ship with a
tortfeasor. Indeed , the fact that Congress did specifically
provide that A's tort became B's liability if B "caused" A to
subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend
§ 1983 liability to attach "·here such cau sation '"as absent."a {
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 370-371 (1976).
56 Support for such a conclusion ca n b<' found in th <' lcgi;:Jatiw hi ~ tory .
As we have indica ted , there is virtually no di::;cussion of § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act. Again, however, Con gress' treatment of the Sherman am<'ndment gives a clue to whether it would have desired to impose respondeat
superior liability.
The prima ry consti tutional justification for the Sherman amendment was ·
that it was a nece>'sa ry and proper rr medy fo r the failure of localitie:; to
protect citizens a ~ the PriYilege,: or Immuniti es Clau~e of the F omtecnth
Amendment required . SeC' pp . 10-13, supra . And according to Sherman,
Shellabarger, and Edmund:;, the am endmC'nt camr into play only wh en a
locality was a t fault or h:1d neglreted it ~ dut~ · to proYide protec tion . See
Globe, at 761 (Sen. Sherman): id .. at 75G (Sen. E dmunds ) ; id., at 751-752
(Rep. Shellabarger). But other propon e nt.~ of the am endment apparently
viewed it as a form of Y i ra ri ou ~ liability for th<' unlawful nets of the
citizens of the locality. See id ., a t 792 (R ep. Butler). And whether
intended or not, tho amendment as drafted did impose a species of
vicarious liability on municipalities since it could be construed to impose
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Equally important, creation of a federal law of respondeat
superior where state law did not impose such an obligation
would raise all the constitutional problems associated with the
obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress chose not
to impose because it thought imposition of such an obligation
unconstitutional. To this clay, there is disagreement about
the basis for imposing vicarious liability on an employer for
the torts of an employre when the employer itself is not at
fault. 5 7 See W. ProEscr, Law of Torts, § 69, at 5G9 (4th ed.
1971). Nonethclca:l,. two justifications tend to stand out.
First in the commonsense notion that no matter how blameliability even if a municipnlity did not know of an impending or ensuing
riot or did not have the whc!·ewithall to do anything about it. Indeed, the
statute held. a municipality linblc even if it had done everything in its
power to curb the riot. Sec p . 8. supra; Globe, at 761 (Sen. Stevens); id.,
at 771 (Sen. Thurman); id .. at 7 8 (R ep. Kerr); id., at 791 (Rep. Willard).
While the first conferenre substitute was rejected principally on constitutional grounds, see id., at 804 (Rep. Poland), it is plain from the text of
the second conference substitute-which limited liability to those who,
having the power to inteJTcne ngainst Ku Klux violence, "neglect[ed] or
refuse[d] so to do," see Appendix, infra, at. 41, and which was enacted as
§ 6 of the 1871 Act and is now codified as 42 U.S. C. § 1986-that Congress
also rejected those elements of vicarious liability contained in the first
conference substitute even while nccepting the basir principle that the
inhabitants of a communit~· were bound to provide protection against the
Ku Klux Klan. Strictly speaking, of course, the fact thnt Congress refused·
to impose vicarious liability for the wrongs of a few private citizens does
not conclusively establish that it would similarly have refused to impose
vicarious liability for the torts of a municipality's employees. Nonetheless, when Congress' rejection of the only form of vicarious liability
presented to it is combined with the absence of any langunge in § 1983
which can easily be construed· to create respondeat superior lin.bility, the
inference that. Congress did not intend to impose such liability is quite
st.rong.
57
We note, however, thnt where there is fault in hiring, training, or
direction, thnt fnult is the bnsis for li:1bi!ity under the common law, sec 2
F. Harper & F. James, The Law of TorL, § 26.1, at 1362-1363 (1956), not
the fault of the employcc-tortfeasor vicariously applied to the employer.
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less an employer appears to be in an individual case, accidents
might nonetheless be reduced if employers had to bear the cost
of accidents. Sec, e. g., ibid.; 2 F. Harper & James, The Law
of Torts, § 26.3, at 1368-1369 ( 1956). Second is the argument
that the cost of accidents should be spread to the community
as a whole on an insurance theory. See, e. g., id., § 26.5;
v.,r. Prosser, supra, at 459. 58
The first justification is of the same sort that was offered for
the Sherman amendment: "The obligation to make compensation for injury resulting from riot is, by arbitrary enactment of
statutes, affirmatory law, and the reason of passing the statute
is to secure a more perfect police regulation." Globe, at 777
(Sen. Frelinghuysen). This ·usti cation was obviously insufficient to sustain the amendment against percCJvc constituti~na1 difficulties and there is no reason to suppose that a more
general liability imposed for a similar reason would have been
thought less constitutionally objectionable. The second justification was similarly put forward as a justification for the
Sherman amendment: "we do not look upon [the Sherman
amendment] as a punishment.... It is a mutual insurance."
/d., a.t 792 (Rep. Butler). Again, this justification was insufficient to sustain the amendment.
fusum, a local government may be sued for monetary,
declaratory, or injunctive relief under § 1983 when it is at
fault, but not for the fault purely of its employees or agents. 59
58

A third justification, often cited but which on examination is apparently insufficient to justify the doctrine of respondeat superior, see, e. (1.,
2 F. Harper & F . James, supra, n. 61, § 26.3, is that. liability follows the
right to control the actions of a tortfeasor. By our decision in Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), we \Yould appear to have decided that the
mere right to control without. any control or direction having been cxcrci~ed
and without any failure to ~upcrvbe is not. enough to support § 1983
liability. Sec id., at. 370-371.
59 Given the Yariety of wa~·s that official polirv ma~· be> demon,.trate>d. we
do not today attempt to e>stabli5h any firm guidelines for determining when
individual action executes or implements official policy. However, given
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It is only when the government's policy, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official po~cy. ~elf inflicts the injury or itself
authorizes orc'i'irCcts the speciflCUct charged against its officer r.o
that the government is responsible under ~ 1983. In all other
cases, a § 1983 action must be brought against the individual
officer;.: whose acts form the basis of the § 1983 complaint.

III
Although we have stated that stare decisis has more force in
statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication because,
in the former situation, Congress can correct our mistakes
our conclusion that Congress did not intend to enact a. regime of vicarious
liability, whateYer offirial action is involvrd must be su ffi cient to support a
conclusion that a local gov<'rnmrnt itself is to bl ame or is at fault.
For example, in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), we recognized
that fault is a crucial factor in determining whether relief may run against
a party for its alleged participation in a constitutional tort. Distinguishing
the relief approved by the lower courts in Rizzo from that sanctioned
by this Court in school desegregation cases, the Court explained:
"Respondents ... ignore a critical factual distinction between their case
'and the desegregation cases decided by this Court. In the latter, segregation imposed by law had been implemented by state authorities for varying
'periods of time, whereas in the instant case the District Court found that
't he responsible authorities had played no affirmative part in depriving any
members of the two respondent classes of any constitutional rights. Those
against whom injunctive relief was directed in cases such as Swann [v.
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971),] and
Brown [v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) ,] were not administrators and school board members who had in their employ a small number
•of individuals, which latter on their own deprived black students of their
constitutional rights to a unitary school system. They were administrators
and school board members who were found by their own conduct in the
administration of the school system to have denied those rights. Here, the
District Court found that none of the petitioners had deprived the
respondent classes of any ri~hts secured under the Constitution. 423 U. S.,
at 377 (emphasis in original).
Go See, however, n. 55, supra.
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through legislation , see, c. g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
671, and n. 14 (1974), "·;c have never applied stare dccis·is
mechanically to prohibit overruling our earlier decisions determining the meaning of statutes. See, e. g. , Conti11ental T. V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1977); Burnet
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. , 285 U. S. 393, 406 n. 1 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., disf'\rnting) (collecting cases) . . Nor is this a case
where we should "place on the shoulders of Congress the
burden of the Court's 0\\'11 error." Girouard v. United States,
328
61,70 (1946).
First, Monroe v. ?ape, supra, insofar as it completely
immunizes municipalities from suit under§ 1983, was a departure from prior practice. See, e. g., Northwestern Fertilizing
Co. v. Hyde Park, supra; City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117
F. 2d 661 (CAl 1941); Hannan v. City of Haverhill, 120 F. 2d
87 (CAl 1941); Douglas v. City of Jeann ette, 319 U. S. 157
(1943); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 3t50 U. S. 879 (1955), in
each of which municipalities were defendants in § 1983 suits.a 1
Moreover, the constitutional defect that led to the rejection
of the Sherman amendment would not have distinguished
between municipalities and school boards, each of which is an
instrumentality of state adminif'\trntion. See pp. 14-22. supra.
For this reason, our cases-decided both before and after
Monroe, sec n. 5, supra-holding school boards liable in § 1983
actions are inconsistent with Monroe, especially as }vfonroe's
immunizing principle was extended to suits for injunctive relief
in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973).G 2 And

u.s.

61 Each case cited by 1\:[ onroe, see 365 U. S., at 191 n. 50, as consistent
with the position that local governments were not § 1983 "persons"
reached its conclusion by ns~uming that state-hw immunities overrode the
§ 1983 cause of action. This hns never bren the lmv and, as we set. out in
Part IV, injm. muni rip:1litirs rnjo~' no ::tb~olute immunity.
62 Although mnny suit s ngainst !'>Chool bonrds also include privnte individuals ns partie , the "princlp:1l drfcncbnt is usually the locnl board of
1 education or school. bon rd." Milliken v . Bradley, supra, n. 4, a.t V (PowELL, J., concurrmg).
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although in many of these cases jurisdiction ..,vas not questioned, we ought not "disregard the implications of an exercise
of judicial authority assumed to be proper for [100] years."
Brown Shoe Co . v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 307 (1962);
see Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, supra, at 88
,(Marshall, C. J.) ("Those decisions are not cited as author-ity . . . but they have much weight, as tr·2Y show that this
point neither occurred to the bar or th e bench " ). Thus, while
. we have reaffirmed JJ1 omoe without further examination on
. three occasions /; 3 it can scarcely be said that JJ1 onroe is so
consistent with the warp and woof of civil rights law as to be
·beyond question.
Second, the principle of blanket immunity established in
-Monroe cannot be cabined short of school boards. Yet such
an extension would itself be inconsistent with recent expressions of cong,Tessional intent. In the wake of our decisions,
· Congress not only has shown no hostility to federal court
decisions against school boards, but it has indeed rejected
efforts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over school
boards. 64 Moreover, recognizing that school boards are often
Moor v. County of Alamerla, 411 U. S. G93 (1973) ; City of K enosha v.
Bruno, 412 U. S. 5.07 .(1973) ; Aldinger v . IIo word, 427 U.S . 1 (197G) .
63

64 During the heyday of . the furor 0\-er -busing, both the House and the
Senate refused to adopt bills that would haYe removed from the federal
courts jurisdiction
"to make any decision,. enter any jud!!:ment, or issue any order requiring
any school board to make any chan ge in the racial composition of the
student body at any public cchool or in any class at any public school to
which students are assiO'ned in conformity with a. freedom of choice system,
or requiring any school board to tru.nsport any students from public school
to another public school or from one place to another place or from one
school di trict to another school district or denying to an y student the
. right or privilege of attending any public school or class a.t any public
school chosen by the parent of such ~ tucl e nt in conformity with a freedom
of choice system, or requiring an y school boa rd to clo ~e any school and
transfer t.he students from the closed school to any other school for the
· · purpose of altering the racial composition of the stmlent body at any
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defendants in school desegregation suits, which have almost
without exception been ~ 1983 suits, Congress has twice
passed legislation authorizing grants to school boards to assist
them in complying with federal court decrees. 0 " Finally, in
public school, or precluding any school board from carrying into dfect any
provision of any contract bct\Yeen it and any mrmher of the fa.cult y of any
public school it operates s p er if)· in~ the publi r school whrrc the member of
the faculty is to perform hi ~ or her duti c~ under the contract." S. 179,
93d Cong., 1st Se:::s., § 1207 (1971) (emphasis added) .
Other bills designed either complet ely to remove the federal courts from
the school desegregation controversy, S. 287, 93d Cong ., 1:: . t Srss. (1973), or
to limit the ability of fed eral courts to subj ect school bon rds to rcmrdi al
orders in desegregation c a~ rs, S. 619, 93d Cong., 1st Srss . ( 1973 ) ; S. 179,
93d Cong., 1st Scs8., § 2 (a) (1973) ; H. R 13534, 92d Cong ., 2d Sess. ,
§ 2922 (1972) , have similarly failed .
65 In 1972, spurred by a finding "that the process of eliminating or
preventing minority group i ~ ol a tion nnd impro,·ing the fJualit? of cducntion
for all children oft en involn's the expendit ure of additional funds to \Yhi ch
local educational agencies do not have nccess," 20 U . S. C. § 1601 (a.)
(Supp . V, 1975), Congress p M~e d the 1972 Emergency School Act. Section
643 (a.) (1) (A) (i) of that Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1605 (a ) (1) (A) (i) (Supp. V,
1975), authorizes the Assistant Secretary
"to make a grnnt to, or a contract. with , a local educational agency [tchich]

is implementing a plan which has been undertaken 7JUrsuant to a final order
issued by a court of th e Unit ed States . . . which requires the dC:"egregation of minority group segregated children or fa culty in the elementary and
secondary schools of such agency, or otherwise requires the elimination or
reduction of minority group isolation in such schools." (Emphasis added.)
A "local educational agen cy" is defined by 20 U. S. C. § 1619 (8 ) (Supp .
V, 1975), as "a public board of education or other public authorit y lega lly
·c onstituted within a State for either administrati\·c control or direction of,
public elementary or secondary schools in a, city, county, township, school,
or other political subdivision of a State, or a fed erally recognized Indian
reservation, or such combination of school distri cts, or counties as arc
recognized in a State as an administrative agency for its public elementary
or secondary schools, or a combination of loc::U educational agencies . . . . "
Congress thus clearly recognized that school board· wcrP often parties to
federal school de:;cgregation ;;uit;;. In § 718 of the Act, 20 U . S. C. § 1617
(Supp. V, 1975), Congress gave its explicit approval to the inst.it.ution of

I
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A t rne s' Fees Award Act of 1976, - Sta.t.
- , which allows prevailing parties in § 1 83 suits to obtain
attorneys fees from the losing party, the Senate stated:
"[D] efendan ts in these cases are often State or local
bodies or State or local officials. In such cases it is
intended that the attorneys' fees , like other items of costs,
will be collected either directly from the official, in, his
federal desrgregation suit s :tgainst school boards-presumably under § 1983.
That section provides:
~'Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the United States against a
local education agency ... for discrimination on the bas is of race, color, or
national origin in violation of . . . the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the Unitrd States . . . the court may allow t.he prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs.!' (Emphnsis added.)
Two years Inter, Congress found that. "the implementation of desegregation plans that require extcnsin student transportation has, in many cases,
required local educational agencies to expand [sic ] large amounts of funds,
thereby depl<:-ting their financial re~ ources . . . . 20 U. S. C. § 1702 (a)
(3). (Emphasis added.) Congress did not. respond by declaring that
school boards wrre not subject to suit under § 1983 or any other federal
statute, "but simply [legi ~ lated] revised evidentiary standards and remedial
priorities to be employed by the courts in deciding ~ uch cases." Brief for
National Education ..-\>:sn., at 15-16. Indeed, Congress expressly reiterated
that a cau e of action, cognizable in the federal courts, exists for discrimina,...
tion in the public school context. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1703, 1706, 1708, 1710,
1718. The Act as:::umes that school boards will usually be the ddendants
in such suits. For example,§ 211 of the Act, 20 U.S . C.§ 1710 provides:
"The Attorney General shall not institute a civil action under section
1706 of this title [which allows for suit by bot i1 private parties and the
Attorney General to redress disc rimination in public education] before he"(a) gives to the appropriate educational agency notice of the condition
or conditions which, in his judgment, constitute a violation of part [the
prohibitions against discrimination in public education]." Section 219 of
the Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1718, proYidrs for the termination of court ordered
busing "if the court finds the defrndant educational agency has satisfied the
requirements of t.he fifth or fourteenth amrndments to the Constitution,
whichever is U]lplicable, and will continue to be in compliance with the
requirements thereof."
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of!icia.l capacity, from funds of his agency or under his
control, or from the State or local government (whether
or not the agency or government is named as a party).
S. Rep. No. 94-1101, a t - (emphasis added).
Far from showing that Congress has relied on Monroe, therefore, events since 1961 show that Congress has refused to
extend the benefits of M on roc to school boards and has
attempted to limit Monroe to allow a\Yards of attorneys' fees
against local governments even though Monroe, City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, supra, and Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S.
1 (1976), have made the joinder of such governments
impossible. 6 a
Third, municipalities can assert no reliance claim which can
support an absolute immunity. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
·said in Monroe, "[t]his is not an area of commercial law in
~ :which, presumably, individuals may have arranged their affairs
otO I+.
in reliance on the expected stability of decision." 365 U. S.,
"{
.at 221-222 (dissent). Indeed. municipalities simply cannot
~
"arrange their affairs" on an assumption that they can violate
.,constitutional rights indefinitely since injunctive suits against
local officials under § 1983 \Yould prohibit any such arrangement. And it scarcely need be mentioned that nothing in
Monroe encourages municipalities to violate constitutional
.rights or even suggests that such violations are anything other
than completely wrong.
Finally, even under the most '5tringent test for the propriety
of overruling a statutory decision proposed by Mr. Justice
Harlan in Monroe 67·-"that it must appear beyond doubt from

4

66 Whether Congress' attempt is in fact effective is the subject of Hutto
.v. Finney, 1977 Term, No. 7G-1660, and therefore we express no view on
it here.
67 We note, ho\Yever, that l\Ir. Justice Harlan's test hns not been
expressly adopted by this Court. Moreover, t.!Htt test is based on t.\\-o
factors: stare decisis and "indications of eongrcs,.;ional a.cceptance of this
Court's earlier interpretation [of the: statute in question]." 365 U. S., at

75-1914-0PINION
.40 MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES

the legislative history of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] misapprehended the meaning of the [section]," Monroe v. ?ape,
supra, at 192 (concurring opinion) - the overruling of Monroe
insofar as it holds that local govrrnmcnts arc not "persons"
who may be defendants in ~ 1083 suits is clearly proper. It
is simply beyond doubt that, under the 1.871 Congress' view
of the hw, were § 1083 liability unconstitutional as to local
governments, it would have been equally unconstitutional as
to state officers. Y ct everyone-proponents and opponents
alike-knew § 1983 would be applied to state officers and nonetheless stated that ~ 1083 was constitutional. See pp. 21-22,
supra. And, moreover, there can be no doubt tha.t § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act was intended to provide a complete remedy,
to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation
of federally protected rights. Therefore, absent a clear statement in the legislative history supporting the conclusion that
§ 1 was not to apply to the official acts of a municipal corporation-which simply is not present-there is no justification for
excluding municipalities from the "persons" covered by § 1.
For the reasons stated above. therefore, we hold that stare
decisis does not bar our overruling of Monroe insofar as it is
·inconsistent with Parts I and II of this opinion. 6 8

IV
Since the question whether local government bodies should
192. As we have explained, the second consideration is not. present in this
case.
No useful purpose wmild be served by :m attempt. at thi:< bte date to
determine whether Monroe was correct. on it s fact s. Similarly, since this
case clearly mvolves official policy and docs not involve respondeat superior,
we do not assay a view on how our ra~e~ which haw reliE'd on that as ect
·of Monroe that is overruled today:-M oor v. ounty o am c a, supra,
n. 9, City of K enosha v. Bruno, supra, n . 9, and Aldinger v. Howard,
supra, n. 63-should haYe bem decided on a. correct view of § 1983.
Nothing we ';n.y today affects the couC'lu . •ion reached in llfoor, sec 411
U. S., at 703-704, that 42 U. 8. C. § 1988 cannot. be used to create a
federal cause of action where § 1983 docs not otherwise provide one.
68
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be afforded some form of official immunity was not presented
as a question to be decided on this petition and was not
briefed by the parties nor addressed by the courts below, we
express no views on the scope of any municipal immun~
beyond holding that municipal bodies sued under § 1983 cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity, lest our decision that
such bodies arc subject to suit under § 1983 "be drained of
meaning," Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U .. S. 232, 248 (1974). Cf.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S.
389, 397-398 (1971).
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For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is
Reversed.

APPENDIX
As proposed, the Sherman amendment was as follows:
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tiThat if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building,
~-rL
barn, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolWWW
ished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in ~
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem- 1 • ~ ~
.
bled together; or if any person shall unla.wfully and with ~ •
1.
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or
~Jy#' killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assem- ~~ _.~
bled together; and if such offense was committed to (l..-~ . •
deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by
th~ Constitution and laws of the United States, or to
deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by
reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or
parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the
person or persons damnified by such ofiense if living, or to
his widow or legal representative if dead; and such compensation may be recovered by such person or his repre_.A
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. sentative by a suit in any court of the United States of
·competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense
· was committed, to be in the name of the person injured,
r.Or his legal representative, and against said county, city,
or parish. And execution may be issued on a judgment
· rendered in such suit and may be levied upon any property, real or personal, of any person in said county, city,
{)r parish, and the said county, city, or parish may recover
· the full amount of such judgment, costs, and interest,
from any person or persons engaged as principle or
accessory in such riot in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction." Globe, at 663.
The complete text of the first conference substitute for the
Sherman amendment is:
HThat if any house, tenement, cabin, snop, building,
barn, or granary shall' be unlawfully or feToniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed·, who1ly or in
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unla.wfully and with
force and violence be whipped, scourge·cl , ><rounded, or
killed by any persons riotously and' tumultuously assem'h led together, with intent to deprive any person of any
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of
t.he United States, or to deter him or punish him for
· e~ercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or
previous conditions of servitude, in every such case the
county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses
shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such offense, if
living, or to· his widow or legal representative if dead; and
such compensation may be recovered in an action on the
·case by such person or his representative in any court of
·the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district
·in which the offense was committed. such action to be in
the name of the person injured, or his legal representative,
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and against said county, city, or parish; and in which
action any of the parties committing such acts may be
joined as defendants. And any payment of any judgment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plaintiff in such action, may, if not satisfied by the individual
defendant therein within two months next after the
recovery of such judgment upon ext;cution duly issued
a.gainst such individual defendant in such judgment, and
returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, be enforced
a.gainst such county, city, or parish, by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding
in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of
judgments against municipal corporations; and such judgment shall be a lien as ''"ell upon all moneys in the
treasury of such county, city, or parish, as upon the other
property thereof. And the court in any such action may
on motion cause additional parties to be made therein
prior to issue joined, to the end that justice may be done.
And the said county. city, or parish may recover the
full amount of such judgment, by it paid, with costs and
interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal
or accessory in such riot, in an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish,
so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plaintiff's
rights under such judgment." Globe, at 749 and 755.
The relevant text of the second conference substitute for the
Sherman amendment is as follows:
"[A]ny person or persons, having knowledge that any of
the wrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in the
second section of this act are about to be committed, and
having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same,
shall neglect or refuse so to do, and such wrongful act
shall be committed, such person or persons shall be liable
to the person injured, or his legal representative." Globe,
at 804 (emphasis added).

13 -I '-/1
3 I)

).,O- ~;).,)

.3).1 3.3)

3rd 011 1-:\10)1 DRAFT

~Sj

~ b} ,), ~

3lf- 3Sj

3~ .. ~~

To: The
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESa:
No. 75-1914
Ja.ne Monell et a1., Petitioners,

Chief Justice
Justice Stewart
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Just ice PowelJ.
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens

Mr · Justice Brennan

Circulated:---,------

Recirculated: ~\\' 1 <(

On Writ of Certiorari to
v.
the United States Court
Department of Social Services of
of Appeals for the Secthe City of New York et al.
ond Circuit.
[January -, 1978]
Mn. JusTICE BnENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, n. class of female employees of the Department
of Socinl Services and the Board of Education of the City of
New York, commenced this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983
jn July 1071,1 The gravamen of the complaint was that the
Board and the Department had as a matter of official policy
compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of
absence before such leaves were required for me<.lical reasons.~
1 The compbint wns amendrd on Srptember 14, 1972 to allege a claim
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Right s Act, as amended, 4'2 U. S. C.
§ 2000e (J970 rd., nnd Supp. V). The District Court held thnt the 1972
:~mendmPnts to Title VII did not apply retroactively to discriminntion
suffered prior to those amendments even when an action challenging ~uch
prior discrimination wn;; pending on t.he dnte of the amendments. :39-1
Jt'. Supp. 853, 850 (SDNY 1()75) . This holding was affirmed on appenl.
532 F . 2d 250, 261-262 (CA2 1!)76). Although petitioners sought certior:tri on the Title VII i~te as well as the § 1983 claim, we rest ricted
out· grant. of certiorari to the httcr if'sue. 429 U. S. 1071.
2 The plnintifTs n!lrgrd th:1t New York hnd a citywide policy of forcing
womE>u to take mat e rnit~ · l<'nn> nfter the fifth month of pregnnney unless
a city phy~ici : m and t hr hrad of an employee',- agency nil owed up to nn
addit.ional two month ~ of work. Amcnd<'d Compbint ~~ ~S, App. 13-14.
The dcf1't1<bnts did not, drny this, but st:1ted that this policy had been
chrwgro after suit wn~ ins tituted. Answer 13, App. 32-33. The plaintilTs furl her all(•gPti that the Board ~1acl a policy of requiring women to
take m:t!Prnity h'<I V!' :tft cr the ;:f'vcnth month of pregnancy unless tha.t
month [(•II in the la:.t month of the school. year, in which cnse the teacher
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Cf. Cleveland Board of Bducation v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632
(1974). The suit sought injunctive relief and back pay for
pm·ious of unla·wful forced leave. Named as defendants in the
action were the Department and its Commissioner, the Board
and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor.
In each case, the individual defendants were sued solely in
their official capacities. 3
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York held moot petitioners'
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief since the city of
New York and the Board, after the filing of the complaint, had
chauged their policies relating to maternity leaves so that no
pregnant employee would have to take leave unless she was
medically unable to continue to perform her job. 394 F.
Supp. 853, 855. No one now challe11ges this conclusion. The
court did conclude, however, that the acts complained of
were unconstitutional under LaFleur, supra. ~94 F. Supp.,
at 855. Nonetheless plaintiff's prayers for back pay were
denied berause any such damages would come ultimately from
the City of Xew· York and. therefore, to hold otherwise would
be to "circumvent" the immunity conferred on municipalities
by },Jom·oe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See 394 F. Supp.,
at 855.
·
On appeal , petitioners renewed their arguments that the
Board of Education~ was not a "municipality" within the
meaning of ~M onroe v. Pape, supra, and that, in any event, the
Di,·trict Court had erred in barring a damage award against
the individual defemlants. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rc.i<>cted both contentions. The court first
rould remain thron~h the end of the srhobl term. Amended Complaint
'~ 39, -13, -15, App . 18-19, 21. This allegation was denied . Answer·
,1 ~ 18, 22, App. 35-37.
8 Amended Cornpl:llnt 124, App. 11-12 .
... Pt>tJtioners conredcd that the Dcpartmrnt of Social Services enjoys the
same tntus as New York City for Monroe purposes. See 532 F. 2d,, at.

~~tl:t
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held that the Board of Education was not a person under
§ 1980 because "it performs a vital governmental function ... ,
and, significantly, while it has the right to deteanine how the
funds appropriated to it shall be spent ... , it has no final
say in deciding what its appropriations shall be." 532 F. 2d
259, 263 (1076) (citation omitted). The individual defendants, however, were "persons" under § 1083, even when sued
solely in their official capacities. /d., at 264. Yet, because a
damage award would "have to be paid by a. citr that \vas held
not to br an tenable to such an action in Monroe v. Pape," a
damage action against officials sued in their official capacities
could not proceed. !d., at 265.
We granted certiorari in this case, 429 U.S. 1071, to consider
~ 'Whether local governmental officials and/ or local independent school boards are "persons" within the meaning
of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature
of back pay is sought against them in their official
capacities?" Pet. for Cert. 8.
Although, after plrnnry consideration, we ,h ave decided the
merits of over a score of cases brought under § 1983 in
which the principal defendant was a school board "-and,
5 Millik eu v. Hradley, 4~3 U. S. 267 (1977) ; Dayton Bom·d of Education v. Brin kman. 433 U. S. 406 (1977); Vorrhheimrr v. Srhool District
of Plnlodrlphia, 430 U. S. 703 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Board\'.
Marshall, -124 U.S. 636 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974);
Bradley v, School Board of the City of Ilil'hrnond. 416 U.S. 606 (19i4);
Clet•cland Uoartl of Eduration v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (19i4); Keyes v.
School District No.1, 413 U.S. 180 (1973); San Antonio School District v.
Rodri!ruez, 411 U. 8. 1 (1973); Swnnn v. Charlotte-Mrcklenburg Board
of Education, 402 U.S. I (1971); Northcross v. City of M emphis Board
of EdHcotion, 307 U. S. 232 (1970); Carter v. West Peliciana Parish
SchoollJoard, a96 U.S . 226 (1069); Alc:rander v. Holmrs County Board
of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1069); Kramrr \'. Union Pree School District,
395 U . S. 621 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indewndcnt School Dist1ict,
393 U. S. 503 (1069); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450
(196S) ; Roney v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (196S); Green v.
Cou11.ty School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (19GS); School
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indeed, in some of whieh ~ 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U. 8. C. § 1343, provided the only basis for jurisdiction6-we inuicated in Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274.270 (1977), last Term that the question
presented here was open and would be decided "another day."
That otlH•r day has come and we now overrule !11 onroe v. Pape,
supra, insofar as it holds that local governments are wholly
immune from suit under§ H)83.7

I
In !lfonroe v. Pape, we held that "Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of
[ § 1983] ." 365 U. S., at 187. The sole basis for this conclusion was an inference dra \\11 from Congress' rejection of the
'"Sherman amendment" to the bill which became Civil Rights
Act of 1871 , 17 Stat. 13-th<• precursor of ~ 1983-which \Vould
have held a municipal corporation liable for damage done to
the person or property of its inhabitants by private persons
"riotously and tumultuoul'ly assembled.''' Cong. Globe, 42cl
Cong .. 1st Sc>ss .. 74!J ( 1871) (hereinafter "Globe''). Although
the Shenm111 amendment did not seek to amend § 1 of the Act,
J>ist1ict of Abington Totcnship ". 8chempp. 37-l U. S. 203 ( 1963); Goss v.
Board of EducatiOn, 373 U.S. (i/\:{ (1911:3): 'McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. G68 (19G3): Orleans 11orish School Board v. Bush, 365 U.S.
'569 (19!H); Brown v. Hoard of Rducntivn. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) .
6 Cleveland Board of Education v. /_.aF'lcur, 414 U. S. G32, 63.6 (1974);
App., Key es v. School District No . .1, 0 . T. Hli2, No. ·71-507, p. 4a; App.,
Swann v. Charlotte-M ecklcnlntrg Board of Education, 0. T. 1970, No.
281, p. 465a; Petition for C:!'rtiorari, Northcross v. Board of Education,
0 . T . 19G9, No. 113G, p. ~; Tillker \'. Des M vines Independent School
District, 393 U. S. 503, 504 (HJliU); Jl!cNcc~>c v. Board of Education, 373
, U . S. 608,671 (lOG:{) .
7

Howrvc-r, wr do aflirm Monroe \' . fJapr' , :3G5 U.S. 1G7 (1961), inf'of:tr
. as it hold,; that thr do<'tnm· of rr~]IOIIrfcnl I>U]Irrior i ~ not a basis for
rrnd!'ring mtmirtpalittr:< ltahl!' undt>r § J9S:3 for the constitutional tort~ of
. their rmployre..; . Srt> Part II. otfrn
8 We exprrs:;l~· declined t.o consider " poliey considerations" for or
t1gainst ~nnmcip:ll liability . S('Q aG5 lJ S ., at HJL
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which is now ~ 1983, and although the 11ature of the obligation
created by that amendment "·as vastly different from that
created by § 1, the Court nonetheless concluded in .Monroe
that Congress must have mea1lt to exclude municipal corporations from the coverage of ~ 1 because "'the House [in voting
against the Sherman amendment] had solemnly decided that
in their judgment Congress had no constitutional power to
impose any obligation upon county and town organizations.
the mere instrumentality for the administration of state law.'"
365 U. ~ .. at 190 (emphasis added). quoting Globe. at 804
(Rep. Poland). This statement. '"e thought. showed that
Congress doubted its "constitutional power . . . to impose
civil liability on municipalities.'' 365 U. S., at 190 (emphasis
added), and that such doubt would have extended to any type
of civilliability.1'
A fresh analysis of debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
and particularly of the case law which each side mustered in
its support. shows, however. that Monroe incorrectly equated
the "obligation" of which Representative Poland spoke with
"civil liability ."
A. An Overview
There arc three distinct stages in the legislative considera•
tion of the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
On March 28, 1871, Representative Shellabarger, acting for
a House select committee, reported H. R. 320, a bill "to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution and for other purposes." H. R. 320 contained
four sections. Section 1, now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
was the subject of only limited debate and was passed without
Mr. Justice Douglas, thr :lllthor of Monroe, hns suggested that the
municipal excluston might more properly rrst on a. theory that Congress
sought to prevent the tin:111rt:tl ruin that einl ri~hts liability might. impose
on munictpaht IC':<. Sr<> City of E<.eno81W Y. 13 runo, -H2 U. S. 507, 517- 520
(1073). However, this view has ne\'C'r be<>n :-harrd by thr Court, sec
Mo11roe v. Papl', wpra. n. 7, at. 1\JO ; )!oar v. County of Alameda, 411
U.S . ()9:~, 70S (197:~), ;uul thr.· drb:ttr:; do not ~ll]l[JOrt thi:< poxition.
9
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amendment. 10 Sections 2 through 4 deall primarily with the
"other purpose" of suppressing Ku Klux Klan violence in
the southern Statcs. 11 The wisdom and constil·. utionality of
these sections-not§ 1, now § 1983-was the subject of almost
all congressional debate and each of these sections was
amended. The .House finished its initial debates on H. R.
320 on April 7, 1871 and one week later the Senate also voted
out a bill. 12 Again, debate on § 1 of the bill was limited and
that section was passed as introduced.
Immediatrly prior to the YOtC' on H. R. 320 in the Senate,
Senator Sherman introduced his amendment. 13 This was not
an amendment to ~ 1 of the bill. but was to be added as § 7 at
the end of thr bill. Under the Senate rules. no discussion of
the amendment "·as allowed and. although attempts were
made to amend the amendment. it was passed as introduced.
·In this form, the amendment did not place liability on municipal corporations, but made any inhabitant of a municipality
liable for damage inflictl'd bJ' persons "riotously or tumultuously assembled.'' 11
The House refused to acquiesce in a number of amendments made by the Srnate, including the Sherman amendment, and the respective versions of II. R. 320 were thereGlobe, nt 522.
Bridly, § 2 crrntrd cprtain f<•dPrnl rrimrs in nddition to t.hose defined
in § 2 of tlw lSGG ('j,·il Ri~ht ,.; Art, U ~tn1. 27, ench nimcd primnrily nt
tho l\u mux Klnn. ~Prt.ion ::! Jli'O\'id<·<l th:lt the President rould send the
militia mlo nn~· Stnte wrnr·k<·d witlt 1\l:tn violence. Finn11y, § 4 provided
for suspen~ton of the wnt of hahr:ts rorpu,.: lll cnumrrntccl circumstnnces,
ngnin primnnly tho5e thought. to obtnin wherr Klan violence was rampant.
Sec Cong. Globr, 42d Con~ .• bt Sc,;..s., App., at. ::!35-336 (1871) (hercinnfter
''Globe A pp " )
a Globe, at. 70H.
1
~ &e. ·u/., at 6o:~, quotrcl in Apprndtx, iufra, nt 41-42.
14 Ibid.
An art ion for rr<·ovrr~· of dam:tgt'" wn::; to be in the fedrral
court,; and denomm:tt('d a~ a tittit again,.:t tlw ronnt~·. rity, or pnrish in
whtch t.ltt~ dama~r had oerurrC'd. Ibid . ExecutiOn of thr judgment was
not to nm agamst thr proprrt_,. of t h<' gon~mment nnit,, however, but
~Rfttn:>t the privHIC prop<•rty of any inhahttant.. lbitl.
10
11
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fore sent to a conference cotnJTllttC'e. Section 1 of the bm,
however, ·was not a subject of this confercneo since, as noted,
it was pa::.sed vcrbatitn as introduced in both Houses of
Congress
On April 18, 1871, the first roJJfcrcnce committee completed
its work on H. R. :3~0. Thr lllain features of tho conference
conuuittre draft of the Slwnnan amendment ''"ere these: '~
First, a cause of action was giv!'ll to persons injured by
1

'any persons riotously an!! tumultuously assembled
togetlwr ; . . mth llltrnt to deprive a11y person of any
right conferred upon him by the Constitution amllaws of
tlw United States. or to deter him or punish him for
exorcising such right. or by reason of his race, color, or
previous CO!ldition of servitude " •• / 9
Second, tho act provided that the action would be against
the county, ctt.y, Ot' parish in whith the riot had occurred and
that it could be mamtainrd by rithcr the person injured or
his legal reprosentatlv<>. Third. unlike the amendment as
proposed. the conference substitute made tlw government
defendant liable on thr j11dgmcnt if it was not satisfied against
individual ddondants who hnd committed the violence. If
a municipality \vero hablc. tlw judgment against it could be
collected
11

by execution, attaehntent. mnndamus, garnishment, or
any other procccdn1g- 1n aiel of rxecution or applicable
to the enforcemrnt of juclgnwnts against municipal corpor·ations; and such judgme11t [would become] a lien
ns \\'ell upon all 111011eys ]n thr treasury of such county,
city, or pansh. Uti upon the other property thereof."
]n the en:-;ulllg drbatt• on tlw lirst confprcncc report. which

was the tin;t debate ot' any k1nd 011 the Shrrman amendment,
Senator Sherman explamed tha.t the purpose of his amendment was to enhst. thr aHl of persons of property in the onl"

8<·i' Globe, at 'i'4fl and 755, r1uoted in Apprndtx, infra, nt 42-43.
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forcement of the civ1l r1p;hts laws l>y ~na)dng ~hcjf ppopepty
11
responsible" for Ku I\lux Klan damage. 11' ~tatutes drafted
on a similar theory, h e stated, had long been in force in
England and \\'ere in force in 1871 in a nurnber gf States. 17
'Nonetheless Lhere wcl'o crit1cal differences Letween the con~
ferencc substi~ulc and r;dant state and English stAtute§: the
conference substitul('. unlike inust state riot statutcr=;, ]p,cked
fl. short statute of limitations ai1d imposed liabiiity on the gov..
r-rnment defendant wh ether or not it had notice of the impending riot, whethei~ or not the municipality 'vas authorized to
exercise a police power, whether or not it exerted ail reason;.
i1ble efforts to stop the rwL. and \\.:hcthef or not the rioters
\vcrc caught allCi punish(•d . ''
The .first confcrencr substitute passeli the Senate but was
rejected by the House. Hotlse oppoi1ents, within wh.ose ranks
"Let the rwoplP of propr rty m the southern St:'1tes understand that if
they will not mnke the hue nnd ery nnd bkc the neccssnr:v steps to put
down hwless violrnce in tho~e Stat{':-; 1llf'ir property will be holden responsible, and the rfTrct wtli br mo;r wlwlrsoinr.j' Globe, a~ 7Gl.
Senator Sherman was npp~1rentl.v UIH'OIH'C'I ned thnt the conference cominittce substitut e, 1inlike thr ona:ma l nmend111 ent, did not plncc liability
for not cbrri:1~c direet lv Qll tlw propert~' of .the .wrll-to-do, but instro d
placed it on the local go,·ern in r nt . Pr('sttmably he n<'surncd that taxes
would be lcviPd agamst tl1r p\·opcrty of thr inhn.bitnnts to mnke the locn.J.ity
whole
17 Accordutg to Sc•l1ator Shrrm:in, the law haci originnlly been ndoptcd
,Englnnd t111n\P1Iiatcly :1ftcr thu .2\nrinar~ Cohqucst and hnd most recently
bl'en promulgnted as thP law of 7 & S hl'o. IV, ch. 31. Sec Globe, at 760.
1).urinA tlw coui·sc of the drlwr~. ~t appcai·ed thnt Kent\Jcky, l\Inryland,
Massnchu,ctts, and ~l'\1' York had ~mllhr lnws. Sec id., nt 751 (Rep.
S)JCilabarger); ul., at. 7G2 (SPn . St('ven,on) ; id., at 771 (Sea. Thurman);
·id., at 792 (HqJ. But]('r) Sur ]~ a. 111\lllieipal li:~bility was nppnrcntly
bornmon throU)!;houL NPw F.n~l:1'nd. See td., nt. 7Gl (Sen. Sherman).
ts In the Senate, ,opponelltl", inr.lucling :1 number of Senators who had
votPd for§ J of the bill, C'riti(·f~f'(.] th'c Sherman !liTl;Cndment as nn imperfect
and m1iJOlrti e rl'nclcnng of thr ~ t :dc ~tatutcs. l\[orcovcr, as drafted, t.hc
confrrrncc subst it'utc ('Ould be ('Oil~tmrd to protect. n 'ghts that were not
protPctl'(l by t hn Cow:t it ut ion. .-\ ('umpletc eritrcltic wns given by Scuatot
Thur.iJ:\:1;1 . ~¢,;'ntobe.nt (7()..772 ,
16
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were some who had supported ~ 1, thought the Federal Government could not, consistent with the Constitution, obligate
municipal corporations to keep the peace if those corporations
were 11eithcr so obligated nor so authorized by their state
charters. And. because of this constitutional objection. opponents of the ::-iherman amendment were unwilling to impose
damage liability for nonperformance of a duty which Congress
could not require municipalities to perform. This position is
reflected in Representative Poland's statement that is quoted
in !11 onroe. u!
Because the House rejected the first conference report a
second conference was called and it duly issued its report.
The second conference substitute for the Sherman amendment
abandoned municipal liability and, instead, made "any person or persons having knowledge [that a conspiracy to violate
civil rights was afoot], and having power to prevent or aid
in preventing the same,)) 'vho did not attempt to stop the
same, liable to any person injured by the conspiracy. 20 The
amendment in this form was adopted by both Houses of Congress and is now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1986.
The meaning of the legislative history sketched above can
most readily be developed by first considering the debate on
the report of the first conference committee. This debate
shows conclusively that the constitutional objections raised
against the Sherman amendment-on which our holding in
Monroe was L>ased. sec p. 5. su,pra--,vou ld not have prohibited
congressional creation of a civil remedy against state municipal corporations that infringed federal rights. Because § 1 of
the Civil Rights Act docs not state expressly that municipal
corporations come within its ambit. it is finally necessary to
interpret ~ I to confirm that such corporations were indeed
intended to be mcludcd within the ''persons" to whom that
section apphes.
Ill &c 3fi5 U.S., :tt 190, quotrcl at p. 5, supra.
'!!<'See Globe•, 111 80~, quot<•d 111 Appendix, wfra, at 43.
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R Debate on the First Conference Report
The style of argument adopted by both proponents and
opponents of the Sherman amendment in bo.th Houses of
Congress was largely legal, with frequent references to cases
decided by this Court and the supreme courts of the several
States. Proponents of the Sherman amendment did not, however, discuss in detail the argument in favor of its constitutionality. Nonetheless, it is possible to piece together such an
argument from the debates on the first conference report and
those on ~ 2 of the civil rights bill, which, because it allowed
the Federal Government to prosecute crimes "in the states,"
had also raised questions of federal power. The account of
Representative Shellabarger~ the House sponsor of H. R. 320,
is the most complete.
Shellabnrger began his discussion of H. R. 320 by stating
that "there is a domain of constitutional law involved in the
right consideration of this measure '"hich is wholly unexplored.'~ Cong. Globe. 42cl Co11g .. 1st Sess .. App .. at G7 (1871)
(hereinafter "Globe App."). There \\'Cre analogies. however.
vVith respect to the meaning of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly its Privileges or Immunities Clause,.
Slwllabaq;cr relied on the stat('ment of Mr. Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 'Vash. C. C. 371 (CCED Pa.
1825), which defined the privileges protected by Art. IV:
"'What these funuamcntal privileges arc[.] it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They
may, however, be nll comprchenclecl under the following·
general heads: proh'etion by the Government;'ullfarl~ thal-li 'protection by the Govermnent; the cnjoy1ncnt of life·
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and'
safety . . .. '" Globe App .. n.t 6!) (emphasis added) ..
quoting 4 Wash. C. C., at :j80.
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Building on his conelusio ii that c:itiz('ns \\'ere owed protection-a conclusion not disput<'d by oppOII<'Ilts of th<' Sherman
Amendment "'- :-ilH'llnbarg<'r tlwn considered Congress' role in
providing that proteetJOII. H<'n' agai11 Uwrr \\·ere precedents:

I

DEJ..t 710 I'{

I

u[Cm1gress has al\\'ays] assumed to enforce, as against
the States, and also persons, every one of the provisions
of the Constitution. Most of the provisions of the Con·
stitution which rt'strain and directly relate to the States,
such as those in [Art. l, ~ 10,] relate to the divisions of
the political powers of the State ami General Governments. . . . These prohibitions upon political powers of
the States are all or such nature that they can be, and
even have been, , .. enforced by the courts of the United
States declaring void all State acts of encroachment on
Federal powers. Thus. and thus sufficiently, has the
United States 'enforced' these provisions of the Constitution. But there are some that arc not of this class.
These arc where the court secures the rights or the liabilities of persons within the States, as bct;veen such persons
and the Sta.tes,

,, See Globe·, nt 75~ (Sen·. Trumbull); iii .. nt 772 (Sen. Thurmnn); id.,
at 791 (Hc•J>. Willnrcl). The Supn•m e Court of Indiana had ~o held in
givmg efi"ect to the CIVIl H1ght~ :\('t of J~GG. See Smith v. Moody, 26 Incl.
2D9 (1866) (following Cor.ll cll), OIH' of thrl'r stntt· suprPme court ca.,p,.;
referrrd to in Globe .-\pp., at G~ (Hep. Shellal.J;nger) . :\lorrover, §2 of
the lt:71 Act a::: pa ::;~C"d, unlil.;:e § 1, pro~ c·c·utrcl JlC'I"~olls who violatrd fl'deral
right>< whrther or not th a t vwl:II!Oil \1":1~ illlrlrr color of onirial anthority,
appare11tl~· on the thror~ · th a t J\.u 1\lux Klan violrnrP wn ::; infringing the
right of proter1ion dd inf'd IJ,· CoJ·yell. Nonrthl'les,.;, oppom•nt:-: nrguecl
that lll\lll!C!]lalil H's wc·re not grnerall~ · rhargcd by the States with kPrping
the peace and henc· e d1d not havr polire forces, so thnt thr dut~· to afl'ord
protrriJOil ou ght 110t devol\'!' on the mun1rip:tl!ty , but on whaten' r agency
of ~ tate governml'Jlt, wn:; eh :trgC'd b~ · the ::>tate with kerping thr pt•arl'.
"Seep. - , and 11 :lO, iujm. Tn addition, thr~· argued that Congre:::s could
not c·on~t1tntionall y add 10 1hr clulw::; of muniripa!Itie:;. SrC' pp. 1:3- 19,
tnf1 i.U.
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"These three arc: first, that as to fugitives from justice rnl; second, that as to fugitives from service, (or
slaves L231 ;) third, that declaring that the 'citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of Citizens in the several States.' l~ 41
"And, sir, every one of these-the only provisions where
it was deemed that legislation was required to enforce the
constitutional provisions--the only three where the rights
or liabilities of persons in the States, as between these persons and the Stat<'s. arc directly provided for, Congress
has by legislation affirmatively interfered to protect ...
such persons.'' Globe App., at 69-70.
Of legislation mcntwnrd by Shellabarger, the closest analog
of the Sherman amendment. ironically. was the statute implementing the fugitives from justice and fugitive slave provisions
of Art. JV- the Act of Feb. 12, 1703, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302-the
constitutionality of which had bern sustained in J842. in Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 530. There, Mr. Justice Story,
w-riting for the Court, held that Art. TV gaYe slaveowners a
federal right to the unhindered possession of their slaves in
whatever State such slaves might be found. 16 Pet .. at 612.
Because state process for rrcovrrmg runaway slaves might be
inadequate or even hostile to the nghts of the slaveowner,
the right iutended to be conf<'ITrcl could be negated if left to
~~U.S . Con~t.,

Art . IV , ~~ . cl 2.

''A Person chargrd ia an)· St;1lf' wtth Tr,•a 8on, Felony, or other Crime, who
shall fl ee from Just tce, nnd br found m another Stale, shall on D emand
of the executive Authonty of th<' State from which he fled, be delivered
\1p, to be remover! to tlJc State havmg Juns(IJction of the Crime."
2
~ /d., cl. 3 .
" No Person held to ServH·c or Labom in one State, under the La\\'s thereof,
escaptng mto another, shall, m Consequcn('c of any Lnw or H.rgulntion
thercm, be dt,;charged from -<urh ~rrYir<' or Ltbom, but shall be delivered
up on Claim of th~ Party to whom such Scrvtre Qr Labour may be due!"
~·ld d . 1.

"!'.'>
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state irnplcmcntatwn . !d., at (514.. Thus, since the Constitution guaranteed the right ancl this in turn required a. remedy,
Story helu it to lX' a. anatural inference" that Congress had
the power itself to rn sur'e at1 appropriate (in the Necessary
and Proper Clnu se sc11se) remrdy for the right. !d., at 615.
Building on Prigg , Shellalmrgcr argued that a remedy
agaillst municipaliti rs tllld counties was an appropriate-and
hence constitu tional- method for ensuring the protection
which the Fourteen th Amrnciment made every citizen's federal
right.z" 1this IIlilCh was elt>ar from thE' adoption of such
statutes by th e several States as devices for suppressing riot."u
Thus. said :::ih cllaoarg<'r. the oilly snious qu estion remaining
was "whether. since a county is an integer or i)art of a State,
the United States ca n impol'r upon it. as such, any obligations
to keep the peace in obc•di t> nce to L'nit0d States laws. " "~ This
he answered a ffir'tna t ivPly. citing i3oard of Commissioners v.
Aspinwall, 24 liO\\' . ~37G ( lRGl). the first of many cases zs
upholding thP power of fed cml courts to enforce the Contract
Clause again st lllllll Jcipalities."''
House opponr nts of Lbe ShNman amendment- whose views
arc particularly illl portan L ;:; i11 cc only the Hou se voted dov.ni
Sec Globe , at 751. Sec a bo hi., a t iGO (Sen . Sherman) ("If a State
may . •. pnss :t law mnkmg a ccnlnLy .. . responsible for a riot in order
to deter such en me, th en we mny pass thP >'amc remedies . .. .").
26 /d., nt. 751 ; ~Pc n. l i, supra
~ 7 Gloor, at. 751 (rmph a~is add ed) . C ompare this sla trmcnt with llepr<';;clllat ivc Poland\ rem a rk upon win ch ou r holding in Monro e was based .
Sec p . 5, svpro.
2 8 Src, e. g., Gelpck e v. ('ity of D ulut que. 1 W :tll. 175 (1 SG·I); l'on Hoffman v . Cz'ty of Quincy, 4 uf., 5:)5 (1 SG7) ; Riggs v . John son County, G
id., lGG (1868) ; IVrb er v. La County, G id ., 210 (1868 ) ; Sup ervisors v.
Rogers, 7 id., 175 (I SII!l), Ucnbow v. lmra City, 7 id., 313 (1869); Sup ervisors v. Durant , !) irl ., -115 (JS70) . Ser I!;Pil('rally C . Fairmnn , History of
the Supn·mr Court of th e Unit1•d StntPs : Hccon ~ tru c tion and Heuliion.
'JSfi4- 18SS, chs Ji- 18 (JDil 1
25

1~
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the anwn chnen t- d 1d not d ispu tc :-ilwllabarger ·s claim that the
Fourteenth AmcndnH'Ilt cn•a tNI a fc~dPra l right to protection.
see n. :21. SU]Jra., but tlwy arp:ued that the~ local units of
governlll<'Ilt upon \\·hich the ain<'IHlnwnt fa stc•neclliahility W<'l'e
110t obligated to kc<'p the p<•ace at statr law and further that
the Federal Go\'C'I'I1Il1Cilt could 110t constitutionally require
local governmciits to ('rente polieC' forces. 1vhcther this requirement was levird directly. or indirectly by imposing damages
for breach of the pracC' on munieipalitirs. The most complete
statement of this positio11 is that ofRepresrntative Blair: ao
"The propositiOn known as the Sherman amendao Others taklllg a VJ<'II' sinular to Ht'prc~cntat ivc Blair'· incluocd:
Rcprcscntatire '\Villard. ~C<' id .. at 7\ll; H<'prr~<'ntatiw· Polaml, sec id., nt
794; Rcprescntntn·c Burchard,~<'<' id .. at 705 ; Hrpre ~c ntnti1·r Farnsworth,
see id., at 799. Tieprr~r ntativr \'\'illard :1bo took a ;:omrwhat ditfrrcnt
position . He thought that ilw Con~titution would not nllow the Feclcrnl
Government. to dirtatl' till' tll:llllll'l' in which a State fnllillrcl it ~ obligntion
of prott'ction . That. i ~, he thourrht. it <l mattrr of ~tale di~rrrtion whether
it clrlq~[lted the pr:lrrkP<'Jlinp; poii'N to ~~ municipal or count~· corporation,
to a sheriff, etc. lie did not doubt, lwwrvrr, thaL thr Fcurral Government
could impo~c on the State.~ the ohlip;:ttion impo~rd by the Sherman amendment., and Jlrr,;umably he II'Ould hav<· rnforcecl the nnwndmcnt. against a
municipal corporatiotl to. whirh the prarckrPping obligation hnd been
delegated. Sec id .. at. 791.
Opponent:-: of the Slwrm:m allH'lHimrnt in tlH' S<•nate agrred with l3lnir
that Conp;n·~~ had no pmH•r to p ; 1 ~,.: the SIH'rman anwndmrnt brcau~c· it
fell out~i<k limit :-: on Il:llion:d poll'<'!' mtpli<'it in the fl'd<'ral ~tructmr of the
Con~titution , aJHI n·cogniz<·d in, 1' . fl. C'ollector , .. lJa!f, 11 Wall. 11;) (lF:/1).
Ho11·c1·r r, thr 8c•n;d<· oppon<·nt~ fol'u"<'d not on tiH' anH' tHlmrnt',.; attempt
to obltp;atr nnmi<'tpaliti<•,.: to kP<'P tlw prac·c·, bnt on tlw li!'n tr<'alt•d by the
amendment, which ran agam~t all mott<'~ · an<l proprrty of a. drfrndant.
munieipalit .~ ·, it1clndmg propNt~· hrld for public Jllll'!HJ:'<'~. :-;ueh a.s jaib or
eourthon:-:e~ . Oppom•Jlt : < arg1n'd th;1t ~urh a lic·n otH·t· t•nl<•rPd would have
tlw <'ffert of making it intpo~~i hl<' for tht• munieipalit~ · lo function. ~ im·p no
onr would trad<· with 11 . ::'.<'<', c·. fl .. t:lolH•, at 702 (Sc•n . Steven:-:on); id.,
at. /(i;J (8<'11. Ca:-N•rl~·). \lon·o1·P r, '!'\'N ,I'Oilt' knc•\\' that ~ound polic·~·
prc1·<·ntrd exreutwn ag; lllt ~ t pul,lte propc·rt~ · ,.: itH'<' thi~ too wa,..; nc•rdrd if
lo!'al. go1·c•rnnwnt w:t." to ~ttn·in•. ~t'<', <'. u.. ibid. S<'c abo llferiu•cthcr v.
Garrett, ltr2 U. ::-;. 41'2, .'iOI, 5]:{ (1~~0) (l'l'<·ogni%ing princ·ipl!' th:lt. public
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ment . , is entirrly new. lt is altogether without a preThat amendment claims the
cedent in this country. . .
power in the General Government to go ~nto the States
of this Union aml l:ty such obligations as it may please
upon the municipalities, which are the creations of the
States alone. . . .
" . . . [H]ere it is proposed, not to carry into effect an
obligation which rests upon the municipality, but to
create that obligation , and that is the provision I am
unable to assent to. Thr parallel of the hundred docs not
in the least nwt•t the> case. The power that laid the
obligation upon the hundred fi.rst put the duty upon the
hundred that it should pc>rfonn in that regard, and failing
to meet the obligation ''"hich had been laid upon it. it "'as
very proper that it should suffer damage for its neglect ....
" ... [T]here are certain rights and duties that belong
to the States .... there arc certain powers that. inhere in
the State governments. They create these municipalities,
they sny what their powrrs shall be and what their obligations shall be. lf the Government of the Unikcl States
can step in and add to those obligations, may it not
utterly d(•stroy the municipality? If it can say that it
shall be liable for damages occurring from a riot, .. .
where [will] its power ... stop and what obligations .. .
might [it] not lay upon a municipality . . . .
"Now, only the other day, the Supreme Court
decided lin Collector v. D£ty, 11 \Vall. 113 (1871)] that
propPrt~·

of a mumripallt~· not 'nh.)r<:t. to cxrcution); 2 Dillon, l~Iunicip::~l
Corporation::< §§ 4-!5-4-!() {11'7:) rd.) (oame) .
Although th<' ar)!umrnt ~ of thr Srnat<• opponents app<·ar to bra correct
anal~·"i" of then-controlling eon:<titlltiOII:d and common-law principlr~, tlwir
argnmc•nt::< an• not rPic·v:tnt to an an:lly~i:; of the eon,-titutionality of§ 1 of
tho C'iYil H1ghts Ac-t ~IIH'<' an.v Jtidgmrnt undrr that ~ection, a::< in any ciYil
:mit in thC' frdPr:tl eottrt~ in li'/1. would haY<' !wen ('!lforced pursuant to
~tat~ Ja.w,- undrr th<' prore:<~< act:< of 1/9:2 and 1i':2<S. Sc'<' Act. of ;\[ay 8,
1792, ell. :3fi, l t'lt41t. :2if>, :\ct of l\lay 19, 1S2~, rh . tiS, 4 Stat.. 278.
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there IS no power in the Government of the United States,
under its authority to tax, to tax the salary of a State
officer. Why'! Simply because the power to tax involves
the power to destroy, and it was not the intent to give
the Government of the United States power to destroy
the government of the States in any respect. It was held
also in the case of P1·igg vs. Pennsylvania [ 1G Pet. 539
(1842)] that it is not within the power of the Congress
of the United States to Jay duties upon a State officer;
that we cannot comhland a State officer to do any duty
whatever, as such; ll.nd I ask ... the tlifference between
that and commanding a municipality which is equally the
creature of the State, to perform a duty.'' Globe, at 795.
Any attempt to impute a unitary constitutional theory to
opponents of the Sherman amendment is. of course, fraught
with difficulties. not tlw irast of "·hich is that most Members
of Congress did not speak to the isflue of the constitutionality
of the amendment. Xonetheless. two considerations lead us
to conclude that opponrnts of the Sherman amendment found
it unconstitutional substantially because of the reasons stated
by Representative Blail' : First. Blair's analysis is precisely
that of Poland, whose views \\'err quoted as authoritative in
Monroe, see p. 5. SUJn·a., and that analysis was shared in large
part by all House opponents \\'ho adclressecl the constitutionality of the Sherman amrndment."' Second. Blair's exegesis
of the reigning constitutional theory of his day, as \Ve shall
explain. was clearly supported by precedent-albeit precedent
that has not survivrd. ser E.r f>arte Viryin-ia, 100 U. 8. 339,
347- 348 (1880); Graves v . .Yew 1' orl\ c:l' rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S.
466. 48G ( 103\J )- and no otlwr constitutional formula \Vas
advanced by participants in thr IlOUfiC debates.
Collector v. Day, citt>d by I31air. " ·as the clrarest and. at the
time of the debates. tlw most rrcent pronouncement of a
doctrine of coordinate sovert'ignty that, as Blait" stated, placed
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limits on en·n the enurnNated pow<'rs of the Xational Government in favor of protc•ctin~ State• (H'<'rogatives. There. the
Court held that the United States could not tax the income of
Day. a Massachusetts state .iud!!;e. because the independence
of the States within their lC'gitimate spheres would be imperiled
if the instrumentalities through which States executed their
powers were "subject to the control of another and distinct
govennnent.'' 11 Wall.. at 127. Although the Court in Day
apparently rested this holding in part on the proposition that
the taxing "power acknowlrdgrs no limits but the \Vill of
the legislative body imposing the tax." id., at 125-126; cf.
:McCulloch v. Maryla11d, 4 'Yhcat. 316 (1819). the Court had
in other cases limited otlwr national powers in order to avoid
i11tcrference with the States. :• ~
Ill Prigy v. Pellnsylvania, supra, for example. Mr. Justice
Story, in addition to confirming a broad national po\ver to
legislate under the Fugitive Slave Chwse. seep. 12. supra, held
that Congress could not "insist that states . . . provide means
to carry into rffect the duties of the national government."
16 Pet., at 615-GlG.":' And Mr. Justice McLean agreed that,
"[a]s a general principle." it was true "that Congress had no
power to impose duti<>s on state officers. as provided in the
[Act of 1793. supra]." i\ on<'theless he wondered whether
Congress might not impose "positive'' duties on state officers
where a clause of the Cor1stitution. like the Fugitive Slave
3
~ lu ndthtton to tlw rase::: discu::::::rd in tPxt. ::'('('Lane C'ounty v. Orfgon,
7 Wall. 71, 77, til (I~G!.JJ. in which tlw Court !wid that th<' fpdcrallegal
t<'ndrr art:> :;hould not U<' ron~tnt<•d to rpquire thP Statrs to neerpt taxes
t{'ndf'r<•d in l'nitrd Stntr~ notps ~<inep thi~ might interfere with a legitimate
Stnt{' art .i,· it~·
aschil'f .Ju~tiCP Tnnp~· ngrred :
" Tho statr ollir<·r,; nwntioned in tlw Ia\\' [of 179:~) nre not bound to
execute the dutirs imposr<l upon them by Congress, unless they choose to
do so, or arc required to do ~o by a hw of the state; and the state
legi::;laturc hns the power, if it thinks proprr, to prohibit tlwm. The act
of 1793, then'fore, nm,.;t clrpencl altogrther for its execution upon the officers of the l.Tnitrd States nam<'cl in it.." Hi Pet., at, 030 (Taney, C. J.).
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Cla.usc. seemed to require affirmative government assistance,
rather than restraint of govPrmnent, to secure federal rights.
Sec id., at GG4-GG5.
Had Justice McLC'an been correct in his suggestion that,
whe>re the Const1 tu tion C'n visioned affirmative govem men t
assistance. the States or their officers or instrumentalities could
be required to provide it. there would have been little doubt
that Congress could have im;istr.d that municipalities aft'orcl
by "positive" action the protection"' owed individuals under
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Anwnclment whether or not municipalities \\'ere obligated by state law to keep the peace. However,
any such argument. largely foreclosed by Prigg, was made
impossible by the C'ourt's holding iu Kentucky v. Dennison,
24 How. 66 (1861 ). There. the C'ourt was asked to require
Dennison, the Governor of Ohio. to hand over Lago. a fugitive
from justice \\'anted in Kentucky. as required by~ 1 of the Act
of 1793.'''' supra, which implemented Art. IV, ~ 2. cl. 2. of the
Constitution. Chief JusticC' Taney. \\Titing for a. unanimous
Court, refused to enforcr that St'ction of the Act:
"[W]e think it clear. that the Federal Government, under
the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, a.s such. any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it; for if it possessed this power, it might overload
the offirer with cluti('S which would fill up all his time, and
disaLle him from pC'rforming his obligations to the State,
~·

SPe pp. 10-11. nnd n . 21, supra.
"Be it Pnact<•d ... That " ·h<'n<'ver the rxrcutive authority of nny state
in the Union ... shnll dcmatHI :my person as :1 fugitive from ju3t ice ...
nnd shall moreover produce a ropy of an indictment found ... charging
the prr~on so dt•mandrd , ll'il h having committed trc.'l .~on, frlony or other
crime, ccrtifird as authrntic
the gon·mor or chief magistrate of the
state . .. from whPncr the pPr,.:on f'.O l'hnrged llr,l, it shniJ be the duty of
the executive authorit~· of thr »tate or trrritory to whirh sueh person sh:tll
have fled, to rau:;;e hun or hrr to be arrp:;;trd and scrmPd . . . and to·
cause the fugitive to be d('ll\·rrrd to such agent [of t.he demanding state]
whrn he ~hall apprar
'' 1 Stat. :302.
35
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and might impose on him duties of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to which he was elevated by
the State." 24 How., at 107-108.
The rationale of Dennison-that the Nation could not
impose duties on stat<' offic(•rs since that might impede States
in their legitimate activities- is obviously identical to that
which animated the dt'cision in Collector v. Day. See p. 1G,
supra. And. as Blair i1Hlicated. municipalities as instrumentalities through which Statrs executed their policies could be
equally disabled from carrying out State policies if they were
also obligated to carry out fcd<'rally imposed duties. Although
110 one:' cited Dennison by name. the principle for which it
stands was well known to Memb<'rs of Congress."" many of
whom discussed Day ~ ~ as W(' ll as a series of state supreme
court cases"' in the mid-1860's ,,·hich haJ invalidated a federal
tax on the process of state rourts on the ground that the tax
threatened the independence of a vital state function.' 1" Thus.
there was ample support for Blair's view that the Sherman
am0nclment. by putting mtmicipalities to the Hobson's choice
of keepi11g the peace or paying civil damages. attempted to
impose obligations on municipalitirs by indirection that could
not be imposed directly. thereby thr<'at<'ning to "drstroy the
government of the States." Globe. at 705.
If municipal liability under ~ 1 of the Civil Rights Act
36

"The Supreme Court of thr Ullltrd Statrs has decich•d rrfJC'.1trdly that
Congress can impose W> duty on :1 Stntr oHicrr ." Globe, at 7U9 (Rep.
Farwworth). Srr also id., at 7S8-7~9 (Hep. Kerr).
37 Sre, e g., Globe. at 'irr~ (Srn . D:tvi,;): ibid . (Sen. Cm;:o:rrl~·); id .. 772
(Sen. Thurma1,) (reciting logic of D ay ): icl ., at 777 (Sen . Fn•lingl111ysrn);
id., at 7R8-7 9 (Hep. Krrr) (rr C'Iting logic of Day); id., at 79:3 (Rrp.
T>oJand) ; id., at 799 (nrp. Farnsworth) (:tl,:o rrciting logic of Day) .
all H'arrrn ,. _ l'aul. 22 lnd. 2/(i (J."fi.l): ./onrs Y. Estate of K.cl'p, 19
Wis. 3G9 (1865); Fifu·ld v. Closl', 15 :i\[ich. 505 (1SG7); Union Bank v.
llill, 3 Colt!. (-t3 Tenn.) 325 (ISGG); Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385 (18G7).
~ 9 S<·c' Globe, nt 76-t (Sr11. na,·i,:); ibid. (Sen. Ca.,~erley). Sec also T.
Coolt•y, Con.;titutional Limitations ·X·-t~3--'"48-t (JR71 cd.) .
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created a Sllmlar Hobson's choice, we might cone] udc. as
]lfonroc did. that C'onp;rcss could not have intended municipalities to be among the "persons" to \vhich that section
applied. But this is not the case.
First. opponents expressly distinguished between imposing
. an obligation to keep the peace and merely imposing civil
liability for damages on a municipality that was obligated by
state law to keep the peace, but which had not in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Poland, for
example, reasoning from Contract Clause precedents, indicated
that Congress could constitutionally confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts to entertain suits seeking to hold municipalities
liable for using their authorized powers in violation of the
Constitution-which is as far as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
'vent :
"I presume . . . that 'vhcre a State had imposed a duty
[to· keep the peace] upon [a] municipality . . . an action
would be a.llowed to be maintained against them in the
courts of the United States under the ordinary restrictions
as to jurisdiction. But enforcing a liability, existing by
their own contract, or by a State la·w, in the courts, is a
very widely different thing from devolving a ne'v duty or
liability upon them by the national Government, which
has no power either to create or destroy them, and no
power or control over them whatever." Globe, at 794.
Representative Burchard agreed :
"[T]here is no duty imposed by the Constitution of the
United States, or usually by State laws, upon a county to
protect the people of that county against the commission
of the offenses herein enumerated, such as the. burning of
buildings or any other injury to property or injury to
person. Police powers arc not conferred upon counties as
corporations; they arc conferred upon cities that have
qualified legislative power. And so far as cities arc conccrne<l, where the equal protection required to be afforded.
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by a State is imposed upon a city by State laws, perhaps
the United States courts could enforce its performance. But counties ... do not have any control of the
police . . . ." 1d., at 795.
See also the views of Rep. Willard. discussed at n. 30, supra..
Second, the doctrine of dual sovereignty apparently put no
limit 011 the po,ver of federal courts to enforce the Constitution
against municipalities that violated it. Under the theory of
dual sovereignty set out in Priem, this is quite understandable.
So long as federal courts wrre vindicating the Federal Constitution. they were provided the "positive'' government action
required to protect fedrral constitutional rights and no question was raised of enlisting the States in "positive" action.
The limits of the principles announced in Dennison and Day
are not so well defined in logic. but are clear as a matter of
history. It must be remembered that the same Court which
rendered Day also vigorously rnforcPCl the Contracts Clause
against municip~::.lities-an enforcement effort which included
various forms of "positive" relief. such as ordering that taxes
be levied and collected to discharge federal court judgments.
once n constitutional. infraction was found. 10 Thus, federal
4 n Sec ca~rs citrd at n. 28, supto.
Sin('r this Court V-ranted unquestionably "po,.;itive, relief in Contracts Clau;:r rasrs, it appran; that the
di~tinrtion bet\\'P<'n the Shrrman :mwnclmrnt and tho~r ca,;rti wn:-; not that.
the former rrratrd n po ~ iti\'e ohlig:llion whrrras thr latter imposrd 0111~·
a !legati\·r rr,.;trnint. ln:;tracl, thr di:-;t inction must have be<'n that a violation of the Con:-:titution wns thr prrdicntc for ·'po:;itivr" rrlief in thr Cont.r:tets Clausr casrs, whrrrns thr Sltrrmnn amrndment impo~rd damagrs
without n•garcl to wbcthrr n lo<·al .!!:O\'C'rnmrnt wns in nn~· wa~· at fault
for the bn·ach of thr prncr for \\'hidt it was to be hrlcl for damages. See
p. 8, supra. Whilr no onr stated this distinction rxpre:,;slr during tho
ciPbatP:;, t hr infc·n·ncr iti strung that Congres,.:mrn in 1871 would haYe
dr:1wn this distinction since it <•xpl:1ins wh~· H<•prrscntatiw;; l'olnnd,
Burchard, nnd Willard, ""r p. - , supra. could opposr thr amrndmrnt
\\'lulr at the :same timr sa~·ing that tiH' F!'drral Go\'<•rnmrnt mig-ht impose
damagc·s on a loeal govemmrnt that h:1d drfaultcd in a :;tatc-impo,cd duty
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judicial enforcetucnt of Lbe Constitution's expr<'SS limits on
statr power. s1nce it was done so fr<'qucntly. must notwithstanding anything said in Dennison or Day have 1lecn permissible. at lrast so long us the int<'rpretation of the Constitution
was left in the hands of the JUdiciary. fJince ~ 1 of the Civil
Rights Act simply conferrPd jurisdiction on the federal courts
to enforce ~ 1 of the Fourtepnth Amendment-a situation
precisely analogous to the grant of diversity jurisdiction under
'>vhich the Contract Chwse was enforced against municipalities-there is no reason to suppose that opponents of the
Sherman amendment would have found any constitutional
barrier Lo ~ 1 suits against municipalities.
Finally, the very votes of those Members of Congress, who
opposed the Sherman amendment but who had voted for ~ 1,
confirm that the liability imposed hy ~ 1 was something very
different from that imposed by the amendment. Section 1
without question could he used to obtain a damage judgmc11t
against state or municipal nflirials who violated federal constitutional rights while acting under color of law. 41 However, for
/ Prigg-Dcn nison-Day purposes. as Blair and others recognized.'~
there was no distinction of constitutional magnitude bet>veen
officers and agents-including corporate agents-of the State:
both were state instrumentalities and the State could be
impeded no matter over which sort of instrumentality the
1o keep the pl'ace and Jt nbo l'Xplain" wll~· rYrl)·onr np;rrrd that n stat~
or mumcipal oflicrr could con,;t it ut ionall~· hr lwld liahl<' undC'r § 1 for
\'iolation~ or tlw Cun::;titution. SP(' Jl. - , infra.
41 Sec, e. g., Globe, at 33·~ (Hep. Hoar); id., at 3G5 (Hep. Arthur); id.,
at 3G7-3G8 (Rep. Shrldon); icf .. at :3t-:.5 {HPJl. Lrwis); Globr App. , at 217'
(Sen. Thurman). In add it iou, ofllccrs werl' included among those who·
could be suc·d under the ~l'cond eonfrrencc ~~~b~titutc for the Sherman
Amendment .. Sec GlobP, at S05 (exl'hanp;l' between Hep. Willard nnd Hcp ..
Shl'llabnrger) . There were no constitutional objections to the second
report .
42 See Globe, nt 795 (Hcp. Blair); id., at 788 (Hcp. Kerr); id., .r,t 795.
(Rep. Burchard); id., at 79\'l (Hep . .Fam;;worth).

1
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Federal Government sought to assert it,s powrr. Dennison
and Da.y, after all, were not snits against municipalities but
against ofj,cers aJJcl Blair was quite conscious that he was
extending these cast's by applying thrm to municipal corporations. :I ; \ onethcless, fi<'na tor ThUrman' who gave the
most exhaustive critique of ~ l-inter alia. complaining that it
would be applied to state officers, sec Globe, at 217-and who
opposed both § 1 and the Shennan amendment, the latter on
Prigg grounds. agreed unequivocally that § 1 was constitutional."4 Those who voted for ~ 1 must similarly have believed
in its constitutionality despite Prir;g, Dennison, and Day.
I

C. Debate on § 1 of the Civil Rights Bill
From the foregoing discussion. it is readily apparent that
nothing said in debate on the Sherman amendment would
have prevented holding a municipality liable under § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourt<>enth
Amendment. The question rrmains. howevrr, whether the
general language' describing those to be liable under § 1-"any
person"-covers morr than 11aiural prrsons. An examination
of the debate on § 1 and application of appropriate rules of
construction shows unequiYoenlly that § 1 \Vas intended to
cover lE'gal as well as natural prrsons.
Representative Shellabarger was the first to explain the
function of § 1 :
" [Section 1] not, only provides a civil remedy for persons
·~ "rWJc <":mnot command a St[t!e oflicl'r to do any duty whatever, as
such; and I ask .. . t)l(' differc·n cc bctwern th:~t and ('ommancling a municipality . . .. " Globe, at 705.
44 Sec Globe App., at 21G-2J7, quotf'd, infra, a,t n. 45.
In 1879, moreover, whf'n the question of tlw limit,; of t·hf' Priug principle w:u; squarely
prl'scnt<'d in Ex ]Jarte l'irg111ia, 100 U.S. 3:39 (1~~0), this Court held that
Dennison and Day and the principle of fl'der:lli ~ m for which they sta11d
did not prohibit feder:tl l'nforcrnwnt of § 5 of the Fourtrl'nth Amendment
ihron,gh snit:; Jirrewrl to :;tall' ofllcers. See 100 U.S., at 3-15-3-18.
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whose former· condition may have been that of slaves,
but also to all people where, under color of State law,
they or ::wy of them may be deprived of rights to which
they arc entitled under the Constitution by reason and
virtue of their national citizenship." Globe App., at 68.
By extending a remedy to all people, including whites, § 1
went beyond the mischief to which the remaining sectionR
of the 1871 Act were addn,ssc·d. Jlepreseutative Shellabarger
also stated without reservation that the constitutionality of
§ 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 controlled the constitutionality of ~ 1 of the 1871 Act. am! that the former had been
approved by "the supreme courts of at least three States of
this Union" and by Mr. Justice Swayne. sitting on circuit, who
had concluded "\Ve have no doubt of the constitutionality of
every provision of this act." Ibid. He then went on to
describe how the courts would and should interpret § 1:
"This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of
human liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are lib-.
erally and beneficently construed. It would be most
strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the
rule of inrerpretation. As has been again and again de ..
cided by your own Supreme Court of the United States,
and everywhere else ·where there is wise judicial interpre ..
tation, the largest latitude consistent with the words
employed is uniformly given in construing such statures
and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and
defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the
people. . . . Chief Justice Jay and also Story say:
" 'Where a powel' is remedial in its nature there is
much reason to contend that it ought to be construed
liberally, and it is generally adopted in the interpretation
of laws.'-1 Story on Constitution, sec. 420." Globe App.,
at 68.

The Sentiments expressed in Representative Shellabarg~t's
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opening speech were echoed hy Senator Edmunds, the manager of H. R. 320 in the Senate:
"The first section is OIH' that I believe nobody objects to,
as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the
United States when they are assailed by any State law or
under color of any State law. and it is merely carrying
out the principles of the civil rights bill [of 1866], which
have since become a part of the Constitution." Globe, at
568.
"[Section 1 is] so vPry simple and really reenacting the
Constitution ." !d., at 569.
And he agreed that the bill "secure[cd] th e rights of white
men as much as of colored men." I d., at 606.
In both Houses, statemcn ts of the supporters of ~ 1 corroborated that Con gress. in enacting ~ 1. intenued to give a
· J broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil
rights:' 5 Moreover, since municipalities through their official
~ 5 Representative Bingh nm, the nut hor of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, declarrd the bill's purpo~e to be " the enforcement .. .
of the Constittltion on bchnlf of en~ ry indiYidunl citi zen of the Republic .. .
to the extent. of thr ri ghts gu nrnnt ecd to hitn by the Constitution." Globe
App., nt 81. He cent inned :
" Tho States never had the n ght , though the~· hnu thr power, to inflict
\vrongs tipon free citizen;; by a. dr nial of the full prot ection of the lnws . ...
(And) the Sta tes did de n~· to C'itizen ~ the equal prot r etion of the lltws, they
did drny the ri ghts of citi zen ~ undrr the Con ~ titution . nnd except to the
extent of the express lnnitat.wns upon th e St a trs, as I have shown, the
citizen had no rcm ed~·. . . . They took property without. compensation,
and he had no remedy. ThL'Y restrirl<·d the freedom of the prrss , and he
lmd no rrnwdy. Th r y rr,; trictl'd the frerdom of :-:perch, and he had no
remedy. They restrict ed thr ri~ht ,; of eon ~ C'irnc e , :111d he lwei no remedy. . . . Who dare ~;ay , now that. th e Constitution ha s been amend ed,
that the nation cannot by law proYicle again,:t all such nhuse:; and denials
of right ns thege in the Stat e;; and by Stat e,;, or combinations of persons ?"
ld , at. 85.
Hcpresentativn Perry , commenting on Congre;;,;' nction in pa.sing the civil
right,~ bitt al ~ o stated .
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acts, cou1d equally with natural pcrso11s create the banns
intended to be remedied by ~ 1. and, further, since Congress
intended ~ 1 to be broadly construed, there is no reason to
suppose that municipal corporatwns would have been excluded
from the sweep of ~ 1. Cf.., e. g., Ex J>arte Virginia, 100 U. S.
"Now, Ly our nction on this · bill we have asserted as fully ns we can
We haYc a~scrted as clearly
as we can n;;::;ert our belief that it is the duty of Congrr~s to rrdre:>s that
mischief. We have also assrrtcd as fully as we can assert the constitutional
right of C'AJngrrss to legislate.'' Globe, a.t. 800.
See also id., <lt 376 (Hep. Lowe) ; id., at 428-429 (Rep. BeaHy); id.,
at 448 (Hep. Butlrr); id., at. 475-477 (Hcp. Dawrs); id .. at 578-579 (Srn.
Trumi.Jtill) ; id., at GOU (Srn. Pool); Glob r App., ut 182 (Hep. J\fprcur).
Other supporters were quite clenr that§ 1 of the act. extended a rrmedy
not only where a State had passed an unconstitutional statute, but also
where otriccr::> of the State wrrc drliberatcly iudifi'ercnt to the rights of
black citiz<'nl'; :

assert t.lw mischief intended to be remedied.

''But the chief complaint b [that] by a. sy:;tematic mnlndministrntion of
[state law], or a. neglrct. or rcfu~al tv enforce their provi,;ions, a portjon of
the people arc denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a stare
of facts is clrarly made out, I brlievc [§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amencl·menL] empowers Congress to step in and provide for doing justice to those
persons who are thus denied equnl protection." Globe App., at 153 (Mr.
Garfirld) . See also Monroe v. Pape, supra, n . 7, at 171-187.

J

'Importnnt.Iy for our inquiry, even tho opponents of § 1 ngrecd that. it was
constttutional and , fmt.hcr, that it swept. vrry broadly. Thus, Senator·
Thmmau, who ga\'C the mo:;t rxhau::;tivc critiqur of§ 1, said:
«This sertion rel:des wholly to ei1·il suits. . . . Its whole effect is to give·
to the F<·c!Pral Judiciary that. which now floc:; not belong to it-a jurisdiction that may be constitutionally couferrerl U]JOn ·it, l grant , but that has
never yet. been conferred upon it. It. :l\lthorize:< any per::~on who i::; deprived
of any ri ght , ]Jrivilq;r , or immun i t~· ~ccurrd to him b y the Con~!itut.iun of
the United StatP;;, to bring nn action again;;:t the wrongdoer in the Federal
courts, and t.hat wtthout nny limit whatsoever as to the amount in
cont.roveriiy. , . •

''['!']here is no limitation whatsoever upon the terms that are en17Jloyed
lin the bill], am! they are as cornprehe11s£ve as ccm be used." Globe App.~
.! \t 21fl- 21? (Pmphasis nddrd) ,
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339. 346- 347 (1880); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles,
227 U. S. 278, 286-287. 204-206 ( 1013). One need not rely on
this infer~llce alone, however, for the debates show that Members of Congress understood "persons" to include municipal
corporations.
Representative Bingham, for example, in discussing § 1 of
the bill, explained that he had drafted § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment with the case of Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243
(1834), especially in mind. "In [that] case the city had taken
private property for public usc. without compensation . . . ,
and there was no redress for the wrong . . . . " Globe App.,
at 84 (emphasis added). Bingham's further remarks clearly
indicate his view that such takings by cities. as had occurred
in Barron, \\'Ould be redressable under ~ 1 of the bill. See
id., at 85. More generally. and as Bingham's remarks confirm,
§ 1 of the bill would logically be the vehicle by which Congress
provided redress for takings. since that section provided the
only civil remedy for Fourteenth Amendment violations and
that Amendment unequivocally prohibited uncompensated
takings:"; Given this purpose. it beggars reason to suppose
that Cougress \\'Ould have exempted municipalities from suit,
i.nsisting instead that compensation for a taking come from an
officer ~n his individual capacity mther than from the government unit that had the benefit of the property taken. 47
In addition, by 1871, it was well understood that corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis. This had not
always been so. When this Court first considered the question
of the status of corporations, Chief Justice Marshall, writing
fm· the Court, denied that corporations "as such" were persons
~uSee

Story, Commrntaries on the Constitution of the United States

§ 195<i (Coolry ('d. 1873) .
lndrcd the frdrr:1l courts found no obstacle to awnrds of damnges
11gainst municipalities for cornmon-l:nv t:~kings. Sec Sumner v. Philadel7Jhia, 23 F. Cns. :m2 (CCED P:1. 1873) (No. 13,611) (:1warding damages
of $2,27:l.36 and c0sts of S346.a5 ngainst the city of Philadelphia).
47
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as that term was used 111 Art. III and the Judiciary Act of
1789. See Bank of the V nited States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61,
86 (1809).' 8 By 1844, however, the Deveaux doctrine was
unhesitatingly abandonefL
"fA] corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes
as a person, although a11 artificial person, ... capable of
being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a
natural person." Lou£sville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497,
558 (1844) (emphasis added), discussed in Globe, at 752.
And only two years before the debates on the Civil Rights
Act, in Cou·les v. ilferr:cr Cou11ty, 7 Wall. 118, 1~H (1869), the
Letson principle "·as automatically and without discussion
extended to municipal corporations. L'nd<>r this doctrine,
municipal corporations \\·ere rout.iuely sued in the federal
courts ~ 9 and this fact was well known to Members of
Congress.r·o
That the "usual" meaning of the "·ord person would extend
to municipal corporations is also evidenced by an Act of
Congress which had been passC'd 01lly months before the Civil
Rights Act was passed. This Act provided that
"in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word 'person' may
extend and he applietl to bodies politic and corporate ... unless the context shows that such words were
intended to be used in a more limited sense[]." Act of
Feb. 25, 1871, ch . 71, § 2, 1o Stat. 431.
46 Noncthrlri'~, suits could be hrought. in feueral court if the natural
person>; who wrrc mPmbc·r:; of thf' ·corpor:~tion were of divrrse citizenship
from the other part irs to the litigation. Sre 5 Cranch, at 91.
4° Sec n. 28, supra
~ 0 Src, r. g., C:lobc, at 777 (Srn. ShPnnan); id .. at 752 (Rep. Shcllah:trgcr) ("countil':-;. citiP~, and corporation~ of all sorts, after years of
judicial confli(·t, have Lrconw thornu~hl~· e:-;tahli,.:hf'd to be an individual or
person or entity of t lw Jwr,.:onal <·xi~t<·nrP, of which, :1s n cit izcn, individu:~l, or inh:1bitant, thr Unlt<'d Stntr,:; Con,.:titution do('S take note and endO\\;·
\V~th f:t<'\\11~· to ~llf' and lw supd iu tlw comt:l of the Unit('(lStates.") ..
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Municipal corporations in 1871 were included within the
phrase "bodies politic and corporate" 51 and, accordingly, the
"plain mea11ing" of § 1 is that local governmC;Ut bodies were
to be includeu within the ambit of the persons who could be
sued under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. Indeed. a Circuit
Judge, writing in 1873 in what is apparently the first reported
case under § 1, read the DictioHary Act in precisely this way
iii a case involving a corporate plaintiff and a municipal
defendant. r.~ See l\'orthwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Parle,
18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,336). 53
51 S<'e Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cns. 393, 394
(CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,:33fi); 2 Kent's Commentaries ·X·27s-·r.·279 (12th
0. W. Holmes ed. 187:3). S('e abo United States Y. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96,
109 (CC Va. 1823) (Mar::;hall, C. J.) ("The United States is a gov<'rnment,
and; consequently, a body politic and corporat<'"); Brief for Petitioner in
Monroe v. Pape, 0. T . HlGO, No. 39, App's. D and E (coll ect ing state
statutes which, in 1871, defined municipal corporations as bodies politic
nnd corporate).
52 The court also noted thnt. there was no discern ible reason why persons
injured by municipal corporations should not be nble to recover. See 18
F . Cas., at 39-L
·
li 3 In con~idrring the effect of the Act of Feb. 25, 1871 in lii on roe, howC\'er, Justice Douglas, appnrentl~· focu~ing on the word ';may,"~ta.ted: "this
definition fof person] is mE'rely an nllowable, not n mandatory, one." 365
U. S., nt 191. A review of tlw lf•gi;;]ativc history of the Dictionary Act
shows this conclusion to lw incorrf'ct.
There i~ no expre ·s reference in the lt>gislative l1istory to the definition of
pen;on, uut. Sena.tor Trumbull, the Art!s sponSOJ', disc i!~ ·cd the phrase
"'words importing thl~ masculine gender may be applied to fE'mnle::;,"
(t-mphnsis n.ddcd), which immt>dintdy prerf'dPs thr. definition of per~on, and

stated:
··'The only object [of tlw Act] is to get rid of n. great deal of verbosity
in our statutr::; by providing that whrn thf• words 'he' is u::;ed it. shall
include frmales a;; well as male:;[]." Congres:;ional Globe, 41 ·t Cong., 3d
Ses...:;., 775 (Jan. 27, 1871) (C'mpha~is nclclf'd).
Thus, in Tnunbull's vif'w the word "may" meant. "::;hall." Such n manda.tory me of the E'Xtendf'd meanings of thr. words dl'finrd by the Act
i::; abo rf'quirPd for it to perform Jt:< intf'tHh·d funetion-to hf' a guide
to '' mlcs Qf ~.onstruction" of Ads of Congn•ss. See id .. at 775 (llem~tr~
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n
Our analysis of the legislativt> history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 cc. :npels the conclusion that Congress did intend
municipalities and other local govprnmcnt units to be included
among those per~on s to \\·hom ~ Hl83 applies.r.• Local governiug bodies.'·· therefore, can lw sued directly under ~ 1083 for
monetary, declaratory. or iJJjUJlCtivC' relief \\'h ere . as here. the
action that is allegc•cl to ht> unconstitutional implements or
executes a policy statement., ordinance, regulation. or decision
of Sen. Trumbull). Werr the ddined words "::tllowablr, [but] not mandatory" ronstructions, a,: Jlfonroe ~11ggests, tlwre would be no "rules" at all.
Instead , Congre:;s mu8t h:n-r intr·ndrd tlw definitions of the Aet to npply
across-the-board except. wlwrr the Act by it ~ term ~ callrd for a. drviation
from this practice--'· Lwhrre] the context. shows that [defined] words
wrre to be u ~ed in a more limi ted sr n~e." Ccrtailll~- this is how the
N orthwcstern Fertilizing court, viewed the matter. Since there is nothing
in the "context" of § 1 of thr Civil Rights Act calling for a rr::;tricted
interpretation of the word "person," the langu:1gc of that section should
prima facie be constr\ted to inc:lude "bodies politic" among thr entities th:1t
could be sued .
5 4 Therr i::; ccrtaml~· no <'Oll"titutwn:il illlpPdimrnt to municipal li:tbility.
''The Te11th Anwndml'llt ·~ rl'>'Pn·:l t ion of tlondrlef(at <'cl ]HJ\1'<'1':< to thr States
b- not. implicated b~- a kd<·ral-<"uurt ,iudgnwnt <'nfort'ing tlw <'XJll'l'>'>' prohibitions of unlawful "tate• l'ondtJ<·t ''nactrd h~ · th<· Fourteenth Aml'ndnwnt."
flfilliken v. Brudle!/. -J;~;{ L'. 8. ::!Iii, :291 (1Yi'7l; ~l'<' R.r partl' l'iroiuia. 100
U.S. 339, :347-:l-±E' (1>'1'0). For thi,; rl'a ~o n, Natio11al L<'O{IUC of Cities v.
Usery. -J2(i U.S. R:l;) (19i'ti). i,; Jfrl'll'\'aJJt to om con:<idl'ration of thi,; e:J,.;e.
Nor i:; thrrr an~· ba,;i,; for eoncluding 1hat thr EI<·,Tnth AmPndmrnt is a
bar to munieipal liahiht~ · . ~<·<-. e. (/ .. Fitzpatrick , .. Bit zer, -J-:27 U.S. 445,
456 (197(}): Li11co/n ('oun/!f , .. 1-tmill(l. 1:n ll . ~ . 5:29, 5:~0 (ll'!lO). Our
holdinf( toda~· i,;, of eour~t· , limiH·d to lor·al f(m·emm<·nt 11t1it,; which an' not
/ <·onsidrrl'd part of t he• Stat<· for Elc-n' n t h _\nwndnH•nt pu rpo"e:;.
''''Si ner oflicl:tl capa<·it~· ~ 11it :- g<'nf'r:tll~· reprrsrnt on!~· anotll('r way of
pkadmg nn artion agalll:-<l :111 rnt.itl· of which an oflirrr i,; an agPnt-at
lea,;t wlwrp Elrn•nt h Am<'tHinH•nt c<mstdPration~ do not control :mal~·~is
our hoJdinf( toda~· I h:l I lora] ,!:(U\'\'fllllll'nt ~ Call ])(' : < lll'd lllld<•r ~ ] ()i-);3 IH'C(',;,;aril~· d<·<·icle,.: th:tt. loeal ~O\'f'l'llllH'Ilt oflieial,.: :'\tl'd ill tlwir oflieial eapar-itiC' ~ arC' " p<·r:;ons " nllcll'r ~ l!JK:i ill tho:;<' ea:<e:; in whic·h , a::; h<·n•, a local
~overlllllC'll_t would. ht• ~ 11abl!• ill it,; 0\\'11 nanw ..
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officially adopted a1td pruntulgated by that body's officers.
Morcov0r. although the touchstone of the~ 1!)8;~ action against
a government body is an allegation that oilicial policy is
responsible for a deprivation of rights prot<>cted by the Constitution, local govcrnmPJl\:-'3. like every other ~ 1083 "person,"
by the very terms of the statute. ma.y l>e sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom" even though such a custom has not received formal
approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels.
As Mr. Justice Harlan. writing for the Court. said in Adickcs
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 308 l'. :-l. 144. 167- IGS ( 1970): "Congress
included custom and usage lin ~ HJ83] because of persistent
and widespread discriminatory practices of State officials . . . .
Although not authorized by \\'ritten law. such practices of state
officials could well be so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law." '' 0
On the other hand. the language of ~ 1083. read against
the background of the same legislative history. compels the
conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be
} held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy
of some nature caused a constitutio11al tort. In particular. \Ve
conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely
because it employs a tortfeasor-or. in other words. a municipality cannot be held liable under ~ 1083 in a respondeat
superior theory.
\Ve begin with the language of § 1983 as passed:

I

"[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute,

I

I

~ 6 Srr a~o .Tu::;ticr Frankfurthrr·~ :;tatrmrnt for thr Court in Nashville,
C. & St. L. R. Co . ,.. Urutcuiu:~. :HO U.S. Jti:!, :Hi9 (19-!0):
"lt would bra natTO\\' conceJHion of juri~prud<'tH·(• to tonfitH' tlw notion of
'htw:;;' to what i,; found writi<'Il 011 t!H· :<tatllt<' book~. and to di~n·gard the
glo~ whirh !if<· ha~ writt<'ll upo11 it. SPttkd :;t:ttP practiPr ... can
P><tabli~h what i,; ,.;tatr law . TIH• Fqual l'rotf'ction CJau,.;e did not write an
empty form:tli:<m into t lw Con:<t it ution. l)pppJ,\· rmlwddN! traditional ways
of carrying out ~tate polie~·. ;;mh a>< tho:<<' of whieh petitiom•r complain:;,
urc oft<'ll 1011ghrr and trurr law than thP dPad \\'on!,- of the written lPxt."
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ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall
subject, or cause to be subjected, any person . . . to the
depriva~.ion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution of the United States. shall. any such
law, statute. ordinance. regulation, custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the
party injured in any action at Jaw, suit i11 equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . ." Globe App., at 335
(emphasis added).
The italicized language plainly imposes liability on a government that. under color of some official policy, "causes" an
employee to violate another's constitutional rights. At the
same time, that language cannot be easily read to impose
liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of
the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a
tortfeasor. Indeed. the fact that Congress did specifically
provide that A's tort beeauw B's liability if B "caused" A to
subject anoth<'r to a tort suggests that Congress did not in tend
~ 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent."7
See Hizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 370-371 (1976).
Support for such :1 conclu~ion c:m be found in thr legislative histo~·.
As we have indicated , there is Yirtually no discussion of § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act.. Again, howrvcr, Congrr~s· treatment of the Sherman amendment givrs a clue to whet her it would ha\'e drsired to impose respondeat
superior liability.
Th e primar~ · con>'titutiOnal Jll>'tifiration for thr Slwrman amrndment. wns
that 1t \\'a,; a. JJ<'Cl'.-;~a r~· and propc·r rr med~ · for t1w failure of loraliti~ to
protrct citizrn,; a,; tlw Prh·ilrgr,; or 1mmunitiP<' Clau,.:e of the Fourteenth
Amcndml'nt. rl'(!UJn•d. Srt• pp. 10-1:~, supra. And ac!'ording to Sherman,
Shrlhbarger, and Ednmnd:;, the anH•ndnwnt <·amr into play only when a
/ locality wa:o at fault or had knowin::;ly JH'glcctPd it:; duty to pro,·ide pro,tcction . S<·e C:lohr. at 7()1 (SPn . Shrrman); ill ., :lt 75(i (Sril. Edmumb);
td ., at 751- 75:2 (H r p. ShPllabargn). But othPr proponrnt:; of thl' amrndmrnt apparr ntl~· VJC'\I'Pd it a,; a form of vicariou,.: liability for thr unlawful
arb of tlw citiz<•n,.: of tht• loeality . Srr id .. at 79:! (Hep. Butlc•r). And
whethl'r mtrndl'd or not, thr allH'lHlm<·nt as draft<·d did impo,.;r a >'JlC'Cir~ of
Yi<'<\TiO\lS lial1ility on mtmicipalit i<•s sitlt:('· it could be c:on~t f\Jt'd to impo~
r- 7
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Equally important, creation of a federal law of respondeat
superior where state law did not impose such an obligation
would raise all the constitutional problems associated with the
obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress chose not
to impose because it thought imposition of such an obligation
unconstitutional. To this day. there is disagreement about
the basis for imposing liability on an employer for the torts of
an employee when the sole nexus bet\vecn the employer and
the tort is the fact of tlw 0mploycr-employee relationship.
See \V. Prosser. Law of Torts. ~ 69, at 5(:)9 (4th eel. 1971).
1\onethcless, two justifications tend to stand out. First is
the commonsense notion that no matter how blameless an
employer appears to be in an individual case. accidents rnight
nonetheless be reduced if rmploycrs had to bear the cost of
accidents. See, e. g., ibid.; 2 F. Harper & F. James, The La.w
liability rvcn if a municipalit)· did not know of an impending or ent-:uing
riot. or did not. have the whrrewithall to do :m~·thing nbout it. Indeed, the
~t<ttute hdd a. municipnlit)· 'li:lblE' c·ven if it had dollP everything in its
powrr to <·mb tlw riot. Ser p. ~. suwa; Globe, at 761 (Sen. Steven;;); id.,
at 771 (Sen. Thurman); id .. at 788 (Tirp. KNr); 1:d .. at 791 (H('p. Willard).
Whilr the fir~t collfer<:'nre ~tib.•titute was rejected principally on con,;titut.ional ground:', :-'Pe id .. at 80-J. (Th-p. 1>oJnnd), it. i::; plain from the text of
the second confrrrnce sub~titutl~,,;hich limitrd liability to tho:-;p who,
having tho powrr to intt>rvem· again"t Ku Klux violenre, "neglect [rd] or
refu:>P[d] ~o to do,"::>('!.' Apprndix, infm, at -11. and which wa::; rnacted as
§ 6 of thr 187] Act and is now rodifird a;; -~2 ll. S.C.§ HJS()-fhat Congre:::s
:d:-:o rri<·dcd t ho::;e elenwnt~ of Yicnrious li:ibility containril in the first
confPn'llCP ><ub:::titutP even while accepting the ba::;ir principle that the
inhabitant::; of a r·ommunit~· wrrr bound to providP protrctiun against the
Ku Klux Klan. Strictly ::;prn king. of couw·, the fact that Congre,:.,; refu~ccl
to impo"P Yicariom; liability for thr wrong~ of a f<'w privatP citizen::; doc:;
not. <·onelu:::in·l~· e,:tabli><h that it would ::;imilarl~· have refu::;rd to impose
viearium; liability for th<• tort" of a municipality's pmploy('('::;, Noncthe1<~, wlwn Congre~;;' rC'j1•ction of the on]~· form of vieariou::: liability
presen!t'(l to it. i::; combined with tlH' ab,rn1·e of an~· lazJj!uag<' in § 198:3
which can t'a:-'i!y be con.;tnzC'd to crPate respondeat SU]Jt>rior liability, the
id<·n·zH:e that Congre::;:; did uot intend to impo:::<' ::;ueh liability is quito
l'ltrong.
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of Torts. ~ 2G.3. at l~GR-l~6D (1!)56). Second is the argument
that th<' cost of accidents shou ld be spread to the community
as a wholE' on an insurance theory. See, e. g., id., § 26.5;
\V. Prossf'r. supra, at 459.''s
The first justification is of the same sort that was offered for
statutes likr tlw Sherman amendment: "The obligation to
make comJwnsation for injury resulting from riot is, by arbitrary enactment of statutes; affirmatory law. and the reason
of passing the statute is to secure a more perfect police
regulation." Globe. at 777 (Sen . Frelinghuysen). This justification was obviously insufficient to sustain the amendment
against prrcE'ived constitutional difficulties and there is no
reason to suppose that a more general liability imposed for a
similar reason would havr been thought less constitutionally
objrctionabl<'. The second justification was similarly put
forward as a justification for the Shennan amendment: "we
do not look upon [the Sherman amendment] as a punishment . . . . It is a mutual insurance." !d., at 792 (Rep.
ButlE'r). Again. this justification was insufficicn t to sustain
the amendmC'nt.
We conclude. therefore. that a local government may not be
sued for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.
Instead. it is \\·hen execution of a government's policy or
custom. whether made by its la\vmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under ~ HJ83. Since this case unquestionably involves
official policy as the moving force of the constitutional violaA third jui'tification, often citrd but which on rxamination is apparently insufficimt to justify the doctrinE' of 1·cspondrat superior, sec, e. g.,
2 F. Harper <.\: F. James, supra. n. rn, § 2o.3, i::: that. liability follows the
right to control the action~ of :1 tortfrnsor. B~· om deci~ion in Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U. S. 3o2 (1976), wr would apprar to havE' decided thnt the
mf.'re right. to control without an~· control or din'ction having brrn exrrcisE'd
and without any failurP to Sll]Wl'Vi>;;C' is not <'llOUgh tO SUpport. § !g83
liability. See ir.l., n.t 370-:3i. !..
58
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tion found hy th<' Distnct. ( 'ouri. f;<'(' pp. 1- :2. ~111d n. 2. suwa,
\\'e must rPver:se the judgment lH'IO\\'. In so doing. we ha.v e no
occasion to address. and do not addrPss. \\'hat the full contours
of municipal liability UJHI<'r ~ 1\J83 may lw. We have attempted only to sketch so much of the ~ 1m~;j caus<' of action
against a local govcnlltH'llt as is appart'nt from tlw history of
the 1871 Act ami our prior cases and \\'C expressly leave further
development of this action to anothC'r day.

Jil
Although \\'e have stated that stare decis-is has more force in
statutory analysis than in cottstitutional adjudication because,
in the former situation, Congress can corrC'ct our mistakes
through legislation. see. e. g., Edclma11 , .. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
671, and n. 14 (HJ74). \\'C hu.ve never applied stare decisis
mechanically to prohibit ovC'rrulittg our C'arlier decisions determining the meaning of statutes. See. e. g., Con6ne'ltlal1'. V.,
lnc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
R. 36. 47-4D ( 1977); Burnet
v. CoTonado Oil & Gns Co .. :285 lT. S. 393. 406 n. 1 (1932)
(Brandeis. J.. dissenting) (collecting cases). Nor is this a case
where \\'e should "place on the shoulders of Congress the
burden of the Court's owll error." GiTouaTd v. United States,
328 U.S. 61,70 (Hl46) .
First, M onToc v. Pape, supra, insofar as it completely
immunizes municipalities from ~uit under ~ 1983. \\'as a departure from prior practiee. Sc<>. e. fl., KoTthwestern FeTtilizing
Co. v. Hyde Park, s·upra; ('ity of ManchesleT v. Leiby, 117
:F'. 2cl GG1 (CAl 1041); l!nnnau v. City of Haverhill, 120 F. 2cl
87 (C'Al 1041); Douulrts V. (Sty of .Teannett:e, a1n u. S. 157
(1943); Holmes v. City of Alla11ta, :150 U.S. 870 (1955), in
('ach of which municipaliti('s wNe defendants in ~ HJSa suits.~\'

r.

I
/

"•" .Earh ea~P CltNI b~· Monroe. ~P<' :~;i(i U. ~ .. at 191 n. 50, a~ con:;;i~trnt .
with tht" po~1t10n that local !!O\'!'rnmrnt~ \\·err not § HJo:{ "per~on~"
rrachPd it;-; con<'hi~IOil b)· a~:<umin~ that ~tat!'-law immunitir:- overrode th~
§ 19~ <:<tl~~<· of ~.ction . Tin~ ha:< n<·,.<:r hP~II th<• law..
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Moreover. the constitutional ddect that led to the rcjection
of tht· Sherman amendment would not have distinguished
betwC'en municipalities and school boards. each of which is an
instrumentality of state administration. See pp. 14-22. supra.
For this reason. our cas<'s-drciclcd both before and after
Monroe, see 11. 5, s-upra-holding school boards liable in ~ 1983
actions are inconsistent, \\·itlt Monroe, especially as llfonn>e's
immunizing principle was (•xtc•ttded to suits for injunctive relief
in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 F. S. 507 (Hl73)." 11 And
although in many of these cns<'s jurisdiction was not questioned, we ought not "disrrgarcl the implications of an exercise
of judicial authority assumed to be proper for [100] years."
Brown Shoe Co. v. Um.led States, 370 U. S. 294, 307 (1962);
see Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, s-upra, at 88
(Marshall, C. J.) ("Those decisions are not cited as authority . . . but they have mueh weight. as they show that this
point neither occurred to the bar or the bench"). Thus, while
we have reaffirmed Jf on roe without further examination on
three occasions.'a it can scarcely be• said that Af ouroe is so
consistent with the warp and \\·oof of civil rights la.w as to be
beyond question.
Second. the principlr of blankrt. immunity established in
Monroe can not be cabinPd short of school boards. Yet such
an extension \\'Oulcl itsrlf be inconsistent \\'ith recent expressions of congressional itttent. Jn thr \\'ake of our decisions,
Congress not only has shown 110 hostility to federal court
d~cisions against school board". but it has indeed rrjccteu
efforts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over school
boards."~ Moreowr. n•cognizing that school boards are often
Although many :-:ull" a~a1n~1 ~t·huol bu:mb :d"o inclmll' pri,·at(' individuals a:; partit>:-:, thr " prine1p:tl dd('ndant i" u~u .11ly tlw local board of
rdura11011 or srhool hoard.. .lfilhk('ll , .. Bnullt ·!t. ~upra. 11 . -t, at :29:2-293
(PowELl,, .J ., ronrurring!
"' !lfoor v. C'oulll!f of Alo1111'rla . -Ill l'. S. ()!);) ( 1\JI:{): Cit!fof Kenosha v.
"0

Hruuv, 412 ll . S. 501 (191:{) : Alrltll!fer , .. lloll'anl. -1:27 U.S. I (197G).
G~ Pltring tlw heyday of tlw furor owr h11~illg, both tlw lln\Js<• <111<.! the.'
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defendants in school desegrcgatioll suits, which have almost
without Pxception been ~ HJ8:1 suits. Congress has twice
passed legis;a.tion authorizing grants to school boards to assist
them in complying \\'ith federal court drcrc<'s."" Finally. in
Sen at n rrfw<ed t{) :tdopt bill~ that would ha.\·r rt'lllO\'(•d from the fedNal
court.~ juri:<d iet ion
"to make any deci ~ ion, enter any judgment, or i:<.~ur any ord<·r n·quiring
any stlwol board to makP any change in thr racial co mpo~it ion of the
studrnt hod~· at an~· publi e ~c hool or in ar)~· cia,.:,-: at. an~· pnblic ,.;chool to
which ,.:tuclrnt~ an• a;-;~il!: n rd in conformit:> with a. frr<'dom of choicr ~·~·~tr m.
or reqniring an~· ~c h oo l board to tmn,.:port nn ~· ~t ud r nt ::; from public sc hool
to anotlwr puhlie ~c ho o l or from onr pbce to another pla cr or from one
sehool di::;trict. to anoth~·r ::;chool di:;trict or dt>n~·ing to any ~t ud r nt. the
right. or privi!PgP of attrnding any public sehool or cia;;.-; at any public
school eho~rn h~· the parent. of ~urh ~ tud <'n t in conformity with a frredom
of choice ,.;y,.:trm, or rpquiring a n~ · school board to close any ~c hool and
tnmsf(•r Ur<' st udent s from the cio::•Pd school to any other :;chool for the
purpo,.;e of altering the racial rompo~it ion of 11w ,.;tuclrnt. body at. any
puhlie :>ehool, or pr<'rluding :my ~rhoo l board from carrying int o •effect. any
provi ~io n of an~· ron tract brt \\'een it all(! any member oft hr faculty of any
publi<' ~clwol it opPratr" ,;pPcif~· mg tlw public ,;c hool \\'lwre the member of
the faeulty i~ to perform hi~ or lwr dutir~ unclr r th r contract." S. 179,
9acl Cong., 1~t Se~s., § 1207 (Hl71) (emphn~i" added).
Other bill:; de "i~nPd either cmnpletrl~· to n•movr the federal courts from
the sc hool dP:;egr<'gation rontro,·<·r~~·. S. 21\7, 9:3cl Cong., ]:;t Se::;::;. (1973), or
to limit the abilit~· of fpderal rourt::; to Hubject ~c hool board,; to rpmrdial
order,.; in de::wgrPga tion rn:oe,;, S. (il\l, 9~d Cong., 1l't Sr,;::;. (197:3); S. 179,
93d Cong., M Sr:<:>., § 2 (a) (197:{); H. n. 13534. 92d Cong., 2d Se:;s.,
§ 2922 (1972) . ha,·c· ~imilarly fa ike! .
n:. In 1972, :<purrrd b~· a finding "thnt. thr ]Ho rr:<~ of rliminat.ing or
preventing minorit~· group i ~o l atio n and imprm·ing th P quality of rclucation
for ;~ll chilclrrn oftt>ll iuvolvr;; the <':qwnditmP of additioual fuud :; to which
local rducational agrneip:; do not h:t\'C' ac·rp:;,.:," 20 U. S. C. § 11301 (n.)
(Supp. V, 1975) , Congrr ~ ~ pa ~~Pd thr 1!172 Emergency School .Aet. Section
64:3 (n)(1)(A)(i) of that Act, 20 U.S. C.§ 1605 (a.)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. V,
1!175), n.uthorizr::; the :\ ,.;,.;istant Sccrrtar~·
"to make a grant to , or a ('Ontract \\'ith , a local educational O(!Ctii:.IJ ['Which]
is implementill(l a plu11 tchich has bt•cn 11ndcrtakc n pur~urwt to a final order
-i~sued by a l'ourt uf th l.' Cnited State . ~ ... which rrquire:; thr d<':'rgrrgation of minorit~· ~roup :;rgrrp;ated childrl'n or faculty in the clrmrnt~try nnd
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tlw Civil Hight. Attoi'll<'ys' Fr<'s Award Act of 1D7o. !)O :-\tat.
/2641, \\'h ich allows JH'('\·ai Jing part irs ( i 11 thr discretion of the
secondarr :;ehooJ,.; of ><ueh ngPJH·~·. or ot hrrwi:<r rrquirr:< the rlimination or
reduction of minont~· ~!roup 1"ol:tl ion 111 snch >'ClJools." (Empha><is addrd.)
A "local ('dueational :IJ.?:<'IH'.\'" 1" drfinrd by :.W U.S. C. § lfi1!l (8) (Supp.
V, I!-J75), a.~ "a publil' board of Pducation or oth('r public authority lrgally
con::titutccl within a St:il<' for ('ith<·r administrative control or direction of,
public· (']cmcntar~· or :;cconclar~· :<choob in a city. county, town:;hip, school,
or othrr political ~ub1livi"ion of a State, or a frdrrall)' recognized Indian
res<·n·at ioll, or >'llch <·ombination of ;;chool di:;trict:;, or counties ns are
recognizl'd in a ~tatl' a>' an admiHi:;tratiVP ngrnc)· for its public rlcmrntary
or ><<'<'O!Jdar~· >'rhools, or a combination of local Pdnration:t! agenci(',.; . ... "
Congrr::'.~ tlm>< clmrl)· rrcognized that :;chool hoard~ \\'Pre oftrn part iPs to
fcdrrnl ~<chool dc·>'rgrcg:Jtion :;uit:;. In§ il~ of the Act, 20 U.S. C. § 1617
(Supp. V, 1975), Congrt'.;s gan• it>' explicit approvnl to the in><titution of
fcdrrnl de....:egrega tion suits again,;! school board:;-pre~umably under § 1983.
That srction provides :
"Upon thr. entry of a final ordPr by a court of the United States against a
local education O(/l'IIC/1 •. • for di~crimination on thr b;l.~i,; of rae<·, color, or
nn.tional origin in \·iolation of . .. tlw fomternth nmriHin1C'nt to thP
Con:>titution of thr Fnitl'd StatP~ .. . thr court mn~· allow thr prevailing
part)', other than thr l 1nitc•d Statr,;, a rensonable attornry':; fee a" part of
the co:;t:;." (Empha:;i" adclNl.)
Two yrars latrr, Congre~~ found that ''the implementation of dr,;cgregat.ion plane that. rrquirc rxtrn>'i\·r stuclrnt transportation has, in many cases,
requirrd local Pducatimwl aoenne~; 1o <'Xpand [ ~;ic] largr amount;< of funds,
thPrrh~· dPplrting thrir finanrial rr>'OtHCr~ .. . . 20 U. S. C. § 1702 (a)
(!l) . (Empha~i;:; addrd.) Congrr:;:< did nor re:<poml by drclaring that
~chool board,; W<"re not ><ubjrrt to ~lilt und<"r § 1mn or an~· oth<·r frclrral
statui<'. "but :;imply [ lrgi"latcdJ rrYi:::NI rYidr11tiar~· ~tandard:-< ami remc·dial
prior it i<•;; to br <·mplo)'Pd b~· th<' cmtrt:< in ckciding :::urh <':l~r:;." Brief for
National Education A,;.~Il., at 15-Hl. Inclrrd, Congrr:;,; c·xprl's~l:-· rritrratetl
that. a eau:;<· of aetwn, c·ogrnzabl<' in. tiH• fpdrral comt:;, l'Xists for discrimination in tlw public ~<·hool rontl'xt. :20 U. S. C. ~§ li03, 170!\, 170.S, 1710,
lilK Thr Act. a>':<Uill<':< that "<'hoof board,; will ll>'llall)· br thr drfmdant:;
in such suit:<. For examplr. § :211 of th<· A!'t, :20 U.S. C.§ 1710 provide:;:
''The Attome)· C:rnPrnl ;;hall not in~111ute n ci\·il action uncJpr ,;ection
170U of thi~ title• [winch ;dlow:< for :<uit h~ · both priYal<' parti<•::; and the
AttQrney Uen<'ral to rrdrr"~' di:<rrinunation in puhlir edu<'ation] brfore he--

......
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/ court) in ~ 10~3 suits to obtain attomeys fees from the losing
party, the Senate stated:
"[D]efendants in these cases are often State or local
bodies or State or local officials. In such cases it is
intend<>cl that thE' attorneys' fe<'s. like other items of costs,
will be collected either directly from the off-icial. in his
official capacity, fro1n funds of his agency or under his
control, or from tile State or loral government (whether
or not the ayency or uovermnen t is named as a party).
S. Rep. Xo. 94-1101, at 5 (emphasis added; footnotes
omitted).

r

Far from showing that C'o11gress has r<>lied on Monroe, therefore, events since HHH sho\\' that Congress has refused to
extend the benefits of Af on roe to school boards and has
attempted to aliO\\' a\\'ards of attorneys' fees against local
govemments even though M omoe, City of Kenosha v. Bruno,
supm, and Aldinger V. Hou•ard, 427 r. S. 1 (Hl76), have made
the joinder of such g()\Wnments impossible.r. 1
Third, municipalitirs can assert no reliance claim \\'hich can
support an absolute immunity. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said in Jfonro e, "[tlhis is not an area of commercial law in
which, presumably. individuals may have arranged their affairs
in reliance on the cxp<>ct<'d stability of decision." 365 U. S.,
" (a) gin•,; to thr nppropriate rdlll':ttional agl'n<'~· notirl' of the condition
or condition,; ll'hich, in hi~ juclgmrnt, rou ..:titutr a violation of part. I the
prohibition:< :11..!;11in~t di;,;rrinnn:ltton in puhlir. rdueationj." Sl•ction :21\J of
the Al't, 20 l'. S.C. § 171S. pr01·idl',.; for tlw tl'nnination of rourt ordl'rl'd
busing .. if t ht• l'omt fi ncl:< t hl' cldrnd:t nt rduea tiona I ag<'IlC'Y ha;; ~a ti"fird t ht•
rt'quir<'llll'llt" of ihe fifth or fourtrrnth anwndmrnt,.; to thr Con::;titution,
whichrver j,.; :tppfieaull'. and will l'Olltinur 10 Ue in compliance with the
n"quireml•nt;:; tiH'I'l'PL"
104
Whrthl'r Congn•:-;;:;' attempt. i~ in iart rfrrrtivr i~ tlw :mbjrC't of Huto
v. Fi1mey, 1917 Trrm, No. 7G- 1GGO, and therrforr we rxpre,;,; no view on
it here.
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at 221 - 222 (dissent). lntkccl. municipalitiPs simply cannot
"arrange their affairs'' on an assumption that they can violate
constitutional rights indefinitely since injunctive suits against
local of-ficials under ~ HJ~3 ,,·ould prohibit any such arrangement. AnJ it scan•ely IH'cd he mentioned that nothing in
Monroe encourages muniripalitiPs to violate constitutional
rights or even suggests that such violations are anything other
than completely wrong.
Finally, even under the most "tringent test for the propriety
of overruling a statutory decision proposed by Mr. Justice
Harlan ill N!onroe ""- "that it must appear beyond doubt from
the legislative history of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] misapprehended the meaning of the [section]," Monroe v. Pape,
supra, at 192 (concurring opinion )- the overruling of Monroe
insofar as it holds that local governments arc not "persons"
who may be defendants in ~ 1983 suits is clearly proper. It
is simply beyond doubt that. under the 1871 Congress' view
of the la>v. were § 1983 liability unconstitutional as to local
goverumcnts. it would have been equally unconstitutional as
to state officers. Yet cYcryone-proponrnts and opponents
alike-knev.- § Hl83 would be applicu to stak officers and nonetheless stated that ~ 1083 was constitutional. See pp. 21- 22,
supra. And. moreover, there can be no doubt that ~ 1 of the
Civil Rights Act \vas intcnclrcl to provide a complete remedy,
to be broadly construed. against all forms of official violation
of federally protected rights. Thr·refore, absent a clear statement in the legislative history supporting the conclusion that
~ 1 was not to apply to the of-ficial acts of a municipal corporaWe note, howPvrr, that \Ir. Ju:::tiel' Harlan':< tr::;t ha::: not bren
expre;;::;ly adopted b~· thi,; Court. \Jon•ovl'r, that tp::;t is basrd on two
factors: stare drcisis all(] '·indications of c·ongn•:o::::ional arcrptanec of this
Court.'s earlier interprPtalion !of tlw ~t~Ltllll' in quc•stionl." 3115 U.S., at
19:!. As we haYl' cxplaitl('d , the :;Pcond con~idcrntion is not. prr.~cnt in this
';
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tion-which simply is not prrs<•ntr-therc is no justification for
excluding municipalities from the "persons" covered by ~ 1.
For the rea~ons stat<'d above. thcn•fore. we hold that stare
decisis does not bar our ov<'tTulitJg of llf onroe insofar as it is
inconsistent with Parts 1 and II of this opinion.•;G

IV
Siuce the question whether local government bodies should
be afforded some form of official immunity was not presented
as a question to be decided ou this petition and was not
briefed by the parties nor addressed by the courts below, we
express no views on the scope of any municipal immunity
beyond holding that municipal bodies sued under ~ 1983 cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity. lest our decision that
such bodies are subject to suit under ~ 1983 "be drained of
meaning." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 41611. S. 232, 248 (1974). Cf.

Bivens v. Si:t Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. 8.
389, 397-398 (1971).

v

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is

Reversed.
r.n ~o u~f'ful purposf' would be Sf'rvf'd by :m attempt at thi::; late date to
drtf'rminr wlw1 ht•r M Ollrul' wa:< corrrct on its fac1". Similarly, since this
case clearly involvrs oflicial polic~· nnd docs not involve respondeat s·upe1ior,
we rlo 1101. a~a~· a virw on how om eas<'" whirh havr rl'li<'tl on tha1 aspect
of .Vonroc that. j,; ovprrulrd today-.1loo1' v. C'ou11t11 uf Alameda, supra,
n. 9, City of Kenosha y nru/10, ~upra. II. 9, and Aldinge1' v. lloward,
suwa., 11. G;j- should ha\'l' lwl'n dl'cided on :1 correct virw of § 198:t
No1hing \IT1 .;ay today nff<·('1::; tlw conclusion rC'arhrd in Moo1'. ~ee 411
1.1. S., nt im-iO.J, that .J:.l ll. S. C. § 1988 cannot. br u,;;rcl to crrate a
f<'dC'r:d (':ltl><r of aetion whPn' ~ HJ~:3 rlo<>::< not othrrwi:<c provid<' on or the
eondH"ioH rra('lwd 111 f'ity of Ko10~ha, :<<'C' .Jl~ U. S., at 513, that
"uo1hin~ . . . :<u~g<'><1[:< I tha1 tiH· gew·rir word ·ppr::;on' in § 19H;~ was
in1<'1Hled 1o han• a hifm<':i!Pd applira1ion to munieipal corpor:ttions dcpcm.lin).!; on thP na111rr. of the n•Jirf :<ough1. again~1 . thrm.."
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APPENDIX
As proposed, the Sherman amentlment was as follows:
"That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building,
bam, or gra.nary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled tlown , burned. or destroyed, wholly or in
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with
force a11d violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; and if such offense was committed to
deprive any pNson of any right conferred upon him by
the Constitution and laws of tho United States, or to
· deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by
reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or
· parish in which any of the saitl offenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the
person or persons damnifierl by such offense if living, or to
his widmv or legal representative if dead; and such compensation may be recovered by such person or his representative by a. suit in any court of the United States of
competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense
was committed, to be in the name of the person injured,
or his legal representative, and again st said county, city,
or parish. And execution may be issued on a jutlgment
rendered in such suit and may be levied upon any property, real or personal , of any person in said county, city,
or parish, and the said county, city, or parish may recover
the full amount of such judgment, costs, and interest,
fron1 ally person or persons engaged as principle or
accessory in such riot in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction." Globe, at 663.
The complete text of the first conference substitute for the
Sherman amendment is :
"That if ttn:y house, tenement, cabin, shop, building1,
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bam, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned. or destroyC'd, wholly or in
part, by ally persons riotously and tumulL.ously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with
force and violence be ":hipped, scourged. \vountlecl , or
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, with intent to deprive any person of any
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for
exercising such right. or by reason of his race, color, or
previous conditions of servitude, in every such case the
county, city, or parish in which ally of the said offenses
shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such offense, if
living, or to his wido'v or legal representative if dead; and
such compensation may be recovered in an action on the
case by such person or his representative in any court of
the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district
in which the offense was committed. such action to be in
the name of the person injured. or his legal representative,
and against said county. city, or parish; and in which
action any of the parties committing such acts may be
joined as defendants. And any payment of any judgment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plaintiff in such action. may. if not satisfied by the individual
defendant therein within two months next after the
recovery of such judgment. upon execution duly issued
against such individual defendant in such judgment. and
returned Ullsatisfied, in >Yhole or in part, be enforced
against such county, city, or parish, by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment. or any other proceeding
in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of
judgments against municipal corporatious; anu such judgment shall be a lien as \vell upon all moneys in the
treasury of such county. city, or parish , as upon the other
}Jroperty thereof. And the court in any such action may
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on motion cause additio11al parties to be made therein
prior to issue joineu, to the end that justice may be done.
And t~e said county, city, or parish may recover the
full amount of such judgment. by it paid. with costs a.n d
interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal
or accessory in such riot. in an action in ally court of
competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish,
so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plaintifi's
rights under such judgment." Globe, at 749 and 755.
The relevant text of the second conference substitute for the
Sherman amendment is as follows:
"[A]ny person or persons. having knowledge that any of
the wrongs conspired to be clone and mentioned in the
second section of this act are about to be committed, and
having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same,
shall neglect or refuse so to do, and such wrongful act
shall be committed, such person or persons shall be liable
to the person injured, or his legal representative." Globe,
~t 8Q4 (emphasis added).
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 75-1914
Jane Monell et al., Petitioners, )On Writ of Certiorari to
v.
the United States Court
Department of Social Services of
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
the City of New York et al.
[January -, 1978]
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department
of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of
New York, commenced this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983
in July 1971,1 The gravamen of the complaint was that the
Board and the Department had as a matter of official policy
compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of
absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons. 2
1

The complaint wa,; amended 011 September 14, 1972 to allege a claim
under Titlo VII of the 1964 Civil ]lights Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000P (1970 rd., and Supp. V) . Thr Di~t.rict Court held that the 197Z
amrndmen1s to Title VIl did not apply retroactively to discrimination
suffered prior 1o those amendments even when an action challenging such
prior discrimination was pending on the date of the amendments. 894
F . Supp. 853, 856 (SDNY 1975). This holding was affirmed on appeaL
532 F . 2d 259, 261-262 (CA2 1976). Although petitioners sought certiorari on the TiLle VII is.-;uo as well as the § 1983 claim, we resr.ricted
our gran1. of certiorari to the latter iRsue. 429 U . S. 1071.
2 Tho plaint iffK ;dle~Pd that New York had a citywide policy of forcing
WOJnt·n to takt• matPrni(y leave af1rr the fifth mont,h of pregnancy unless
a t·i1 y phy~trt;m and. (he h!'ad of an employee's agency allowed up to an
nddi1.ional two monthH of work. Ammdrd Complaint ~28, App. 13-14.
Tlw (lrfrndantH did not. dPH~· this, but stated tha,t this policy had been
<"lmngrd af1rr Kuit waH in::;titu1ed . An;,wer ,113, App. 32-33. The plain1.iffH fmther all(•gt"d that thr Hoard -had n policy of requiring women to
takr ma.t rrnit .y lt%\'C' aflrr the H<'vPnth month of pregnancy unless that
month fpll in the laHt month of the school year, in which case the teaoher
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Cf. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632
(1974). The suit sought injunctive relief and back pay for
periods of unlawful forced leave. Named as defendants in the
action were the Department and its Commissioner, the Board
and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor.
In each case, the individual defendants were sued solely in
their official capa.cities. 8
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York held moot petitioners'
claims for injunctive· and declaratory relief since the city of
New York and the Board, after the filing of the complaint, had
changed their policies relating to maternity leaves so that no
pregnant employee would have to take leave unless she was
medically unable to continue to perform her job. 394 F.
Supp. 853, 855. No one now challenges this conclusion. The
c.o urt did conclude, however, that the acts complained of
were unconstitutional under LaFleur, supra. 394 F. Supp.,
at 855. Nonetheless plaintiff's prayers for back pay were
denied because any such damages would come ultimately from
the City of New York and, therefore, to hold otherwise would
be to "circumvent" the immunity conferred on municipalities
by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). See 394 F. Supp.,
at 855.
On appeal, petitioners renewed their arguments that the
Board of Education • was not a "municipality" within the
meaning of Monroe v. Pape, supra, and tha.t, in any event, the
District Court had erred in barring a dama.ge award against
·the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit rejected both contentions. The court first
could remain through the end of the school term. Amended Complaint
H 39, 42, 45, App. 18- 19, 21. This allegation was denied. Answer
1s, 22, Apr. 35- 37.
3 Amended Complaint f24, App. 11- 12.
• Petitioners conceded that the Department of Social Services enjoys the
same status as New York City for Monroe purposes. See 532 F . 2d, at

n

263.
·,
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held that the Board of Education was not a person under
§ 1983 because "it performs a vital governmental function ... ,
and, significantly, while it has the right to determine how the
funds appropriated to it shall be spent ... , it has no final
say in deciding what its a.ppropriations shall be." 532 F. 2d
259, 263 (1976) (citation omitted). The individual defendants, however, were "persons" under § 1983, even when sued
solely in their official capacities. I d., a.t 264. Yet, because a
damage award would "have to be paid by a city that was held
not to be amenable to such an action in Monroe v. Pape," a
damage action against officials sued in their official capacities
could not proceed. I d., at 265.
We granted certiorari in this case, 429 U.S. 1071, to consider
"Whether local governmental officials and/or local independent school boards are "persons" within the meaning
of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature
of back pay is sought against them in their official
capacities?" Pet. for Cert. 8.
Although, after plenary consideration, we have decided the
merits of over a score of cases brought under § 1983 in
which the principal defendant was a school board 5-and,
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267 (1977); Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406 (1977); Vorchheimer v. School Disttict
of Philadelphia, 430 U. S. 703 (1977); East Carroll Parish School Board v,
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974);
Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696 (1974);
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974); Keyes v.
School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971); Northcross v. City of Memphis Board
of Education, 397 U. S. 232 (1970); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish
School Board, 396 U. S. 226 (1969) ; Alexander v. Holmes County Board
of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District,
395 lJ. S. 621 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,
393 U. S. 503 (1969); Monroe v. Boatd of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450
(1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (1968); Green v.
County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (196.8); SchooL
5
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indeed, in some of which § 1983 and its jurisdictional counter~
part, 28 U. S. C. § 1343, provided the only basis for jurisdic~
tion 6-we indicated in Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977), last Term that the question
presented here was open and would be decided "another day."
That other day has come and we now overrule Monroe v. Pape,
supra, insofar as it holds that local governments are wholly
immune from suit under§ 1983.7

I
In Monroe v. Pape, we held that "Congress did not undertake to bring municipaJ corporations within the ambit of
[ § 1983] ." 365 U. S., at 187. The sole basis for this conclusion was an inference drawn from Congress' rejection of the
"Sherman amendment" to the bill which became Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13-the precursor of§ 1983-which would
have held a municipal corporation liable for damage done to
the person or property of its inhabitants by private persons
"riotously and tumultuously assembled." 8 Cong. Globe, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess., 749 (1871) (hereinafter "Globe"). Although
the Sherman amendment did not seek to amend § 1 of the Act,
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Goss v.
Board of Educat·ion, 373 U. S. 683 (1963) ; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 365 U. S.
569 (1961); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) .
6 Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 63,6 (1974);
App., K eyes v. School Di.st1'ict No.1, 0. T . 1972, No. 71-507, p. 4a; App.,
Stvann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 0. T. 1970, No.
281, p . 465a; Petition for Certiomri, Northcross v. Board of Education,
0 . T. 1969, No. 1136, p. 3; 'Pinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District, 393 U. S. 503, 504 (1969); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373
U. S. 668, 671 (1963) .
1 However, we do affirm Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), insofar
as it holds that the doctrine of respondeat supe1·ior is not a basis for
rendering municipalities liable under § 1983 for the constitut.ionaJ torts of
their employees. See Part II, infra.
s We expressly declined to consider "policy considerations" for or
against municipal liability. See 365 U. S., at 191.
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which is now § 1983, and although the nature of the obligation
created by that amendment was vastly different from that
created by § 1, the Court nonetheless concluded in Monroe
that Congress must have meant to exclude municipal corporations from the coverage of ~ 1 because " 'the House [in voting
against the Sherman amendment] had solemnly decided that
in their judgment Congress had no constitutional power to
impose any obligation upon county and town organizations,
the mere instrumentality for the administration of state law.'"
365 U. S., at 190 (emphasis added), quoting Globe, at 804
(Rep. Poland). This statement. we thought, showed that
Congress doubted its "constitutional power ... to impose
civil liability on municipalities." 365 U. S., at 190 (emphasis
added), and that such doubt would have extended to any type
of civil liability.9
A fresh analysis of debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871;
and particularly of the case law which each side mustered in
its support, shows, however, that Monroe incorrectly equated
the "obligation" of which Representative Poland spoke with
"civil liability."
A. An Overview
There are three distinct stages in the legislative consideration of the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
On March 28, 1871, Representative Shellabarger, acting for
a. House select committee, reported H. R. 320, a bill "to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution and for other purposes." H. R. 320 contained
four sections. Section 1, now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
was the subject of only limited debate and was passed without
9

Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of Monroe, has suggested that the
municipal exclusion m1ght more properly rest on a theory that Congress
sought to prevent the financial ruin that civil rights liability might impose
on municipalities. See City of Kenosha , .. Btuno, 412 U. S. 507, 517-520'
(1973) . However, this view has never bef'll shared by the Court, see
Montoe v. Pape, supra, n. 7, at 190; Moor v. County of Alameda, 411
U . S. 693, 708 (1973), and the debates do not support this position.
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amendment.10 Sections 2 through 4 dealt primarily with the
"other purpose" of suppressing Ku Klux Klan violence in
the southern States. 11 The wisdom and constitutionality of
these sections-not§ 1, now§ 1983-was the subject of almost
all congressional debate and each of these sections was
amended. The House finished its initial debates on H. R.
320 on April 7, 1871 and one week later the Senate also voted
out a bill. 12 Again, debate on § 1 of the bill was limited and
that section was passed as introduced.
Immediately prior to the vote on H. R. 320 in the Senate,
Senator Sherman introduced his amendment. 18 This was not
an amendment to § 1 of the bill. but was to be added as § 7 at
the end of the bill. Under the Senate rules, no discussion of
the amendment was allowed and, although attempts were
made to amend the amendment, it was passed as introduced.
In this form, the amendment did not place liability on municipal corporations, but made any inhabitant of a municipality
liable for damage inflicted by persons "riotously or tumultuously assembled." 14
The House refused to acquiesce in a number of amendments made by the Senate, including the Sherman amendment, and the respective versions of H. R. 320 were thereGlobe, at 522.
Briefly, § 2 created certain federal crimes in addition to those defined
in § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat.. 27, each aimed primarily at
the Ku Klux Klan. Section 3 provided that the President could send the
militia into any State wracked with Klan violence. Finally, § 4 provided
for suspension of the writ of habeas corptJR in enumerated circumstances,
again primarily those tlwught to obtain where Klan violence was rampant,
See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., lst Sess., App., a.t 335-336 (1871) (hereinafter
" Globe App " )
12 Globe, at 709
13 See id., at 663, quotrd in Appt>nclix, wfm, at 41-42.
14 lbtd.
An action for rrcovrry of damagrs was to be in the federal
courts and denommalrd a~ a suit against the county, city, or parish in
which t·he damage had occurred. Ibid. Execution of the judgment was
not to run against the property of the government unit, however, but
a-gainst the private property of any inhabitant. Ibid.
to

11
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fore sent to a conference committee. Section 1 of the bill,
however, was not a subject of this conference since, as noted,
it was passed verbatim as introduced in both Houses of
Congress.
.
On April 18, 1871, the first conference committee completed
its work on H. R. 320. The main features of the conference
committee draft of the Sherman amendment were these: 15
First, a cause of action was given to persons injured by
"any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled
together; ... with intent to deprive any person of any
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for
exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or
previous condition of servitude ...•"
Second, the act provided that the action would be against
the county, city, or parish in which the riot had occurred and
that it could be maintained by either the person injured or
his legal representative. Third, unlike the amendment as
proposed, the conference substitute made the government
defendant liable on the judgment if it was not satisfied against
individual defendants who had committed the violence. If
a municipality were liable, the judgment against it could be
collected
"by execution, .attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or
any other proceeding in aid of execution or applicable
to the enforcement of judgments against municipal corporations; and such judgment [would become] a lien
as well upon all moneys in the treasury of such county,
city, or parish, as upon the other property thereof."
In the ensuing debate on the first conference report, which
was the first debate of any kind on the Sherman amendment,
Senator Sherman explained that the purpose of his amendment was to enlist the aid of persons of property in the enl5Sc·e Globe, at 749 and 755, quoted in Appendix, infra, at 42--43.
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forcement of the civil rights laws by making their property
"responsible" for Ku Klux Klan damage,l 6 Statutes drafted
on a similar theory, he stated, had long been in force in
England and were in force in 1871 in a number of States.17
Nonetheless there were critical differences between the conference substitute and extant state and English statutes: the
conference substitute, unlike most state riot statutes, lacked
a short statute of limitations and imposed liability on the government defendant whether or not it had notice of the impending riot, whether or not the municipality was authorized to
exercise a police power, whether or not it exerted all reasonable efforts to stop the riot, and whether or not the rioters
were caught and punished. 18
The first conference substitute passed the Senate but was
rejected by the House. House opponents, within whose ranks
16 "Let the people of property in the southern States understand that if
they will not make the hue and cry and taJm the necessary steps to put
down lawless violence in those States their property will be holden responsible, and the effect will be most wholesome." Globe, at 761.
Senator Sherman was apparently unconcerned that the conference committee substitute, unlike the original amendment, did not place liability
for riot damage directly on the property of the well-to-do, but instead
placed it on the local government. Presumably he assumed that taxes
would be levied against the property of the inhabitants to make the locality
whole.
'
17 According to Senator Sherman, the law had originally been adopted in
England immediately after the Norman Conquest and had most recently
been promulgated as the law of 7 & 8 Geo. IV, ch. 31. See Globe, at 760.
During the course of the debates, it appeared that Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and New York had similar laws. See id., at 751 (Rep.
Shellabarger); id., at 762 (Sen. Stevenson); id., at 771 (Sen. Thurman);
id., at 792 (Rep. Butler). Such a municipal liability was apparently
'Common throughout New England. See id., at 761 (Sen. Sherman).
J.s In the Senate, opponents, including a number of Senators who had
voted for § 1 of the bill, criticised the Sherman amendment as an imperfect
:and impolitic rendering of the state statutes. Moreover, as drafted, the
'Conference substitute could be construed to protect rights that were not
protected by the Constitution. A complete critique was given by Senator
'Thurman. See Globe, at 770-772.
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were some who had supported § 1, thought the Federal Government could not, consistent with the Constitution, obligate
municipal corporations to keep the peace if those corporations
were neither so obligated nor so authorized by their state
charters. And, because of this constitutional objection. opponents of the Sherman amendment were unwilling to impose
damage liability for nonperformance of a duty which Congress
could not require municipalities to perform. This position is
reflected in Representative Poland's statement that is quoted
in Monroe. 19
Because the House rejected the first conference report a
second conference was called and it duly issued its report.
The second conference substitute for the Sherman amendment
abandoned municipal liability and, instead, made "any person or persons having knowledge [that a conspiracy to violate
civil rights was afoot], and having power to prevent or aid
in preventing the same," who did not attempt to stop the
same, liable to any person injured by the conspimcy. 20 The
amendment in this form was adopted by both Houses of Con~
gress and is now codified as 42 U. S. C. § 1986.
The meaning of the legislative history sketched above can
most readily be developed by first considering the debate on
the report of the first conference committee. This debate
shows conclusively that the constitutional objections raised
against the Sherman amendment-on which our holding in
Monroe was based. seep. 5, supra-would not have prohibited
congressional creation of a civil remedy against state municipal corporations that infringed federal rights. Because § 1 of
the Civil Rights Act does not state expressly that municipal
corporations come within its ambit, it is finally necessary to
interpret § 1 to confirm that such corporations were indeed
intended to be included within the "persons" to whom that
section applies.
1u See 365 U.S., a.t 190, quoted at. p. 5, supra.
See(Globe, at 804, quoted in Appendix, infra, at 43.

'2°
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B. Debate on the First Conference Report
The style of argument adopted by both proponents and
opponents of the Sherman amendment in both Houses of
Congress was largely legal, with frequent references to cases
decided by this Court and the supreme courts of the several
States. Proponents of the Sherman amendment did not, however, discuss in detail the argument in favor of its constitutionality. Nonetheless, it is possible to piece together such an
argument from the debates on the first conference report and
those on § 2 of the civil rights bill, which, because it allowed
the Federal Government to prosecute crimes "in the states,"
had also raised questions of federal power. The account of
Representative Shellabarger, the House sponsor of H. R. 320,
is the most complete.
Shellabarger began his discussion of H. R. 320 by stating
that "there is a domain of constitutional law involved in the
right consideration of this measure which is wholly unexplored." Con g. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., at 67 (1871)
(hereinafter "Globe App."). There were analogies, however.
With respect to the meaning of§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly its Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Shellabarger relied on the statement of Mr. Justice Washington in Garfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 (CCED Pa.
1825), which defined the privileges protected by Art. IV:
"'What these fundamental privileges are[,] it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They
may, however, be all comprehended under the following
general heads: protection by the Government;'uMark that" 'protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property
of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety . . . .'" Globe App., at 69 (emphasis added)~
quoting 4 Wash. C. C., at 380.

·.
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Building on his conclusion that citizens were owed protection-a conclusion not disputed by opponents of the Sherman
Amendment 21 -Shellabarger then considered Congress' role in
providing that protection. Here again there were precedents:
11

[Congress has always] assumed to enforce, as against
the States, and also persons, every one of the provisions
of the Constitution. Most of the provisions of the Con·
stitution which restrain and directly relate to the States,
such as those in rArt. I, § 10,] relate to the divisions of
the political powers of the State and General Governments. . . . These prohibitions upon political powers of
the States arc all of such nature that they can be, and
even have been, ... enforced by the courts of the United
States declaring void all State acts of encroachment on
Federal powers. Thus, and thus sufficiently, has the
United States 'enforced' these provisions of the Constitution. But there are some that arc not of this class.
These are where the court secures the rights or the liabilities of persons within the States, as between such persons
and the States.
21 Sec Globe, at 758 (Sen. Trumbull); id .. nt 772 (Sen. Thurman); id.,
at 791 (Rep. Willard). ThP Supremr Court of Indiana had so held in
giving effect to the Civil Rights Art of 1866. Sec Smith v. Moody, 26 Incl.
299 ( 1866) ( followi11p; Coryell), one of t hrrc state supreme court cases
referred to in Globr App ., at 68 (Rep . ShPilabarger). Moreover, § 2 of
t·he 1871 Act as passrd, unlike § 1, prosecuted persons who violated federal
rights whcther or not that violation was under color of offteial authority,
apparently on the theory that Ku Klux Klan violrnce was infringing thc
nght of protection drfinrd by Coryell. Nonetheless, opponents argurcl
that municipalitirs were not general!~· charged by the States with keeping
thr peace and hence did not lmvc police forces, ~o that the duty to afford
protcction ought not devolve on thr municipality, but on what('ver agency
of state government wa~ charged by the State with keeping the peace.
Sre p. 7f-• and n. 30, infra. In addition, they arguPd that Congrrss could
not constitutionally add to the duties of municipalities. Sec pp . 13-19,

iufra.
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"These three are: first, that as to fugitives from justice r221 ; second, that as to fugitives from service, (or
slaves r281 ; ) third, that declaring that the 'citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.' r24 J
"And, sir, every one of these-the only provisions where
it was deemed that legislation was required to enforce the
constitutional provisions-the only three where the rights
or liabilities of persons in the States, as between these persons and the States, are directly provided for, Congress
has by legislation affirmatively interfered to protect ...
such persons." Globe App., at 69-70.
Of legislation mentioned by Shellabarger, the closest analog
of the Sherman amendment. ironically, was the statute implementing the fugitives from justice and fugitive slave provisions
of Art. IV-the Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302-the
constitutionality of which had been sustained in 1842, in Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539. There, Mr. Justice Story,
writing for the Court, held that Art. IV gave slaveowners a
federal right to the unhindered possession of their slaves in
whatever State such slaves might be found. 16 Pet., at 612.
Because state process for recovering runaway slaves might be
inadequate or even hostile to the rights of the slaveowner,
the right intended to be conferred could be negated if left to
22

U. S. Canst., Art. IV,§ 2, cl. 2 :
"A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand
of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
up, to be removed to 1,he State having Jurisdiction of Lhe Crime."
23
I d., cl. 3 ·
" No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
'l:lSeaping mto another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered
up on Claim of the Party to :whom such Service. or Labour may be due:~
24 /ri., cl. 1.
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state implementation. ld., at 614. Thus, since the Constitution guaranteed the right and this in turn required a remedy,
Story held it to be a "natural inference" that Congress had
the power itself to ensure an appropriate (in the Necessa~:y
and Proper Clause sense) remedy for the right. ld., at 615.
Building on Prigg, Shellabarger argued that a remedy
against municipalities and counties was an appropriate-and
hence constitutional-method for e11suring the protection
which the Fourteenth Amendment made every citizen's federal
right. 2 5 This much was clear from the adoption of such
statutes by the several States as devices for suppressing riot. 26
Thus, said Shellabarger, the only serious question remaining
was "whether, since a county is an integer or part of a State,
the United States ca11 impose upon it. as such, any obligations
to keep the peace in obedience to United States laws." 27 This
he answered affirmatively, citing Board of Commissioners v.
Aspinwall, 24 How. 376 ( 1861), the first of many cases 28
upholding the power of federal courts to enforce the Contract
Clause a.g ainst municipalities. 2 0
House opponents of the Sherman amendment-whose views
are particularly important since only the House voted down
See Globe, at 751. See also id., at 760 (Sen. Sherman) ("If a State
may ... pass a law making a county . . . responsible for a riot in order
to deter uch crime, then we may pass the same remedies .. . .") .
:G fd., at 751 ; seen . 17, supra.
2 7 Globe, at 751 (emphasis added) .
Compare tlns statement with Representative Poland's remark upon which our holding in Monroe was based.
Seep. 5, supra.
28 See, e. g., Gelpcke v . City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (1864) ; Von Hoffman v. Clt.1J of Quiucy, 4 Wall. 535 (1RG7) ; Rioos \'. Johnso11 County, 6
Wall. 16() (lSGR): Weber v. Lee Count!J. n Wall. 210 (lkoH): .'iupervisors
v. Rooers. 7 \Vall. 175 (lkH9) ; BenboiC v. iowa Ctiy , 7 Wall. :H:3 (1R69) ;
Supervisors v Dumut, 9 Wall. 415 (1870) . St>t> g<'IH'rall~ · C . Fairman,
1Iititory of the Suprrnw Court of tlw Unitrd Rtn!t'~ : RPcon~trurtion and
Hrunion , 1864-1888, rh ~. 17- 18 (1971} .
~ 9 l;!,ee Globe, at 751- 752.
25
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th<' amendment-did not dispute Shellabarger's claim that the
Fourteenth Amendment created a federal right to protection.
see n. 21, supra, but they argued that the local units of
government upon which the amendment fastened liability were
not obligated to keep the peace at state law and further that
the Federal Government could not constitutionally require
local governments to create police forces. whether this requiremel! t was levied dir<'ctly. or indirC'ctly by imposing damages
for breach of the peace on municipalities. The most complete
statcmen t of this position is that of R<'prescn tative Blair: 30
"The proposition known as the

herman amend-

Others takmg a view s11111lar to Hepresentative Blair's included:
Willard, :oer id., nt 701; Hepre::;enl<ltive Poland, >:ee id., at
794; Repre~entative Burchard, ~:;ep id., at 7H5; Hepresen!atiw Farn::;worth,
soe id., at 799. Representative Willard abo took a ::;omewhat different
po~1tion. He thought tha.t the Constitution would not allow Ow Federal
Government to dict<lte the mannpr in which a State fulfilled it~:; obligation
of pro1Rction. That i:s, hr thought it a maf!Pr of ::;taft' discretion whether
it delrga ted I he pracrkPrping powN to n municipnl or county eorporation,
to a sheriff, pfc. He did not doubt, howPv<•r, that the Fedrral Govrrnmenl
could impo:-;r on the Stales the obligatwn imposed by the Sherman amendment, a,nd prP~:;umably lw would ba.ve enforcrd the amendment against a,
municipal corporation to which tlw peacekeeping obligation had been
delegatro . Ser id .. at 791.
Opponent,; of tlw Hlwrman anwndnwnt 111 thr SPnatr ag;n•('(l with Blair
that, C'ongn•ss had no pow<•r to pa~s tlw Rll('rman anH·ndnwnt l>reau;;e it,
ft'll out-~id<• limit s on natwnal pow<'r implic·it in tlw fcdc·rnl struetur<' of tlw
Con~titution, and f<'<'Ognizrd in, e. o. C'ollettor v.lJay. 11 Wall. ll:l (li-171 ).
Howpvrr, tlw HPnate opponpnts rocu~Pd not on the amPndnwnt.'s attempt
to ob!Jgate munit'ipallli<•s to kPrp tlw pPa<'e, but on tlw liPn crc•atPd h~ · th<'
anwndmPnt, wlurh ran agam~t all moiH·~ · and propert~· or a defendant
mum<·Jpalit~·, meluctmg propPrt~· held for public purposPH, >:urh as jail,; or
eourt hou,;t•s. Oppom·nts a rgu<'d that surh a, lien oneP <•nt!'rC'd would have
th<• rlf<'rt of making it impo::;~ihlr for the· 1!1\llllt'ipality to function. since• no
on<' woulll trade• with it . He<',<'. o.. nlolw, at 7(i:2 (Sen. StPvt·n~on): id.,
<Lt. 7();~ (8<'11. ( 'a.~S<'rl.\·). :\I orrovc•r, i('VP r~ ·o iH' km•w that ~ound policy
pr<'v<·ntrd t'Xt'<'UtJon again~! publi<' propnt .\· ::;imP thi~ too waH nrrdecl if
lora! gov<"rnmt•nt wa" to ~urvi\"t'. RrP, 1'. (! .• ibid. SP<' al~o 1\frriU"ether v.
(Jarrett, 102 l ' H, -1(:2, .101, f)l:~ (11--r;O) ( n·<"ognizing prinripl<' that publie
so

Repre~ntativo
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ment ... is entirely new. It is altogether without a pre·
cedent in this country. . . . That amendment claims the
power in the General Government to go into the States
of this Union and lay such obligations as it may please
upon the municipalities, which are the creations of the
States alone .. ..
" ... [H] ere it is proposed, not to carry into effect an
obligation which rests upon the municipality, but to
create that obligation, and that is the provision I am
unable to assent to. The parallel of the hundred does not
in the least meet the case. The power that laid the
obligation upon the hundred first put the duty upon the
hundred that it should perform in that regard, and failing
to meet the obligation which had been laid upon it, it was
very proper that it should suffer damage for its neglect....
" ... [T]here are certain rights and duties that belong
to the States, ... there are certain powers that inhere in
the State governments. They create these municipalities,
they say what their powers shall be and what their obligations shall be. If the Government of the United States
can step in and add to those obligations, may it not
utterly destroy the municipality? If it can say that it
shall be liable for damages occurring from a riot, . . .
where [will] its power ... stop and what obligations ...
might [it] not Jay upon a municipality . . . .
"Now, only the other day, the Supreme Court
decided [in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall 113 (1871)] that
municipalit~· not. subject to t'xccution); 2 Dillon, Municipal
§§445-446 (1873 rd.) (same).
Although tlw argumrnt:; of the Senate opponrnts appear to be a, correct
ana.Jy::;i::; of then-controlling constitutional and rommon-lnw principles, their
argumrnt.::; a.r<> uot rrlevnnt to an ana]y~is of the constitutionality of § 1 of
tlw Civil Hight ::; Act ::;incr any judgmrnt under that. ::;cction, a::; in any rivif
,m iL in thr fedE-ral court:; in 1R71 , would have been enforced pur:;uant to
state law~ undE-r the proce&-; acts of 1792 and 1828. See Act of May 8,,
J792. rh. 3(i, 1 Stat,. 271'l ; Act. of May 19, 1828,_ch. 68, 4 St.<J.t,.. 2.7&.

property of a,
Corpomtion~
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there is no power in the Government of the United States,
under its authority to tax, to tax the salary of a Stat('}
officer. Why? Simply because the power to tax involves
the power to destroy, and it was not the intent to give
the Government of the United States power to destroy
the government of the States in any respect. It was held
also in the case of Prigg vs. Pennsylvania [16 Pet. 539
(1842)] that it is not within the power of the Congress
of the United States to lay duties upon a State officer;
that we cannot command a State officer to do any duty
whatever, as such ; and I ask .. . the difference between
that and commanding a municipality which is equally the
creature of the State, to perform a duty." Globe, at 795.
Any attempt to impute a unitary constitutional theory to
opponents of the Sherman amendment is, of course, fraught
with difficulties, not the least of which is that most Members
of Congress did not speak to the issue of the constitutionality
of the amendment. Nonetheless, two considerations lead us
to conclude that opponents of the Sherman a.mendment found
it unconstitutional substantially because of the reasons stated
by Representative Blair: First, Blair's analysis is precisely
that of Poland, whose views were quoted as authoritative in
Monroe, sec p. 5, supra, and that analysis was shared in large
part by all House opponents who addressed the constitutionality of the Sherman amendment.~, Second, Blair's exegesis
of the reigning constitutional theory of his da.y, as we shall
explain, was clearly supported by precedent-albeit precedent
that has not survived. see Ex Parte Virgim'a, 100 U. S. 339,
347-348 (1880); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S.
466, 486 (1939)-and no other constitutional formula was
advanced by participants in the House debates.
Collector v. Day, cited by Blair, was the clearest and, at the
time of the debates, the most recrnt pronouncement of a
doctrine of coordinate sovereignty that, as Blair stated, placed
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limits on even the enumerated powers of the National Government in favor of protecting State prerogatives. There, the
Court held that the United States could not tax the income of
Day, a Massachusetts state judge, because the independence
of the States within their legitimate spheres would be imperiled
if the instrumentalities through which States executed their
powers were "subject to the control of another and distinct
goverument." 11 WalL at 127. Although the Court in Day
apparently rested this holding in part on the proposition that
the taxing "power acknowledges no limits but the will of
the legislative body imposing the tax," id., at 125-126; cf.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), the Court had
in other cases limited other national powers in order to avoid
interference with the States. 32
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, supra, for example, Mr. Justice
Story, in addition to confirming a broad national power to
legislate under the Fugitive Slave Clause, seep. 12. supra, held
that Congress could not "insist that states ... provide means
to carry into effect the duties of the national government."
16 Pet., at 615-616. 3 a And Mr. Justice McLean agreed that,
"[a]s a general principle." it was true "that Congress had no
power to impose duties on state officers, as provided in the
[Act of 1793, supra]." Nonetheless he wondered whether
Congress might not impose "positive" duties on state officers
where a clause of the Constitution, like the Fugitive Slave
82 In addition to the cases discussed in text, see Lane County v. Oregon,
7 Wall. 71, 77, 81 (1869), in which the Court held that the federal legal
tender act<; should not be construed to rpquire the States to accept taxes
tendered in United States notcR since this might interfere with a legitimate
tate act.ivity.
sa ChiCf Justice Tan e)' ngrrrd :
"The state ollic.ers mentioned in the law ror 1793] are not bound to
execute the duties 1mposed upon them by Congress, unless they choose to
do so, or are required to do so by a law of the state; and the state
leg1slature has the power, if it thinks proper, to prohibit them. The act
of 1793, therefore, must depend altogether for its execution upon the offi<eers of the Umted States named in it." 16 Pet., at. 630 (Taney, C. J.).
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Clause, seemed to require affirmative government assistance,
rather than restraint of government, to secure federal rights.
See id., at 664-665.
Had Justice McLean been correct in his suggestion that,
where the Constitution envisioned affirmative government
assistance, the States or their officers or instrumentalities could
be required to provide it, there would have been little doubt
that Congress could have insisted that municipalities afford
by "positive" action the protection R4 owed individuals under
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment whether or not municipalities were obligated by state law to keep the peace. However,
any such argument, largely foreclosed by Prigg, was made
impossible by the Court's holding in Kentucky v. Dennison,
24 How. 66 (1861). There, the Court was asked to require
Dennison, the Governor of Ohio, to hand over Lago. a fugitive
from justice wanted in Kentucky, as required by § 1 of the Act
of 1793, 35 supra, which impleme11ted Art. IV. § 2. cl. 2, of the
Constitution. Chief Justice Taney. writing for a unanimous
eourt, refused to enforce that section of the Act:
"[W]e think it clear, that the Federal Government, under
the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it; for if it possessed this power, it might overload
the officer with duties which would fill up all his time, and
disable him from performing his obligations to the State,
See pp. 10-11, and n . 21, supm.
"Be it enacted .. . That whenever the executive authority of any state
in the Union ... shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice . . .
and hall moreover produce a copy of an indictment found . . . charging
the person so demanded, w1th having committed treason, felony or other
'Crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the
state ... from whence the person so charged fled, it shall be the duty of
the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person shall
have fled, to cause hnn or her to be arrested and secured .. . and to
'Cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent [of the demand.ing state]
\-vhen he shall appear . . . . " 1 Slat. 302.
a;

35
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and might impose on him duties of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to which he was elevated by
the State." 24 How., at 107-108.
The rationale of Dennison-that the Nation could not
impose duties on state officers since that might impede States
in their legitimate activities-is obviously identical to that
which animated the decision in Collector v. Day. See p. 16,
supra. And, as Blair indiqated, municipalities as instrumentalities through which States executed their policies could be
equally disabled from carrying out State policies if they were
also obligated to carry out federally imposed duties. Although
no one cited Den:nison by na.me, the principle for which it
stands was well known to Members of Congress,'w many of
whom discussed Day H7 as well as a series of state supreme
court cases HH in the mid-1860's which had invalidated a federal
tax on the process of state courts on the ground that the tax
threatened the independence of a vital state function.'j 9 Thus,
there was ample support for Blair's view that the Sherman
amendment, by putting municipalities to the Hobson's choice
of keeping the peace or paying civil damages, attempted to
impose obligations on municipalities by indirection that could
not be imposed directly, thereby threatening to "destroy the
government of the States." Globe, at 795.
If municipal liability under ~ 1 of the Civil Rights Act
36

"The Suprcme Court of thc Umtcd States has decidcd rcpcatcdly that
can nnposc no duty on a State• offirer." Globe, at 799 (Rep.
Farnsworth) . Sce also td., at 788-789 (Rep. Krrr) .
'17 See, e. {f., Globe, at 7G4 (Srn. DaviK) ; ibid. (Srn . Cnsserly); id., 772
(Sen . Thurman) (rcritmg logic of Day); id., at 777 (Sen. Frrlinghuysen);
ul., at 7 8-789 (Rep. Kerr) (reciting logic of Day); id., at 793 (Rep.
Poland) ; id., at 799 (Rep. Farnsworth) (also reciting logic of Day).
38 Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 276 (1864) ; Jones v. Estate of Keep, 19
Wis 369 (1865), Fifield v Close, 15 Mtch. 505 (1867); Union Bank v.
llzll, 3 Cold (43 Trnn .) 325 (1866), Smith v Short, 40 Ala. 385 (1867).
1 " SeP Globe, at 764 (Sen . DaviK); ibid. (Sen. ca~~erley).
See also T.
99c!e~ C'on~titutiOnal L!mitat~ons *483-·x-184 (1871 rd .),
1
Congre~s
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created a similar Hobson's choice, we might conclude, as
Monroe did, that Congress could not have intended municipalities to be among the "persons" to which that section
applied. But this is not the case.
First. opponents expressly distinguished between imposing
an obligation to keep the peace and merely imposing civil
liability for damages on a municipality that was obligated by
state law to keep the peace, but which had not in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Poland, for
example, reasoning from Contract Clause precedents, indicated
that Congress could constitutionally confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts to entertain suits seeking to hold municipalities
liable for using their authorized powers in violation of the
Constitution- which is as far as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
went :
"I presume . . . that where a State had imposed a duty
[to keep the peace] upon [a] municipality ... an action
would be allowed to be maintained against them in the
courts of the United States under the ordinary restrictions
as to jurisdiction. But enforcing a liability, existing by
their own contract, or by a State law, in the courts, is a
very widely different thing from devolving a new duty or
liability upon them by the national Government, which
has no power either to create or destroy them, and no
power or control over them whatever." Globe, at 794.
Representative Burchard agreed :
" [T]here is no duty imposed by the Constitution of the
United States, or usually by State laws, upon a county to
protect the people of that county against the commission
of the offenses herein enumerated, such as the burning of
buildings or any other injury to property or injury to
person. Police powers are not conferred upon counties as
corporations ; they are conferred upon cities that have
qualified legislative power. And so far as cities are con'Cerned, where the equal protection required to be afforded
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by a State is imposed upon a city by State laws, perhaps
the United States courts could enforce its performance. But counties ... do not have any control of the
police ... ." !d., at 795.
See also the views of Rep. Willard. discussed at n. 30, supra.
Second, the doctrine of dual sovereignty apparently put no
limit on the power of federal courts to enforce the Constitution
against municipalities that violated it. Under the theory of
dual sovereignty set out in Prigg, this is quite understandable.
So long as federal courts were vindicating the Federal Constitution, they were providing the "positive'' government action
required to protect federal constitutional rights and no question was raised of enlisting the States in "positive" action.
The limits of the principles announced in Dennison and Day
are not so well defined in logic, but are clear as a matter of
history. It must be remembered that the same Court which
rendered Day also vigorously enforced the Contracts Clause
against municipalities-an enforcement effort which included
various forms of "positive" relief, such as ordering that taxes
be levied and collected to discharge federal court judgments,
once a constitutional infraction was found. 40 Thus, federal
49 See cases cited at n. 28, supm.
Since this Court granted unquestionably "positive" relief in ContractR Clausr cases, it appears that the
distinction between the Shrrman amendmrnt and those cases was not that
the former creatrd a positive obligation wherras the latt.rr imposed only
a negative restraint. Instrad, the distinction must have been that a violation of the Constitution was the predicntr for "positive" rrlief in the Contracts Clause cases, whereas t·llP Shrrman amrndment imposrd damages
wit.hout. regard to whether a loc::tl governmrnt was in any wa,y at fault
for the breach of the peace for which it was to l>e hrld for damages. See
p 8, supm. While no one stated this distinction E'XJ)ressly during the
debates, the inference is st.rong that Congrrssmen in 1871 would have
drawn this distinction since it rxplainA why Rrprcsentatives Poland,
Burchard, and Willard, srr pp . 20-21, supra, conlcl oppo~e the amendment
while at the same time saying that the Frdrral Governmrnt might impose
damage,' on a local government that had defaulted in a state-imposed d1.1ty
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judicial enforcement of the Constitution's express limits on
state power, since it was done so frequently, must notwithstanding anything said in Dennison or Day have been permissible, at least so long as the interpretation of the Constitution
was left in the hands of the judiciary. Since § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act simply conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts
to enforce § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-a situation
precisely analogous to the grant of diversity jurisdiction under
which the Contract Clause was enforced against municipalities-there is no reason to suppose tha.t opponents of the
Sherman amendment would have found any constitutional
barrier to § 1 suits against municipalities.
Finally, the very votes of those Members of Congress, who
opposed the Sherman amendment but who had voted for § 1,
confirm that the liability imposed by § 1 was something very
different from that imposed by the amendment. Section 1
without question could be used to obtain a damage judgment
against state or municipal officials who violated federal constitutional rights while acting under color of la:w. 41 However, for
Prigg-Dennison-Day purposes, as Blair and others recognized/ 2
there was no distinction of coustitutional magnitude between
officers and a.g ents-includiug corporate agents-of the State:
both were state instrumentalities and the State could be
impeded no matter over which sort of instrumentality the
to keep the pracr and it al~o rxplain~ why rveryone agreed that. a state
or municipal offiCPr could con::;titutionall~· be held liable under § 1 for
violation::; of thr Con~titution. Srr pp. 22-2:3, infra.
41
See, e. g., Globe, at 334 (Rep. Hoar); id., at 365 (Rep. Arthur); id.,
at 367-368 (Rep. Sheldon); id., at 385 (Rep. Lewis); Globe App., at 217
(Sen. Thurman) . In addition, officers were included among those who
could be sued under the ~econd conference substitute for the Sherman
Amendment. See Globe, at 805 (exchange between Rep. Willard and Rep.
Shellabarger) . There were no constitutional objections to the second
report.
42
See Globe, at 795 (Rep. Blair); id., at 788 (Rep. Kerr); id., at 795
(Rep. Burchard) ; id., at 799 (Rep. Farm;worth) .
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Federal Government sought to assert its power. Dennison
and Day, after all, were not suits against municipalities but
against officers and Blair was quite conscious that he was
extending these cases by applying them to municipal corporations. •:• Nonetheless, Senator Thurman. who gave the
most exhaustive critique of § l-inter alia complaining that it
would be applied to state officers, see Globe, at 217-and who
opposed both § 1 and the Sherman amendment, the latter on
Prigg grounds, agreed unequivocally that § 1 was constitutional.44 Those who voted for § 1 must similarly have believed
in its constitutionality despite Prigg, Dennison, and Day.
C. Debate on § 1 of the Civil Rights Bill
From the foregoing discussion, it is readily apparent that
nothing said in debate on the Sherman amendment would
have prevented holding a municipality liable under § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question remains, however, whether the
general language describing those to be liable under § 1-"any
person"-covers more than natural persons. An examination
of the debate on § 1 and application of appropriate rules of
construction shows unequivocally that § 1 was intended to
cover legal as well as natural persons.
Representative Shellabarger was the first to explain the
function of § 1:
"[Section 1] not only provides a civil remedy for persons
43 " LWJ e cannot command a State officer to do any duty whatever, as
such; and I ask ... the difference between that and commanding a munictpahty . . " Globe, at 795.
44 Sec Glohr App., at 216-217, quoted, infra, at n. 45.
In 1879, moreOV('r, when the question of the limits of the Prigg principle was squarely
prrscntcd in Ex part!' Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), this Court held that
Demnson and Day and the principle of fedrralism for which they stand
did not prohibit federal enforcement of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
t hrough Rtti ts directed to state oflicers. See 100 U . S., at 345-34 .
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whose former condition may have been that of slaves,
but also to al1 people where, under color of State law,
they or any of them may be deprived of rights to which
they are entitled under the Constitution by reason and
virtue of their national citizenship." Globe App., at 68.
By extending a remedy to all people, including whites, § 1
went beyond the mischief to which the remaining sectionR
of the 1871 Act were addressed. Representative Shellabarger
also stated without reservation that the constitutionality of
§ 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 controlled the constitutionality of § 1 of the 1871 Act, and that the former had been
approved by "the supreme courts of at least three States of
this Union" and by Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting on circuit, who
had concluded "We have no doubt of the constitutionality of
every provision of this act." Ibid. He then went on to
describe how the courts would and should interpret § 1:
"This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of
human liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed. It would be most
strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the
rule of interpretation. As has been again and again decided by your own Supreme Court of the United States,
and everywhere else where there is wise judicial interpretation, the largest latitude consistent with the words
employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes
and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and
defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the
people. . . . Chief Justice Jay and also Story say:
" 'Where a power is remedial in its nature there is
much reason to contend that it ought to be construed
liberally, and it is generally adopted in the interpretation
of laws.'-1 Story on Constitution, sec. 429.'' Globe App.,
at 68.
The sentiments expressed in Representative Shellabarger's.
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opening speech were echoed by Senator Edmunds, the manager of H. R. 320 in the Senate:
"The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to,
as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the
United States when they are assailed by any State law or
under color of any State law. and it is merely carrying
out the principles of the civil rights bill [of 1866], which
have since become a part of the Constitution." Globe, at
568.
"[Section 1 is] so very simple and really reenacting the
Constitution." ld., at 569.
And he agreed that the bill "secure[ed] the rights of white
men as much as of colored men." ld., at 696.
In both Houses, statements of the supporters of § 1 corroborated that Congress, in enacting § 1, intended to give a
broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil
rights. 45 Moreover, since municipalities through their official
45 Representative Bi11gham, the author of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, declared the bill's purpose to be "the enforcement .. .
of the Constitution on behalf of every individual citizen of the Republic .. .
to the extent of the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution." Globe
App., at 81. He continued:
"The States never had the right, though they had 1he power, to inflict
wrongs upon free citizens by a denial of thr full protection of the laws . . . .
rAnd] the Stat('S did deny to citizens the equal protection of the laws, they
did deny the rights of citizens under the Constitution, and except to the
extent of the express limitations upon the States, as I have shown, the
ciltzen had no remedy. . . . They took property without compensntion,
and he had no remedy. They rr::;trictcd the freedom of the press, and he
had no remedy. They restricted the freedom of speech, and he had no
remedy. They restricted the t;gh1s of con1'cienre, and he had no remedy.. . . . Who dare say, now that. the Constitution has been amended,
tha.t the nation cannot by la.w provide against all such abuses and denials
of nght as these in the State,-; and by States, or combinations of persons?"
!d., at 85
Representative Perry, commenting on Congress' action in passing the civil
rights bill also sk'ttcd :
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acts, could equally with natural persons create the harms
intended to be remedied by § 1, and, further, since Congress
intended § 1 to be broadly construed, there is no reason to
suppose that municipal corporations would have been excluded
from the sweep of § 1. Cf.,, e. g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S.
" Now, by our action on this bill we have asserted as fully as we can
assert the mischief intended to be remedied. We have asserted as clearly
as we can assert our belief that it is the duty of Congress to redress that
mischief. We have also asserted as. fu lly as we can assert the constitutional
right of Congress 1o legislate." Globe, at 800.
Sec also id., at 376 (Rep. Lowe); id., at 428-429 (Rep. Beatty); id.,
at 4<J8 (Rep. Butler); id., at 475-477 (Hep. Da.wcs); id., at; 57&-579 (Sen.
Trumbull); id., at. 609 (Sen. Pool); Globe App., at 182 (Rep. Mercur) .
Other supporters were quite clear that § 1 of the act extended a remedy
not only where a State had passed an unconstitutional statute, but also
where officers of the State were deliberately indifferent, to the rights of
black cit.izens :
"But the chief compla.int is [that] by a. systematic maladministration of
[state bw], or a neglect or refusal to enforce the.i r provisions, a portion of
the people are denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a state
of facts is clearly made out, I believe [§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment] empowers Congress to step in and provide for doing justice to those
persons who are thus denied equal protection." Globe App., at 153 (Mr.
Garfield). See also Monroe v. Pape, supra, n. 7, at 171-187.
Importantly for our inquiry, even the opponents of § 1 agreed that it was
constitutionnl and, furt,her, that it swept. very broadly. T·hus, Senator
Thurman, who gave the mo:st exhaustive critique of § 1, said:
"This section relates wholly to civil suits. . . . Its whole effect is to give
to the F·ederal Judiciary thaL which now does not belong to it--a jurisdiction that may be constitutionally conferred upon it, I g1·ant, but that has
never yet been conferred upon it. It authorizes any person who is deprived
of any right, privilege, or immunity serured to him by the Constitution of
the United States, to bring an action a.gainst the wrongdoer in the Federal
courts, and that without aJJY limit whatsoever as to the amount .in
controversy...•

"['l']here is no limitation whatsoever upon the terms that m·e employed
{in the bill], and they are as comprehensive as can be used." Globe App.,
at 216-217 (emphasis added).
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339, 346~347 (1880); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Anqeles,
227 U.S. 278, 286-287,294-296 (1913). One need not rely on
this inference alone, however, for the debates show that Members of Congress understood "persons" to include municipal
corporations.
Representative Bingham, for example, in discussing § 1 of
the bill, explained that he had drafted § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment with the case of Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243
(1834), especially in mind. "In [that] case the city had taken
private property for public use, without compensation . . . ,
and there wa.s no redress for the wrong . . . ." Globe App.,
at 84 (emphasis added). Bingham's further remarks clearly
indicate his view that such takings by cities, as had occurred
in Barron, would be redressable under § 1 of the bill. See
id., at 85. More generally, and as Bingham's remarks confirm,
§ 1 of the bill would logically be the vehicle by which Congress
provided redress for takings, since that section provided the
only civil remedy for Fourteenth Amendment violations and
that Amendment unequivocally prohibited uncompensated
takings:w Given this purpose, it beggars reason to suppose
that Congress would have exempted municipalities from suit,
insisting instead that compensation for a taking come from an
officer in his individual capa.city rather than from the government unit that had the benefit of the property taken. 47
In addition, by 1871, it was well understood that corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis. This had not
always been so. When this Court first considered the question
of the status of corporations, Chief Just,ice Marshall, writing
for the Court, denied that corporations "as such" were persons
See Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
§ 1956 (Cooley ed . 1873) .
11 Indeed the federal courts found no obstacle to awards of damages
again t municipalities for common-law takings. See Sumner v. Philadelphia, 23 F. Cas. 392 (CCED Pa. 1873) (No. 13,611) (awarding damages;
•Q( $2~4(3.3& and costs Qf $346,.35 again&t the city of Philadelphia.).
·40
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as that term was used in Art. Il J and the Judiciary Act of
1789. See Bank of the United States v. Devea'UX, 5 Cranch 61,
86 (1809). 48 By 1844, however, the Deveaux doctrine was
unhesitatingly abandoned
"[A] corporation created by and doing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes
as a person, although an artificial person, ... capable of
being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a
natural person." Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497,
558 (1844) (emphasis added), discussed in Globe, at 752.
And only two years before the debates on the Civil Rights
Act, in Cowles v. Mercer County, 7 Wall. 118, 121 (1869), the
Letson principle was automatically and without discussion
extended to municipal corporations. Under this doctrine,
municipal corporations were routinely sued in the federal
courts 49 and this fact was well known to Members of
Congress. Go
That the "u, ual" meaning of the word person would extend
to municipal corporations is also evidenced by an Act of
Congress which had been passed only months before the Civil
Rights Act was passed. This Act provided that
"in all acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person' may
extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate ... unless the context shows that such words were
intended to be used in a more limited sense[]." Act of
Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
18 Nonetheless, suits could be brought in federal court if the natural
per on. who were member-s of the corporation were of diverse citizenship
from the other parties to the litigation. See 5 Cranch, at 91.
49 See n. 2 , supra.
(•O See, e. g., Globe, nt ·777 (Sen. Sherman); id., at 752 (He11. Shellabarger) ("count.ies, ciliPs, and corpornlions of all sorts, after yenrs of
judicial conflict, have become thoroughly established to be an individual or
person or entity of the personal existence, of which, as a citizen, individ1Jrtl , or inhabitant, the United States 'Constitution does take note and endow
wtth faculty to sue and be sued in the courts of the United States:").
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Municipal corporations in 1871 were included within the
phrase "bodies politic and corporate" 51 and, accordingly, the
"plain meaning" of § 1 is that local government bodies were
to be included within the ambit of the persons who could be
sued under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. Indeed, a Circuit
Judge, writing in 1873 in what is apparently the first reported
case under § 1, read the Dictionary Act in precisely this way
in a case involving a corporate plaintiff and a municipal
defendant. 52 See Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,
18 F. Cas. 393, 394 (CCND Ill. 1873) (No. 10,336). 53
~ 1 See Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393, 394
(CC D Ill. 1 73) (No. 10,336); 2 Kent's Commentaries *2783279 (12th
0. W. Holme· ed. 1873). See also United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96,
109 (CC Va. 1823) (Marshall, C. J.) ("The United States is a government,
and, consequently, a body politic and corporate"); Brief for Petitioner in
Monroe v. Pape, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, App's. D and E (collecting state
st1ttutes which, in 1871, defined municipal corporations as bodies politic
nnd corporate).
r. 2 The court also noted that there was no discernible reason why persons
injured by municipal corporations should not be able to recover. See 18
F. Cas., at 394.
53 In considering the effect of the Act of Feb. 25, 1871 in Monroe, however, Justice Douglas, apparently focu ing on the word "may," stated: "this
definition [of person] is merely an allowable, not a mandatory, one." 365
U. S., at 191. A review of the legi lative history of the Dictionary Act
hows thi conclusion to be incorrect.
There is no express reference in the legislative history to the definition of
pPrson, but Senator Trumbull, the Act's sponsor, discussed thP phrase
"words importing the masculine gender may be applied to females,"
( Pmphasis added), which immediately precedes the definition of person, and
stated:
"The only object [of the Act] is to get rid of R great deal of verbosity
in our statutes by providing that when the words 'he' is used it shall
in('lude females as well as males[]." Congressional Globe, 41st Cong., 3d
, css., 775 (Jan. 27, 1871) (emphasis added).
Tlms, in Trumbull's view the word "may" meant "shall." Such a matJdatory use of the extended meanings of the words definPd by the Act
is abo required for it to perform its intended function-to be A guide
to "nJlQs Qf const!1lction" of Acts of Congress. See id., a.t 775 (Remark&
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II
Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend
municipalities and other local government units to be included
among those persons to whon1 § 1983 applies."'1 Local governing bodies,"" therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinru1ce, regulation, or decision
of Sen. Trumbull) . Were the defined words "allowable, [but] not mandatory" constructions, as Monroe suggests, there would be no "rules" at all.
Instead, Congress must have intended the definitions of the Act to apply
across-the-board except. where the Act by its terms called for a devia.tion
from this practice-"[ where] the context shows that [ dcfincdl words
were to be used in a more limited sense." Certainly this is how t.he
Northwestern Fertilizing court viewed the matter. Since there is nothing
in the ·'context" of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. calling for a restricted
interpretation of the word "person," the language of that section should
prima facie be construed to include "bodies politic" among the entities that
could be sued.
5 J Then' is certainly no constitutional impediment to municipal liability.
"The Tenth Amrndment'~ re~:<Prvation of nondPirgated powrr::: to the States
i:; not implicated by a frdpra]-court judgnwnt enforcing thP exprp~,; prohibitions of unlawful Htate conduct. ('llttetPd b~· tlw Fourtrenth Amendment.n
Milliken v. Bradley. 4:~;3 1i. S. 2!i7, 291 (1977); ~e<· Ex parte Viroinia. 100
U. S. 339, 347-34R (1HXO) . For thi:; rra::<on, National League of Cities v.
Usery. 426 U . S. x;);~ (197!)) , i,; irrrlrvant to our l'Oil~ideration of thiR case.
or is thrre :my bn~i~ for eonrludiug that the Elrvent h Amrn<imrnt is a
bar to muniripa.l liability. Ser, e. y .. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976); Ll:uco/n ('ount!f v. Luning. 1:{;~ lT. S. 529, 5:30 (1R90). Our
holding today i~:~. of rourtie, limited to local govPrnmrnt units which arc not
considrrrd part of thr State for Elcv('Ilth Amendment purposr;;.
Go Since official capacity ~uits grnrrally rrpre:;ent only anothrr way of
pleading an net ion agnin.,;t an t>nt.it y of which an offirrr i~ an agPnt-at
least wherr Elrwnth AmPndtm•nt con~ideration~ do not control analysisour holding today that local govl'rnment~ can lw Hurd unclrr § 19R3 neccssnrily drcide~ that local govrrmnent official~ ~urd iu thPir official capacities nre '·per;:;ons " under § 19~:3 in thoi<r ca~s in which , a:-; hPrr, a local
·~overlJ.ment would I><' Htllthlr in it" own name,
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officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.
Moreover. although the touchstone of the~ 1983 action against
a government body is an allegation that official policy is
responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments, like every other ~ 1983 "person,"
by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom" even though such a custom has not received formal
approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels.
As Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court. said in Adickes
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144. 167- 168 ( 1970): "Congress
included custom and usage [in ~ 1H83J because of persistent
and widespread discrimiHatory practices of State officials . . . .
Although not authorized by written law. such practices of state
officials could well be so perma11ent and well settled as to
constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law." fiG
On the other hand, the language of § 1983, read against
the background of the same legislative history, compels the
conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be
held liable unless actioll pursua11t to official municipal policy
of some nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular, we
conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely
because it employs a tortfeasor-or. in other words, a municipality cannot br held liable under ~ 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.
We begin with the language of § 1983 as passed:
" [A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute,
' ' 6 SrP al~o .luHflrP Fmnkfmfpr'~ ~tatrnwnt for tlw Court in Nashville,
C. & St. L . ll . Co. v. Browning, :no U. S. :~6:2, :~69 (1940):
" It would be a narrow roncpption of jnri~prucience to confine the notion of
'laws' to what. is found writtPn on the statute books, and to disregard the
gloss which life has writt<'n upon it. S<'t!led :state practice . . . can
r;;tabh~h what is state lnw . The Equal Protection Clause did not write an
empty f01malism into tlw Corh;titution. D<'eply embedded traditional ways
of carrying out state policy, such a:s those of which JWtitioner complains,,
·:&rQ oft~1 tougher and truer law tlwn the dead word~ of the written texL'"
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ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall
subject, or cause to be subjected, any person ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the
party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . ." Globe App., at 335
(emphasis added) .
The italicized language plainly imposes liability on a government that, under color of some official policy, "causes" an
employee to violate another's constitutional rights. At the
same time, that language cannot be easily read to impose
liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of
the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a
tortfeasor. Indeed, the fact that Congress did specifically
provide that A's tort became B's liability if B "caused" A to
subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend
7
~ 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent."
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 370--371 (1976).
r. 7 Support for such a conclusion ran be found in the legislative history.
As we h!tve indicated, there is virtually no discussion of § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act. Again, however, Congress' treH.tment of the Sherman amendment gives a clue to whether it would have desired to impose respondeat
superior liability.
The primary con~titutional justification for the Sherman amendment was
that it was a necessary and proper remedy for the failure of localities to
TJrotert cllizrns a:; the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amrndment required . See pp. 10-13, supra. And according to Sherman,
Shellabarger, and Edmunds, thr amendment ramr into play only when a
locality was at fault or had knowing!~· neglrctecl its duty to provide protection . See Globe, at 761 (Sen . Shrrman); id., at 756 (Sen. Edmunds);
ul., at 751-752 (Rep. Shrllabargrr). But other proponents of the amendment ttpparently viewed it as a form of virariou:; liabilit~· for the unln.wful
arts of thr citizen~ of the locality . Ser id., at 792 (Rrp. Butler). And
whether mtrndrd or not, the amendment as drafted did impose a sprcies of
vic<lriou.<> liability on municipalities since it could be construed to impose·
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Equally important, creation of a federal law of respondeat
superior would have raisrd all the constitutional problems
associated with the obligation to keep the peace, an obligation
Congress chose not to imposr because it thought imposition
of such an obligation unconstitutional. To this day, there is
disagreement about the basis for imposing liability on an
employer for the torts of an employee when the sole nexus
between the employer and the tort is the fact of the employeremployee relationship. Sec W. Prosser, Law of Torts, ~ 69,
at 569 (4th ed. 1971). Nonetheless, two justifications tend to
stand out. First is the commonsense notion that no matter
how blameless an employrr appears to be in an individual case,
accidents might nonetheless be reduced if employers had to
bear the cost of accidents. See. e. g., ibid,; 2 F. Harper &
F. James, The Law of Torts, § 26.3, at 1368-1369 (1956).

I

Iiabihty even if a municipality did not know of an impending or ensuing
riot or did not. have the wherrwithall to do anything about it. Indeed, the·
statute held a municipality liable rven if it had done everything in its
power to curb thr riot . Seep. 8, supra; Globe, at 761 (Sen. Stevens); id.,
at 771 (Sen. Thurman); id .. nt 788 (Rep . Krrr); id., at 791 (Rep. Willard).
While the fir:;t conference o;ubstitute wao; rrjrcted principally on constitutional grounds , ~ee id., at 804 (Rrp. Poland), it is plain from the text of
the srcond conference substitute-which limited liability to those who,
having tho power to intervene ngain~t Ku Klux violence, "neglect[ed] or
refu;,;e[d] ~o to do," see Appendix, infra, at 41, and which was enacted as
§ 6 of the 1871 Act and Ill now cod1fied as 42 U.S. C.§ 1986-that Congress
also rejected those element~ of vicarious liability contained in the first
ronf<'r<'nce sub:st.itute even while accepting the bal':ic principle that the
inhabiianto; of a community w0re bound to provide prot•ection against the
Ku Klux Klan . Strictly speaking, of coursr, the fact that Congress refused
to Impo:;e v1canou:s hability for th0 wron11:t< of a f0w privatr cit izens doe
not concllll:nvely establish that it would ~imilarly have refu~ed to impose
vicanous liability for the tortR of a municipality's employ('('s. Nonethelct<-~, when Congre~;s' rejection of the only form of vica,riou~ liability
presentro to it. io; combined w1th the ab~<'nce of any language in § 1983
wh1ch can rat<ily be construed to cr0ate respondeat superior liabili ty, the
mference that Congress did not mtrnd to Impose such liability is quite·
'iitrong..

·
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econcl is tlw argument that the cost of accidents should hi:'
spread to tlw community as a whole on an insurance theory.
R<'('. e. y., id., ~ 26.5; "\Y. Pross<'r. supra, at 459.""
The first justification is of the same sort that was offered for
statutes like the Rherman amendment: "The obligation to
make com])('nsation for injury resulting from riot is, by arbitra~·y enactment of statutes; affirmatory law, and the reason
of ]tassing the statute is to secure a more perfect police
rcgula·t ion." Globe, at 777 (Sen. Prelinghuysen). This justification was obviously insufficient to sustain the amendment
against [)erceived
constitutional difficulties and there is no
._
reason to suppose that a more general liability imposed for a
similar reason would have been thought less constitutionally
objectionable. The second ,iustification was similarly put
forward as a justification for the Sherman amendment: "we
do not look upon [the Sherman amendment] as a punishmE'nt . . . . It is a mutual insurance." !d., at 792 (Rep.
Butler). Again, this justification was insufficient to sustain
tl10 amendment.
"\Ve conclude. therefore, that a local government may 11ot be
sued for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.
Instead, it is when execution of a governme11t's policy or
custom , whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under ~ 1983. Since this case unquestionably involves
official policy as the moving force of the constitutional violafiB A thtrd justtfica llon, often ctt ed but which on examination is apparenUy insufficient to JUstify the doctrine of respondeat superior, sec, e. g.,
2 F . Harper & F . James, supra, n. rn, § 26.il, is that liability follows the
right to control the actionR of a tort fenRor. B~· our decision in Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), W<' would npp<>ar to have d<'cided that th<'
mt• re right to con trol wtthout nny control or clnwtion having b<>en exercised
and wtthout any fatlure to o:llp<'rvt ~(' ts not enough to ~ trPl){)l't § 1983
boNli ty. See id., at 37()...:37 L

75-1914-0PINION

MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES 35

tion found by the District Court, see pp. 1-2, and n. 2. supra,
we must reverse the judgment below. In so doing, we have 110
occasion to address. and do not address. what the full contours
of municipal liability under ~ 1983 may be. We have attempted only to sketch so much of the ~ 1983 cause of action
against a local government as is apparent from the history of
the 1871 Act and our prior cases and we expressly leave further
development of this action to another day.

III
Although we have stated that stare decisis has more force in
statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication because,
in the former situation, Congress can correct our mistakes
through legislation, see, e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
671, and n. 14 (1974), we have never applied stare decisis
mechanically to prohibit overruling our earlier decisions determining the meaning of statutes. See, e. g., Continental T. V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36. 47-49 (1977); Burnet
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 n. 1 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). Nor is this a case
where we should "place on the shoulders of Congress the
burden of the Court's own error." Girouard v. United States,
328 u.s. 61,70 (1946).
First, Monroe v. Pape, supra, insofar as it completely
immunizes municipalities from suit under § 1983, was a departure from prior practice. See, e. g., Northwestern Fertilizing
Co. v. Hyde Park, supra; City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117
F. 2d 661 (CAl 1941); Hannan v. City of Haverhill, 120 F. 2d
87 (CAl 1941); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157
(1943); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879 (1955), in
each of which municipalities were defendants in § 1983 suits. 50
59 Each case cited by Monroe, see 356 U. S., nt. 191 n. 50, as consistent.
with the position thnt locnl governments were not § 1983 "persons"
reached its conclusion by assuming thnt state-law immunities overrode the
§ 198a c:_nuse of action . This ha~ never heen the L'tw.
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Moreover, the constitutional defect that led to the rejection
of the Sherman arnendment would not have distinguished
between municipalities and school boards, each of which is an
instrumentality of state administration. See pp. 14-22, supra.
For this reason, our cases-decided both before and after
Monroe, seen. 5, supra-holding school boards liable in § 1983
actions are inconsistent with Monroe, especially as M onme's
immunizing principle was extended to suits for injunctive relief
in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973).r.o And
although in many of these cases jurisdiction was not questioned, we ought not "disregard the implications of an exercise
of judicial authority assumed to be proper for [ 100] years."
Brown Shoe Co. v. Unded States, 370 U. S. 294, 307 (1962);
see Banlc of the United Sta.tes v. Deveaux, supra, at 88
(Marshall, C. J.) ("Those decisions are not cited as authority . .. but they have much weight, as they show that this
point neither occurred to the bar or the bench"). Thus, while
we have reaffirmed Monroe without further examination on
three occasions, at it can scarcely be said that Monroe is so
consistent with the warp and woof of civil rights law as to be
beyond question.
Second, the principle of blanket immunity established in
Monroe cannot be cabin eel short of school boa.rds. Yet such
an extensiou would itself be inconsistent with recent expressions of congressional intent. In the wake of our decisions,
Congress not only has shown no hostility to federal court
decisions against school boards, but it has indeed rejected
efforts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over school
boards.a 2 Moreover, recognizing that school boards are often
uo Although many s\llt~ agam~t ~ehool board~ abo incluclr private indiVIduals as pnr1JP~, the ''prmripal clrfendan1 iH uHually thr local board of
rducation or sehool board ." Milliken v. Bradley, supra.. n. 4, at 292-298

(POWELL, J., f'Onrmring) .
<n Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 093 (1973); Cit!! of Kenosha. v .
Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (197a); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976).
u2 During the hPyday of' tlw furor ovrr huHing, both the House a.nd the
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defendants in school desegregation suits, which have almost
without exception been § 1983 suits, Congress has twice
passed legislation authorizing grants to school boards to assist
them in complying with federal court decrees."'1 Finally, in
Srnato rrfusrd lo adopt bills that would h:wc removed from the frderal
courts juri~dict10n
"to make any decision, enter any judgment, or issur any orc!Pr requiring
any school board to make any change in the rnrial compo;;ition of the
studrnt hod~· at any public school or in any class at. any public school to
which r:<tudrnt;;: arP assigned in conformity with a. frrrdom of choicr system,
or rrquiring any school board to transport any studrnt~< from public school
to anothrr public ,;chool or from one place to another place or from one
school dt:-;trict. to another ~;chool district or denying t.o any studmt the
right. or privtlegr of attending any public school or cia::;.,; at any public
school rho»en by the j)Hrent. of such student in conformity with a freedom
of rhoire s~·stcm, or rPquiring any school board to close any school and
transfer t.he studPnt;.; from the clo ·eel school to any other school for the
purpo~ of altrring the racial composition of the studrnt body at any
public :orhool, or precluding nny school board from carrying into effect any
provision of any rontract between it and any member of the fa.c ulty of any
puhlir ~chool it operate;; ~;pecifying the public school where the member of
t.lw facult~r i:; to perform hi~; or her duties under the contract." S. 179,
93d Cong ., 1::;t Se~s., § 1207 (1971) (emphasis added).
Other bills clc~<igned either completely to remove the federal courts from
the t<thool de;;<:>grrgation cont.rover::;y, S. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Ses:;. (1973), or
to linllt the ability of federnl courts to subject. school boards to remedial
order,; 111 dr:;egrrgation cal:!e~. S. 619, 93d Cong., 1st Ses:;. (1973); S. 179,
9:3d Cong., M Sr~"·• § 2 (a) (1973); H. H. 13534, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 2922 (1972), haw ~;imilarly failed.
0 '1 In 1972, ~pmrcd by a finding "that. thr proress of elimina.t.ing or
preventmg minority group isolation and imr)roving the quality of education
for all children oftpn mvolves the expenditur<:> of additional funds to which
local educational agencies do not. havr accc;;s," 20 U. S. C. § 1601 (a)
(Supp. V, 1975), Congres~ IJ:tl:!sed the 1972 Emergency School Act. Section
64:3 (a.)(l)(A)(i) of that Act, 20 U.S. C.§ 1605 (a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V,
1975), authorizr::; the Assistant Secretary
11 grant to, or a contract with, a local educational agency [whichJ
implementing a plan which has been unde1·taken Jntrsuant to a final order
issued b.ll a court of the United Stntes .. . which requires the desegregn-

" to makr
i<S

lion of minorit · group :;egrrgated childrrn or faculty in the elementary and
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the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976, 90 Stat.
2641, which allows prevailing parties (in the discretion of the
secondary schools of such agency, or otherwise requires the elimination or
reduction of minortty group t::;olation in Ruch schools." (Emphasis added.)
A "local educational agrncy" 1::; defined by 20 U.S. C.§ 1619 (8) (Supp.
V, l 975), a::; "a public board of education or other public authority lega lly
constituted within a Stat'e for either administrative control or direction of,
public elementary or <:rcondary schools in a city, county, township, school,
or other political subdivil:lion of a State, or a federally recognized Indian
reservation, or such combination of school districts, or counties as are
recognized in a Statr as an administrative agency for its public elementary
or secondary schools, or a combination of local educational agencies . . . . "
Congre::;s thus clrarly rccogni21ed that school boards were often parties to
federal school desegregation suits. In § 718 of the Act, 20 U.S. C.§ 1617
(Supp. V, 1975), Congress gave its explicit approval to thr institution of
federal desegregation suits against school boards-presumably under § 1983.
That section provtdes :
"Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the United States against a
local education agency ... for discrimination on tJH' basis of race, color, or
national origin in violation of . . . the fourteenth amrndment to the
Constttut10n of the United Statrs . . . the court may allow t.IH• prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasomtble attorney's fee as part of
the costs." (Emphasis addrd.)
Two year::; later, Congress found that "the implrmentation of desegrega~
t10n plans that require extensive studrnt transportation has, in many cases,
required local educational agencies to expand [sic] large amounts of funds,
thereby depleting their financial re~ources . . . . 20 U. S. C. § 1702 (a)
(3)
(Emphasis added .) Congress did not re~pond by declaring that
school boards wrre not. subJrct lo Ruit undrr § 1983 or any other federal
statute, "but :sunply [Irgislated] revJS<'d evidentiary standards and remedial
pnoritieH to be <'ffiJ11oyecl by the court" in deciding ~uch cm;es." Brief for
Natwnal Education A;,;;;n., at 15-16. Indred, Congre::;s expressly reiterated
thnL a cause of aet ton, cogmzable in thl' federal court~;, exists for discrimina~
tton 111 the public school context. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1703, 1706, 1708, 1710,
1718 ·The Act. a~:<:-cumes that school boards will u8ually be the defendants
m such stuts. For example, § 211 of the Aet, 20 U. S. C. § 1710 provides:
"Tiw Attorney Genrral ·hall not inHtitute a civil action under section
1706 of tht::; tttlr I whtch nllowl' for suit by both privatr parties and t.lte
Attorn<' Gl'Jlf'ral to redr<'i:ii:i dNrimmat ion in public education] before he--
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court) in ~ 1983 suits to obta.in a.ttorneys fees from the losing
party, the Senate stated:
"[D]efendants in these cases are often State or local
bodies or State or local officials. In such cases it is
.intended that the attorneys' fees, like other items of costs,
will be collected either directly from the official, in his
official capacity, from funds of his agency or under his
control, or from the State or local government (whether
or not the agency or government -is named as a party).
S. Rep. No. 94-1101, at 5 (emphasis added; footnotes
omitted).
Far from showing that Congress has relied on Monroe, therefore, events since 1961 show that Congress has refused to
extend the benefits of Monroe to school boards and has
attempted to allow awards of attorneys' fees against local
governments even though Monroe, City of Kenosha v. Bruno,
supra, and Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. I (1976), have made
the joinder of such governments impossible. 64
Third, municipalities can assert no reliance claim which can
support an absolute immunity. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said in Monroe, "ft]his is not an area of commercial law in
which, presumably, individuals may have arranged their affairs
in reliance on the expected stability of decision." 365 U. S.,
" (a.) gives to the appropriate educational ngency notice of the condition
·o r conditions which, in his judgment, constitu1r a. violation of part rthe
prohibitions against discrimination in public. rdura.tion] ." Section 219 of
the Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1718, provides for t.he termination of court ordered
busing "if t.he court finds the defendant educational agency has satisfied the
requirements of t.he fifth or fourtf'cnth mnrndments to the Constitution,
whichever is applicable, and will continue to be in compliance with the
requirements thereof."
04 Wllf'ther Congrr~~ · atlrmpl is iu fact. f'ffrctive is the subjrct of Hutto
v. Finney, 1977 Term, No. 76-1660, and thrrefore we express no view olll
i~ here:,
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at 221-222 (dissent). llldecd, municipalities simply cannot
"arrange their affairs" on an assumption that they can violate
constitutional
rights indcfinitrly since injunctive
suits a.gainst
I
'
local officials under § 1983 would prohibit any such arrangement. And it scarcely need b0 mentioned that nothing in
Monroe encourages municipalities to violate constitutional
rights or even suggests that such violations are anything other
than completely wrong.
Finally, even under the most stringent test for the propriety
of overruling a statutory decision proposed by Mr. Justice
Harlan in Monroe nr._"that it must appear beyond doubt from
the legislative history of the 1871 statute that [Monroe l misapprehended the meaning of the [section l ," Monroe v. Pape,
supra, at 192 (concurring opinion)-the overruling of Monroe
insofar as it holds that local governments are not "persons"
who may be defendants in § 1983 suits is clearly proper. It
is simply beyond doubt that, under the 1871 Congress' view
of the law, were § 1983 liability unconstitutional as to local
governments, it would have been equally unconstitutional as
to state officers. Yet everyone-proponents and opponents
alike-knew§ 1983 would be applied to state officers and nonetheless stated that § 1983 was constitutional. See pp. 21-22,
supra. And, moreover. there can be no doubt that ~ 1 of
the Civil Rights Act was in tended to provid0 a remedy. to
be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation
of federally protected rights. Therefore, absent a clear statement in the legislative history supporting the conclusion that
§ 1 was not to apply to the official acts of a municipal corpora65

We note , how<'vH, that 1\Ir. Justice Harlan 's test has not been
adopted
tins Court. Moreover, that teHt js ba;;ed on two
factors: stare dectbis and "indications of congressionJ1l acceptance of this
C'ourt's earlit>r interprrtatiOn I of the statute in que~tionJ :" 365 U. S., at
192. As we have explamed, the :;econd C'OilBideration is not, pre:seni .in this
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tion-which simply is not present-there is no justification for
excluding municipalities from the "persons" covered by § 1.
For the reasons stated above, therefore, we hold that stare
decisis does not bar our overruling of Monroe insofar as it is
inconsistent with Parts I and II of this opinion. 66

IV
Since the question whether local government bodies should
be afforded some form of official immunity was not presented
as a question to be decided on this petition and was not
briefed by the parties nor addressed by the courts below, we
express no views on the scope of any municipal immunity
beyond holding that municipal bodies sued under § 1983 cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity, lest our decision that
such bodies are subject to suit under § 1983 "be drained of
meaning," Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974). Cf.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S.
389, 397-398 (1971).

v

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is
Reversed.
oo No useful purpose would be served by an attempt at this late date to
detennine whether M (Jn1'0e was correct on its facts. Similarly, since this
case clea.rly involves official policy and does not involve respondeat superior,
we do n 0 t, assay a view on how our cases which have relied on that aspect
of Monroe that is overrulrd today-Moor v. County of Alameda, S'Upm,
n . 9, City of Kenosha v Bruno, supra, n. 9, a11d Aldinger v. Howm·d,
supra, n . 63-should have been decided on a. correct view of § 1983.
Not.hmg we sny today affects the conclusion reached in Moor, see 411
U . S., at 708-704, thaL 42 U. S. C. § 1988 cannot be used to crrate a
f<'rl(·r;d ca11~P of ndion wlwrt· § 1\:JH:~ doe;; not othrrwi~P provide OJlP or tlw
conclusion rPachrd m Cdy of Kenosha, sre 412 U. S., at 513, that
" nothing . . . :suggPHt I Hj ! hat the generic word ' per:son' in § 1983 was
intended to havp a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on the naLure of the relief ,.;oughL against them."
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APPENDIX
As proposed, the Sherman amendment was as follows:
"That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building,
barn, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, wholly or in
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; and if such offense was committed to
deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to
deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by
reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or
parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the
person or persons damnified by such offense if living, or to
his widow or legal representative if dead; and such compensation may be recovered by such person or his repreentative by a suit in any court of the United States of
competent jurisdiction in the district in which the offense
was committed, to be in the name of the person injured,
or his legal representative, and against said county, city,
or parish. And execution may be issued on a judgment
rendered in such suit and may be levied upon any property, real or personal, of any person in said county, city,
or parish, and the said county, city, or parish may recover
the full amount of such judgment, costs, and interest,
from any person or persons engaged as principal or
accessory in such riot in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction." Globe, at 663.
The complete text of the first conference substitute for the
herman amendment is :
"That if any house, tenement, cabin, hop, buildin~,
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barn, or granary sha11 be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, who1ly or in
part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with
force and violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or
killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, with intent to deprive any person of any
right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, or to deter him or punish him for
exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or
previous condition of servitudr. in every such case the
county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses
shall be committed shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such offense, if
living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead; and
such compensation may be recovered in an action on the
case by such person or his representative in any court of
the United States of competent jurisdiction in the district
in which the offense was committed, such action to be in
the name of the person injured, or his legal representative,
and against said county, city, or parish, and in which
action any of the parties committing such acts may be
joined as defendants. And any payment of any judgment, or part thereof unsatisfied, recovered by the plaintiff in such action, may, if not satisfied by the individual
defendant therein within two months next after the
recovery of such judgment upon execution duly issued
against such individual defendant in such judgment, and
returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, be enforced
against such county, city, or parish, by execution, attachment, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding
in aid of execution or applicable to the enforcement of
judgments against municipal corporations; and such judgment shall be a lien as well upon all moneys in the
treasury of such county, city, or parish, as upon the other
property thereof. And the court in any such action may
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on motion cause additional parties to be made therein
prior to issue joined, to the end that justice may be done.
And the said county, city, or parish may recover the
full amount of such judgment, by it paid, with costs and
interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal
or accessory in such riot, in an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction. And such county, city, or parish,
so paying, shall also be subrogated to all the plaintiff's
rights under such judgment." Globe, at 749 and 755.
The relevant text of the second conference substitute for the
herman amendment is as follows:
" [A lny person or persons having knowledge that any of
the wrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in the
second section of this act are about to be committed, and
having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same,
shall neglect or refuse so to do, and such wrongful act
shall be committed, such person or persons shall be liable to the person injured, or his legal representatives."
Globe, at 804 (emphasis added) .
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MR. JusTICE PoWELL, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and add these additional
VIews.
Few cases in the history of the Court have been cited more
frequently than Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961) , decided less than two decades ago. Focusing new light on 42
U. S. C. ~ 1983. that decision widened access to the federal
courts and permitted expansive interpretations of the reach of
the 1871 measure. But Monroe exetnptecl local governments
from liability at the same time iL opPnecl wick the courthouse
door to suits against officers a11d employees of those entitieseven when they act pursuant to Pxpress authorization. The
oddness of this result, ancl the weakness of tlw historical
evidence relied on by the JI!I onroe Court in support of it. are
well demonstrated by the Court's opinion today. Yet the
gravity of overruling a part of so important a decision prompts
me to write.

I

In addressing a complaint alleging unconstitutional police
conduct that probably was unauthorized and actionable under
state la-vv/ the Monroe Court treated the 42cl Congress' re1 The gmvarnpn of the complaint in "~[on me wa.~ that Chicago police
offirers acting "under color of" ,.,J,a te law hnd conducted it warrantless,
<:>nrly morning raid ancl ntnHacking of a private home. Although at
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jection of the Sherman Amendment as conclusive evidence
of an intention to immunize local governments from all liability under the statute for COilStitutional injury. That readiug, in light of today's thorough canvass of the legislative
history, clearly "misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision." Momoe, supra, at 192 (Harlan. J., concurring). In this case. involving formal. written policies of
the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the C'ity of N'ew York that arc alleged to conflict
with the con1mand of the Due Process Clause. cf. Cleveland
Board of Educatio11 v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974). the
Court decides "not to reject l wisdom] merely because it comes
too late," Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600
(1949) (Frankfurter, J.. dissenting).
As the Court demonstrates. the Sherman Amendment presented an extreme example of "riot act" legislation that sought
to impose vicarious liability on government subdivisions for
the consequences of private lawlessness. As such. it implicated
concerns that are of marginal pertine11ce to the operative
principle of ~ 1 of the 1871 legislation-now ~ 1983-that
"[ejvery person" acting "undC'r color of" state law may be held
liable for affirmative conduct that "subjects, or causes to be
subjected. any person to the deprivation of any" federal
constitutional or statutory right. Of the many reasons for the
!Pa~t

one of tlw nllrgation~ in thr romplaint ronld hn.vr brrn construrd
to charge a. cu:stom or usagr of thr Polirl' Dl'parlm<'nt of tbr City of
Chicago that did not Yiolatr statr law, ~<Pr :~()51'. IS., at 25f\-259 (Frankfnrtrr, J., di~<~rnting in part), aud thrre j,., ;t hint of such n theory in
petitioner::;' brirf, 0. T. 19ti0, No. 39, pp. 41--+2. that fratmr of the rase
wa,; not highlightrd in thi~ Court.. Thl' disputr that divided the Court.
was over whether a complaint. ai!Pging polirr miscondnct in violation of
Hla.tr law, for which ~tall' jndi<"ial n'lll<'die,; wl'!"e availablr, ;;tntrd a § 1983
claim. in light of tlw ~tatntor.Y reqnin•mrnt. that tbr conduct working
injmy be "undrr color of" <>tat!' law. Comparr :365 U. S., at 172-183'
(opinion of thr Court), and id .. :1l Hl:3-202 (Harlan, J., concurring),
wilh id" at. 202-259 (FrankfurlN, .T., di;;~pntin~~: in pnrt) .
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defeat of the Sherman proposal. none supports Monroe's
observation that the 42d Congress was fundamentally «antagonistic," 365 U. S .. at 1\ll. to tlw propositio11 that government
entities and natural persons alike should bf' held accountable
for the consequences of COilduct dir0ctly working a constitutional violation . Oppon0nts in tlw Rf'natc app<•ar to have
been troubled primarily by the proposal's unprecedented lien
provision , which would have exposed f'ven property held for
public purposes to tlw drmands of ~ 1983 judgment lienors.
Opinion of thr Court, ante, at 14 n. 30. The opposition in the
House of Representatives focusPcl largely on the Sherman
Ameudment's attempt to impose a peacekc0ping obligation on
municipalities when thC' Constitution itself imposed no such
affirmative duty and wlwn many municipalities were not even
empowered under state Jaw to maintain police forces. Ante,
at 20-22. 2
The Court correctly rejects a view of the legislative history
that would produce the anomalous result of immunizing local
government units frolll monetary liability for action directly
causing a constitutional dPprivation. even though such actions
may be fully consistent with. and thus uot remediable under,
state law. No conduct of govcrnnwnt comes more clearly
within the «under color of" state law languagf' of ~ 1983. It
is most unlikely that CongrPss in tended puhlic officials acting
under the command or the SJWCific authorization of the gov" If in tlw viPw of Uou~C' oppon<·tit~ , ~urh m> Hrprr~rntativ(·~ Polund,
Burchard, and Willard,"<'<' opinion of tlw Court, ante, at 20-21, a municipa.lit~· obligatrd hy ~tnt<' law to kt•Pp t.lw ]Ware could be held liablr for a
failurr to proYiclr rqunl protl'rtiou a~ain,.;t priYat(' violl'nre , it ~eem:-; imwobable thnt tlw~ · would han· oppo~<'d impo~ition of Jiabilit~· on a
111\111iCi]lHJit~· for thr affinnatiV<' impiPI11<'11tatiOll of polirir,.; JlfOITilllgated
w1t hin it:; propPr splwr<' of OJWra.t ion undrr ~ tat(' Ia w. Such Iia bili t .~· is
prrmi:-;c·d not on <1 f<1ilmt' to take• affirmntivr action in nn art>a ont:oidr the
contrmplation of thr stntP-!aw t'hartrr, but on thr con~r quenccs of act.ivitir,; actua!l~ · unclertnk<·n within th r :>COP<' of the powrr:o conferred by
-tate Jaw,
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('l'lllllent C:'Jll ploypr to be e:rclusively liable for resulting con-stitutional injury.::
As elaboratNI in Part l I of today's opinion. the rejection
of the Sherman Amendment ca.tl best be understood llOt as
<.'vidt'nce of Congress' acceptance of a rulr of absolute municipa.J
immunity. hut as a limitation of the statutory ambit to actual
wrongdoers. i. e., a rejection of respondeat superior or any
other principle of vicarious liability. Thus, it has been clear
that a public official may bP held liable in damages when his
actions are found to violate a constitutional right and there is
no qualified immunity. see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 208
(1975); Procunier Y. Xavarette , No. 76-446. U. S. ( Hm~). Today the Court recogniz<:>s that this principle also
applies to a local government when implementation of its
official policies or established customs inflicts the constitutional injury.

II
This Court traditionally has been hesitant to overrule prior
constructions of statutes or interpretations of common-law
rules. "Stare decisis is usually the \Vise policy,'' Burnet v.
Coro~tado Uil & Gas Co., 285 r. S. 393. 406 ( 1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). but this cautionary principle must give way
to coUJitervailing considerations in appropriate circumstances.''
a The virw 1nkrn todny i ~ < ' Oil >' i~tt·nt with tlH' undrr:'tanding of til('
42d Congrr:<;; 1 hat unJp,.;,.; the t•ont <'XI l'l"VPaiPd a morf' limit<•d definition,
•·tJw word ']wr,.;on' ma~· Pxtrnd nnd hl' applil'd 1o hodiP>' politil' nnd rorponlt P.. . .., Art of FPh . :25, li-:71, rh . 71, § 2. J(i Stat . .t:n. It nbo
nrconl ~ with thr intPrprrta1iou gil'l'll till' ,.;amP word whrn it wa~ u~Pd by
8Pnntor SlwmJHll in thr autitrtl>'l IPgi>'lation of 11-<UO lll'aring hi>' namr .
8r<' Lafayette \' . IAJuisiana fJotc er (t· [,lflht Cu., :\o. 7H-~o4 , - l 1 . S.( 1971') (pluralitY opiuion): Chattauouyo Foundry v. Atlanta , 2():3 lJ. S.
ernment of ludio. :\o. /(i-7+9 , :l90, :mn (l!:JO(i) : cf. Pfizer. Inc. ,.. Oot>

P R -- (197~)
I Srr, e. ~f . , rontlll l' lltal '!'\'. 1111' . \'. 0'/'B ~y/Nwia hu·., ,n:l r . S. 3()
(1977) ; Machin ists 1. Wisco11 .~111 I<:mp He/. Co111111 .. .J-:27 l'. ::-> . 1:3:.1 (JHiti):
Hradeu v. .3Uth Judil'iu/ C'ircuit ('ollrt of /(!/ .. .J.JO l'. ::-> . .J./-:4 (197:~) ~
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I concur in the ( 'ourt's view that this is not a case where we
should "place on the shoulders of Congress the burden of the
Court's OWII error." Girouard\', Cnited States, 328 r. S. 61,
70 (1946) .
Nor is this thf' usual case in which the Court is asked to
overrule a precedent. Hero considerations of stare decisis cut
in both directions. On the om' hand. wf' havf' a series of
rulings that municipalities and counties are not "persons'' for
purpos<>s of ~ 1983. On the other hand. many decisions of
this Court havP been prcmisPd on the amenability of school
boards and similar elltities to ~ 1983 suits.
Jn Monroe and its progrny. we have answered a question
that was never actually briefed 01· argued in this Courtwhether a municipality is liable in damages for injuries that
are the cl1rect result of its official policies. "The theory of the
complaint [in Monroe wasj that under the circumstances
[t_lhere alleged the City fv,:asj liable for the acts of its police
officers. by virtue of respondeat superior." Brief for Petitioners. 0. T. 1960. No. 39. p. 21.'' Respondents answered that
adoption of petitioners' position would expose "Chicago and
every other municipality in the l:nited States . . . to Civil
Rights liability through no action of its own and based on
Griffiu v. Breckenridge. 403 U. S. X8 (1971); Boys Market v. Retail
('/erks Unum, :39~ U. S. 2:35 (1970); Burnet "· Corouadu Oil & Gas Co.,
:!~5 P. 8. a9:~. 406-407 n. 1 (19:32) (BrandPi~, .T., di><:;f'nting).
r. Thr Di;;t rici Court in Monrm· rulrd in thr municipalit.y'R favor, <;tatmg: "Hille<• t hr liabilit~· of thr City of Chicago i::; ba:;ecl on thc dort rine
of re8pondeat superior. and ~inrr I havc alrrnd~· hclcl thai thr complaint
fail~ to ~tat<' a rlaim for relicf ngain~t thr ng(•nt:; of the city, thrrr i::; no
el:iim for rPlirf agHin:;t the city it~clf." Rreord, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 30.
Thc Comt. of Appr<tl:-: affirmed for thr ~amr rca;;o11. 272 F. 2d 365-366
(CA7 105\l) .
l'PtitioiH'l'" in thi~ Court al;,;o offrrcd an alternativ<' argumcnt that. the
<'tl.1· of C'lneago wa>' a ··per;;on" for piii'JlOH<'~ of § 19S:3. Brief for Prtittom·r~, 0 . T. 1960, Xo. 39, p. 25, but thr undrrlying theory of munici1>al
hahtliiy n·mainrd <mr of respondeat superior.
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action contrary to its own ordinances and the laws of the state
it is a part of I .sic] .. , BriE>f for Respondents, supra, p. 26.
Th ns the ground of decision in Monroe was not advanced by
cithcr party and was broader than necessary to resolve the
COlltcntions 1nade in that casP. 0
flimilarly. in Jfvor v. County of Ala.meda, 411 F. S. 693
(107:3). petitioners asserted that "the County was vicariously
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff." id., at 696. under
42 r. R. C. ~ 1DRR. In rejecting this vicarious-liability claim,
id., at 710. and n. 27, vYe reaffirmed Monroe's reading of the
statute. but therr was no challenge in that case to "the holding
in i1fo11me conceming the status under ~ 1983 of public entities
such as the County." id., at 700; Brief for Petitioners, 0. T.
1D72. No. 72- 10, p. 9.
Only i11 City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973),
did the Court confront a ~ 1983 claim based on conduct that
was both authorized under state law and the direct cause of
thc claimed constitutional injury. In Kenosha, however. we
raised the issue of the City's amenability to suit under § 1983
on our own initiative. 7
This line of cases-from Monroe to Kenosha-is difficult
to reconcile on a principlrcl basis with a parallel series of cases
in which the Court has assumed sub silentio that some local
''We· ow<' :;:onH•what lr"" d<'frr<•JH'<' to n dre•JHion thnt wnf' rrndPrPd without. hPll<'fit or a full airing of all tiH' rrl<·,·ant con~idPmtion::< ThP fact that
uutll thi::: <'H~'f' thr Court ha:s not had to confront ~qunr<'l.'· thr e·on~Nturncr:;
or holdlllg § 191{:) inapplicable- to oJli!'inl munieipal policir~ mn~· be rontiidN!'d 111 a::;~r~~ing thr quality of the pn·t·Pdent that we• nrr ask<'d to
rr-Pxaminr .
7 ln Aldin(le1' v. Tfo!l'ard, 42i LT. S. 1 (Hlif1), \\'<' rraffinnrd Monroe,
hut pt't1tionrr did not !'ontr~t tlw propo~ition that, rountir::< wrrr !'Xcluded
from tlw n•arh of§ 19ttl und<'r .11onroe. id .. at JG, and ilw qll<'Stion brforc
11s coJH'<'l'll<'d lhr ~eopr of P<'IHl<'nl-part.\· .imi"'dirt ion wiU1 rr::;pe•e·t to a
Htatr-Jaw claim. Simil;lrl~·. tht• partie·~ in ,1 ft. Ilea/thy City Boa'l'd of Ed. v.
Doyle. 429 l . S. 274 ( 1977) , did not >'<'Pk n rr-examination of our ruling
111 Monme.
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govC'fnment entities could be sued UJlder ~ 1983. If now. after
full consideration of the qu<'stion, we continue to adhere to
Monroe, grave doubt would be cast upon the Court's exercise
of ~ 1983 jurisdiction ov<'r school boards. See opinion of the
Court. ante, at 3 n. 5. Since "tlw principle of blanket immunity established in Monroe cannot be cabined short of school
boards," ante, at 36. the conflict is squarely presented.
Although there' was an inclepC'udent basis of jurisdiction in
many of the school board cases because of the inclusion of
individual public officials as nominal parties. the opinions of
this Court make explicit reference to the school board party,
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded. see,
e. g., Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430. 437-439,
441-442 (1968); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267. 292-293
(1977) (PowELL. J.. concurring in the judgment). And, as
the Court points out. a11te, at 36-39. Congress has focused
specifically on this Court's school board decisions in several
statutes. Thus the exercise of ~ 1983 jurisdiction over school
boards, while perhaps 110t premised 011 considered holdings, has
been longstanding. Tndecd. it predated Monroe.
Even if one attempts to explain away the school board
decisions as involving suits which "may be maintained against
board members in their official capacities for injunctive relief
under either~ 1083 or Ex parte 1"ou11g, 209 U. ~. 123 (1908),"
dissenting opinion of MR. Jl'S'l'ICE REHNQUlST, post, at 3 n. 2,
some difficulty remains in rationalizing the relevant body of
precedents. At least two of the school board cases in valved
claims for monetary relic-f. Cohen v. Chesterfield County
School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159. 1161 (ED Va. 1971). rev'd,
474 F. 2d 395 ( CA4 1973). rev' d. 414 U. S. 632 ( 1974); Tinker
v. Des Moi11es School Dist., 393 U. S. 503. 504 (1969). See
also Vland1:s v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441.445 (1973). Although the
point was not squarely presented in this Court, these claims
for damages could not have been maintained in officialcapacity suits if the government entity were not .itself suable.

!
[
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C'f. Bdel111a11 v. .Jordan, 415 l r. 8. ('jt)l ( Hl74).' Moreover, the
ratio11ak of Ke11osha \\'Ould have to be disturhed. to avoicl
closing all avcnuPs UIH!Pr ~ 108:3 to injunctive relief against
constitutional violatio11S by local govE:'rlllnent. The Court of
Appeals in this case suggPsted that \H' import. by analogy. the
Eleventh Anwndnwnt "fiction" of E:r parte }'ouny into~ 1983.
532 F. 2d 250. 2()4--:26() ( CA2 H)7(i). That approach. however,
would cn'atP tension with Ke11osha lweause it would require "a
bifurcated application'' of "tlw generic word 'person' in ~ 1983"
to public officials "depending on the nature of the relief sought
against tlwm.'' 412 U. S .. at 513. A public official sued in
his official capacity for carrying out official policy would be a
"pt-rson" for purposes of injunctive relief. but a non-"person"
in an action for damages. The Court's holding avoids this
difficulty. Ree ante, at 30 11. 55.
Finally. if we continued to adhere to a rule of absolute
municipal immunity under~ 1983. we could not long avoid the
quPstion whPth<'r "we should. hy analogy to our decision in
Bive11s v. S1:-r l'11known Ji'ed. Xarcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388
(1971 ). imply a cause of action directly from the Fourteenth
Amendnwnt "·hich would not be subject to the limitations
contained in ~ 1983 ... .n M t. Healthy City Board of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 1T. f.i. 274. 278 (1977). One aspect of that inquiry
would be whether there arc any "special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."
Bivens, supra, at 396. such as an "explicit congressional
declaration that persons injured by a [municipality] may not
reeovcr money damages . . . . but must instead be remitted
to another remedy. equally effective in the view of Congress,"
1'd., at 397. fn light of the C'ourt's persuasive re-examination in
' To thr r xfrnf that thr

romplaint~

in

tho~e

ra:;e,; assertrd rluims

Hga tn~t, tlw indi,·idual def<>Jtdunt:,: in tlwir prr~onal caparit~·, a.~ wrll as

ofli<'ial eapa<·it~· . thr Court would haw had authorit~· to award the rrlicf
r<·qu<·:-;1<'<1. ThrrP iH no suggeHtion in tlw opinion:;, howrver, that t·hr
praet ir<':; at i~:;ur wrrr anything other thn11 official, duly authorized policirs.

75-1914-CONCUR (A)

l\TONELL v. NEW YOHK CITY DEPT. O.F SOCIAL SERVICES

9

toclay's decision of the 1871 debates, I would have difficulty
inferring from ~ 1983 "an explicit congressional <.leclaration"
a!!:ainst municipal liability for the implementation of official
policies in violation of the Constitution. Rather than constitutio11alize a cause of action against local government that
Congress in tended to create in 1871, the better course is to
coufess error and set the record straight, as the Court does
today.u

III
Difficult questions nevertheless remain for another day.
There arc substantial line-drawing problems in determining
"wheu execution of a government's policy or custom" can be
said to inflict constitutional injury such that "government as
an entity is responsible under § 1983." Opinion for the Court.
ante, at 34. This case. however, involves formal, written
policies of a municipal department and school board; it is the
clear case. The Court also reserves decision 011 the availability
of a qualified municipal immunity. Ante, at 41. l11itial resolution of the question whether the protection available at
common law for municipal corporations, see dissenting opinion
of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, post, at 6-7, or other principles
support a qualified municipal immunity in the context of the
§ Hl83 damages action, is left to the lower federal courts.

9

REHNQUJ~>'l' ':s di~~>cnt makes a strong argument that
Monroe, mnnicipalitic>:s have had the right. to expert that they
would not bC' liable rctroa.ctivel~· for thc>ir oflicer:-;' failure to predict this
Court'~ recognition of new constitutional rightH." Post, at 4. But it
rea~>OJHI.bly rna~· br <l:;snmC'd tha.t. moHt municipa.liti<'i:' already indemnify
oflleiab surd for conduct within thr HCOJlC of thPir authorit~·, a policy that
furl h!'r:; the important. intPN':>t of attracting and retaining competent
officrr~, board mrmbcrs and employers. In an~- event, thr pos:sibility of
a qu:-tlifird immunity, aH to which the Court re~rrvrH dPci~ion, may remove
somr of the> h:-trshnps:-; of Jiabilit.y for good-faith failmr 1o predict the
ofteu uncntaiu cour:-;e of conHtitutional adjudication.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and add these additional
views.
Few cases in the history of the Court have been cited more
frequently than Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), decided less than two decades ago. Focusing new light on 42
U. S. C. § 1983, that decision widened access to the federal
courts and permitted expansive interpretations of the reach of
the 1871 measure. But Monroe exempted local governments
from liability at the same time it opened wide the courthouse
door to suits against officers and employees of those entitieseven when they act pursuant to express authorization. The
oddness of this result, and the weakness of the historical
evidence relied on by the Monroe Court in support of it, are
well demonstrated by the Court's opinion today. Yet the
gravity of overruling a part of so important a decision prompts
me to write.
I

In addressing a complaint alleging unconstitutional police
conduct that probably was unauthorized and actionable under
state law/ the Monroe Court treated the 42d Congress' reJ The gravamen of the complaint in Monme was that Chicago police
officers acting "under color of" state law had conducted n warrantless,
early morning raid and ransaeking of a private home. Although at

..
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jection of the Sherman Amendment as conclusive evidence
of an intention to immunize local governments from all liability under the statute for constitutional injury. That reading, in light of today's thorough canvass of the legislative
history, clearly "misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision," Monroe, supra, at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring). In this case, involving formal, written policies of
the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York that are alleged to conflict
with the command of the Due Process Clause, cf. Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974), the
Court decides "not to reject [wisdom] merely because it comes
too late," Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600
(1949) (Frankfurter, J.. dissenting).
As the Court demonstrates, the Sherman Amendment presented an extreme example of "riot act" legislation that sought
to impose vicarious liability on government subdivisions for
the consequences of private lawlessness. As such, it implicated
concerns that are of marginal pertinence to the opera.tive
principle of § 1 of the 1871 legislation-now § 1983-that
" [ e] very person" acting "under color of" state law may be held
liable for affirmative conduct that "subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any person to the deprivation of any" federal
constitutional or statutory right. Of the many reasons for the
least one of the allegationR in the complaint could h:wr bern construed
t o charge a custom or usage or the Police Department of the City of
Chicago that did not. violate state law, r:;cr 365 U . S., a.t. 258-259 (Frankfurter, J ., dissenting in part), and there is a hint of such a theory in
p etitioner:;' brief, 0 . T . 1960, No . 39, pp . 41-42 , that fea turr of the case
was not highlighted in this Court . The dispute that divided the Court
was over whether a complaint all eging police misconduct in violation of
sta te la.w, for which state judicial remedil'l:i were a.vailablc, sta ted a § 1983
claim in light of t he statutory re4uirement, that the conduct working
injury be " under color of" state law . Compare 365 U. S., at 172- 183'
(opinion of the Court), nnd id., at 193-202 (Harlan , J ., concurring) .
with id., at 202-259 (Frankfurtrr, ,J;., dis;;enting in part) .
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defeat of the Sherman proposal, none supports Monroe's
observation that the 42d C'ongress was fundamentally "antagonistic," 365 U. S., at 191, to the proposition that government
entities and natural persons alike should be held accountable
for the consequences of conduct directly working a constitutional violation. Opponents in the Senate appear to have
been troubled primarily by the proposal's unprecedented lien
provision, which would have exposed even property held for
public purposes to the demands of § 1983 judgment lienors.
Opinion of the Court, ante, at 14 11. 30. The opposition in the
House of Representatives focused largely on the Sherman
Amendment's attempt to impose a peacekeeping obligation on
municipalities when the Constitution itself imposed no such
affirmative duty and when many municipalities were not even
empowered under state law to maintain police forces. Ante,
at 20--22. 2
The Court correctly rejects a view of the legislative history
that would produce the anomalous result of immunizing local
government units from monetary liability for action directly
causing a constitutional deprivation, even though such actions
may be fully consistent with, and thus not remediable under,
state law. No conduct of government comes more clearly
within the "under color of" state law langua.ge of § 1983. It
is most unlikely that Congress intended public officials acting
under the command or the specific authorization of the gov2 If in the view of House opponent~, such as Representatives Poland,
13urrhard, and Willard, see opinion of the Court, ante, at 20-21, a municipality obligated by state law to keep t.he peace could be held liable for a
failure to provide equal protection against privat~ violence, it seems improbable that they would have oppoRecl imposition of liability on a
municipality for the affirmative implementation of policies promulgated
withm its proper ~phere of operation under stat~ law. Such liability is
prem1secl not on a failure to t<tke aflirmative action in an area outside the
eontemplation of thr :;tate-law rhartpr-the ~ort. of liability that would
ha vr been imposed by tlw Shennan Amendment-but on the consequence;;
of aetJvJtJr~ actual!~· undertaken within the scopr of the power:; conferred.
hy til <tiP law.
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ernment employer to be exclusively liable for resulting constitutional injury. 8
As elaborated in Part II of today's opinion, the rejection
of the Sherman Amendment can best be understood not as
evidence of Congress' acceptance of a rule of absolute municipal
immunity, but as a limitation of the statutory ambit to actual
wrongdoers. i. e., a rejection of respondeat superior or any
other principle of vicarious liability. Thus, it has been clear
that a public official may be held liable in damages when his
actions are fouud to violate a constitutional right and there is
no qualified immunity, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 208
(1975); Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446. U. S. (1978). Today the Court recognizes that this principle also·
applies to a local government when implementation of its
official policies or established customs inflicts the constitutional injury.
II
This Court traditionally has been hesitant to overrule prior
constructions of statutes or interpretations of common-law
rules. "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy," Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). but this cautionary principle must give way
to coUJitervailing considerations in appropriate circumstances.~·
The view taken toda~· i,; ron;;i~t Pn t with the undNf'tanding of the
42d Congres:; that unlrss the contpx(. revealed H more limited definition,
" the word 'j)erson' may extend and be aPJlliecl to bodie~:< politic and corporate . .. . " Art of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2. 16 Stat. 431. It also
accord~ with the interpretation givrn thP ~>ame word when it was used by
Senator ShPrman in the ant it ru~:~t Jegi::;lat ion of 1X90 bra ring his name.
U. S . Sre Lafayette \' , Louisiana Power & Li(Jht Co., l'\o. 76-l:lH4, (1978) (pluralit~· opinion); Chattanoooa Poundry v. Atlanta, 203 U. S.
:390, 396 (1906); rf. Pfizer, lnr. v. Govemmeut of India. ~o. 76-749,P . S. - - (197R) .
1
Se<', e. (} .. Continental TV, Inc. \'. GTE Sylvauia Inc., 43:3 U. S. 36
(1977); Machinists"· Wisconsiu Ernp. Rei. Comm., 427 U.S. 132 (1971i};
Braden . 30th J'udir·ial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484 (1973);
8
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I concur in tiH• Court's vi<'w that this is not a case where we
should "place on the shoulc!Prs of ( 'ongrcss tlw burden of the
Court's own error." Girouard Y. Cnited States, 328 U. S. 61,
70 (1946).
Nor is this the usual case in which the Court is asked to
overrule a precedent. Here considerations of stare decisis cut
in both directions. On the one hand. we have a series of
rulings that municipalities and counties are not "persons" for
purposes of ~ 1983. On the other hand. many decisions of
this Court havr been prrmised 011 the amenability of school
boards and similar elltities to § H)83 suits.
In Monroe and its progeny. we havr answered a question
that \Vas never actually briPfPd or argued in this Courtvvhethcr a municipality is liable in damages for injuries that
are the direct result of its official policies. "Tlw theory of the
complaint rin Mol!roe \VaS I that under tlw circumstances
rtJhere alleged the City lvvaslliablt> for the acts of its police
officers, by virtue of respondeat superior... Brief for Petitioners, 0. T. 1960. No. 39. p. 21.'' Respondents ansvvered that
adoption of pPtitioncrs' position would expose "Chicago and
every other municipality in the 'Cnitect Rtates . . . to Civil
Rights liability through no action of its own and bas<'d on
Gri/fiu v. Breckenridge, 40:3 U. S. /-1?' (1971): Boys Market v. Retail
('lerks Uuion, :39R U. S. 2:3.5 (1970); Bunwl v. C'orouado Oil & Gas Co.,
2 5 P. S. :393, 40()-407 n. 1 (1932) (BrandPis, .1., dis:'<<·nting).
" Thr Dis( rirt Court in :\[onro<' ru!Pd in tlw municip:tlit ,y'~ favor, stating: "sincr the liability of the Cit~· of Chicago i~ hasrd on thr doctrinr
of respoudeal superior, nnd sincP 1 h:tvr nln•ad~· hrld t hnt thr complaint,
fnil.- to f.-tate a rlaim for relil?f against tiH' agent;; of thE' <'it~·, thPrr i::; no
f'laim for rrlid against the cit~· it,rlf." Ureord, 0. T. 1960. ~o. 89, p. ~0.
The Court. of Appenls affirmed for the samP rm"on. 272 F. 2d :365-:~66
(CA7 Hl50) .
Petitiorwr~ in thi,.: Court nlso offrrrd an :tltrrnative arp:umrnt that the
cit~· of Chicago wnH a "person" for Jlllrpo"r" of § 198:~. Brirf for Petii.iouer,.:, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 25, but the undrrl~·ing theory of mnnirip:1.Y
linhility remained one of res]J01ldeal superiot.
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action conkary to its own ordinances and the laws of the state
it is a part of [sic]." Brief for Respondents, supra, p. 26.
Thus the ground of decision in Monroe was not advanced by
either party and was broader than necessary to resolve the
contentions made in that case.6
Similarly, in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693
(1973), petitioners asserted that "the County was vicariously
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., at 696, under
6 The docrine of stare decisis advances two important values of a ra·
tionnl ~yt>tem of law: (i) the certainty of legal principles and (ii) the
wi~dom of the conservative vision, that existing rules should be presumed
mtiOJllll and not :;ubject to modification "at any time a new thought seems
appealing," di~;:;enting opinion of Mn. Jus'l'JCE REHNQUIST, post, at 5; cf.
0. Holmes, The Common Law 36 (1881). But , at the same time, the Jaw
has recognized the necessity of change, lest rules "simply persi~t . . .
from blind imitation of the past." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
Harv. L. Hev. 457, 469 (1897). Any overruling of prior precedent,
whether of a constitutional decision or otherwise, disserves to some extent
the value of certainty. But I think we owe &"Omewhat less deference to a
decision that. wa:; rendered without bem•fit of a full airing of all the relevant. co11Hidf>rations. That is the premise of the canon of interpretation
that language in a decision not necessar~· to the holding may be accorded
lP::;s weight. in subsequent cases. I also would recognize the fact that
until thi:; case the Court has not had to confront square!~· the consequences
of holding § 1983 inapplicable to official municipal policies.
Of cour:;e, the mere fact. that Rn issuf> was not argued or briefed does
not. undermine the precedenti::ll forrt' of a considered holding. M arburu
v Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), cit<•d by the dissent, post, at 5, is a case
in point. But the Court's recognition of its power to invalidate legislation not. in conformity with constitutional command was essC"ntial to its
judgment in Marbury . And on numerous subsequt>nt occasions, the Court
has been required t.o apply thr full brt>adt.h of the Marbury holding. In
Monroe, on the otht>r hand, the Court'i:l rationale was broader than neces:;ary to meet, the contentions of the parties and to decide the case in a
principled manner. The lnnguage in Monroe cannot be dismissed as dicta ,
but. we may take account of the fact. that the Court simply was not confronted with the implicat-ions of holding § 1983 inapplicable to official
municipal policies. It i~ an appreciation of those implications that ha:t
prompted today's rc-examimLtion of the legislative history of the 1871
measurE'.
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42 U. S. C. § 1988. In rejecting this vicarious-liability claim,
id., at 710, and 11. 27, we reaffirmed Monroe's reading of the
statute, but there was no challenge in that case to "the holding
in Monroe concerning the status under§ 1983 of public entities
such as the County," id., at 700; Brief for Petitioners, 0. T.
1972, No. 72-10, p. 9.
Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973),
did the Court confront a § 1983 claim based on conduct that
was both authorized under state law and the direct cause of
the claimed constitutional injur-y. In Kenosha, however, we
raised the issue of the City's amenability to suit under § 1983
on our own initiative. 7
This line of cases-from Monroe to Kenosha-is difficult
to reconcile on a principled basis with a para.llel series of cases
in which the Court has assumed sub silentio that some local
government entities could be sued under§ 1983. If now, after
full consideration of the question, we continued to adhere to
Monroe, grave doubt would be cast upon the Court's exercise
of ~ 1983 jurisdictiou over school boards. Sec opinion of the
Court, ante, at 3 n. 5. Since "the principle of blanket immunity established in Monroe cannot be cabined short of school
boards," ante, at 36, the conflict is squarely presented.
Although there was an indepcnden t basis of jurisdiction in
many of the school board cases because of the inclusion of
individual public officials as nominal parties, the opinions of
this Court makr explicit refrrencc to the school board party,
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded, see,
e. g., Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-439,
441-442 (1968); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 292-293
r rn Aldinger v. Iloward, 427 U. S. J (1976), we reaffirmed Monme,
1)ut petitioner did not contest thr proposition that. counties were excluded
from the reach of § 1983 undrr Monroe, id., at 16, and the quest.ion before
ronrrrnrd t·he scopr of prndrnt.- party jurisdiction with respect to a
,.;tate-la.w claim. Similarly, the parties in Mt . HeaLthy City Board of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U . S. 274 (1977), did not seek a re-examination of our ruling
m Monroe.

111-l
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(1977) (PowELL . .T .• concurring in thr judgment). And. as
thr Court points out. ante, at 36-3!1, Congress has focused
specifically on this Court's school board decisions in several
statutrs. Thus thr Pxercisr of ~ 1983 jurisdiction over school
boards. whil<' perhaps not premised on considered holdings, has
been longstanding. Indeed. it predated Monroe.
Rven if one attempts to explain away the school board
decisions as involving suits which "may be maintained against
board membPrs in their official capacities for injunctive relief
under either~ Hl83 or E:r parte Young, 209 V. S. 123 (1908),"
dissenting opinion of MH. JrH'l'lCE REHNQUIST, post, at 3-4
n. 2. sonl<' difficulty remains in rationalizing the relevant body
of prrcr<lents. At least two of thr school board cases involved
claims for monetary relief. Cohen v. Chesterfield County
School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159. 1161 (ED Va. 1971), rev'd,
474 F. 2rl 395 (C'A4 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Tinker
v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503. 504 (1969). See
also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445 (1973). Although the
point was not squarely presented in this Court, these claims
for damages could not have been maintained in officialcapacity suits if the government entity were not itself suable.
Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).R Moreover, the
rationale of Kenosha would have to be disturbed, to avoid
closing all avenues under § 1983 to injunctive relief against
constitutional violati~ms by local government. The Court of
Appeals in this case suggested that we import, by analogy, the
Ekventh Amendment fiction of Ex parte Young into ~ 1983,
532 F. 2d 259, 264-266 (C'A2 1976). That approach, however,
would create tension with Kenosha because it would require "a
bifurcated application" of "the generic 'Nord 'person' in § 1983"
" To tlw rx trnt that thr complaints in tho:;e cases aSHerted claims
mdiv1dual defE'ndant ~ in their personal capacity, Hil well as
official capaeit~·, the Court would have had authority to award the relief
reqne8ted. There i ~ no ::;uggeHtion in the opinionH, however, that the
practice~; at J&me were anything other than official, duly aut·hori:zed policies.
agam~t. 1he
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to public officials "depending on the nature of the relief sought
against them." 412 U. S., at 513. A public official sued in
his official capacity for carrying out official policy would be a
"person " for purposes of injunctive relief, but a non-"person"
in an action for damages. The Court's holding avoids this
difficulty. See ante, at 30 n. 55.
Finally. if we continued to adhere to a rule of absolute
municipal immunity under § 1983. we could not long avoid the
question whether "we should, by analogy to our decision in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388
(1971) , imply a cause of action directly from the Fourteenth
Amendment which would not be subject to the limitations
contained in § 1983 .... " Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). One aspect of that inquiry
would be whether there are any "special factors counselling
hesitation iu the absence of affirmative action by Congress,"
Bivens, supra, at 396, such as an "explicit congressional
declaration that persons injured by a [municipality] may not
recover money damages .. . . but must instead be remitted
to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress,''
id., at 397. In light of the Court's persuasive re-examination in
today's decision of the 1871 debates, I would have difficulty
inferring from § 1983 "an explicit congressional declaration"
against municipal liability for the implementation of official
policies in violation of the Constitution. Rather than constitutionalize a cause of action against local government that
Congress intended to crea.te in 1871, the better course is to
confess error and set the record straight, as the Court does
today.u
u MH. Ju sTICE REHNQUisT's dissent makes a strong a rgument that
" [s]in ce Monro e, municipalities have had the right. to expect tha t they
would not, bE' liable retroac tively for th E>ir officers' fa ilure to predict this
Court 's recognition of new constitutional rights." Post, at 4. But it
rE>ao;onably ma y hE' assumed that most municipalitiE's already indE>mnify
offirials sued for conduct within the scope of their authority , a policy that

. '·
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III
Difficult questio11s nevertheless remain for another day.
There are substantial line-drawing llroblems in determining
11
when execution of a government's polic·y or custom" can be
said to inflict constitutional injury such that "governnwnt as
an entity is responsible under ~ 1983." Opinion for the Court.
ante, at 34. This case, however, involves formal, written
policies of a municipal department and school board; it is the
clear case. The Court also reserves decision on the availability
of a qualified municipal immunity. Ante, at 41. Initial resolution of the question whether the protection available at
common law for municipal corporations, see dissenting opinion
of MH.. JusTICE REHNQUlST. post, at 8, or other principles
support a qualified municipal immunity in the context of the
§ 1983 damages action, is left to the lower federal courts,

fllrt hers tho important interest of attracting and retaining competent
•officers, boa.rd mf'mbers aml employees. In any event, the possibility of
:it qualified immunity, as to which the Court reserves decision, may remove
Homr of the harshnrs~ of liability for good-faith failure to predict the
•oftrn nncrrtn,in course of constitutional adjudication .
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and add these
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additional views.
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Few cases in the history of the Court have been
cited more frequently than Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167

(1961) , decided less than two decades ago.
light on 42

u.s.c.

§

Focusing new

1983, that decision widened access to

the federal courts and permitted expansive interpretations
of the reach of the 1871 measure.

But curiously Monroe ~
I

exempted local governments from liability at the same time
it opened wide the courthouse door to suits against
officers and employees of those entities - presumably, even
when they act pursuant to express authorization.

The

oddness of this result, and the weakness of the historical

~~~~)"~A,.;
evidence 1 ~e~e.u

by the Monroe Court in support of it, are

"

well demonstrated by the Court's opinion today.

Yet, the

gravity of overruling a portion of so important a decision
prompts me to write.

2•
I

Addressing a complaint alleging unconstitutional
police conduct that probably was unauthorized and
actionable under state law, !/ the Monroe Court treated
the 42d Congress' re jection of the Sherman Amendment as
conclusive . evidence of an intention to immunize local
governments from all liability for constitutional injury
under the statute. That reading, in light of today's
thorough canvass of the legislative history, clearly
"misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision,"
Monroe, supra, at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring).

In this

case, involving formal, written policies of the Department
of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City
of New York that are alleged to conflict with the command
of the Due Process Clause. Cf. Cleveland Board of Education
v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), the Court correctly
decides "not to reject [wisdom] merely because it comes too
late," Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600
(1949)

(Franfurter, J., dissenting).
As the Court demonstrates, the ill-conceived

Sherman Amendment presented an extreme example of "riot
act" legislation that sought to impose vicarious liability
on government subdivisions for the consequences of private
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lawlessness. As such, it implicated concerns that are of
marginal pertinence to the operative principle of § 1 of
the 1871 legislation-- now§ 1983 --that "[a]ny person"
acting "under color of" state law may be held liable for
affirmative conduct that "subject[s], or cause[s] to be
subjected, any person to the deprivation of any"
constitutional or federal statutory right.

Of the many

reasons for the defeat of the Sherman proposal, none
supports Monroe's observation that the 42d Congress was
fundamentally "antagonistic," 371 U.S., at 191, to the
proEosition that government entities and natural persons
alike should be held accountable for the consequences of
conduct directly working a constitutional violation.

t

Opponents in the Senate appear to have been troubled
primarily by the proposal's unprecedented lien provision,
which would have exposed even property held for public
purposes to the demands of §1983 judgment lienors. Opinion
of the Court,

ante, at 14 n.30.

The opposition in the

House of Representatives focused largely on the Sherman
Amendment's attempt to impose a peacekeeping obligation on
muncipalities when the Constitution itself imposed no such
affirmative duty and when many municipalities were not even
empowered under state law to maintain police forces. Ante,
at 20-22.

2

4.
The Court correctly rejects a view of the
legislative history that would produce the anomalous result
of immunizing local government units from monetary
liability for actions directly causing a constitutional
deprivation, even though such actions may be fully
consistent with, and thus not remediable under, state law.
No conduct of government comes more clearly within the
"under color of" state law language of §1983. It is most
unlikely that Congress intended public officials acting
under the command or the specific authorization of the
government employer to be exclusively liable for resulting
constitutional injury. ~/
As elaborated in Part II of today's opinion, the
rejection of the Sherman Amendment can best be understood
not as evidencing acceptance of a rule of absolute
municipal immunity, but as limiting the statutory ambit to
actual wrongdoers, i.e., a rejection of respondeat superior
or any other principle of vicarious liability.

Thus, a

public official may be held liable in damages when his
actions are found to violate constitutional right and there
is no qualified immunity under Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975); Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446,

u.s.

(1978). Similarly, local government may have to answer in
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damages "when execution of [its] policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
[constitutional] injury •••• " Opinion of the Court, ante, at
33-34.
II
This Court traditionally has been hesitant to
overrule prior constructions of statutes or interpretations
of common- law rules. Stare decisis is "usually the wise
policy," Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
406 (1932)

u.s.

393,

(Brandeis, J., dissenting), but this cautionary

principle must give way to countervailing considerations in
appropriate circumstances.

!/

I concur in the

Court's view that this is not a case where we should "place
on the shoulders of Congress the burden of the Court's own
-~

error."

Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946).
It is important to note that considerations of

stare decisis cut in both directions in this case.

On the

one hand, we have a series of rulings that municipalities
and counties are not "persons" for purposes of

§

1983.

In

the somewhat accidental manner that characterizes some of
the Court's decisions in this area, cf. Runyon v. McCrary,

6.

tL

427 U.S. 160, 186* (1976), we have answered a question that
;\

was never actually briefed or argued in this Court. In
Monroe -- which announced the principle of absolute
municipal immunity-

"[t]he theory of the complaint [was]

that under the circumstances [t]here alleged the City [was]
liable for the acts of its police officers, by virtue of

1

respondeat superior."
No. 39, p. 21. ~/

Brief for Petitioners,

O.T. 1960,

Respondents answered that adoption

of petitioners' position would expose "Chicago and every
other municipality in the United States ••. to Civil Rights
liability through no action of its own and based on action
contrary to its own ordinances and the laws of the state it
is a part of." Brief for Respondents, supra, p.26.

Thus

the decision in Monroe went beyond the issue as viewed and
argued by the parties themselves. 6
Similarly, in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693 (1973) - the only other relevant case presenting a
substantial discussion of the legislative history of §1983
- petitioners asserted that "the county was vicariously
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., at
696, under 42

u.s.c.

§ 1988.

In rejecting this

vicarious-liability claim, id., at 710 & n. 27, we
reaffirmed Monroe's reading of the statute, but there was

7.

no challenge in that case to "the holding in Monroe
concerning the status under
as the County,"

id., at

§

700~

1983 of public entities such
Brief for Petitioners, O.T.

1972, No. 72-10, p. 9.
Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973), did the Court confront a

§

1983 claim based on

conduct that was both authorized under state law and the
direct cause of the claimed constitutional injury.

But in

Kenosha we raised the jurisdictional question on our own
initiative. 11
Continued adherence to Monroe's account of the
legislative debates,
lines of decision.

h,o\}~Ver,

would require upsetting other

We would have to reject this Court's

sub silentio exercise of jurisdiction over school boards.
See Opinion for the Court, ante, at 3 n.5. Since "the
principle of blanket immunity established in Monroe cannot
be cabined short of school boards,"
conflict is squarely presented.

~nte,

at 36, the

Although there was an

independent basis of jurisdiction in many of the
school-board cases because of the inclusion of individual
public officials as nominal parties, the joinder of the
school board itself was a question of jurisdictional

8.

magnitude. See City of Kenoshav.

Bruno, supra, at

511-514; Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274' 278-279 (1977).

Moroever, the opinions of this Court

make explicit reference to the school-board party,
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded,
see,

u.s.

Green v. County School Board, 391

~'

430,

437-439, 441-442 (1968); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,
292-293 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
And, as the Court points out, ante, at 36-39, Congress has
focused specifically on this Court's school-board decisions
in several statutes. Thus the exercise of

§

1983

jurisdiction over school boards,
while perhaps not premised on considered holdings, has been
longstanding.

Indeed, it predated Monroe.

Even if one attempts to

exp~ain
''~}~,,

away the

school-board decisions as involving suits which "may be
maintained against board members in their official
capacities for injunctive relief either under

§

1983 or Ex

parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ," Dissenting/ pinion of
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, post, at 3 n.2, there remains some
difficulty in rationalizing the relevant body of
precedents.
involved

First, at least two of the school-board cases

claims for monetary relief.

Cohen v.

{

I

9.

Chesterfield County School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159, 1161
(ED Va. 1971), rev'd, 474 F. 2d 395 (CA4 1973), rev'd, 414
U.S. 632 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 504
445 (1973).

(1969); also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,
Although our decisions did not focus on the

point, these claims could not be asserted in
official-capacity suits if the government entity was not
otherwise suable.
(1974).

8

Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651

Second, and more importantly, the

rationale of Kenosha would have to be disturbed, unless all
avenues under §1983 to

injunctive relief against

constitutional violations by local government were to be
closed.

The Court of Appeals in this case suggested that

we import the Eleventh Amendment "fiction" of Ex parte
Young into § 1983, 532 F.2d 259,
264-266 (CA2 1976). That approach, however, would create
tension with Kenosha because it would require "a bifurcated
application" of "the generic word 'person' in §1983" to
public officials "depending on the nature of the relief
sought against them." 412

u.s.,

at 513.

A public official

sued in his official capacity would be a "person" for
purposes of injunctive relief, but a non-"person" in an
action for damages.

10.
Finally, if we continue to adhere to a rule of
absolute municipal immunity under §1983, we cannot long
avoid the question whether "we should, by analogy to our
decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403

u.s.

388 (1971), imply a cause of action directly from

the Fourteenth Amendment which would not be subject to the
limitations contained in§ 1983 •••• "
Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429

u.s.,

Mt. Healthy City

at 278.

One aspect of

that inquiry would be whether there are any "special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress," Bivens, supra, at 396,
such as an "explicit congressional declaration that persons
injured by a [municipality] may not recover money
damages •.. , but must instead be remitted to another remedy,
equally effective in the view of Congress," id., at 397.
In light of the Court's persuasive reexamination of the
1871 debates in today's decision, I would have difficulty
inferring from §1983 "an explicit congressional
declaration" against municipal liability for the
implementation of official policies lin violation of the
Constitution.

Rather than constitutionalize a cause of

action that Congress intended to create in 1871, the better
course is to confess error and set the record straight, as
the Court does

today.~/

11.

III
Difficult questions remain for another day.

There

are substantial line-drawing problems in determining "when
execution of a government's policy or custom" can be said
to inflict

injury such that "government as

con~titutional

an entity is responsible under §1983."
Court, ante, at 33-34.

Opinion for the

This case, however, involves

formal, written policies of a municipal department and
school board; it is the clear case.

The Court also

reserves decision on the availability of any qualified
municipal immunity. Ante, at 41.

Initial resolution of the

question whether the protection available at common law for
municipal corporations, see Dissenting Opinion of MR.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, post, at 6-7, or other principles

.

•

I

...
·f~ •'

support ··a ·qt1a1.ff1-ed munic.ipal immunity in the context of
the

§ 1983

damages action, is left for the lower federal

courts.

.

'

. .

.·
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FOOTNOTES
1.

The gravamen of the complaint in Monroe was

that Chicago police officers acting "under color of" state
law had conducted a warrantless, early morning raid and
ransacking of a Negro family's home.

Although at least one

of the allegations in the complaint could have been
construed to charge a custom or usage of the Police
Department of the City of Chicago that did not violate
state law, see 365

u.s.,

at 258-259 (Frankfurter J.,

dissenting in part) , and there is a hint of such a theory
in petitioners' brief, O.T. 1960, No. 39, pp. 41-42, that
feature of the case was not highlighted in this Court.

The

dispute that divided the Court was over whether a complaint
alleging police misconduct in violation of state law, for
which state judicial remedies were available, stated a
§

1983 claim in light of the statutory requirement that the

conduct working injury be "under color of" state law.
Compare 365 U.S., at 172-183 ;£pinion of the Court), and
id., at 193-202 (Harlan, J., concurring), with id., at
202-259, (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
2.

If, in the view of these Representatives, a

municipality obligated by state law to keep the peace could
be held liable for a failure to provide equal protection
against private violence, it seems improbable that they

N-2
would have opposed imposition of liability on a
municipality for the affirmative implementation of policies
promulgated within its proper sphere of operation under
state law. Such liability is premised not on a failure to
take affirmative action in an area outside the
contemplation of the state-law charter, but on the
consequences of activities actually undertaken within the
scope of the powers conferred by state law.
3.

The view taken today is consistent with the

understanding of the 42d Congress that unless the context
revealed a more limited definition, "the word 'person' may
extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate •..• "
Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71,

§

2, 16 Stat. 431.

It also

accords with the interpretation given the same word, used
by Senator Sherman in the antitrust legislation of 1890
bearing his name. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., No. 76-864,

u.s.

(1978)

(plurality

opinion); Chatanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906); cf. Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, No. 76-749

u.s.

(1978). See

also First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, No.
76-1172, p. 14 n. 13, ___ U.S.

n. 15 (1978).

N-3
4. See,

~'

Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE

Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36

(1977);

Machinists v.

Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm., 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Braden v.
30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410
Breckenrid~,

Griffin v.

403

u.s.

88

u.s.

484

(1973);

(1971); Boy's Market,

Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398

u.s.

235

(1970); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra, at 406 n.l.
5. The District Court in Monroe ruled against
municipal liability, stating:

"since the liability of the

City of Chicago is based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior, and since I have already held that the complaint
fails to state a claim for relief against the agents of the
city, there is no claim for relief against the city
~

itself."

RecordA 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 30.

Appeals affirmed for the same reason.

The Court of

272 F.2d 365-366

(CA 7 1959) .
Petitioners in this Court also offered an
alternative argument that the dity of Chicago was a
"person" for purposes of § 1983, Brief for Petitioners,
O.T. 1960, No. 39, p. 25, but the underlying theory of
municipal liability remained one of respondeat superior.
6. We owe somewhat less deference to a decision
that was rendered without benefit of a full airing of all

~

...

N-4
the relevant considerations.

The fact that until this case

the Court has not had to confront squarely the consequences
of a ruling holding

§

1983 inapplicable to official

municipal policies may be considered in assessing the
quality of the precedent that we are being asked to
reexamine.
7. In Aldinger v. Howard, 427

u.s.

1 (1976),

we

reaffirmed Monroe, but petitioner did not contest the
proposition that counties were excluded from

§

1983 as a

result of Monroe, id., at 16, and the question before us
concerned the scope of pendent-party jurisdiction with
respect to a state-law claim. Similarly, the parties in Mt.
Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977),
did not seek a reexamination of our ruling in Monroe.
8. To the extent that the complaints in those
cases asserted claims of personal liability, as well as
official capacity, the Court had jurisdiction to render
decision. There is no suggestion in the opinions, however,
that the practices at issue were anything other than
official, duly authorized policies.
9. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent makes a strong
argument that "[s]ince Monroe, municipalities have had the

N-5

right to expect that they would not be liable retroactively
for their officers' failure to predict this Court's
recognition of new constitutional rights." Post, at 4.

But

it reasonably may be assumed that most municipalities
already indemnify officials sued for conduct within the
scope of their authority, a policy that furthers the
important interest of attracting and retaining competent
officers, board members and employees.

In any event, the

possibility of a qualified immunity, as to which we reserve
decision for another day, may remove some of the harshness
of liability for good-faith failure to predict the often
uncertain course of constitutional adjudication.

l
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and add these additional
VIews.
Few cases in the history of the Court ha.v e been cited more
frequently than Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), decided less than two decades ago. Focusing new light on 42
U. S. C. § 1983, that decision widened access to the federal
courts and permitted expansive interpretations of the reach
of the 1871 measure. But@ rio:§!jT M onroe2exempted local
governments from liability at the same time it opened wide
the courthouse door to suits against officers and employees of
t ose ent1 1eseven when they a,c t pursuant to
express authorization. The oddness of this result, and the
weakness of the historical evidence relied on by the Monroe
Court in support of it, are well demonstrated by the Court's
opinion today. Yet, the gravity of overruling a portion of so
important a decision prompts me to write.

I
Addressing a complaint alleging unconstitutional police
conduct that probably was unauthorized and actionable under
state law/ the Monroe Court treated the 42d Congress' re1 The gravamen of the complaint in Monroe was that Chicago police
officers acting "under color of" state law had conducted a warrantless,
early morning raid and ransacking of a Negro family's home. Although

,,r

l
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jection of the Sherman Amendment as conclusive evidence
of an intention to immunize local governments from all liability for constitutional injury under the statute. That reading, in light of today's thorough canvass of the legislative
history, clea.rly "misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision," Monroe, supra, at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring). In this case, involving formal, written policies of
the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York that are allegtf to conflict
with the command of the Due Process ClausEb f. Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 6i'2 (1974), the
Court~oFFeetl¥ decides "not to reject ·[wisdom] merely because it comes too late," Henslee v. Union Planters Bank,
335 U. S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
As the Court demonstrates, the ill-conceived Sherman
Amendment presented an extreme example of "riot act" legislation that sought to impose vicarious liability on government subdivisions for the consequences of private lawlessness.
As such, it implicated concerns that are of marginal pertinence
to the operative principle of § 1 of the 1871 legislation-now
§ 1983-tha t " [a] ny person" acting "under color of" state
law may be held liable for affirmative conduct that "subject[s] , or cause[s] to be subjected, any person to the deprivation of any" constitutional or federal statutory right. Of
the many reasons for the defeat of the Sherman proposal,
at least one of the allegations in the complaint could have been construed
to charge a custom or usage of the Police Department of the City of
Chicago that did not violate state law, see 365 U. S., at 258-259 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part), and there is a hint of such a theory in
petitioners' brief, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, pp. 41-42, that feature of the case
was not highlighted in this Court. The dispute that divided the Court
was over whether a complaint alleging police misconduct in violation of
state law, for which state judicial remedies were available, stated a § 1983
claim in light of the statutory requirement that the conduct working
injury be '"under color of" state la.w. Compare 365 U. S., at 172-183
(opinion of the Court), and id., at 193-202 (Harlan, J., concurring),
with id., at 202-259 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
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3

none supports Monroe's observation that the 42d Congress
was fundamentally "antagonistic," 371 U. S., at 191, to the
proposition that government entities and natural persons alike
should be held accountable for the consequences of conduct
directly working a constitutional violation. Opponents in the
Senate appear to have been troubled primarily by the proposal's unprecedented lien provision , which would have exposed even property held for public purposes to the demands
of § 1983 judgment lienors. Opinion of the Court, ante, at
14 n. 30. The opposition in the House of Representatives
focused largely on the Sherman Amendment's attempt to impose a peacekeeping obligation on muncipalities when the
Constitution itself imposed no such affirmative duty and when
many municipalities were not even empowered under state
law to maintain police forces. Ante, at 20--22. 2
The Court correctly rejects a view of the legislative history
that would produce the anomalous result of immunizing local
government units from monetary liability for action directly
causing a constitutional deprivation, even though such actions
may be fully consistent with, and thus not remediable under,
state law. No conduct of government comes more clearly
within the "under color of" state law language of § 1983. It
is most unlikely that Congress intended public officials acting
under the command or the specific authorization of the government employer to be exclusively liable for resulting constitutional injury. 8
2 If, in the view of these ReprE'sentatiVJes, a municipality obligated by
state law to keep the peace could be held liable for a failure to provide
equal protection against private violence, it seems improbable that they
would have opposed imposition of liability on a municipality for the
affirmative Imp entation of policies promulgated within its proper
sphere of operation under state Jaw. Such liability is premised not on a
failure to take affirmative action in an area outside the contemplation of
the state-law charter, but on the consequences of artivitics actually undertaken within the scope of the powers conferred by state law.
s The view taken today is consistent with the understanding of the
42d Congress that unless the context revealed a more limited definition,
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As elaborated in Part II of today's opinion, the rejection
of the Sherman Amendment can best be understood not as
evidencing acceptance of a rule of absolute municipal immunity, but as limiting the statutory ambit to actual wrongdoers, i. e., a rejection of respondeat superior or any other
principle of vicarious liability. Thus, a public official may be
held liable in damages when his actions are found to violate
constitutional right and there is no qualified immunity under
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 208 (1975); Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446, U. S. (1978). Similarly, local
government may have to answer in damages ..,.,when ~•eeHtlOn

II
This Court traditionally has been hesitant to overrule prior
constructions of statutes or interpretations of common-law
rules. Stare decisis is "usually the wise policy," Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting), but this cautionary principle must give way
to countervailing considerations in appropriate circumstances.4
"the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate. . . . " Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. It also
accords with the interpretat-ion given the same word, used by Senator
Sherman in the antitrust legislation of 1890 bearing his name. Sec City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., No. 76-864, U. S. (1978) (plurality opinion); Chata.nooga Foundry & Pipe W arks v. City of
Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, 396 (1906); cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India,
No. 76-749,- U.S.- (1978). See also First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, No. 76-1172, p. 4 n. 13,- U. S. - , - n. 15 (1978).
4 See, e. g., Continental TV, I nc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U. S. 36
(1977); Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp Rel. Comm., 427 U.S. 132 (1976);
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484 (1973);
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Boy's Market, Inc. v. Retail

~~.,~~~Ht..-t.- ~ ~ ~ ~~
Uu- ~ i4.... ~ >-0 ~ a...~•
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I concur in the Court's view that this is not a case where we
should "place on the shoulders of Congress the burden of the
Court's own error." Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61,

Lis i.mporhwt t.Q. ~e Mutt onsiderations of stare decisis
cut in both directions i.P- thiil Qt;:BC," On the one hand, we
have a series of rulmg"S.lhat municipalities and counties are
not "persons" for purposes of § 1983. In the somewhat accidental manner that characterizes some of the Court's decisions
in this area, cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 186 n. *
(1976), we have answered a questioin that was never actually
briefed or argued in this Court. In Monroe-which announced
the principle of absolute municipal immunity-" [ t] he theory
of the complaint [was] that under the circumstances [t]here
alleged the City [was] liable for the acts of its police officers,
by virtue of respondeat superior." Brief for Petitioners, 0. T .
1960, No. 39, p. 21. 5 Respondents answered that adoption of
petitioners' position would expose "Chicago and every other
municipality in the United States ... to Civil Rights liability through no action of its own and based on action
contrary to its own ordinances and the laws of the state it
is a part of." Brief for Respondents, supra, p. 26. Thus the
Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U. S. 235 (1970); Burnet v. Coronado Oil
& Gas Co., supra, at 406 n. 1.
5 The District Court in Monroe ruled against. municipal liability, stating: "since the liability of the City of Chicago is based on the doctrine
of respondeat superior, and since I have already held that the complaint
fails to state a claim for relief against the agents of the city, there is no
cla.im for relief against the city itself." Record, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 30.
The Court of Appeals affirmed for the same reason. 272 F. 2d 365-366
(CA7 1959).
Petitioners in this Court also offered an alternative argument that the
city of Chicago was a "person" for purposes of § 1983, Brief for Petitioners, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 25, but the underlying theory of municipal
liability remained one of respondeat superior.

~~
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./~

~:J ~tk.J
decision in Monroe went beyond the issue as viewed and
6
J..-.a,~argued by the pa.rties themselves.
Similarly, in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693
~.-.; 4.L(1973)-the only other relevant case presenting a substantial discussion of the legislative history of § 1983-petitioners
asserted that "the county was vicariously liable for the acts
of its deputies and sheriff," id., at 696, under 42 U. S. C. ~kJ
§ 1988. In rejecting this vicarious-liability claim, id·., at 710,
~~~
and n. 27, we rea.ffirmed Monroe's reading of the statute, but ·
~~
there was no challenge in that case to "the holding in Monroe
concerning the status under § 1983 of public entities such as k.~~-~
the County," id., at 700; Brief for Petitioners, 0. T. 1972, ~~·r
No. 72-10, p. 9.
~~
Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno , 412 U. S. 507 (1973),
14'?~
did the Court confront a § 1983 claim based on conduct that
was both authorized under state law and the direct cause of
the claimed constitutional injury. But in Kenosha we raised
the jurisdictional question on our own initiative. 7

~;:-

i

~

·G We owe somewhat less deference to a decision that was rendered without benefit of a full airing of nll the relevant considerations The fact that
until this case the Court has not had 1o confront squarely the consequences
of a ruling holding § 1983 inapplicable to offtcial municipal policies may
be considered in assessing the quality of the precedent that we are being
asked to re-examine.
7 In Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976), we reaffirmed Monro e,
but petitioner did not contest til(' propm~ition that couniies were excluded
from § 1983 as a result of Monroe, id., at 16, and ihe qucsiion b efore us
concerned the scope of pendent-party jurisdiction with respect to a statelaw claim. Similarly, the parties in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), did not seck a re-examination of our n1ling
in Monroe.

MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DE

!though there was a.n independent basis of jurisdiction in
many of the school board cases because of the inclusion of
individual public officials as nominal parties, the joinder of the
T}J
school board itself was a question of jurisdictional magnitude.
(V"t' eUJ"'c,l ,r~ 11
See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, supra, at 511-514; Mt. Healthy
r "" - p-!)')1'1' '1'1~
City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 278- 279 (1977).
po, Yl f' , .i
Moreover, the opinions of this Court make explicit reference
~,.a e,
, ....
to the school board party, particularly in discussions of the
-j1, c_ ~vert I u!A- I
relief to be awarded, see, e. g., Green v. County School Board,
391 U. S. 430, 437-439, 441-442 (1968); Milliken v. Bradley,
·e-?1 ~Ui! .
433 U. S. 267, 292-293 (1977) (PowELL, J., concurring in the
judgment). And, as the Court points out, ante, at 36-39,
Congress has focused specifically on this Court's school board
decisions in several statutes. Thus the exercise of § 1983
jurisdiction over school boards, while perhaps not premised on
considered holdings, has been longstanding. Indeed, it predated Monroe.
Even if one attempts to explain away the school board
decisions as involving suits which "may be maintained against
board members in their official capacities for injunctive relief
either under§ 1983 or Ex parte Young, 209, U.S. 123 (1908);''
dissenting opinion of MR. JusTICE .REHNQUIST, post, at 3 n. 2, .J:~ 1 1
I"L
there remams
difficulty in rationalizing the rel.;pq~,~od~ W
of precedents. ~ ltt least two of the school board cases ~ "\V'T
involved claims for m~netary relief. Cohen v. Chesterfield
ruff
County School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (ED Va. 1971),
.f-~ ( 1(,":1
rev'd, 474 F. 2d 395 (CA4 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974);
a)rou.fTinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969);
'' f,.Jc,
also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,445 (1973). Although our
(r.oclt ~ of
decisions did not focus on the point, these claims could not be
r-recdem. f:s' ~ 1
asserted in official-capacity suits if the government entity was
f c.J() tA.
not otherwise suable. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651
rOt fl.t..-r
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· ,
(1974) .8
the rationale of
Kenosha would have to Br disturbed, unless all avenues under
§ 1983 to injunctive relief against constitutional violations by
ocal governmen
to be closed. The Court of Appeals in
this case suggested that we import the Eleventh Amendment
"fiction" of Ex parte Young into~ 1983, 532 F. 2d 259,264-266
(CA2 1!)76). That approach, however, would create tension
•
with Kenosha because it would require "a bifurcated applica~~
tion" of "the generic word 'person' in § 1983" to public officials
"depending on the nature of the relief sought against them." /
~L-.~.~~
412 U. S., at 513. A public official sued iH his effi:sisl eaf-Jaeity 0
PJ4A ~
would be a "person" for purposes of injunctive relief, but a
~
non-"person" in an action for damages.
Finally, if we continue to adhere to a rule of absolute
municipal immunity under § 1983, we cannot long avoid the
question whether "we should, by analogy to our decision in
Bivens v. Si.rc Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388
(1971), imply a cause of action directly from the Fourteenth
Amendment which would not be subject to the limitations
contained in § 1983. . . . " Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U. S. , at 278. One aspect of that inquiry would be
whether there are any "special factors counselling hesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress," Bivens, supra,
at 396, such as an "explicit congressional declaration that
persons injured by a [municipality] may not recover money
damages ... , but must instead be remitted to anoth_..;e.._r__ 2...
remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress," id., at S97.
In light of the Court's persuasive re-examination of the 1871
debates in today's decision, I would have difficulty inferring
from § 1983 "an explicit congressional declaration" against
municipal liability for the implementation of official policies

ft!Y;_

8 To the extent that the complaints in those cases asserted claims of
personal liability, as well as official capacity, the Court had jurisdiction
to render derision. There is no suggestion in thP opinions, however, that
the practices at issue were anything other than official, duly authorized
policies.
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in violation of th Constitution. Rather than constitutionalize
a,
a cause of action hat Congress intended to create in 1871~
~~
better course is to confess error and set the record straigh1, as
the Court does today .9

III

1?' _'Jb.,~/~AA/ r Difficult questionS)emain for another day.

There are substantialline-drawing problems in determining "when execution
of a government's policy or custom" can be said to inflict
constitutional injury such that "government as an entity is
responsible under § 1983." Opinion for the Court, ante, at
33-34. This case, however, involves formal, written policies
of a municipal department and school board; it is the clear
case. The Court also reserves decision on the availability of
~ qualified municipal immunity. Ante, at 41. Initial resolution of the question whether the protection available at
common law for municipal corporations, see dissenting opinion
of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, post, at 6-7, or other principles
support a qualified municipal immunity in the context of the
§ 1983 damages action, is left for the lower federal courts.

~~

MR. JusncE REHNQUIST's dissent makes a strong argument that
"[s]ince Monroe, municipalities have had the right to expect that they
would not be liable retroactively for their officers' failure to predict this
Court's recognition of new constitutional rights." Post, at 4. But it
reasonably may be assumed that most municipalities already indemnify
officials sued for conduct within the scope of their authority, a policy that,
furthers the important intevest of attracting and retaining competent
officers, board members and employees. In any event, the possibility of
a qualified immunity, as to which we reserve decision for another day,
may remove some of the harshness of liability for good-faith failure to
predict the often uncertain course of constitutional adjudication.
9
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and add these additional
views.
Few cases in the history of the Court have been cited more
frequently than Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), decided less than two decades ago. Focusing new light on 42
U. S. C. § 1983, that decision widened access to the federal
courts and permitted expansive interpretations of the reach of
the 1871 measure. But Monroe exempted local governments
from liability at the same time it opened wide the courthouse
door to suits against officers and employees of those entitieseven when they act pursuant to express authorization. The
oddness of this result, and the weakness of the historical
evidence relied on by the Monroe Court in support of it, are
well demonstrated by the Court's opinion today. Yet the
gravity of overruling a part of so important a decision prompts
me to write.
I
In addressing a complaint alleging unconstitutional police
conduct that probably was unauthorized and actionable under
state law/ the Monroe Court treated the 42d Congress' re1 The gravamen of the complaint in Monroe was that Chicago police
officers acting "under color of" state law had conducted a warrantless,
early morning raid and ransacking of a Negro family's home. Although
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jection of the Sherman Amendment as conclusive evidence
of an intention to immunize local governments from all liability under the statute for constitutional injury. That reading, in light of today's thorough canvass of the legislative
history, clearly "misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision," Monroe, supra, at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring). In this case, involving formal, written policies of
the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York that are alleged to conflict
with the command of the Due Process Clause, cf. Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974), the
Court decides "not to reject [wisdom] merely because it comes
too late," Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U. S. 595, 600
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
As the Court demonstrates, the Sherman Amendment presented an extreme example of "riot act" legislation that sought
to impose vicarious liability on government subdivisions for
the consequences of private lawlessness. As such, it implicated
concerns that are of marginal pertinence to the operative
principle of § 1 of the 1871 legislation-now § 1983-that
"[e]very person" acting "under color of" state law may be held
liable for affirmative conduct that "subjects, or causes to be
subj-ected, any person to the deprivation of any" federal
constitutional or statutory right. Of the many reasons for the
at least one of the a.Ilegations in the compla.i nt could have been construed
to charge a custom or usage of the Police Department of the City of
Chicago that did not violate state law, see 365 U. S., at 258-259 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part), and there is a hint of such a theory in
petitioners' brief, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, pp. 41-42, that feature of the case
was not highlighted in this Court. The dispute that divided the Court
was over whether a complaint alleging police misconduct in violation of
state law, for which state judicial remedies were available, stated a § 1983
claim in light of the statutory requirement that the conduct working
injury be "under color of" state law. Compare 365 U. S., at 172-183
(opinion of the Court), and id., at 193-202 (Harlan, J., concurring),
with id., at 202-259 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
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defeat of the Sherman proposal, none supports Monroe's
observation that the 42d Congress was fundamentally "antagonistic," 365 U. S., at 191, to the proposition that government
entities and natural persons alike should be held accountable
for the consequences of conduct directly working a constitutional violation. Opponents in the Senate appear to have
been troubled primarily by the proposal's unprecedented lien
provision, which would have exposed even property held for
public purposes to the demands of § 1983 judgment lienors.
Opinion of the Court, ante, at 14 n. 30. The opposition in the
House of Representatives focused largely on the Sherman
Amendment's attempt to impose a peacekeeping obligation on
municipalities when the Constitution itself imposed no such
affirmative duty and when many municipalities were not even
empowered under state law to maintain police forces. Ante,
at 20-22. 2
The Court correctly rejects a view of the legislative history
that would produce the anomalous result of immunizing local
government units from monetary liability for action directly
causing a constitutional deprivation, even though such actions
may be fully consistent with, and thus not remediable under,
state law. No conduct of government comes more clearly
within the "under color of" state law language of § 1983. It
is most unlikely that Congress intended public officials acting
under the command or the specific authorization of the gov2

If, in the view of House opponents, such as Representatives Poland,
Burchard and Willard, sec opinion of the Court, ante, at 20-21, a municipality obligated by state law to keep t.he pE'acr could be held liable for a
failure to provide equal protE'ction against private violE'ncc, it serms improbable that they would have opposed imposition of liability on a
municipality for the affirmative implementation of policies promulgated
within its proper sphere of operation under state law. Such liability is
premised not on a failure to take affirmative action in an area outside the
contemplation of the state-law charter, but on the consequences of activities actually undertaken within the scope of the powers conferred by
fj,tate law.
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ernment employer to be exclusively liable for resulting constitutional injury. 8
As elaborated in Part II of today's opinion, the rejection
of the Sherman Amendment can best be understood not as
evidence of Congress' acceptance of a rule of absolute municipal
immunity, but as a limitation of the statutory ambit to actual
wrongdoers, i. e., a rejection of respondeat superior or any
other principle of vicarious liability. Thus, a public official
may be held liable in damages when his actions are found to
violate a constitutional right and there is no qualified immunity, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 208 (1975); Procunier
v. Navarette, No. 76- 446, U. S. (1978). Similarly,
local government may have to answer in damages when
implementation of its official policies or established customs
inflicts the constitutional injury.

II
This Court traditionally has been hesitant to overrule prior
constructions of statutes or interpretations of common-law
rules. "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy," Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting), but this cautionary principle must give way
to comitervailing considerations in appropriate circumstances.4
8 The view taken today is consistent with the understanding of the
42d Congress that unless the context revealed a more limited definition,
"the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate. . . . " Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431. It also
accords with the interpretation given the same word when it was used by
Senator Sherman in the antitrust legislation of 1890 bearing his name.
See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., No. 76-864, U. S. (1978) (plurality opinion); Chatanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390,
396 (1906); cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, No. 76-749,- U.S.
(1978).
4 See, e. g., Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36
(1977); Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. R el. Cornm., 427 U.S. 132 (1976);
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky ., 410 U. S. 484 (1973);
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I concur in the Court's view that this is not a case where we
should "place on the shoulders of Congress the burden of the
Court's own error." Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61,
70 (1946).
Nor is this the usual case in which the Court is asked to
overrule a precedent. Here considerations of stare decisis cut
in both directions. On the one hand, we have a series of
rulings that municipalities and counties are not "persons" for
purposes of § 1983. In Monroe and its progeny, we have
answered a question that was never actually briefed or argued
in this Court--whether a municipality is liable in damages for
injuries that are the direct result of its official policies. "The
theory of the complaint [in Monroe was] that under the
circumstances [t]here alleged the City [was] liable for the acts
of its police officers, by virtue of respondeat superior." Brief
for Petitioners, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 21. 5 Respondents
answered that adoption of petitioners' position would expose
"Chicago and every other municipality in the United
States ... to Civil Rights liability through no action of its
own and based on action contrary to its own ordinances and
the laws of the state it is a part of [sic]." Brief for Respondents, supra, p. 26. Thus the ground of decision in Monroe
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88 (1971); Boy's Market v. Retail
Clerics Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U. S. 393, 406-407 n. 1 (1932) (Brandeis, J., di, enting).
5 The District Court in Monroe ruled in the municipalit.y's favor, stating: "since the liability of the City of Chicago is based on the doctrine
of respondeat superior, and since I have already held that the complaint
fails to state a claim for relief against the agents of the city, there is no
claim for relief against the city itself." Record, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 30.
The Court of Appeals affirmed for the same reason. 272 F. 2d 365-366
(CA7 1959).
Petitioners in this Court also offered an alternative argument that the
city of Chicago was a "person" for purposes of § 1983, Brief for Petitioners, 0. T. 1960, No. 39, p. 25, but the underlying theory of municipal
liability remained one of respondeat superior.
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was not advanced by either party and was broader than
necessary to resolve the contentions made in that case. 6
Similarly, in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693
(1973), petitioners asserted that "the County was vicariously
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., at 696, under
42 U. S. C. § 1988. In rejecting this vicarious-liability claim,
id., at 710, and n. 27, we reaffirmed Monroe's reading of the
statute, but there was no challenge in that case to "the holding
in Monroe concerning the status under§ 1983 of public entities
such as the County," id., at 700; Brief for Petitioners, 0. T.
1972,~0. 72-10,p.9.
Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507 (1973),
did the Court confront a § 1983 claim based on conduct that
was both authorized under state law and the direct cause of
the claimed constitutiohal injury. But in Kenosha we raised
the issue of the city>s am~nability to suit under § 1983 on our
own initiative. 7
But this line of cases-from Monroe to Kenoshar-is difficult
to reconcile on a principled basis with a parallel series of cases
in which the Court ·has assumed sub silentio that some local
government entities could be sued under § 1983. If now, after
full consideration of the question, we continue to adhere to
Monroe, grave doubt would be cast upon the Court's exercise
of § 1983 jurisdiction. Since "the principle of blanket immu'6 We owe somewhat less de!ere'tlce to a decision that was rendered without benefit of a full airing of a'!! t1Ie relevant considerations The fact that
until this case the Court has not had to confront squarely the consequences
''of holding § 1983 inapplicable to official municipal policies may be considered in assessing the quality of the precedent that we are asked to
re-examine.
7 In Alainger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976), we reaffirmed Monroe,
but petitioner did not contest the proposition that counties were excluded
from the reach of § 1983 under Monroe, id., at 16, and thr question before
us concerned the scope of pendent-party jurisdiction with respect to a
state-law claim. Similarly, the parties in Mt. Ilealthy City Board of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), did not seek a re-examination of our ruling
in Monroe.

.·
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nity established in Monroe cannot be cabined short of school
boards," ante, at 36, the conflict is squarely presented.
Although there was an independent basis of jurisdiction in
many of the school board cases because of the inclusion of
individual public officials as nominal parties, the opinions of
this Court make explicit reference to the school board party,
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded, see,
e. g., Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-439,
441-442 (1968); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 292-29·3
(1977) (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). And, as
the Court points out, ante, at 3&--39, Congress has focused
specifically on this Court's school board decisions in several
statutes. Thus the exercise of § 1983 jurisdiction over school
boards, while perhaps not premised on considered holdings, has
been longstanding. Indeed, it predated Monroe.
Even if one attempts to explain away the school board
decisions as involving suits which "may be maintained against
board members in their official capacities for injunctive relief
vnder either§ 1983 or Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),"
Hissenting opinion of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, post, at 3 n. 2,
some difficulty remains in rationalizing the relevant body of
precedents. At least two of the school board cases involved
claims for monetary relief. Cohen v. Chesterfield County
School Board, 326 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (ED Va. 1971) , rev'd,
474 F. 2d 395 (CA4 1973) , rev'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Tinker
v. Des Moines School Dist. , 393 U. S. 503, 504 (1969). See
also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,445 (1973). Although the
point was not squarely presented in this Court, these claims
for damages could not have been maintained in officialcapacity suits if the government entity were not itself suable.
Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 8 Moreover, the
8 To the extent that the complaints in those cases asserted claims
against the individual defendants in their personal capacity, as well as
official capacity, the Court would have had authority to award the relief
requested. There is no suggestion in the opinions, however, that the
practices at issue were anything other than official, duly authorized policies.
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rationale of Kenosha would have to be disturbed, to avoid
closing all avenues under § 1983 to injunctive relief against
constitutional violations by local government. The Court of
Appeals in this case suggested that we import, by analogy, the
Eleventh Amendment "fiction" of Ex parte Young into§ 1983,
532 F. 2d 259,264-266 (CA2 1976). That approach, however,
would create tension with Kenosha because it would require "a
bifurcated application" of "the generic word 'person' in§ 1983"
to public officials "depending on the nature of the relief sought
against them." 412 U. S., at 513. A public official sued in
his official capacity for carrying out official policy would be a
"person" for purposes of injunctive relief, but a non-"person"
in an action for damages. The Court's holding avoids this
difficulty. See ante, at 30 n. 55.
Finally, if we continued to adhere to a rule of absolute
municipal immunity under § 1983, we could not long avoid the
question whether "we should, by analogy to our decision in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388
(1971), imply a cause of action directly from the Fourteenth
Amendment which would not be subject to the limitations
contained in § 1983. . . . " Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 278 (1977). One aspect of that inquiry
would be whether there are any "special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress,"
Bivens, supra, at 396, such as an "explicit congressional
declaration that persons injured by a [municipality] may not
recover money damages ... , but must instead be remitted
to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress,"
id., at 397. In light of the Court's persuasive re-examination in
today's decision of the 1871 debates, I would have difficulty
inferring from § 1983 "an explicit congressional declaration"
against municipal liability for the implementation of official
policies in violation of the Constitution. Rather than constitutionalize a cause of action against local government entities
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that Congress intended to create in 1871, the better course is to
confess error and set the record straight, as the Court does
today. 9

III
Difficult questions nevertheless remain for another day.
There are substantial line-drawing problems in determining
"when execution of a government's policy or custom" can be
said to inflict constitutional injury such that "government as
an entity is responsible under § 1983." Opinion for the Court,
ante, at 34. This case, however, involves formal, written
policies of a municipal department and school board; it is the
clear case. The Court also reserves decision on the availability
of a qualified municipal immunity. Ante, at 41. Initial resolution of the question whether the protection available at
common law for municipal corporations, see dissenting opinion
of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, post, at 6-7, or other principles
support a qualified municipal immunity in the context of the
_§ 1983 damages action, is left to the lower federal courts.

ll MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST's dissent makes a strong argument that
·"[s]ince Monroe, municipalities have had the right to expect that they
would not be liable retroactively for their officers' failure to predict this
Court's recognition of new constitutional rights ." Post, at 4. But it
reasonably may be assumed that most municipalities already indemnify
officials sued for conduct within the scope of their authority, a policy that
furthers the important interest of attracting and retaining competent
officers, board members anct employees. In any event, the possibility of
a qualified immunity, as to which we reserve decision, may remove some of
,the harshness of liability for good-faith failure to predict the often uncer,tain course of constitutional adjudication.
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
Seventeen years ago, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167
(1961), this Court held that the 42d Congress did not intend
to subject a municipal corporation to liability as a "person"
within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Since then, the
Congress has remained silent, but this Court has reaffirmed
that holding on at least three separate occasions. Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412
U. S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693
(1973). See also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429
U. S. 274, 277-279 (1977). Today, the Court abandons this
loug and consistent line of precedents. offering in justification
only an elaborate canvass of the same legislative history which
was before the Court in 1961. and a single footnote, ante, at
31 u. 57, brushing aside the doctrine of stare decisis. Because
I cannot agree that this Court is "free to disregard these
precedents," which have been "considered maturely and recently" by this Court, Runyon v. McCrary, 426 U.S. 160. 186
(1976) (PoWELL, J., concurring), I am compelled to dissent.

I
As this Court has repeatedly recognized, Runyon, supra, at
175 n. 12; Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 671 n. 14 (1974),
considerations of stare decis1.c; are at their strongest when this
Court confronts its previous constructions of legislation. In
all cases, private parties shape their conduct according to this

75-1914-DISSENT
~

MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Court's settled construction of the law. but the Congress is at
liberty to correct our mistak('s of statutory construction. unlike
our constitutional interpretations, whenever it sees fit. The
controlling principles were best stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis:
"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is
commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.
But in cases involving the Federal Constitution. where
correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions."
Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 39a, 406407 (1932) (dissentiug opinion) (footnotes omitted).
Only the most compelling circumstances can justify this
Court's abandonment of such firmly established statutory
precedents. The best exposition of the proper burden of persuasion was delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan in Monroe itself:
"From my point of view. the policy of stare decisis, as
it should be applied in matters of statutory construction,
and, to a lesser extent, the indications of congressional
acceptance of this Court's earlier interpretation. require
that it appear beyond doubt from the legislative history
of the 1871 statute that Classic [v. United States, 313
U. S. 299 (1941)] and Screws [ v. United States, 325 U. S.
91 ( 1945)] misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision, before a departure from what was decided
in those cases would be justified." Monroe, supra, at 192
(concurring opinion) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).
The Court does not suggest that this standard has been
satisfied. but rather implies that in certain circumstances it
need not be applied. Ante, at 31 n. 57. The cases relied upon
by the Court are manifestly inapposite. In Girouard v. United
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States, 328 U. S. 61. 70 (1946), the Court explicitly noted that
"the affirmative action taken by Congress in 1942 negatives
any inference that might otherwise be drawn from its silence."
By contrast, the Court today points to no affirmative action of
the Congress which is in any way inconsistent with the holding
in Monroe. Likewise, in Continental T. V., Inc. v. G. 'P. E.
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977), the Court overruled a
recent precedent which was inconsistent with an established
line of earlier cases. The Court acknowledged that it need not
adhere "to the latest decision, however recent or questionable,
when such adherence involves co'llision with a prior doctrine
more embracing in its scope. intrinsically sounder, and verified
by experience." /d., at 58 11. 30, quoting Helvering v. Hallock,
'309 U. S. 106, 119 (1940). The Court today does not, and
indeed cannot, suggest that Monroe is in any way inconsistent
with previously established authority.
Most disturbing. howevf'r, is the Court's suggestion that it
has some special competence to devise principles of law in the
field of civil rights legislation. As the'Court's citations suggest. ante, at 31 n. 57, we have exercised such authority in the
fields of admiralty and labor law. In admiralty. such a practice
is appropriate. because "the Judiciary has traditionally taken
the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law
maritime, and 'Congress has largely left to this Court the
responsibility for fashioniug the controlling rules of admiralty
law.' " United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397,
409 (1975), quoting Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, Co., 374
U. S. 16, 20 (1963). Even in this field. the will of Congres~,
where expressed. is controlling. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, No. 76-1726. Likewise, this Court has undertaken
to fashion substantive principles of labor law only because
"Congress has indicated by § 301 (a) [29 U. S. C. § 185 (a)]
the purpose to follow that course." Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448.457 (1957).
:I t is simply impossible to maintain that the 42d Congres!
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indicated any purpose to follow such a course in the construction of § 1983. It beggars the imagination to suppose that
the same Reconstruction legislators who had proposed the
Fourteenth Amendment for the purpose of overturning this
Court's decision in 'Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), see
Afroyim v. 'Rusk, 387 U. S. 253, 284-285 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), and who truncated this Court's jurisdiction for the
purpose of protecting their own legislative authority, Ex parte
McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869), ever intended that we "take[]
.upon ourselves, without guidance from Congress, to construe
the broad language of § 1983 in light of its history, reason, and
purpose." Ante, at 31 n. 57. The 42d Congress intended this
Court to implement the congressional will, and nothing else.
Indeed, in all of our cases defining the scope of immunity
under § 1983, we ha.ve explicitly ende;:tvored to be guided by
the intent of that Congress. In our earliest effort, Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), we examined the state of the
common law of legislative immunity as it existed in 1871,
and concluded, "We cannot believe that Congress-itself a
staunch advocate of legislative freedom-would impinge on a
tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert
inclusion in the general language before us." I d., at 376.
Likewise, in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-555 (1967), we
observed, "The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial
role is equally well established, and we presume that Congress
would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish
the doctrine." We went on to recognize a defense of good
faith and probable cause in favor of police officers making an
arrest because it was " [ p] art of the background of tort liability" in the context of which the 42d Congress had legislated.
!d., at 556. The Court later recognized a similar defense for
other executive officers in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232
(1974), without any suggestion that we were exercising any
special competence of our own to shape the substantive law.
Indeed, we have Qnly recently rejected such an invitation t,o,
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fashion a federal common law of civil rights remedies m
Robertson v. Wegmann, No. 77-178.
Thus, our only task is to discern the intent of the 42d
Congress. That intent was first expounded in Monroe, and it
has been followed consistently ever since. This is not some
esoteric branch of the law in which congressional silence might
reasonably be equated with congressional indifference. Indeed, this very year, the Senate has been holding hearings on
a bill, S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which would remove
the municipal immunity recognized by Monroe. 124 Cong .
.Rec. Dl17 (daily ed. Feb. 8. 1978). In these circumstances, it
cannot be disputed that established principles of stare decisis
require this Court to pay the highest degree of deference to its
prior holdings. Monroe may not be overruled unless it has
been demonstrated "beyond doubt from the legislative history
of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision." Monroe, supra, at 192
(Harlan, J., concurring). [am satisfied that no such showing
has been made ..
II
Any analysis of the meaning of the word "person" in ~ 1983,
which was originally enacted as '§ 1 of the Ku Klux Act of
April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 1'3, must begin, not with the Shermau Amendment, but with the Dictionary Act. The latter
Act. which supplied rules of construction for all legislation,
provided:
"That in all acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person'
may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . . . unless the context shows that such words
were intended to be used in a more limited sense ...."
Act of Feb. 25, 1871. ch. 71, ~ 2, 16 Stat. 431.
The Act expressly provided that corporations need not be included within the scope of the word "person" where the context suggests a more limited reach. Not a word in the legis-
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lative history of the Act gives any indication of the contexts
in which Congress· felt it appropriate to include a corporation
as a person. Indeed, the chief cause of concern was that the
Act's provision that "words importing the masculine gender
may be applied to females," might lead to an inadvertent
·extension of the suffrage to women. C01ig. Globe, 41st Cong.,
3d Sess., 777 (remarks of Sen. Sawyer).
There are other factors, however, which suggest that the
Congress which enacted § 1983 may well have intended the
word "person" "to be used in a more. limited sense," as Monroe
concluded. It is true that this 'Court had held that both
commercial corporations, Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2. How.
497, 558 ( 1844), and municipal corporations, Cowles v. Mercer
·County, 7 Wall. 118, 121 (1869), were "citizens" of a State
within the meaning of the jurisdictional provisions of Art. III.
Congress, however, also knew that this label did not apply
. in all contexts, since this Court, in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall.
168 ( 1868), had held commercial corporations not to be "citizens" within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, U. S. COnst., Art. IV, § 2. Thus, the Congress surely
knew that, for constitutional purposes, corporations generally
enjoyed a different status in different contexts. Indeed, it
may be presumed that Congress intended that a corporation
should enjoy the same status under the Ku Klux Act as it
did under the Fourteenth Amendment, since it had been assured that § 1 "was so very simple and really reenacting the
Constitution." Cong. Globe , 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 569 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). At the time § 1983 was enacted
the only federal case to consider the status of corporations
under the Fourteenth Amendment had concluded, with impeccable logic, that a corporation was neither a "citizen" nor
a "person." Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67
(C. C. D. La. 1870) (No. 7,052) .
Furthermore, the state courts did not speak with a single
voice with regard to the tort liability of municipal corporations. Although many Members of Congress represented
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States which had retained absolute municipal tort immunity,
see, e. g., Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E.
228 (1911) (collecting earlier cases), other States had adopted
the currently predominant distinction imposing liability for
proprietary acts, see generally 2 F. ~arper & F. James, The
Law of Torts§ 29.6 (1956), as early as 1842. Bailey v. City of
New York, 3 Hill 531 (N. Y. 1842). Nevertheless, no state
court had ever held that municipal corporations were always
liable in tort in precisely the same manner as other persons.
Thus. it ought not lightly to be presumed, as the Court
does today. ante, at 28 n. 53. that § 1983 "should prima facie
be construed to include 'bodies politic' among the entities
that could be sued." Neither the Dictionary Act, the ambivalent state of judicial decisions, nor the floor debate on § 1
of the Act give any indication that any Member of Congress
h~:~-cl any inkling that § 1 could be u'sed to impose liability on
municipalities. Although Senator Thurman, as the Court
emphasizes, ante, at 25 n. 45. expressed his belief that the
terms of § 1 "are as comprehensive as can be used,"* Cong.
Globe. 42d Cong.. 1st Sess., App .. 217. an examination of
his lengthy remarks demonstrates that it never occurred to
him that § 1 did impose or could have imposed any liability
upon municipal corporations. In an extended parade of horribles, this "old Roman," \vho was one of the Act's most implacable opponeuts. suggested that state legislatures, Members
of Congress, and state judges might be held liable under the
*Senator Thurmnn'b fear,.; notwith~tanding, this Court has squarely
rrjrrted thr virw that ·'f'onp;n•;;;: in rnacting § 1 intended to exercise the
entirrty of its powrr to rnforrr § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ante,
at 24. We have prrYiou,.;[~· !wid in Fitzpat1·ick ,.. Bitze1', 427 U. S. 445
(l97o). th:1t Congrr"" ha;: the powrr to authorize ;;nits for damages again.\lt
the Stntr,.;, but wr haw likP\\'I,:r }l('kl, in Edelnum v. Jol'dan, 415 U.S. 651,
67..J.-677 (1974), tlwt Congrr,.;,: rh([ not intPnd to rxerci;;r that power in
Pnacting § 1983. SeP Fitzpatrick. supm, at 451-452 . The~c recent precede'qt,.; rlr~rribing t \tr limited rrneh of § 1983 further undermine today's
J':H'iiP a:,;sumption that the tl'l'm " per,.;on '' wa::; intended to include "bodies
politic."
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Act. Ibid. lf, at that point in the debate, he had any idea
that ~ 1 was desiglled to impose tort liability upon cities and
counties, he would surely have raised an additional outraged
objection. Only once was that possibility placed squarely
before the Congress-in its cousideration of the Sherman
Amendment-and the Congress squarely rejected it.
The Court is probably correct that the rejection of the
Sherman Amendment does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that Congress intended municipalities to be immune from
liability under all circumstances. Nevertheless. it cannot be
denied that the debate on that Amendment, the only explicit
consideration of municipal tort liability. sheds considerable
light on the Congress' understanding of the status of municipal
corporations in that context. Opponents of the Amendment
were well aware that municipalities had been subjected to the
.iurisdiction of the federal courts in the context of suits to
enforce their contracts. Cong. Globe. 42d Cong .. 1st Sess., 789
(remarks of Rep. Kerr), but they expressed their skepticism
that such jurisdiction should be exercised in cases sounding in
tort :
"Suppose a judgment obtained under this section, and
no property can be found to levy upon except the courthouse, can we levy on the court-house and sell it? So
this section provides, and that too in an action of tort, in
an action ex delicto, where the county has never entered
into any contract, where the State has never authorized
the county to assume any___liability of the sort, or imposed
any liability upon it. It is in my opinion simply absurd."
I d., at 799 (remarks of Rep. 'F arnsworth).
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against it, the fact remains that Congress rejected the concept
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thus the reasoning of Monroe on this point is subject to challenge. The meaning of ~ 1 of the Act of 1871 has been
subjected in this case to a more searching and careful analysis
than it was in Monroe, and it ma.y well be that on the basis of
this closer analysis of the legislative debates a conclusion
contrary to the Monroe holding could have been reached
when that case was decided 17 years ago. But the rejection
of the Sherman Amendment remains instructive in that here
alone did the legislative debates squarely focus on the liability
of municipal corporatio11s. and that liability was rejected.
Any inference which might be drawn from the Dictionary Act
or from general expressious of benevolence in the debate on
§ 1 that the word "persou'' was intended to include municipal
corporations falls far short of showing "beyond doubt'' that
this Court in Monroe "misapprehended the meaning of the
controlling provision." Errors such as the Court may have
fallen in to in Monroe do not end the inquiry as to stare decisis;
they merely begin it. I would adhere to the holding of Monroe
as to the liability of a muuicipal corporation § 1983.

III
The Court is quite correct that we need not determine today
whether municipalities enjoy a more limited immunity under
§ 1983 now that the absolute immunity recognized by Monroe
has been abrogated. The Court of Appeals, however, will be
required to face this issue squarely on remand. Since the
Court has offered gratuitous guidance in this regard, I feel
obliged to point out the manner in which its approach differs
from that of our earlier cases.
As I ha.ve already pointed out, supra, at 4-5, this Court has
consistently recognized that its task in considering claims of
official immunity is "one essentially of statutory construction."
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308. 316 (1975). The Court of
Appeals must examine the congressional debates and reach its
conclusion on the basis of "the background of tort liability."
PiersarD. gupra;, at 556, as it existed at the time § 1983 was

r
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enacted. Thus, it is utterly irrelevant that the doctrine of
municipal immunity" '[flor well over a century . . . has been
subjected to vigorous criticism,'" Ante, at 37 (citation
omitted) . The Court of Appeals ought not to consider "'the
trend of judicial decisions,' " ante, at 37 n. 65 (citation
omitted) , but must direct its attention to the intent of the
Congress in 1871. In this regard. the Court's conclusion today
tha.t the Congress drew no distinction between a municipal government and its officers, ante, at 21, should not escape notice.

IV
The decision in Monroe v. Pape, was the fountainhead of
the torrent of civil rights litigation of the last 17 years. Using
§ 1983 as a vehicle, the courts have articulated new and previously unforseeable interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendments. · At the same time, the doctrine of municipal immunity
enunciated in Monroe has protected municipalities and their
limited treasuries from the consequences of their officials'
failure to predict the course of this Court's constitutional
jurisprudence. None of the Members of this Court can foresee the practical consequences of today's removal of that
protection. Only the Congress. which has the benefit of the
advice of every segment of this diverse Nation, is equipped to
consider the results of such a drastic change in the law. It
seems all but inevitable that it will find it necessary to do so1
after today's decision .
l. wQuld affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeala.
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
Seventeen years ago, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167
(1961), this Court held that the 42d Congress did not intend
to subject a municipal corporation to liability as a "person"
within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Since then , the
Congress has remained silent, but this Court has rea.ffirmed
that holding on at least three separate occasions. Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412
U. S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U. S. 693
(1973). See also Mt. Hea.lthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429
U. S. 274, 277- 279 (1977). Today, the Court abandons this
long ru1d consistent line of precedents, offering in justification
0nly an elaborate canvass of the same legislative history which
was before the Court in 1961~ and a iiiugle £Qotnote, B;nte, at-81 n. 57, br~::~shiog aside tfie dedt iJJe ef...stare decisis.. Because
I cannot agree that this Court is "free to disregard these
precedents," which have been "considered maturely and recently" by this Court, Runyon v. McCrary, 426 U.S. 160, 186
(1976) (PowELL, J. , concurring), I am compelled to dissent.

I
As this Court has repeatedly recognized. Runyon, supra, at
175 n. 12; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,671 n. 14 (1974),
considerations of stare decisis are at their strongest when this
Court confronts its previous constructions of legislation. In
all cases, private parties shape their conduct according to this
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Court's settled construction of the law, but the Congress is at
liberty to correct our mistakes of statutory construction, unlike
our constitutional interpretations, whenever it sees fit. The
controlling principles were best stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis:
"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is
commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.
But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where
correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions."
Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406407 (1932) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted).
Only the most compelling circumstances can justify this
Court's abandonment of such firmly established statutory
precedents. The best exposition of the proper burden of persuasion was delivered by Mr. Justice Ha.rlan in ·Monroe itself:
"From my point of view, the policy of stare decisis, as
it should be applied in matters of statutory construction,
and, to a lesser extent, the indications of congressional
acceptance of this Court's earlier interpretation. require
that it appear beyond doubt from the legislative history
of the 1871 statute that Classic [ v. United States, 313
U. S. 299 (1941)] and Screws [v. United States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945)] misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision , before a departure from what was decided
in those cases would be justified." Monroe, supra, at 192
(concurring opinion) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added) .
The Court does not demonstrate that any exception to this
general rule is properly applicable here. The Court's first
assertion , that Monroe "was a departure from prior practice,"
<;tnte, at 35, is patently ~rroneous. Neither in Douglas v. City
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of Jea.n nette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943), nor in Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879 ( 1955), nor in any of the school board
cases cited by the Court, ante, at 3-4, n. 5, was the question
now before us raised by any of the litigants or addressed by
this Court. As recently as four Terms a.go, we said in Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974):
"Moreover, when questions ,of jurisdiction have been
passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when the case finally brings
the jurisdictional issue before us." I d., at 535 n. 5.
The source of this doctrine that jurisdictional issues decided
sub silentio are not binding in other cases seems to be Chief
Justice Marshall's remark in United States v. More, 3 Cranch
159, 172 (1805). 1 While the Chief Justice also said that such
decisions may "have much weight, as they show that this point
neither occurred to the bar or the bench," Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61. 88 (1809), unconsidered
assumptions of jurisdiction simply cannot outweigh four consistent decisions of this Court, explicitly considering and
rejecting that j urisdiction.
Nor is there any indication that any later Congress has ever
approved suit against any municipal corporation under § 1983.
Of all its recent enactments, only the Civil Rights Attorneys'
Fees Act, Pub. L. 94-559, ~ 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976), codified
at 42 U. S. C. § 1988. explicitly deals with the Civil Rights Act
of 1871. 2 The Act provides that attorneys' fees may be
As we pointed out in Mt. Healthy, the existence of n claim for relief
under § 1983 is "jurisdictional" for purposes of invoking 28 U. S. C. § 1343,
even though the exi~tencP of a meritorious constitutional claim is not
~imilarly required in order to invokP jurisdiction under 28 U, S. C. § 1331.
Seo Bell v. Hood, 327 U . S. 67H, 682 (1946); Mt. Healthy, supra, at
278-279 . •
2 The other statutes cited by thr Court, at 37-38, n. 65 make no mention
of § 1983, but refer general!~· to ::<uit::; against "a local educational agency ."
A::; noted by the Court of A]lJ)('al:;, 532 F. 2d 259, 264-266, such suits may
be maintained against board membrr::; in tht>ir official capacitirs for
1
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awarded to the prevailing party "[i] n any action or proceeding
to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983. 1985. and
1986 of this title." There is plainly no language in the 1976
Act which would enlarge the parties suable under those substantive sections; it simply provides that parties who are
already suable may be made liable for attorneys' fees. As the
Court admits, ante, at 39, the language in the Senate report
stating that liability may be imposed "whether or not the ~
agency or government is named as a party," S. Rep. No,
94-1101, at 5, suggests that Congress did not view its purpose
as being in any way inconsistent with the well-known holding
of Monroe.
The Court's assertion that municipalities have no right to
act "on an assumption that they can violate constitutional
rights indefinitely, ante, at 39, is simply beside the point.
Since Monroe, municipalities have had the right to expect that
they would not be held liable retroactively for their officer£
failure to predict th1s Court's recogmtwn of new constitutional
ri~s. No dou bt mnumera.ble mumCipal msurance pohc1es
at1aindemnity ordinances have been founded on this assumption, which is wholly justifiable under established principles of
stare decisis. To obliterate those legitimate expectations
without more compelling justification than those advanced
by the Court is a significant departure from our prior practice.
Thus, our only task is to discern the intent of the 42d
Congress. That intent was first expounded in Monroe, and it
has been followed consistently ' ever since. This is not some
esoteric branch of the law in which congressional silence might
reasonably be equated with congressional indifference. Indeed, this very year, the Senate has been holding hearings on
'injunctive relief under either § 1983 or Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123
( 1908). Congress did not stop to consider the technically propN avenue
of relief, but merely responded to the fact that relief was being granted.
The practical result of choof;ing the avenue suggested by petitioners would
br thr subjection of srhool corporations to liability in damages. Nothin~
)n rrcent congressional 'hj~a,ry even remotely supports such a result.
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a bill, S. 35, 95th Con g. , 1st Sess. ( 1977) , which would remove
the municipal immunity recognized by Monroe. 124 Cong.
Rec. D117 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1978). In these circumstances, it
cannot be disputed that established principles of stare decisis
require this Court to pay the highest degree of deference to its
prior holdings. Monroe may not be overruled unless it has
been demonstrated "beyond doubt from the legislative history
of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision." Monroe, supra, at 192
(Harlan , J., concurring). The Court must show not only that
Congress, in rejecting the Sherman Amendment, concluded
that municipal liability was not unconstitutional, but also that,
in enacting § 1, it intended to impose that liability. I am
satisfied that no such showing has been made.

II
Any analysis of the meaning of the word "person" in § 1983,
which was originally enacted as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act of
April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, must begin, not with the Sherman Amendment, but with the Dictionary Act. The latter
Act, which supplied n,J.les of construction for all legislation,
provided :
"That in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word 'person'
may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . . . unless the context shows that such words
were intended to be used in a more limited sense ...."
Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
The Act expressly provided that corporations need not be included within the scope of tbe word "person" where the context suggests a more limited reach. Not a word in the legislative history of the Act gives any indication of the contexts
in which Congress felt it appropriate to include a corporation
as a person. Indeed, the chief cause of concern was that the
Act's provision that "words importing the masculine gender
may be applied to females," might lead to an inadvertent
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extension of the suffrage to women. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong.,
3d Sess., 777 (remarks of Sen. Sawyer).
There are other factors, however, which suggest that the
Congress which enacted § 1983 may well have intended the
word "person" "to be used in a more limited sense," as Monroe
concluded. It is true that this Court had held that both
commercial corporations, Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2. How.
497, 558 (1844), and municipal corporations, Cowles v. Mercer
County, 7 Wall. 118, 121 (1869), were "citizens" of a State
within the meaning of the jurisdictional provisions of Art. III.
Congress, however, also knew that this label did not apply
in all contexts, since this Court, in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall.
168 (1868), had held commercial corporations not to be "citizens" within the meaning of the Privileges and Imrrrunities
Clause, U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2. Thus, the Congress surely
knew that, for constitutional purposes, corporations generally
enjoyed a different status in different contexts. Indeed, it
may be presumed that Congress intended that a corporation
should enjoy the same status under the Ku Klux Act as it
did under the Fourteenth Amendment, since it had been assured that § 1 "was so very simple and really reenacting the
Constitution." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 569 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). At the time § 1983 was enacted
the only federal case to consider the status of corporations
under the Fourteenth Amendment had concluded, with impeccable logic, that a corporation was neither a "citizen" nor
a "person." Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67
(C. C. D. La. 1870) (No. 7,052).
Furthermore, the state courts did not speak with a single
voice with regard to the tort liability of municipal corporations. Although many Members of Congress represented
States which had retained absolute municipal tort immunity,
see, e. g., Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E.
228 ( 1911) (collecting earlier cases), other States had adopted
the currently predominant distinction imposing liability for
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proprietary acts, see generally 2 F. Harper & F. James, The
Law of Torts§ 29.6 (1956), as early as 1842, Bailey v. City of
New York, 3 Hill 531 (N. Y. 1842). Nevertheless, no state
court had ever held that municipal corporations were always
liable in tort in precisely the same manner as other persons.
The general remarks from the floor on the libeml purposes
of § 1 offer no explicit guidance as to the parties against whom
the remedy could be enforced. As the Court concedes, only
Representative Bingham raised a concern which could be
satisfied only by relief against governmental bodies. Yet he
never directly related this concern to § 1 of the Act. Indeed,
Bingham sta.ted at the outset, "I do not propose now to discuss
the provisions of the bill in detail," Cong. Globe, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess., App. 82, and, true to his word, he launched into an
extended discourse on tl1e beneficent purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. While Bingham clearly stated that Congress could "provide that no citizen in a.ny State should be
deprived of his property by State law or the judgment of a
State court without just compensation therefor," id., at 85, he
never suggested that such a power was exercised in § 1. 3
Finally, while Bingham has often been advanced as the chief
expositor of the Fourteenth Amendment, Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145. 165 (1968) (Black, J .. concurring); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46. 73-74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting),
there is nothing to indicate that his colleagues placed a.ny
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an has not b('{'ll genrrally thought, before todny, that§ 1983 provided an
nvennc of relief from uncon:;titnt.iona.l takings. Thot<f' f<'deral courts which
have granted romprnsation against ,·tate and local governments have
I'!'.~ort rd i o an implied right. of action under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amrndments. Richmond Elks Hall Assn. v. Richmond Redevelopment
AgPnry, 561 F . 2d 1:~27 (CA9 1977) , aff'g 389 F. Supp. 486 (ND Cal.
1975) ; Fostn v. City of Detroit, 405 F. 2d 138, 140 (CA6 1968). Since
thr C'ourt t.odity abandons the holding of Monroe chiefly on the strength
of Bingham '~ argumPnt~, it is indef'd anomalou::; thnt § Hl8:1 will provide
tPlief only when n local government, not the State itself, seizes private
propcrt.y. S<'C ante, at 29 n, 54, citing Edelman, supra..
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greater credence in his theories than has this Court. See
Duncan, supra, at 174-176 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Adamson,
supra, at 64 (Frankfurter. J., concurring).
Thus. it ought not lightly to be presumed, as the Court
does today, ante, at 29 n. 53, that § 1983 "should prima facie
be construed to include 'bodies politic' among the entities
that could be sued." Neither the Dictionary Act. the ambivalent state of judicial decisions, nor the floor debate 011 § 1
of the Act give any indication that any Member of Congress
had any inkling that § 1 could be used to impose liability on
municipalities. Although Senator Thurman, as the Court
emphasizes, ante, at 25 n. 45, expressed his belief that the
terms of § 1 "are as comprehensive as can be used," Cong.
Globe. 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., 217, an examination of
his lengthy remarks demonstrates that it never occurred to
him that § 1 did impose or could ha.ve imposed any liability
upon municipal corporations. In an extended parade of horribles, this "old Roman." who was one of the Act's most implacable opponents. suggested that state legislatures, Members
of Congress, and state judges might be held liable under the
Act. Ibid. If, at that point in the debate. he had any idea
that § 1 was designed to impose tort liability upon cities and
counties, he would surely ha.ve raised an additional outraged
objection. Only once was that possibility placed squarely
before the Congress-in its consideration of the Sherman
Amendment-and the Congress squarely rejected it.
The Court is probably correct that the rejection of the
Sherman Amendment does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that Congress intended municipalities to be immune from
liability under all circumstances. Nevertheless, it cannot be
denied that the debate on that Amendment, the only explicit
consideration of municipal tort liability. sheds considerable
light on the Congress' understanding of the status of municipal
corporations in that context. Opponents of the Amendment
were well aware that municipalities had be n subjected to the

I
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jurisdiction of the federal courts in the context of suits to
enforce their contracts. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong .. 1st Sess., 789
(remarks of Rep. Kerr), but they expressed their skepticism
that such jurisdiction should be exercised in cases sounding in
tort:
"Suppose a judgment obtained under this section, and
no property' can be found to levy upon except the courthouse, can we levy on the court-house and sell it? So
this section provides, and that too in an action of tort, in
an action ex delicto, where the county has never entered
into any contract, where the State has never authorized
the county to assume any liability of the sort, or imposed
any liability upon it. It is in my opinion simply absurd."
!d., a.t 799 (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth).
Whatever the merits of the constitutional arguments raised
against it, the fact rema.ins that Congress rejected the concept
of municipal tort liability on the only occasion in which the
question was explicitly presented. Admittedly this fact is not
conclusive as to whether Congress intended § 1 to embra.ce a
municipal corporation within the meaning of "person." and
thus the reasoning of Monroe on this point is subject to challenge. The meaning of § 1 of the Act of 1871 has been
subjected in this case to a more searching and careful analysis
than it was in Monroe, and it ma.y well be that on the basis of
this closer analysis of the legislative debates a conclusion
contrary to the Monroe holding could have been reached
when that case was decided 17 years ago. But the rejection
of the Sherman Amendment remains instructive in that here
alone did the legislative debates squarely focus on the liability
of municipal corporations, and that liability was rejected.
Any inference which might be drawn from the Dictionary Act
or from general expressions of benevolence in the debate on
§ 1 that the word "person" was intended to include municipal
corporations falls far short of showing "beyond doubt'' that
this Court in Monro~ "misapprehended the mea11ing of the
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Errors such as the Court may have
fallen into in Monroe do not end the inquiry as to stare decisis;
they merely begin it. I would adhere to the holding of Monroe
as to the liability of a municipal corporation § 1983.

III
The decision in Monroe v. Pape, was the fountainhead of
the torrent of civil rights litigation of the last 17 years. Using
§ 1983 as a vehicle, the courts have articulated new and previ()usly unforseeable interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendments. At the same time, the doctrine of municipal immunity
enunciated in Monroe has protected municipalities and their
limited treasuries from the consequences of their officials'
failure to predict the course of this Court's constitutional
jurisprudence. None of the Members of this Court can foresee the practical consequences of today's removal of that
protection. Only the Congress, which has the benefit of the
advice of every segment of this diverse Nation, is equipped to
consider the results of such a drastic change in the law. It
seems all but inevitable that it will find it necessary to do so
after today's decision.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powel l
Mr. Justice Stevens
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i[April - , 19:78]
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
Seventeen years ago, in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167
(1961), this Court held that the 42d Congress did not intend
to subject a municipal corporation to liability as a "person"
within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Since then, the
Congress has remained silent, but this Court has rea.ffirmed
that holding on at least three separate occasions. Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U. S. 1 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412
U. S. 507 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693
(1973). See also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429
U. S. 274, 277-279 (1977). Today, the Court abandons this
long and consistent line of precedents, offering in justification
only an elaborate canvass of the same legislative history which
was before the Court in 1961. Because I cannot agree that
this Court is "free to disregard these precedents," which have
been "considered maturely and recently" by this Court.
Runyon v. McCrary, 426 U. S. 160, 186 (1976) (PowELL, J .•
concurring), I am compelled to dissent.

I
As this Court has repeatedly recognized, Runyon, supra, at
175 n. 12; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 n. 14 (1974),
considerations of stare decisis are at their strongest when this·
Court confronts its previous constructions of legislation. In
cases, private parties shape their conduct according to this

wl
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Court's settled construction of the law, but the Congress is at
liberty to correct our mistakes of statutory construction, unlike
our constitutional interpretations, whenever it sees fit. The
controlling principles were best stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis:
"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than tha.t it be settled right. . . . ·This is
·commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.
But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where
correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions."
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393. 406407 (1932) (dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted).
Only the most compelling circumstances can justify this
Court's abandonment of such firmly established statutory
precedents. The best exposition of the proper burden of per~
suasion was delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan in Monroe itself:
"From my point of view, the policy of stare decisis, as
it should be applied in matters of statutory construction,
and, to a lesser extent, the indications of congressional
acceptance of this Court's earlier interpretation, require
that it appear beyond doubt from the legislative history
of the 1871 statute that Classic [ v. United States, 313
U.S. 299 (1941)] and Screws [v. ·United States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945)] misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision, before a departure from what was decided
in those cases would be ·justified." Monroe, supra., at 19·2
(concurring opinion) (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added) .
The Court does not demonstrate that any exception to this·
general rule is properly applicable here. The Court's first
· assertion. that Monroe "was a departure from prior practice,'"
ante, at 35, is· patently erro11eous. Neither in Douglas v. Citw
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of Jea.nnette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943), nor in Holmes v. City of
Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955). nor in any of the school board
cases cited by the Court, ante, at 3-4, n. 5, was the question
now before us raised by any of the litigants or addressed by
this Court. As recently as four Terms ago, we said in Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 ( 1974) :
"Moreover, when questions of jurisdiction have been
passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when the case finally brings
the jurisdictional issue before us." I d., at 535 n. 5.
The source of this doctrine that jurisdictional issues decided
sub silentio are not binding in other cases seems to be Chief
Justice Marshall's remark in United States v. More, 3 Cranch
159, 172 (1805). 1 While the Chief Justice also said that such
decisions may "have much weight, as they show that this point
neither occurred to the bar or the bench." Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 88 (1809). unconsidered
assumptions of jurisdiction simply cannot outweigh four consistent decisions of this Court, explicitly considering and
rejecting that jurisdiction.
Nor is there any indication that any later Congress has ever
approved suit against any municipal corporation under § 1983.
Of all its recent enactments. only the Civil Rights Attorneys'
Fees Act. Pub. L. 94-559. § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976). codified
at 42 U. S. C. § 1988, explicitly deals with the Civil Rights Act
of 1871. 2 The Act provides that attorneys' fees may be
1 A;; we pointed out in Mt. Healthy. tlw rxi;;tencr of a claim for relief
under § 1983 i,.; "juri~dictional" for purpm;e:-; of invoking 2g U.S. C. § 1343,
even though the existencr of a meritoriom: constitutional daim i:;; not
similnrly required in or<ler to invokr juri~dirtion under 2S U. S. C. § 1331.
SeEI Bell v. Hood, :l27 U. S. 678, 682 (1946) ; }ft. Healthy, supra, a.t

278-279.
2
The other statutes e1ted hy thE' Court, at 37-39, n. 63 make no mention
of § 1983, but rE-fer generally to suit~ against "a local educational ngrncy.''
A::; notE'd by the Court of Appeal~, 5:32 F. 2d 25H, 264-266, ;;uch ;;uit;; ma.y
be maintained agninf't board uwmher:; in their official CllllacitiE>s for

"75-1914-DlSSENT

4:

MONELL v. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES

awarded to the prevailing party ''[i]n any action or proceeding
to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and
1986 of this title." There is plainly no language in the 1976
Act which would enlarge the parties suable under those substantive sections; it simply provides that parties who are
already suable may be made liable for attorneys' fees. As the
'Court admits, ante, at 39, the language in the Senate report
stating that liability may be imposed "whether or not the
agency or government is named as a. party," S. Rep. No.
94-1101, at 5, suggests that Congress did not view its purpose
as being in any way inconsistent with the well-known holding
of Monroe.
The Court's assertion that municipalities have no right to
act "on an assumption that they can violate constitutional
rights indefinitely," ante, a.t 40, is simply beside the point.
Since Monroe, municipalities have had the right to expect that
they would not be held liable retroactively for their officers
failure to predict this Court's recognition of new constitutional
rights. No doubt innumerable municipal insurance policies
arid indemnity ordinances have been founded on this assumption, which is wholly justifiable under established principles of
stare decisis. To obliterate those legitimate expectations
without more compe1ling justification than those advanced
by the Court is a significant departure from our prior practice.
I cannot agree with MR. Jus'l'ICE PowELL's view tha.t "[w]e
owe somewhat less deference to a decision that was rendered
without benefit of a full airing of all the relevant considerations." Ante, at 6 n. 6 (PowELL, J., concurring). Private
parties must be able to rely upon explicitly stated holdings
of this Court, without being obliged to peruse the briefs of
injunctive relief under either § 1983 or Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123
{1908). Congress did not stop to consider the technicaiiy proper avenue
of relief, but merely responded io the faet thnt. relief was being granted.
The practical result of choosing the nvcnue suggested by petitioners would
be the subjection of school corporn.t.ions to liability in damages. Nothing:
in recent congressional· history 1even remotely supports such a result.
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the litigants to predict the likelihood that this Court might
change its mind. To cast such doubt upon each of our cases,
from Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 ( 1803) , forward, in
which the explicit ground r;i decision "was never actually
briefed or argued." ante, at~ (PowELL. J., concurring), would
introduce intolerable uncertainty into the law. Indeed, in
Marbury itself, the argument of Charles Lee on behalf of the
applicants-which, unlike the arguments in Monroe, is reproduced in the Reports of this Court where anyone can see itdevotes not a word to the question of whether this Court
has the power to invalidate a statute duly enacted by the
Congress. Neither this ground of decision nor any other was
advanced by Secretary of State Madison, who evidently made
no appeara11ce. 1 Cranch, at 153-154. That Marbury and
countless other decisions retain their vitality despite their
obvious flaws is a necessa:ry by-product of the adversary system, in which both judges and the general public rely upon
litigants to present "all the relevant considerations." Ante,
at 6 n. 6 (PowELL, J., concurring). More recent landmark
decisions of this Court would appear to be likewise vulnerable
under my Brother PowELL's a.nalysis. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) , none of the parties requested the Court to
overrule Wolf v. Colorado, 335 U. S. 25 ( 1949) ; it did so only
at the request of an a.rnicus curiae. 367 U. S .. at 646 n. 3.
While it undoubtedly has more latitude in the field of constitutional interpretation, this Court is surely not free to
abandon settled statutory interpretation at any time a new
thought seems appealing.8
Thus, our only task is to discern the intent of the 42d
Congress. That intent was first expounded in Monroe, and it
3 T find it ~orne what ir·onic thnt, in abandoning the supposedly illronsiderecl holding of Monroe, m:v Brother PowELL relies hrnvily up oil
cases involving school boards, although he admits thnt " the exerci~;e of
§ 1983 juri ~;dietion . . . [was] perhaps not. premil:ied on con;,;idered holding:;." Ante, a t 7 (PowEt.r., J ., concurring) .
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has been followed consistently ever since. This is not some
~soteric branch of the law in which congressional silence might
t'easonably be equated with congressional indifference. Indeed, this very year, the Senate has been holding hearings on
a bill, S. 35, 95th Gong., 1st Sess. (1977), which would remove
the municipal immunity recognized by Monroe. 124 Cong.
Rec. D117 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1978). In these circumstances, it
cannot be disputed that established principles of stare decisis
require this Court to pay the highest degree of deference to its
prior holdings. Monroe may not be overruled unless it has
been demonstrated "beyond doubt from the legislative history
of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision." Monroe, supra, at 192
(Harlan, J., concurring). The Court must show not only that
Congress, in rejecting the Sherman Amendment, concluded
that municipal liability was not unconstitutional, but also that,
in enacting § 1, it intended to impose that liability. I am
satisfied that no such showing has been made.

II
Any analysis of the meaning of the word "person" in § 1983,
which was originally enacted as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act of
April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, must begin, not with the Sherman Amendment, but with the Dictionary Act. The latter
Act, which supplied rules of construction for all legislation,
provided :
"That in all acts hereafter passed ... the word 'person'
may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . . . unless the context shows that such words
were intended to be used -in a more limited sense .•.."
Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
'l'he Act expressly provided that corporations need not be included within the scope of the word "person" where the context suggests a more limited reach. Not a word in the legislative history of the Act gives any indication of the contexts
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in which Congress felt it appropriate to include a corporation
as a person. Indeed, the chief cause of concern was that the
Act's provision that "words importing the masculine gender
may be applied to females," might lead to an inadvertent
extension of the suffrage to women. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong.,
3d Sess., 777 (remarks of Sen. Sawyer) .
There are other factors, however, which suggest that the
Congress which enacted § 1983 may well have intended the
word "person" "to be used in a more limited sense," as Monroe
concluded. It is true that this Court had held that both
commercial corporations, Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2. How.
497, 558 (1844), and municipal corporations, Cowles v. Mercer
County, 7 Wall. 118, 121 (1869), were "citizens" of a State
within the meaning of the jurisdictional provisions of Art. III.
Congress, however, also knew that this label did not apply
in all contexts, silice this Court, in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall.
168 (1868), had held commercial corporations not to be "citizens" within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2. Thus, the Congress surely
knew that, for constitutional purposes, corporations generally
enjoyed a different status in different contexts. Indeed, it
may be presumed that Congress intended that a corporation
should enjoy the same status under the Ku Klux Act as it
did under the Fourteenth Amendment, since it had been assured that § 1 "was so very simple and really reenacting the
Constitution." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 569 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds) . At the time § 1983 was enacted
the only federal case to consider the status of corporations
under the Fourteenth Amendment had concluded, with impeccable logic, that a corpora.tion was neither a "citizen" nor
a "person." Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67
(C. C. D. La. 1870) (No. 7,052).
Furthermore, the state courts did not speak with a single
voice with regard to the tort liability of municipal corporations. Although many Members of Congress represented
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States which had retained absolute municipal tort immunity,
see, e. g., Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E.
228 ( 1911) (collecting earlier cases), other States had adopted
the currently predominant distinction imposing liability for
proprietary acts, see generally 2 F. Harper & F. James, The
Law of Torts§ 29.6 (1956), as early as 1842, Bailey v. City of
New York, 3 Hill 531 (N. Y. 1842). Nevertheless, no state
court had ever held that municipal corporations were always
liable in tort in precisely the same manner as other persons.
The general rema.rks from the floor on the liberal purposes
.of § 1 offer no explicit guidance as to the parties against whom
the remedy could be enforced. As the Court concedes, only
Representative Bingham raised a concern which could be
satisfied only by relief against governmental bodies. Yet he
·never directly related this concern to § 1 of the Act. Indeed,
Bingham stated at the outset, "I do not propose now to discuss
the provisions of the bill in detail," Cong. Globe, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess., App. 82, and, true to his word, he launched into an
extended discourse on the beneficent purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. While Bingham clearly sta.ted that Congress could "provide that no citizen in any State should be
deprived of his property by State law or the judgment of a
State court without just compensation therefor," id., at 85, he
never suggested that such a power was exercised in ~ 1.'
Finally, while Bingham has often been advanced as the chief
It ha~ not been generally thought, before tcday, that§ 1980 provided an
avenue of relief from unconstitut.iona.l takings. Those federal courts which
have granted compensation agaim;t. state and local governments have
rrsortrd to an implied right of action under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Richmond Elks Hall Assn. v. Richmond Redevelopme71t
Agenq;, 561 F. 2d 1327 (CA9 1977), a.ff'g 389 F. Supp. 486 (ND Cal.
1975); Foster v. City of Detrcrit, 405 F. 2d 138, 140 (CA6 1968). Since
the Court today abandons the holding of Monroe chiefly on the ::;trength
of Bingham's arguments, it is indeed anomalous that § 1983 will provide
relief only when a local government, not the State itself, seizes private
vropcrty. See ante, at 30 n. 54; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 /
{1976); Edelman, supra, n.t 674--677.
4
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expositor of the Fourteenth Amendment, Duncan v. Louisia,na,
391 U.S. 145, 165 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 73-74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting),
there is nothing to indicate that his colleagues placed any
greater credence in his theories than has this Court. See
Duncan, supra, at 174--176 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Adamson,
supra, at 64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Thus, it ought not lightly to be presumed, as the Court
does today. ante, at 30 n. 53, that ~ 1983 "should prima facie
be construed to include 'bodies politic' among the entities
that could be sued." Neither the Dictionary Act, the ambiva.lent state of judicial decisions, nor the floor debate on § 1
of the Act give any indication that any Member of Congress
had any inkling that § 1 could be used to impose liability on
municipalities. Although Senator Thurman, as the Court
emphasizes, ante, at 26 n. 45. expressed his belief tha.t the
terms of § 1 "are as comprehensive as can be used," Cong.
Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., 217, an examination of
his lengthy remarks demonstrates that it never occurred to
him that § 1 did impose or could have imposed any liability
upon municipal corporations. In an extended parade of horribles, this "old Roman," who was one of the Act's most implacable opponents, suggested that state legislatures, Members
of Congress, and state judges might be held liable under the
Act. Ibid. If, at that point in the debate, he had any idea
that § 1 was designed to impose tort liability upon cities and
counties, he would surely have raised an additional outraged
objection. Only once was that possibility placed squarely
before the Congress-in its consideration of the Sherman
Amendment--and the Congress squarely rejected it.
The Court is probably correct that the rejection of the
Sherman Amendment does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that Congress intended municipalities to be immune from
liability under all circumstances. Nevertheless, it cannot be
deJ1ied that the debate on that Amendment, the only explicit
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consideration of municipal tort liability, sheds considerable
light on the Congress' understanding of the status of municipal
corporations in that context. Oppon.ents of the' Amendment
were well aware that munici.palities h.ad been subjected to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in the context of suits to
enf0rce their contracts, Cong.· Globe: 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 789
(remarks of Rep. Kerr), but they expressed their skepticism
that such jurisdiction should be exercised in cases sounding in
' tort :
"Suppose a judgment obtained under this section, and
, no property can be found to levy upon except the courthouse, can we levy on the court-house and sell it? So
this section 'provides, and that too in an action of tort, in
an action ex delicto, where the county has never entered
into any contract, where the State has never authorized
the county to assume any liability of the sort, or imposed
any liability upon it. It is in my ·opinion simply absurd."
ld., at 799 (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth).
Whatever the merits of the constitutional arguments raised
against it, the fact remains that Congress rejected the concept
of municipal tort liability on the only occasion in which the
question was explicitly presented. Admittedly this fact is not
conclusive as to whether Congress intended § 1 to embrace a
municipal corporation within the meaning of "person," and
thus the reasoning of Monroe on this point is subject to challenge. 'The meaning of § 1 of the Act of 1871 has been
subjected in this case to a more searching and careful analysis
than it was in Monroe, and it may well be that on the basis of
this closer analysis of the legislative debates a conclusion
contrary to the Monroe holding could have been reached·
when that case was decided 17 years ago. But the rejection
of the Sherman Amendment remains instructive in that here·
alone did the legislative debates squarely focus on the liability
of municipal corporations, and that liability was rejected.
Any inference which might be drawn from the Dictionary AcL
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or from general expressions of benevolence in the debate on
§ 1 that the word "person" was intended to include municipal
corporations falls far short of showing "beyond doubt" that
this Court in M ()11,roe "misapprehended the meaning of the
controlling provision." Errors such as the Court may have
fallen into in Monroe do not end the inquiry as to stare decisis;
they merely begin it. I would adhere to the holding of Monroe
as to the liability of a municipal corporation § 1983.

III
The decision in Monroe v. Pape, was the fountainhead of
the torrent of civil rights litigation of the last 17 years. Using
§ 1983 as a vehicle, the courts have articulated new and previously unforseeable interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendments. At the same time, the doctrine of municipal immunity
enunciated in Monroe has protected municipalities and their
limited treasuries from the consequences of their officials'
failure to predict the course of this Court's constitutional
jurisprudence. None of the Members of this Court can foresee the practical consequences of today's removal of that
protection. Only the Congress, which has the benefit of the
advice of every segment of this diverse Nation, is equipped to
consider the results of such a drastic change in the law. It
seems all but inevitable that it will find it necessary to do so
after today's decision.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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Memora.n dum of Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIST.1
While petitioners in my view tender only two bases for
reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in this case, the Conference discussion ranged
little more extensively than the limits of the questions on
which we granted cortiorari. This memorandum will therefore address what seem to me to be three seemin 1 se arate,
-;.,... u4a.., ~ but nonetheless related, grounds for reversa : 1) Overrule the
~
.L,.~ conclusion reached in MOttroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187
. _ . . . . . _ _ (1961). that "Congress did not undertake a bring municipal
a.-,. ~
corporations within the ambit of§ 1979 [§ 1983]"; (2) Allow
that conclusion in Prfonroe to stand as a matter of form. but
(!;c.c,_ ~~~~..._.... permit federal courts who have individual municipal officials
before them as defendants to require those officials to use their
statutory authority to draw checks upon the bank account of
the municipal corporation in order to satisfy a judgment for
damages; (3) conclude that the "school board" in this case
is not the sort of "municipal corporation" exempted from
liability under Jlrfonroe v. Pape, and therefore is a "person'1

•I'
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1 Sinre only tJ~e Chief and Hnrry joined me in my vote to affirm at
conference, I have not felt w1~rnmted in !Structuring this memornndum as
a pole11t ial Court opinion in all but name. Should I persuade Potter and
Lewis of ihe eorrectner:s of my view, I will obviously rearra.ng; t he form
~t the l:!nbstanre of'this memomndum.
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within the metwing of ~ 1983 and suable as a defendant tplC}er
28 U. S. C. § 1~3. Contentions two and three. though nominally separate, both depend to a greater or lesser extent on the
conclusion that the Court's rea4ing of the legislative history
in connection with the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 was so plainly erroneous as to warrf_\nt abandonment of
the principle of stare deaisis in connection with it and with
subsequent cases which have reaffirmed it. This memo there~
fore addresses tha.t question first.

I
Are municipal corporations persons under § 1983? Bill
Douglas' opinion for the Court in M onroe sets forth relevant
portions of the debates at pp. 18(-192 of 365 U.S. It seems to
me worth noting tha.t although f.\n elabor~te canvass of the
history surrounding the adoption of ·the Act of 1871 for the
purpose of determining the m~t:lning of the phrase "under
color of law" produced a Co'!lrt opinion written by Biil
Douglas, a concurring opinion written by ·John Harlan in
which Potter concurred , and a dissenting opinion by Felix
Frankfurter, the' Court was unanimous in the conclusion that
the word "persot1" in the Act d id not incl\}de a municipal
corporation.
Johtl Harlan's opinion; whicp Potter joil)ed, commented,
"Were this case· here as one of ·first impression. I would find
the 'under color of any statute' issue yery close indeed." 36,5
U. S .. at 192. He went on to say ·that because of previous
' h1terpretations of the phtase in Classic V.' United Sta.tes, 313'
U. S. 299 (1911), and Screws y. United States, 32q U. S. 91
(1945), the policy of stare decisis should govern , even though
the previous interpretations hqd involveq different though
substai1tially identical phraseology, unless it were to 11 appear·
beyond doubt from the legislative history of the 1871 statute
that Classic and Screws misapprehended the meaning of the
l CQntrollin~ ,provision .."
3Q5 U. S., 3-t. 192.. A simi tar·burdeDJ

~
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of persuasion must rest upon those who submit that Monroe
incorrectly respJved the question of municipal liability.
The best stf!temm~t of the argument against the Monroe
Court's copstructioq of § 1983 with respect to the meltl1ing of
"person" appears in the Appendix to the brief of the National
Education 4ssociation in this case. pp. 1a-31a, Unquestion·
ably "ffieb nef malres out a very plausible case for the proposition that the rejection of the so-called "Sherman Amendment,"
which was in fact proposed as a new section to the bill which
would become the Civil ~ights Act of 1871, did not require
the limitation' which the M anroe Court placed upon the wc;.rd
"person" in the first sec~ion of the Act. The first section was
never amended in either House.
While I have said ~ think the case made out by the brief is
plausible, it is quite understalldably a very good piece of
advocacr.!ather than an Qbjective discussion of what Congress
intended in 1871. The brief repeats argumeqts raised in law
review criticism of the Monroe Court's treatrpent of the meaning of the word ('person" as del}ned in § 1983. Law review
comm~nt at the time Monroe was decided paid little attention
to this point. The Supreme Court, 1960 '.ferm, 75 Harv. L.
Rev. 40, ,213 (1961), simply mentions the holding as to
municipal liability in passing; a more extenf:live trea.t rnent of
the issue is containeq in 49 Calif. L. Rev. 145, 153-1M ' (1961),
but the result reached py tpe Court is not criticized there,
either. Four years later, in an otherwise exhaustive discussion
of the possible import of Monroe ; Professor Shapo merely
mentions the municipal ~xclusion without offering any dif:!CUS•
sion or criticism of it. ·Shapo, Constitqtional Tort, Monroe v.
Pape and the Frontiers ~eyond, 60 Nw. U. L. Rev. 277,
295-296 (1965) .
I do not find any law review criticism of the Monroe Ooqrt's
treatment of rpunicipal liability until eight yea.rs after the
decision, in a comment in 57 Calif. L. Rev. 1142, 1164-1172
(1969). 'Two years ~ter, ~ note in 55 Miqn. L. Rev. 12014
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1205-1207 (1971), was likewise critical of the Court's use of
history with respect to this question. A third article that same year, Suing Publtc Entities under the Feqeral
Civil Rights Act: Monroe v. P~pe neconsiqered, 43 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 105, 118-1~0 (1971), echoed the objections made in
the other two articles. The · most e~t~nsive atfack on , the
Court's reasoning is found in Kates & Kouba, Liability of
Public Entities 'under § 1983 of· the Civil Rights Act, 45 S.
. C~tlif. L. Rev. i31 (1972).
The ye~r jftet this last article appeareq, we decided City of
l(enoshii v. rur;o, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), ~nd Moor v. County
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). -Bruno held that Congress
coula not have intended to 'allow a municipal corporation to
be a "person" within the meaning of§ 1983 where the relief
sought Wf!S equitable.~ and still have intended to exclude it
from the definition of "person" when moneta.r y dama.ges were
sought. Moor held that a county as well as a city was a
11
municipal corporation" for purppses of § 1983, and therefore
not suable as a defendant uridef' § 1343.I
While Bru,no ma.de no effort to do 111ore than rely upon the
holding of Monroe for its interpretation o.f the word "person;"
Moor went back into ·the q~estio~~ arid, ·it seems to me,
r~rmed
of Monrof3 on the is8ue:
, ~the reasoning
~
"In effect, petitioners are arguing that their particular
actions may be properly brought ag~inst this County on
the basis of § J983. nut whatever the factual premises of
Monroe, we find the COllStructi~n which petitioners seek
to impose l.J.pon § 1983 cohcerning the status of munici: palities as 'persons' to be simply untenable.
"In Monroe, the Court, in examining the legislative
evolution of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871,
which is the source of § 1983, pointed out that Senator
Sherman introduced an l\Jflendment which would have
added to the Act a new section providing expressly for
'-trtunicipal liabUity in civil ~tctiQns~ QQSed-; on the depriva...
le~islative

I
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tioil of civil rights. Although the amendment was passed
by the Sena.re, it w&s rejected by the House, as wa,s
another version included in the first Conference Committee report. Th~ propos~l for municipal liability encount. .
ered strongly held views in the House on the part of both
its supporters and opponents, hut the root of the proposa-l's qifficulties stemmed from serious legislative concern as to Congress' corstitution11l power to impose
liability on poUtical s-qbdiyisions of the Sta.tes.
"As ir Monrqe, we h~.ve no occasion here to 'reach the
constitutional questi~n w~ether Congre13s ha,s the power
to make municipalities liable for acts of its officers that
violate the civil rights of individuals.' 365 U. 8., at 191.
For in in~erpreting the statute it is not our task to consider
whether Congress was mistaken in 1871 in its view of the
limits of its 'power pver •nunicipalities; rather, we must
construe the ~tatute in ljght of the impressions under
which Copgress did i~ facf act, see ~ies v. Lynskey, 452
F. 2d, at 175. In this respept, it ca1mot be doubted th&t
the House a.rrived at the firm conclusion that Congress
lacked the constitutional power to impose liability upon
municipa-lities, and thus, accord,ing to Repres~ntative
Poland, the Senate Conferees were informed by th,e House
Conferees that the '~ection imposing liability upon towns
I
'
and counties must gq out or w~ should fail to agree.' To
save the Act, the propos11l for municipal liability w~
given up. It Ipay qe thl:lt EJven in 1871 municip11lities
which were subject to suit under state law did not pose
in the minds of the legisla.torli! tpe constitutio11al problems
that caused the defea.t ~f the proposal. Yet nevertheless
the proposal' was 'rejected in toto, and from this action we
cannot infer any congressional intent other than to exclude all municipa.l ities-regardless of whether or not
their immunity has been lifted by state la.w -from the
civil liability created in the Act of April 20, 1871, and
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§ 1983. Thus, § 1983 is unavftilable to these petitioners
insofar as they seek to sue the County. And § 1988, in
1ight of the express limitation contained within it, cannot
be used to accomplisq what Congress clearly refused to
do in enacting § 1983." 411 U. S .. at 707- 710 (1972) .
(Footnotes omitted.)

It is especially noteworthy that eight Members of this Court
subscribed to the holdin s in Moor and ifruno m tfie fMe of
dissents by ill Dougl~s ·w llC essentui..ly agreed with these
petitioners that ¥ onroe should be limited to its peculiar
·circumstances. Sipce the ~ssue now presented "has been con-. 1
·sideted J'natur~ly ~nd recently" in these two cases, the Court
should "not feel fq~e to qisregard these precedents." R'l(,nyon
v. McCrary, 427 U. 8. 160, 186 (1976) (PowE~~, J.,
'
· concurril)g).
Bill Brenn11n's 1nemoqmdum makes a yery comprehen!3ive
~ndi>y riOrt'~eans unpers9asive'a.r gument that, for severa-l clif...
ferent but related reasons, Congress intended the worq '" person" as used in ~ 1083 to include a mupicipal corporfttion.
He draws the conclusion , as do the law review pieces referred
tO SUpra, at 3-4, fllat the re~f1Qn for COJ1gfl'JSSion~J l'fjectiqn of
the Sherman Amenqment WI¥ not l}n Ullwillh1guess to impose
liability on municipal corporations for their ow11 viol~tions of
constitutional gqaranu~es. bqt only au unwillingness to·
impose liability l!pqn such corpor~ttion~ when tpey fail~ to
protect private lpdividuals within their boundaries from
actions which they should I,aye prevented in the exercise of
their police power. Undpubtedly mal1Y of the quotfttions
that he cites do SI.Jpport this. line of re&.soniug. But it seems
to me that in view of the holcling iu M onPoe,. and st~.tements
such as those contain.ed iu ·Johu l{arla11's concurrence in that
~~ ~
case and in Lewis' concurrence in Run on v. McCrary, the
-___,
burden uHon
qse w o WIS to overrule &. demsion of this ~
·• .(...
(joQrt involving only a matter of statutory construction is
~• ,., ...,
lw\ me):'ely th~ civil burqen of a preponderance of .the evi..

-
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de~ce, but more nearly the ~urdeu in a priminal case: to show,
as John Harlan said that it appeared "beyond doubt from the
legislative history of the 1871 statute that [Monroe] mfsapprehended th~ meaning of the controlling provision." I 365
U. S., at 192. This I do not think he has done.
The legislative deb~ttes are there in the Congressio~1al Globe
for anyo~1e to reaq; they went ou over a pe'riod of three w~eks,
al1d, in mi1dng terminology, ope must pan a good deal of sand
in order to get a~ty gold from them. It seems to me th~tt
there are pontions of the debates. not cited by the NEA ·ef
r rn n s memo. w IC tend to unc ercut t eir view
or 1
of the limitefl import of the ~e.iectiou of the Sherman Amendment. Congressman Bingham, for example, said:
"Everybpdy knows an honest jury in such a case, when
the rioters are implcacled with the county &nd an innocent
person is slain in th~ street, will find, and no m~tn can
find fault with them, damages perhaps to the extent qf
$50,000 or $100,000. The counti~s to be held liable with
the rioters, and all 1no•wy in its treasury and all its
prop~rty charged with the payment thereof. Such a proceeding would deprive the county qf the means of administering justice." Congressionfll Globe, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess., Pt. 2, p. 798.
In a similttr vein arf} thesp remar·ks of Representative
Farnsworth:
"Suppose a judgment obtained under this sectiop, and
no property can be found to levy u.pon except the 'courthouse, can we leyy on the court-pouse and sell i~? So
this section provides. and that too in an action of tort, in
an action e:~.· delicto, where the county has never entered
into any contract, where the State has never authorized
the county to assume any liability of the sort OJ' imposed
any liability upon it. {tis in my opinion sitnply ~tbsur£t'~
I d., :a t 799.
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Finally, see the comments of Representative Kerr:

(

"How are they to perform their necessary and customary
function~ if you may send a Feder11l officer to put his
arms into the tre&sury of the county, or parish, or city in
this way and withdraw therefrom all the ·revenues, or if
you cau authorize the sale of a cou11ty court-house, or
county jail, or the co1.1nty schools, or any other of the
property of the people? l ask you, if that pan be done,
where is the · security that h~s hitherto been supposed to
exist in this country for self-government in the States of
the Uniop ?'' Jd., a.t 789.
These stfl,tements can leav~ no doubt that these Members
of Congress were troubled ·by something deeper than doubts
about their authority to prescribe a federal form of execution
in place of the ordinarily applicable state procedures. ·They
wished to )reserve the financial capacity of municipalities to
carry ou asic governmen a unctions an , as i Brepnan
points out, at 20, to insure the security of businessmen who
traded with them. These purposes would be seriously
impaired by a tort judgment against the municipa.lity regardless of the form of execution which followed such a judgment.
The tort remedy created by the Act would have seriously
compromised these concerns in a way which the contract cases,
familiar to Congress and cited by Bill Brennan, at 18, and n ..
32, did not. The a.vailability of a federal forum for the
enforcement of contracts, strictly according to the terms dictated by the State, see. e. g., Yon Hoffman v. City of Qu·incy,
4 Wall. 535,554-555 (1866), insured the continued a.vailability
of municipal credit by providiug creditors with a sure means
of enforcement. Couversely, the ordinary business affairs of
a municipality wQuld be seriously impaired by the threat of
massive and unpredictable tort judgments under this Act.
·This concern ~ith the solvency of municipalities, and not
only doubts about federal power to impose affirmative obliga.tions upon them, underlay the complete rejection of municipat
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tort liability. Even if Bill Brennan is correct that Congress
never doubted its power to impose liability on municipalities
for their owu violations of civil rights." the debates suggest
that it chose not to impose such liability out of solicitude for
municipal financial stability. The continuing validity of thftt
concern is confirmed by the 11otoriously insecure position of
the creditors of these respoudents.
Furthermore, it is readily apparent that at least some Members of Congress concluded. though incorrectly, "that Congress
lacked the constitqtiona] power to impose liability on municipalities." Moor, supra, at 709. Representative Shellabarger
felt it necessary to rebut the contention "that it is incompetent
to authorize a judgment for a tort to be rendered under Fed..
eral law against any municipal corporation." Globe, supra,
at 752. After the Shermau Amendment had been rejected
by the Hoqse. Senator Sherman himself took the floor to
explain its defeat: "Sir, we are told, by some mystic process,
by some mode of reasoning.
which I ca11not
comprehend,
I
'
which seems to me so absurd that I cannot even fashion its
face, that the Constitution of the United States does not
allow a county to pe sued in the courts of the United States."
Id:, at 820. If th&t was the belief upon which Congress f1Cted,
as we have previously concluded, we 11re bound thereby, for
"we must construe the statute in light of the impression under
which Congress did in fa~t ac~." Moor, supra, at 709.
2 The adoption of his suggested interpretation of § 1983 would insert
into every case the qut>:Stion of whethrr the art of an official wus authorized so as to be attributable to the corporation it:self. j\s Bill notes, at 46,
those cases involving duly enacted ordinanres will be " [ t] he m0i>1 clearcut," but. as all the mejllbers of our litigious profession know, it it> not. just
"[t]he most. clear-cut" of cases that will be brought. The inrvitab)(' result
of the litigation of marginal cnst>:S will be to plagu(' the froeral courts with
the nice distinctions which prt>:Sently Hbound in the 1'espondeat supet·im·
law of every State in th(' Union. If the good-faith defense were not extended to municipnliti('S, the lure of the relatively deep public pocket
would make f)'uch 1$Uits Rll the rnoreJtttrnctiv'e.
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The basis of this impression emerges from a brief ·exjlmiilation of the constitutional and judicial world in which the
Coqgress of 1871 lived and acted. It should be recalled that
the Dictionary Act did not include "bodies politic and corporate" withhj the definition of the word f'person" where "the
context show[ed] that such words were intended to be used
in a more limited sense[]." Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2,
16 Stat. 431. Before 1871, municipal corporations had been
sued in the federal co1.1rts in only a single "context." Citizens of differeut States were permitted to enforce a municipal
corporation's contractual obligations under state law through
the ordinary diversity jurisdiction of tpe federal courts. 3
Representative Kerr described this context in some det~l:
"[T]he Federal courts in the exercise of this grant of judicial powers may, where they ha.ve the jurisdiction undet·
the Constitution, compel these municil)a}ities to execute
their contracts. a.nd that is all. To execute their contracts; but let it be remembered that no dj.'loree of a Federal court ha-S gone to -the extent of saying that any ope
of these divisions should execute its own contracts except
in pr(')cise com})liimce with the law of the State. in precise
accordancp with its own contract and the law upon which
it was b~tsed, and not in pursuance of any l~tw dictated to
it by Congress." Globe, supra, at 789.
In these years-before the establishment of federal question
jurisdictio11 of the federa1 courts in 1875--it is pardly surprising that some Members of Congress should have doubted their
authority to h'ale state instrl.Jment~lities ~nto the feder~tl
1

8 And it sePms too well known to bf' worth f'lauorating in any detail that
the reason for conferring divPr~ity jurit<diction upon the federal courts
was not a concern that municipal corporation~ would violntp the constitutional rights of private individual~:;, hnt that state judges fl!ld r>tate juries
would not deal evenhandedly with citizen~ of another State stting or
defending upon a. claim based upon state la.w. The r.ontrart eases arising
under tbis jur~dkqon are cqnsider!;Xi fu1iher~ infrfZt pt 16 n• .).
'
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courts. Indeed, although Rrnator 'l"hurman. as Bill Brennan
notes. at 33. expressed his belief that the terms of ~ 1 "are
as comprehensive as can be usPd.'' Globe, supra, App .. at 217,
an examination of his lengthy rrmarks demonstrates that it
never occurred to him that ~ 1 did impose or could have
imposed any liability upon municipal corporations. Tn an
extended parade of horribles, thP Senator suggested that state
legislators. Members of f'ongress. and state j uclges might be
held liable under th(' a.ct. Ibid. lf. at that point in the
debate. hP had any inkli1!g that ~ 1 was designed to imposr
tort liability upon cities and counties. he would surely have
raised on outraged objection. "\Yhm tlw spectre of municipal liability "··as unmistakably raised for the first time by the
Sherman Amendment. Thurman. Krrr. and their a1lies struck
it down.
I think as good a summary of the balance that would lead
me to reaffirm the construction adopted in Monroe aud followed in Bruno and };f oor is contained in The Supreme Court.
1972 Term, 87l{arv. L. Rev. 1. 257 (Hl73) (a publication not
known for its lack of s;;;:pathy for civil rights plaintiffs):
"Critics of the Monroe decision stress that rejection of
.:.. ~ _...__1
the broad liability proposed by the Sherman Amend~~
ment is 110t at all incousistent with holding municipali- ;L~wA"
ties liablP for the acts of their own officers. On the other ·~ _
hand. the debates on the amendment do reveal that some
,..,~
members of Congress opposed thP amendment on grounds ~
which would apply to any municipal liability. More,
over, while the debates do not center on the meaning of ( Y, W H-~ i:"'
the word 'person,' they do provide evidence that Congress
~ )
did not i11teud that the word encompass municipalities:
if that had been the understanding, the debates surely
would include some reference to the municipal liability
being created by the statute even without the addition of
the Shermatl Amendment. Thus, although Monroe can
be critici;.~ed for relyin_g so heavily on a.mbiguous legisla..

I
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live histor·y ancl ignoring policy consid{'mtiolls. its resulL
docs not seem so plainly wrong that th<• Bruno Comt
could havP ov<'rTukd Monroe's intNpl"<'tation of sectio11
1983 without a sharp dPparturP from traditional notions
of stam decisis JJl statutory con~<tructio11.'' CF'ootnotes
omitted.)

II

May board rneml>ers as individuals be required to e:tercise
their o tcwl a.ut wnty o roll' funds for payment of damaye~?
PetitiOners argll<'. t 1at. <'V<'Il 1 t lP hoard itst•lf is not subjpct
to ~.uit. a board nwmh<'r rnay lJ<' r<'quirP<l "to pxerci&• the
powpr·s of his officp" to <'xp<•ncl publie funds for the pay111ent
of damagPs. PPiitiorH•rs Bri<·f. at 32. Tlw probkm with
this theory is that school board m<'mbPrs may not ordinarily
i(~
hav<• tlw a11thoritY: to on1c·r·~, rxpPnditur<' of f unds. As we
..,_
w<>re trt'visrcl at oral argtlllH'nt. lh PsP n'spon ch'rJts can only ~~
submit a vouclwr· to t.lw ( 'omptroll<•r of the city. who may
l'C'fUR<' to pay it if lw 8l'<'8 fit. In my vi('W. tlw Co~nptroller
could not be requin•d to satisfy tlw judgnwnt of the Court,
($,
'1<,.. ~£1·
sine<' lw could not l)(' mach' an individual dPfrndant. having
don<' rtothing to violate th<> cunstitutional rights of these. t..,~
petition<'rs.
That condusion is consist.(•nt with tlw ordinary rule that
a corporation may not h<' sub.iP<'t<•<l to 1iahility in damagC'S
/'G.A...~
llwrely by a suit agalllst ttH olfiepr·g or shan•holders. As this
~
Court lwld in St~Ylll Land & enttl( eo. '· Pmnk, 148 U. S.

-

~w~.&,-~.L)

()0:3. 610

(180~):

"Kow. it is too ekar to admit of discussion that; th<' various eorporations ehargPd with thP fraud \\ hich has·
r·c>sul t<'d in damag<• to tlw com plai nan t ar'<' 1wcessary all(]
indispensahiP partit•s to auy suit !;o Pstablish the allrged'
fr·aud and to delPrrnim' tlw damag<•s ar·ising from them.
rnless mad<• pat·ties to t)w pl'OC<'Pdillg in which tfH'SC
!lltttters are to hP pass~d npou atHI adj'uclicatcd, Heith~r·
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they nor tlwir other stockholders would be concluded by
the decree."
This same rule has been applied in determining indispensable
parties under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19. "Unless the corporation is defunct, the debtor corporation is ~m indispensable
party to an action by a creditor to establish his claim . . . ."
3A Moore's Federal Practice ~ 1'9.13 (1), at 2377. Thus, in
order to require payment from the funds of a municipal
corporation, whether that corporat,ion be a city or a school
district, the corporation as well as its officers must be made
parties to the suit.
More importantly. to adopt the fiction advanced by petitioners would totally frustrate the intent of Congress as
perceived in our earlier opinions. Rightly or wrongly, Congress believed it lacked the power to impose tort liability on
municipalities. The relief sought by petitioners would negate
the congressional intent to protf'ct municipal treasuries whenever named defendants have au~hority to draw funds. Where,
as here. the defendants lack such authority, the court's decree
could provide no relief. To remain COJlsistent with the
principles of Monroe, the fiction lll\]St be rejected.

UJ
Are school boards municipa,l corporations under the holdinq
in 'A1onr~e! L ast yPar, in Lhe o}nmon for a unanimous C'our't
which I wrote in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v.
Doyle, 42911. S. 274 (1977). we treah•d the question of exclusion of municipal corporations from tlw definition of 1 'persou'r
in ~ 1983 as settled. Ree id., at '277- 278. Siuce what was
involved therr was a 10 school board,'' to use the term colloquially. we stated that the proper mode of analysis was to
determine awhether petit,ionpr· Board in this case is sufficiently )
likt• thr municipal corporations iu lM onroe and Bruno] so
that it. too, is excluded fr-om § H>83 liability." ld., at 278.
Althuugh that qu(•stion
not need to be answered iu Me.
---~

uiu
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Healthy, I believe that it states the pt•oper approa.ch to the
question before us. As will be seen, nothing in our prior
decisions or in recent cotlgressional pronouncements suggests
that this approach was incort·ect.

1\
Before turning to tl1c merits of this question, I think ·i t
appropriate to point out a confusion of terminology which
makes it difficult to generalize about entities coiloquially
referred to as 1'school boards." It is impossible to decide {
whether a "school board'' is a municipal corporation unless
one knows the law of the State where it exists. "School
board" may be simply a shorthand term for the aggregate of
the members of the board who manage the affiairs of a muni~
cipal corporation charged with the administration of schools.
Ip Pasadmw C1:ty Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S.
424 (1976), the "Pasadena City Board of Education." which
was a named party to the case, operated the Pasaden11 Unified
School District.
Td., at 427. So far as can be told from
the opinion. the "Pasadena City Board of Education" is sim~
ply a name for the aggregate of elected officials \Vho manage
the affairs ·o·r the Pasadena tT nified School District. That
aggregate is no more a "mt~nicipal corporation" than
would
I
the entire membership of the Board' of Directors of a private
corporation be itself a. "corporation." A fortiori, where a
school board does not govern a separate school corporation
but merely admiuisters the ' eclucationfil facilities of a city. or
a county, it cannot be considere(1 a "corporation" in itself. 4
Thus even if municipal corporations concerned solely with
school affairs are not "persons" within § 1983. it is by no means
"A school distt·ict m11~· bP a ~rparatP and di~tinct corporation from the
local governnwntal unit in whicl1 l'itnatP. r . g .. the municipal corporation,
county or town~hip. Pven though thr trrritorial extPnt of the twq is ihe
satne. On tlw other hand, it may br ::;imply onr of the ngmcies of .the
municip11l corporation or thr ~tate." (Footnotes omitted.) 16 E . McQ1jiJ..
~i~ =Law ·6r :Monir(pal Cor.por:.~tion~ .j 'lf\.03, !!It 652 (3\1 ed. 1972•.
4
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possible to tell simply from the fact that a "school board"
appears as It party defend~nt in the name of It case which this
Court has deciqed that su~h a defendant was a "municjpal
corporation" a.nd therefOffl not s4able upder § 1983. Only
where the partifls h~tve e~plored these issues of state law, as
they have done in this case and as they did h1 Mt. Healthy,
supra, can It court say thf\t the entity named as a deffln~ant
is or is 11ot a "municipal c6rpor11-tion" sufficiently an11logou~ to
a city or county to be exclud~d from the definition of person
in§ 1983.
B
Petitioners rel upon ei ht decisions of this Court in which
§ 1983 was the sole sis sserted for re Ie
ainst a school
board. Petitioners' Brief, at
n.
n none o t ese cases,
however, was th~ question now before us raised ·by any of
the litigants or addressed by th~s Court. As recflntly flS four
Terms ago, we saiq in Hagans v. Lavine, 4115 U.S. 528 (1974);
"Moreover, when questions of jurjsqiction tuwe been
passed on in prior qecisions sub silentio, this Co1.1rt has
never considered itseH bound when the case finally brings
the jurisqictional isslle pefor~ us." ld., at 535 n. 5.
'T he source ·of this doctri11e tl~!lt jurisdictional issQes qecided
sub sifentio llre not bit1dipg in other cases seep1s to be Chief
Justice Marshall's remark in United States v. ¥ore, 3 Cranch
159, 17'2 (1805). As we poipted OtJt in · Mt. Healthy,
the existence of a claim for relief ~nder § 1983 is "jurisdic·
tiona!" for purposes of invokipg 28 U. S. C. § 1343, ~ven
though the existence of & meritorious constitutional c~a.im i~
not similar1y requjred in order to invoke jl.lrisdictioq under 28
U.S. C. ~ 1331. See Bell v. Hopd, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946);
.Aft. Healthy, supra, at 278-279.
Although the cases relied upon by petitioner failed t(}
address the suability of a. schoo1 district which is a municipal
corporation &nd are therf)fore not binding as precedents on
~thlt't point, I wmdd not at all favor disposit~g of them in :-a

~··~

~,.,._. ••• 4
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footnote on that basis. As important as school desegregation
litigation has been in this Court's history in the past gener_a,.
tipn. one is enti~led to,Jtsk whether the s~rne substantive ,.constitutional law winci les decided m those cases could have
been deCI e un er the doctrine that a s hool district n y be
a "muntci ~ cor >m·ati n w nc 1s no suable uquer § 1983.
111k ere Is more t an m1e answer to this concern. In
the first place, it is not clear from the c~se names alone fhat
true municipal corporations were even involved. The school
boards named as defendants, like ~he one in P~adenCL City
Board of Education, .supra, at 427, may have been mere col1ections of individual persons, clearly su~tble under § 1983."
5 In this respect., I ngrce with .Tuqge Gurfein's view expressed in his
opinion for t)1e Court of Appenl~ in this cnsc thnt tlwrc> is an analogy,
albeit nn incomplete ope, bet,vee~ the balnpce struck in Ex pm·te Young,
209 U, S. 1~:3 (1908), betwf'en the Eleventh t)nc:l Fourteenth Amendments, nnd that. strt;ck by Monroe because of ~he conflicting con~iderat.ions
which went. into congressionnl ennctment of the Civil Rights Act of .1871.
01.Jr conclusion tl1nt individnnl officials !pay 110t bc> compelled to pa.y
clamages from the public treasury nuder § 198:~ does not mean that they
may not be stibjecteq to prospective eqtiita.ble decrees.
The cases cited by Bill ~renqan, at ~7, dq npt establish that suits
against officers in their ' o~clai capacities were invariably treated aa
suits n.gainst their corporations. Each of thoiSC suits w11s n mere coptract
action, brought under the ordinary diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts. See, e. (J., Cowles v. Mercer Cou71ty, 7 Willi. 118, 122 (18(!8).
CoJltrolling statc> law was regq.rded as n. part of the cont.ract, see, e. g.,
Von llof!man, sunm. at 554-555. and officinls were subject to mandamus
only to the extent oT tl1eir 'duties under state ln.w, see, e. g .. Edwards v,
United States, IOq U. S. 471 0880). Unqer such circumstances1 it is
hardly surprisiqg that the Court woulq consider the corporation and 1ts
officers interchangeable, &1nce the oblig1ttions of both hnd been defined by
t~e State under the same contract.
'
It cnnnot be StJpposec.l that Congress would have expected the s.ame
principle to fjpply in actim1s rounding in tort.. lndeed, the very novelty
of the tort rl'!medy was one of the chief objectiors rnjsed by opponents
of the Shetmatl Atnendnwnt. See. e. g., Cong. Glpbe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.,
789 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Kerr); id., at 799 (I{ep. Farnsworth). It
was not. ~ntil l!J;r; '.,far~e Yo:~Jn.g thQ..t .it bec~e liiVPa4'ent that ;relief coukl

~J-tA.
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In the second place, in six of these cases relied upon by
petitioners, East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424
U. S. 636 (1976); Keyes v. School District No. 1, ~13 U. S.
189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971); Northcross v. Board of Education,
397 U. S. 232 (l970); School District of A~ington v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963); and McNeese v. Bop,rd of Educq,tion, 373
U. S. 668 (1963), <2,nly equitable rel~f was sought by the plaintiffs. As Judge Gurfein pointed out. in each of these cases
and in the remaining two discussed infra, individual defend·a nts were named at? well as the school entit . The equitable
relief actual1y a.war e ran against t em as well as the school
entity, and certah1ly a long line of our cases following Ex parte
Young, 209 U. 8. 123 (1908), attest to the fact that such reHef
against indiviclual · public officials, even in the absence of
§ 1983, can effectuate the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment without requiring that the State be named as a
defendant.
In two of the ei ht cases cited by petitioners. Cleveland
Boar o 1 UC(Ltion v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974), and
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-

~~·

·'· -""

,.,.~

~t1' •*"C(4• ... ; . .J;A
'
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.....
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be gmnted in tort. again~t public officials without endangering to the same
extent the public treasury whieh Congress sought to protect by relieving
·mtmicipalitiPR thrm~rlvrf:l' of liabijit~'· Since officials a.re clearly "per~o11~·"
under § 198a, injuuctivr relief hat" quite propNly bern availa.blr against
them, in ordrr to carry out the librral purposes of the Act. Sre The
Supreme Coqrt., 1972 Term, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 259-260 (1973).
Becansc we have allowrd >turh prospective relirf rrquiring future rXJWilditure~; of public funds, E(lelmmi v. Jordan, 415 U . S. 651 (1974);
Millil>en v. Bradley, U. S . - (1977), the question is obviously not
one of aJI or nothing. But petitionrr~· arc qttitt> crmdid about thr fact t.ljat
they would not ask us to ovrrrule Monroe if it werP not for the pro~pcct
that damage judgmpnt:< in thrir favor would thrreby bf more easily ~atit-:
:fied. And if we Wf'l'e to accpde to thrir t·rqurst, we would unqurstionably
saddle municipal trPa.surirs with liabijitii'S to which they arr JWt now subject and about whieh Members of t.he Congre:-;R were genuinely concennc.d

in 18.71.
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trict, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the plaintiffs did seek d~WJ.ages as
well as equitable relief in the Dist~ict Court. Vnder my
vi~w of § 1983, the damages remedy could be award e<L,o nh
against individual defendan £s 0 a.n d not agamst a municipal
corporif,io'fi"'; ft'"fs'Only in such a case that it m~kes a practical
difference whether a school district which is a mu~1icipal corporation is suable uuder ~ 1983. But in neither LaFleur nor
in Tinker did this Court address th~ prop~iety of an aw~rd
of damages against a11Y of the parties defepdant. In Tinker,
after deciding th,a t complaint stateq a claim for relief, the
Court remanded the case for further proceedings, aJJ.d concluded, ''We express no opinion as to the form of relief which
should be granted. this being a matter for lower courts to
determine." 393 U. S .. at 514. · Likewise, in · LaFleur, the
Court's opinion held that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit had peen wrong in ruling against the constitutio11al
claims of the tea.chers in the compftnion case of Cohen v.
Chesterfield County School Boa.rd, 474 :F'. 2d 395 (CA4 1973),
rev'g 326 F. Sqpp. 1150 (ED Va.. 1971). but. it did not
'so
far as to reinstate the judgment for damages awarded against
· the school board by the District Court in the first i11stance. · It
merely remanded the case "for fmther proceedings consistent
with this opinion," 414 U.S .. at 651.
Thus it seems to me that all of the substantive constitutional questions decided in the cases cited £ )etitioner, and
a o t e re 1e approvel y this Court in those ca.ses, are
entirely consist ,nt with the holdin tha.t respondent in w~
present case is a mumc1 )a cor . orat101 Immune rom smt
un( er s 1. 8< ,7 even thoug t1ere may hA>ve been in son~e · of

go

0 Thos(' drfendnnts are, of rourst>, entitled to a qualified immunity.
See, e. g., Wood v. St1'ickland, .:po U . S. 30S (1975).
7 Evrn if the matter wer<' othrrwi~e , iher<' is obviously no possibility of
t•eopening those cases sincr 'Tt]hc principle;; of 1·es judicata apply to question:; of jnri:;diction as wrll ail to other issues." Ame1'icm~ S-q,rety Co. v.
fJaldwin, 28'7 u.s. 156, 166 (1932) .
'

J

75-1914.-MEMO
MONELL v. NEW YORK C!1'Y DEPT. OJ<' SOCIAL SERVICES 19

the cases a municipal corporation cha.rged with the administration of school matters which was not suable under § 1983.

c
There is no indication that any later Congress has ever
a
ed suit"""" aiil~t any tn Wti"Cipal corpora.hon vnaer §1YST.
Of all its recent enactments. ou y e /IVI 1ghts ttorneys'
fees Act, fub. L. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stfl.t. 2641 ( 1976), codified
at 42 U. S. C. § 1988, explicitly deals with thp Civil Rights Act
of 187I.s The Act provides that attorneys' fees may be
awarded to the prevailing party "[i]n any' f.\Ction or proceeding
to enforc1:1 a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, anq
1986 of this title." There is plainly ~o laugua.ge in tpe 1976
Act which
ould en large the parties suable under t hose
at partjes who
su stantive sections; 1 s.u nply prov1 es
are already suable lna.y be made liable for attorneys' fees.
Although the Senate re;cort states that "defendants in these
ca~ses are qften state or· local bo_Qjes." R. ltep. No. 94-lOll, at
5,lt can l 1araly be inferred from this brief refereuce that the
Congress believed that municipal corporatioilS were p~qper
defendants under every section coven'd by the Act. Certp,infy
Congress knew by virtue of Monroe v. Pape that most state
~tnd local bodies were I1ot subject to suit Ul1der § 1983 Jtst:llf, as
demonstraj!ed by the report's co11clusiqn that fees cotJld be
awarded "whether or 11ot the age11cy or government is a nameq
pa.r ty." Ibid."

;m

The oihrr sta tutr~ f'itf'd by Bill nrenna-!J, :1t 41-43, make no ment,ion <if § 191\:3, but n·f<'r gf'nrrall~· to ;.;uit,; ag:Linst ''rt looa.l f'ducatioral
agency." As already notPd, supm. at 16 n. 5, -·spch suits may be ma.int:rincd agn im~t board members in their ollirial oa.pacitie::~ for injupctive
rPliof undrr either § 19~:~ or Ex parte YoWI(f . Congres,; did Hot stop to
C011tiidor the teehnif'nlly proprr 1\Yelll\0 of relief, but l()('rely responded
to tho faet. thnt I'PliPI' wn~ I>Ping gmutt'<l. The practlcalre~:~ult. of choosing
tho a\·rnue ~~~~gl'~tt•d b~· petitimwr:> would be tht;> subjection of school
corporation,; to liability in dmnagP~. Nothing in IW<'Ilt f'Ougre~sjonal his~
tory evrn remotely support:; ~:~ uch a re;.;ult .
.!l Sjnce fc<:s are to .be awa,rded " likr other jt<'llls of costl:l," Cong~·~
8

'I
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Certainly, nothing in this 1976 congressional discussion of
the recent uses of § 1983 sheds any light on the intent of an
earlier Congress in 1871. 'fhat Congress realized that municipal corporations were creature~ of the State, and had only
~l.Jch powers as the State granted to them. The Congress WP.-S
relucta.n t to hnpose liability upon these coq)orations for carrying out duties thrust upon them by the State .or for f~tiling
to protect constitutional rights which thr State had giyen
them no power to protect. See Bruno 1 supra, at 5l8-5HI
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Because of this copcern. this Court
has properly excluded cities and counties, municipal corporations having broa.q and varied government~] authority, from
liability under § 1983. It c~n hardly be supposed that the
Congress would have wished to subject school districts, which
are burdened with exactly those limitatim1s on their authority
and their du.ties which ga.ve rise to the original congressional
concern, to liability under the Act. 1 n , See The Supreme Oout:t,
1972 Term, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 258, and n. ~4 (1973).

D
Thus, nothing in our previous cases or in congressional pronouncements undermines t~e sug~estion in ·Mt.Bealthy, su~~a~
explicitly recognized that thry conld be assetiSed only against named par·
ties, but made no effort to rnlarge the class of proper defrndants.
1 ° For this reason, I cannot nrcPpt Bill Brennan'~ distinction, at 38-39,
betwrrn municipal corporations and "quasi-mllnicipal bodi('S." Spf'cial corporatiom; crontro by the Statr, ~'IH'h as scl10ol district,; or water districts,.
are oftrn descrihrd Hs "qna~i-municipal" because they lack "many of the
power~ rommonly and urerst<nril~· characteristic- of municipal corporations."
1. E. :\JcQuillin, supra, § 2.28. A Congres.;, concerned by the limjted
powrrs of citil:'s and rouutirs surely would not. havl:' imposrd liability upon
creat.urrs of t.jw St~lt(' having rvcn mm'(' limited authority. Further, the
congrr&<ional purposr of protPcting municipal tren:;uries applies with equal
force to financially prel>.\'!'d school districts. Cf. San A-ntonio Independent
School D£st1ict v. Rodriauet, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). Thus, an affir~pance
here of the dccibion of the Conrt of Appeals rcpreseuts, not an extensiou.
~f Yon1·oe, but [L simllle fll1l1licat~on of th~ bn~s of it~ ;J1olding.
'
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that a "school board" whh:~h is a municipal corporation may
not be sued under ~ 1983. Ot~r analysis recognized only two
alternatives: Either "the Mt. Healthy Board of Education is
to be treated as an arm of the State partaking of the State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity, or is h1stef!.d to be treated
a~S a municip~l corporation or other political subdivision to
which the Eleventh Amendment does not e~tend." 42Q U. S.,
at 280. lf the New York City Board of Education is an arm
of the State of New York, it may not be sued for damages,
even though its individual members may pe sued for equit&ble
relief. Edelrnq.n v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). If the
Bo&rd is an arm of the city of New York, it must partake of
the city's immunity frorp suit under § 1983. If, on the other
hand, as petitioners contend, the board is the governing body
of an incorpor&ted school qistrict separate from the city, that
district must be a "political subdivision" of the State. Mt.
Healthy, supra, at 280.
Since this Court has a1l'f:lady concluded that the limited
definition of "p~rson" qnder § 1983 "stemmed from serious
legislative concern as to Congress' constitutional power to
impose liability on politjcal subdivisions of the States," Moor,
S'f.tpra, at 708, I ca11 see 110 reason for concluding that Congress
would not have entert&ined the same doubts about school
districts as it did about cities &nd counties. Accordingly, any
school board, to 'the extent that it is not mer(lly an a.nn of the
State or of tpe city or county, is the governing body of a
· sepa.r ate municipal corporation which is not itself subject te
· suit under § 1983.
I

IV
Thus, it appears to me that none of the three suggested
grounds for reversal is consistent with the basis of our holding
in Monroe, as amplified by Moor. Accordingly, only a rejection of that holding can support a reversal of the judgment of
the Court of Appeals. l c~mwt conclude that such a r~je~tion
ca-n be justified.

·'
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Sixteen ye~trs have gol\e by since this Court l.lnanimously
held"m 114 onrae ifi~tf a rnumdp~tl corpor~.tion was nqt a pe~son
for p\lrposes of § ~983. Oply two years h~tve gone by sinc!l
. fotter, sptutki~g for .the .9gl;fvt iQ ~unyqn, ~ supra, ~tt 175 n. l2,
re~tffirrned tlb.e ,ation~tJe of stare deoisi:s ItS enunciated py J'\1~"
tice l3ranqej~ and citfld by my opinion for th~ Court in

Edelman:
"Th~

Cpurt in J!Jdelman ~tated a~ follows:
"'I~1 tpe \vords of Mr .. Justfce Br~tpdeis: "Stare decisis
is usu~ly the wise policy, because h1 most matters it is
more iq1porta11t th~tt the appllc~tbl~ rule of law be settled
than that
it be settle~:F righ( . . . This
is compwnly true
·I
.
even where the error is fL lflatter of serious copcerq, pro-.
vided corr~ption Cflll be pad by legislatfon. . . ."' 415
U. S., at 67ln. 14 (citation o~ittrd)."
As counsel for respondent pointed ot~t, Congress h~s presently
pending b~forp it ·s. 35 and fl H. R COl.lnterpa.r t whic4 would
· substantially lllodifyt he immunity 8f m~.nic\pal corporations
which h!is rflsulteq frofll the· MotfrOf! holding. Ordinary l>rinciples ofstare decisis dictf\.te that we shoqld leave the pepision
to them.
.
.
If fhe
years that had passed between the tiPle of the
Screws de~ision iJil 1945 and the ti:rne of the Monro~ qecis+on
in 1961 wa,s sufficient to move John fla,rlan and Potwr to
require "Hu1-t it appear peyond do11bt from the legislative history of th~ ' 1871 statute yhflt Classic p,nd Screws misa:ppre.
hended th'e Inf:!!Lning Of thf:l contrplling provisi011," 365 U. S.,
at 192, tpe same test 'should be pa.
Fticu~!LrlY applicable h~re
I
where prep~~ly the s~me n~mber of ye~try; have elapsed since
tl)e M onrae decision. 'fhere is no way of eJlcapsUlf1ting th~se
1871 debAte~ that wel)t Of1 o'ver three 'Yeeks into a few paragrij.phs. The "revisionists" who have criticiz~d the Monroe
opinion htwe shown tJlttt the excl11sion
' municip~J corporations was a closer Q'4f:lstion than that opinion treated it as
being. But iri my view l~ey have f~l~en tar slwrt of showi~g
I
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,

I

"beyond doubt from the legislative history of the 1871 statute," Harlan, J., co11c4rripg~ 365 U. S., ~tf 192, tQ!l't Monroe
"misapprependfld the me~tning of the controlling provi~iq:p."
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment pf tGf:l Co4rt of
Appe~tls.
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MONE;LL

-

Federal/Civil

v.
DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES

1.

SUMMARY:

The petn presents three issues:

t
(1) whether

the 1972 amendments extending Title VII coverage to state and
local officials and educational institutions should be applied
in an action brought prior to the effective date of the 1972
amendments; (2) v1hether a local independent school board is a
"person" within the meaning of § 1983; and (3) whether govGrnment

2.
officials are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 when
~

"equitable relief'.' in the nature of baclfay is sought

aga.~nst

them in their official capacities.
Petitioners are female employees of the New York City
Dept. of Social Services and of the NYC Board of Education suing
on behalf of themselves and other female employees incity
1

agencies similarly situated.

The

c~mplaint

alleg?d that rules

and regulations of the city agencies compelled I(pregnant employees" '
to take unpaid leaves of absence before medical reasons required
them to do so, and that such rules and regulations were
unconstitutional.

The defendants are the Dept., the Board, the

former Commission of the Dept., the former Chancellor of the
City School District of NYC, and the former Mayor. [The individuals
were sued in their official capacities.]

Jurisdiction is alleged

under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28
U.S.C. 1343(3), as well as under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
Petrs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages
for "the deprivation of their right to be employed, including
but not limited to
alleged.

~mges

lost."

No amount of damages was

The defendants moved to dismiss the action, or in the

alternative, for an order granting summary judgment.

The

plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment.
SDNY (Metzner) dismissed the complaint.

With respect to

the requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, the DC

1.

SDNY determined that the action could be maintained
as a class action.

3. '

noted that in the fall of 1971, the Dept. had changed its
maternity leave policy to provide that no woman need report
her pregnancy or take maternity leave as long as she is able
to continue to perform her job and desires to do so.
change became effective on January 29, 1972.

The policy

The Board similarly

changed its bylaws effective September 1, 1973.

The DC therefore

dismissed as moot the claims for equitable relief by way of
injunction or declaratory judgment.

CA2 affirmed dismissal of

these claims as moot and no review is sought with respect to that
action.
The DC also dismissed the claims for back pay covering the
periods for which plaintiffs allege they could have worked after
they were forced to take maternity leave on the ground that there
was no subject matter jurisdiction for the award of back pay
either under Title VII or under § 1983.

--~------~~--~-~~-------------

The DC concluded that

the 1972 amendment to Title VII which broadened the definition
of "person" under the Act to include "governments, gov-2 rnmental
agencies [and] political subdivisions," could not be applied
retroactively.

Since all the alleged acts of discrimination

occurred before the 1972 amendment to Title VII, the DC dismissed
the Title VII claim.

The DC also concluded that any attempt to

use 1983 as a basis of obtaining monetary relief against the
named city officials in their official capacities would circumvent
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167.
CA2 affirmed.

With respect to the Title VII claim, CA2

held that Title VII does not apply retroactively so as to permit

4.
an award of back pay under the circumstances of this case.
With respect to the 1983 claim, CA2 held that the Board (an
independent agency) is not a ':,Pers.:;.n".

[Petrs had conceded

that the Dept. of Social Services, as an agency of the city,
was not a "person".]

-

Finally, CA2 ruled that it was without

jurisdiction to entertain the claim for monetary relief against

--- --------------------

the named individuals in their official capacities since such
a' suit was actually one against the Board, which is not a "person".
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs first contend that the CA2 ruling

w ith respect to the re ~ctivity of Title VII conflicts with a
subsequent decision of this Court.

They cite Brown v. GSA, 96

S.Ct. 1961, 1964 n. 4, for the proposition that § 717(c) of the
1972 amendments applies to claims of federal employment
discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of the
amendments if the employee's complaint was the subject of
administrative proceedings on that date or if a judicial
proceeding had been timely commenced after final administrative
action and was pending on the Act's effective date.

They also

refer to Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412 (CA6), cert. granted,
-

judgment vacated, and remanded "for further consideration in
light of Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. __ , slip op. 3 n. 4 (1976). 11
[CA6 had been the only CA to rule that § 717(c) was not retroactive with respect to claims of employment discrimination by
federal employees.]

Petrs suggest

that the instant case, like

Place v. Weinberger, should be remanded for further consideration
in light of Brown.

:

s.
Petrs next contend that CA2's ruling that the Board is not
a "person" for purposes of 1983 conflicts with decisions of
other CAs and with decisions of this Court.

Petr notes that

CA4 and CAS have held that a school board is not a person, while
( CAB has ruled that a school board is a person.

CA7 has ruled

that a school board established under one statute was a person, ~~d
subsequently found that a school board established under a
different statute was not a person.

Petr also refers to Mount

Healthy City School District, in which cert has already been
case
granted, No. 7S-1278. Petr notes that in that/CA6 "apparently"
ruled that a school board is a person. Finally, petr suggests
CA2's decision is inconsistent wi~
this Court's decision in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,

~~
~

414

u.s.

632.

Petrs also contend that there is a circuit conflict over
whether local officials are liable in 1983 suits for monetary
relief in their official

capacities.

Petrs note that CAS,

sitting en bane, recently reached the same conclusion as that
reached by CA2 in the instant case. Muzguiz v.

~an

Antonio School

District, S28 F.2d 499, petn for cert filed, see summer list S,
sheet 4, No. 7S-1723.
As noted above, petrs \vould prefer to have the case
remanded to consider the retroactivity question in light of
Brown.

Alternatively, petrs ask that the petn for cert be

granted for consideration of all the issues, or that consideration of the petn be deferred pending a decision in Mt. Healthy.

:?

6. '
4.

DISCUSSION:

With respect to the retroactivity issue,

the decision of CA2 does not conflict with this Court's footnote
(number 4) in Brown or with its disposition of Place v. Weinberger.
Both the Brown footnote and Place concern § 717(c) of the 1972
amendments, which grants federal ·employees the right to file
employment discrimination claims against the Government in
federal district court.

At the time of this Court's decision

in Brown a number of CA's had considered the question whether
§

717(c) applied to proceedings already pending at the time of

its effective data.

With the exception of the decision of CA6

in Place, every CA faced with the issue held that § 717(c)
applied to claims of fuderal employment discrimination if the
employee's complaint was the subject of administrative proceedings
on that date or if a judicial proceeding had been timely
commenced after final administrative action and was pending on
the Act's effective date.

The retroactivity ruling was based

on the view that § 717(c) was merely a procedural statute that
remedies available to federal employees suffering
their right to be free of such
discrimination had been assured for yea.rs under a number of
Executive Orders.

The legislative history of § 717(c)

indicated ~

that § 717(c) did not grant a new substantive right to federal
employees, but merely created a new remedy for the enforcement
of existing rights.
In the instant case CA2 concluded that the § 717(c) cases
were not directly on point.

With respect to state and local

officials, CA2 concluded that the 1972 amendments were intended

7.
to create a new substantive right thus barring retroactive
application.

See Weise v. Syracuse University, S22 F.2d 397,

410-411 (CA2)(Title VII inapplicable to discrimination occurring
before the lifting in 1972 of the exemption for educational
institutions).
Petr's assertion that the decision of CA2 is in conflict
with a subsequent decision of this Court is thus inaccurate.
Petr cites no other federal decision concerning the precise
retroactivity question at issue.

In any event, it would be

silly to remand the case to CA2 for further consideration in
light of Brown, since the prevailing law in that circuit at
the time the instant case was decided was that § 717(c) was
.

retroactive.

..

~

..

Brown v. GSA, S07 F.2d 1300, 1304-06, aff'd,

96 S. Ct . 1961.
As to the issue ot whether a school board is a "person"
for purposes of 1983, it is not at all clear that this case
is a hold for Mount Healthy insofar as the Court may not reach
the "person" issue in that case.
District,

su~ner

Muzguiz v. San Antonio School

list S, sheet 4, No. 7S-1723 may present another

opportunity to consider the parameters of the "person" requirement.

CAS held en bane in that case that the Board of Trustees

of a city's Firemen's and Policemen's Pension Fund was not a
"person" for purposes of 1983.

S28 F.2d at SOO, adopting as

the opinion of the court en bane the panel dissent of Judge

...__

\ ....

Godbold, S20 F.2d 1003-06 . The pool memo in Muzquiz indicates,
.the
however, that/petr does not challenge CAS's ruling in that regard.

\.,..-~

. ' .. , ....

8.

Thus a grant in Muztuiz would not assure consideration of the
"person" issue.

l

:P

¥A~
/

The main issue in Muzguiz, and the remaining issue in the
instant case as well, is whether monetary relief is appropriate
against the individual members of the entity (Board of Educ.

\ '.{"

Trustees in Muzquiz) when they are sued

.kG.,\\1'\Y, ~: ::::r1 section
c::: ~c:::r:a::ci ties .
1983 action§/
'~-

AT'
·;
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¥ ~~~

t-/cl)
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~~"
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,.(~/

directly against the entity, and consequently there was a lack

of jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
ruled to the contrary.

>V

CA6 has apparently

See Burt v. Board of Trustees of

Edgefield City School District, 521 F.2d 1201 (CA4)(to the extent
-

that plaintiff seeks equitable relief [including back pay]
under 1983 against the members of the Board in their official
capacities, the action may be prosecuted, for such municipal
officers are "persons" within the meaning of 1983).
There is no response.
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Op in petn.

RE:CIZIVEC

JAN 5 19n

January 5, 1 9 77
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington , D.C. 2054 3
Attn :

Frank Lors.o n
RE :

Dear Mr. Lor son :

(

Monell v. Department of Socia l
Servlces, No. 75-1914
_____ _

s;._ C._ C, _.,... f'

,.,... • 4' ~

•

r~~~~o\

Pursu a nt to our telephone conversation , I
bring this letter to the attention of the Justices s o that
may consider it at the conference of the above-named case
scheduled for Friday , January 7, 1977.

t~

In Int~rnatiq_nal Un-"!:_q_r_l v. Robbins an d Myers , 45 U.S.L.W.
4068 (No. 75-1264, December 20 , 1976 ) the Court h e ld that the
1972 amendme nts to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act shou ld
be applied to cases pending as of their effec·tive date , id. a t
45 U.S.L.W. 407 1. This is one of the two grounds on which
certiorar i was sought in the instant case ( see Petition at 14 -2 2).
The Second Circuit had held that such app li cationO.f the amendment s
was not warranted and had accordingly affirme d a dismissal.
Pet itioner urges, there fore , that this case should be remanded to th )
Second Circuit for reconsideration in the light of International
Union.
Thank you fo r your courtesy and assist: a.nce.
Sincerely ,

0-o..c.Q/\.. "" · c.~cv.u.laL(~-

Oscar G. Chase
Counsel for Petitioner
OGC/ jc
cc : Corporation Counsel of
·the City of New York
Counsel for Respondents

• /
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Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ........ ... ..... . .. , 19 .. .
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1977
No. 75-1914

JANE MONELL, ET AL., Petitioners
vs.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL.

7/2/76 - Cert.

fV(~~~·~~
7~-17Z~

( ·~ ''~-~)
HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

D

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT
N

POST

Stevens, J ............... ........ .
Rehnquist, J ................. .
Powell, J ... . .. ...... .. ..... .
Blackmun, J ............... .. .
Marshall, J ............ .
White, J ..... . ......... .
Stewart, J ........ . .... .
Brennan, J ............. .
Burger, C::h. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...

DIS

AFF

MERITS
REV

AFF·

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

Gene:

Dave and I agree that the Court should take MMKMHII Monell limited
to the 1983

question~

a.l&o

Justice Powell is Ainterested in the

i
14th Amendment cause of action issue.

The only case

possibly raising that question is MuzquizJ but CAS

~~KKIMXMJ

MXK~MXH

discussed

that question only long enough to say that there was insufficient
amount in controversy to satisfy 1331.

Some rather far-fetched

issues concerning 1331 and 1343(3) are raised in the petn, but,

KH

given the minimal treatment below and the far-fetched nature of

them, I consider this case to be a bad vehicle for the 14th Amendment
issue.

The Justice would IX like your opinion as well •
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January 18, 1977
Memorandum for the Conference
Subject:

No. 75-1723, Muzquiz v. City of Antonio
No. 75-1914, Monell
Dept. of Social Services of
City of New York
No. 76-5224, Thurston v. Dekle

v.

These cases appear on the January 21 Conference List,
page ten.

5
l

Introduction: The common question presented in these cases is
whether a USD~ has _ subjec~matter jurisdiction over a suit for
monetary relief brought under 42- u.s.c; § 1983 against- individual
members- of a municipal entity - in their official capacities.
In each of the cases, petitioners are aggrieved former employees.
In Muzquiz and Monell, CA - S and CA 2 each held that - the
municipal agency itself was not a "person" within the contemplation of § 1983; in Thurston, the suit was brought against
individuals only. The question whether the municipal entity
is a "person" under § 1983 is raised in this Court only in _
Monell.
This memorandum attempt~ a brief sketch of each of ~ these
cases in aid of a determination as to which, if any, is most
appropriate for plenary consideration.

·

No. 75-1723, Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio
Petitioners, former San Antonio - police and firemen, brought
a class action to challenge the constitutionality of a Texas
statute declaring that no member of the City's Firemen's and
Policemen's Pension Fund (Pension Fund) "shall ever be entitled
to any refund from said Fund on account of the money deducted
from that amount of their pay . • . which money is in itself
declared to be public money • • . " Petitioners, alleging jurisdiction under 28 U.S.G. §§ - 1343 - and 1331, claimed that the norefund provision violated their rights to due process and equal
protection, the right to travel, the Supremacy Clause and constituted a bill of attainder. The suit named as defendants

- 2 -

the City, the Pension Fund, and the Fund's board members and
asked for damages, restitution, declaratory and injunctive
relief. The DC granted summary judgment for defendants.
On appeal, petitioners abandoned their claim against the
City. CA 5, like the DC, considered and rejected petitioners'
claims on the merits. The CA majority also found that the
Board of Trustees of the Pension Fund was not "like a municipality" and did not possess broad governmental pow~rs.
Rather, the trustees served an e ssentially private function which
might have b e en discharged by a bank or insurance company
without the n e c e ssity for naming public officials as trustees.
Thus, the Pension Fund and its me mbers were amenable to suit
under § 1983. The dissent took another view. Criticizing the
"essentially private" function of the Fund as a "dubious
distinction," the dissent saw the Fund and its members as an
" ~y."
The dissent found no jurisdiction fn - a
suit against the Fund nor against its members for relief
other than declaratory and injunctive relief.

C (f ?"

'~

Sitting en bane, CA 5 a roved the_ dissenting view as to
~ the Fund. As to its individual members, _the CA took- the

~u ~iew that the suit was -, - in effect, not one - against - the nominal
v.lvr_~,l ~
defendants, but, instead, one - against the Fund. Under the
1 v~particular facts of the case, the CA found that equitable
lt4~
relief-- petitioners' claim for damages had been withdrawn-~~
was tantamount to a money judgment for restitution (directed
AA-~~
at the assets _of the Fund) and held that all claims were barred
~>_lr~ under § 1983 y TheCA also found that there was no - jurisdiction
~~~ under § 1331 for lack of the requisite amount.
.

ct'

~~ ~

16t

~
~

H

In - this Court,- petitioners 1:1rge not only that the individual
members of the Fund are "persons" under § 1983 in a suit for
equitable relief which includ~s restitution, but also, that
jurisdiction lies for equitable relief against the Fund and its
members directly under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
pursuant to § 1331 without regard to the jurisdictional amount,
and pursuant to § 1343 without regard to § 1983.
No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of
New York
Petitioners ,-- alleging- :i uris diction under § 19 83, (§ 134 3)
and Title VII, brought a class action against the _Dept. of
Social Services, the NYC Board of Education and certain individu
1n
e1r officiaT capacities. T eir complaint challenged
certain rules and regulations of city agencies making mandatory

-

3 -

unpaid leave for pregnant employees at a specified point in
their pregnancies without regard to medical reasons.
By 1973,
the challenged city policy had been discontinued. Accordingly,
the DC dismissed as moot petitioners' claims for declaratory
and i~~eT.'--~.tt1one rs prayer for an award of
b-ack~a~alned- in the case.
However, the DC, noting that in
the l1tst analysis any award would be paid by the City -petitioners ultimate y onceaea-th~ t e Dept., as~n agency
of the City, was not a "person" -- refused to find jurisdiction
to support an award of backpay in light of Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
The DC also rejected petitioner~itle
VII claim because the alleged acts of discrimination occurred
before the effective date of the 1972 Amendment which broadened
the definition of "person." Accordingly, the DC dismissed the
complaint without reaching the merits.
The ~ rejected petitioners' claim that the Board of
Education constitutes an independent body and not an arm of
the city.
It held that the Board was not a "person'! under
§ 1983 and that no jurisdiciion existed to support a suit to
recover money from the city treasury.- A different result would
allow a subterfuge wher~by -a suit against the Board itself
could be maintained- in the guise -of a -suit against its members
in their official capacities and, -thus, contravene the intended
jurisdictional bar to suits against municipalities. The CA
agreed with the DC that Title VII does not apply retroactively to
permit an award of backpay in these circumstances.

In -this Court; petitioners raise their Tit~e VII-- claim in
addition to the questions whether a local independent - school board is a "person" under § 1983 and whethe~ municipal officials
are "persons" when relief in the form of backpay is sought
against them -in their official capacities. ~ ~~
No. 76-5224, Thurston v. Dekle

~M ~

13sj 7

Petitioner commenced a class action under § 1983 against
individual members of the Jacksonville Civil Service Board
(Board) and the Director of the Jacksonville DepG of Housing
and Urban Development. The suit challenged on due process
grounds certain Board regulations authorizing suspension of
an_ employee without pay. The DC granted summary judgment for
petitioner - and declaratory - and injunctive relief, including _
backpay.
CA 5 agreed with the DC that the challenged suspension and
dismissal rules provided constitutionally inadequate pretermination procedures and sustained the relief granted by the
DC except for the backpay award. The CA found that, insofar

- 4 as petitioner sought restitution, the practical effect, as in
Muzquiz, would be to use the individual members of the Board
as conduits to the City treasury. Accordingly, the backpay
award was reversed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The sole question presented for review in this Court relates to the availability of subject matter jurisdiction under
§ 1983 in a suit for equitable relief, including backpay,
against individual members of a local civil service board and
the director of a municipal housing agency.
Discussion: The petitioners in Muzquiz do not rely exclusively
on § 1983 as a basis for jurisdiction. Nor do they challenge
the CA's ruling that the Pension Fund itself is not a "person"
for § 1983 purposes.
In Muzquiz, both the nature of the municipal entity (a
pension fund) and the nature of the monetary relief sought
(restitution in the - form of a refund of deductions from pay)
are sufficiently unusual to raise some doubts about . the appropriateness of this case as the one in which to decide the common __
question presented. _ For example, _to the extent that the Court
weighs the argument that the public officials -- defendants
serve an essentially private function as opposed to exercising
governmental powers, trustees of a pension fund may be distin~ 
guishable from school board members - or other more typical
municipal officials. - Also, equitable relief in the form of a ~
"refund" may be distinguishable from _the more commonly__reques-=-ted relief in the form of backpay. Howeve~, insofar as the
equitable relief sought here is tantamount to awar~ing a money
judgment, theCA- opinion in Muzquiz does raise - the ~ "subterfuge"
argument, i.e., whether aggrieved _parties may reach~he
municipal coffers in a suit naming as defendants individuals
in their official capacities, but not in a suit naming as
defendant the agency - itself.
On the merits, the Muzquiz petitioners' claims are weak
and have already been considered and rejected in the courts
below.
In Monell, the Court may wish _to limit plenary consideration
to the § 1983 questions and let stand the CA holding barring
petitioners' claims - under-- Title - VII.
Monell is - the =.only -one
of these cases to present the question whether a municipal
entity, here a school board, is itself a "person" within the
meaning of § 1983. CA 2, while reaching the same result as
CA 5, analogized the case to the Eleventh Amendment and
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
In - its current posture,
the relief sought in Monell is limited to backpay.

I

-

5 -

Monell is the one case of the three in which the courts
below did not reach the merits. Respondents argue that they
are not liable for a policy adopted and maintained in good
faith and without discriminatory motive before this Court
announced its decision in Cleveland Board of Education v.
La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Parenthetically, petitioners
rely in part on La Fleur itself as authority for the propriety
of awarding backpay in this case.
Thurston is the narrowest of the cases.
It presents the
quest1on whether jurisdiction lies for a § 1983 suit for backpay
against individual municipal officials acting in their official
capacities.
In deciding the question, the CA relied on Muzquiz.
Non-monetary equitable relief was granted in the DC and affirmed
by the CA; there is no cross petition.
Petitioner Thurston's constitutional claims were sustained
on the merits in both courts below~
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983 Actions

(Who are Persons, and when
may they be sued?)

Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York

___ F. 2d ___ (CA2, March 8, 1976)*

The plaintiffs (petitioners) were female employees of the
New York City Department of Social Services (department) and
of the New York City Board of Education (board).
suit under

§

They brought

1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts attacking

rules of these city agencies that compelled pregnant employees
to take unpaid leaves of absence before medical reasons required
them to do so.

CA2 held that the 1972 amendment to Title VII

(applicable to municipal employees) was not retroactive.

I am

not interested in this issue.
The remaining tissue (whether these city agencies, and the
members thereof), are " persons"within the meaning of
a question of considerable importance.

§

1983, is

My guess is that the

Court will grant certiorari on this issue.
I dictate this memorandum not because of the probability
of a "grant" , but primarily to record - for my memorandum file
on § 1983 - some of the statements by CA2 (Judge Gurfein).

*As of the date of this memorandum this case is pending on
petition for cert No. 75-1914, and the case may well be granted
at our Conference today.

2.
Municipal Boards and

~encies

CA2 held that "the Board of Education is no more a 'person'
than the state university, the city employees' retirement system
or the city transit authority (all of which have been held by the
New York federal courts not to be "persons")."
cert at p. A48.

See petition for

The Court noted that "all funds for use of the

board must be appropriated by the city • • • the funds are public
funds appropriated for [the board's) use as if it were a department
of the city government."
Officials Sued in "Official Capacities"
This is the more interesting issue.

Judge Gurfein's opinion

is interesting:
~
"We must, however, considr appellants' claim that
the officia~named in their complaint may be sued in
their official capacities under §1983 for damages,
even though the money would have to come out of the
city treasury.
"There is no doubt that municipal and state
officials, sued in their official capacities, are
'persons' !Nithin ~he meaning of §1983 when they are
sued for (:!njunctiv~ or declaratory relief. See
Wri~ht N.~~ Transit Police, slip op. 1561,
156 -63 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 1976); Gresham v. Chambers,
501 F.2d 687, 690 (2d Cir. 1974); Er&mann v. Stevens,
458 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
u.s. 889 (1972). It is also true that individual
officials who violate the civil rights of plaintiffs
may be required to respond to damages for their tortious
conduct out of their own pockets. Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 u.s. 232, 238 (1974).
t'\
"In this case, unlike Scheuer, there are no \", _\
al~e. gations that the individual defendants acted o~~e
th icope of their offices or in an arbitrary manner.
Th ~ividual defendants are sued here solely in their
official capacities.

3.

"Appellants would have us merge two discrete
conceptions to award relief. They would have us
entertain suit against the official who committed an
unconstitutional act, without malice, solely ex officio,
even though from the nature of th~ relief sought - back
pay - an award must come out of the public treasury of
the Board of Education ." A 53- A 55 of Pet for Cert
The court reached the foregoing conclusion by analogy to
the 11th Amendment, and our decision Edelman v. Jordan.

When

damages which are sought in a 1983 action have to be paid by the
city, it is ~e ._re~-~-~rty_ in i~~e:~s:.__ nd is not a ''person"
under § 1983.
Implication that 1983 lies only for "arbitrary" or "malicious"
conduct.
Judge Gurfein recognized, in the language quoted above,
that 1983 authorizes suit against officials who violate the
civil rights of plaintiffs by their "tortious conduct".

But

the situation is different where the individual defendants are
acting within the scope of their official duties.

Judge Gurfein

held that in the latter case, where they are sued "solely in
their official capacities'', 1983 does ·not lie because a money
judgment would be paid by the city or state agency.
But Judge Gurfein noted that there was no allegation in
this case of defendants having acted "in an arbitrary manner"
or with "malice''.

Does this language suggest that something

more than mere negligence must be shown in a 1983 suit even
where the defendant is a "person" for jurisdictional purposes?

.4.
To be sure Judge Gurfein was not addressing this question ,
and his language is hardly "on point 11 directly.

One also could

construe his language as saying that if the individual defendant
had acted in an arbitrary manner or with malice, a 1983 suit
would like even if the official were acting within the scope
of his official duties .

L. F. P., Jr.
ss
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Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Sam Estreicher
Date: November 4, 1977
Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dep't of Social Services
Because I have heard through the "grapevine" that
some of the other Justices may be receptive to a
reexamination of Monroe v. Pape along the lines that I
have suggested to you, I thought it might prove useful to
offer a relatively brief restatement of my approach.
I propose a reexamination of the meaning of the
1871 Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment. In my
view, the measure was rejected because (1) it sought to
impose liability for failure to prevent or take action
against lawlessness when many municipalities lacked
general police powers under the law of their states, and
(2) it imposed vicarious, indeed strict, liability for the
conduct of private individuals. Contrary to the language
of some of our prior decisions, I doubt where there was
any general intention to shield municipal and county
treasuries or whether the Republican legislators
entertained serious doubts as to congressional power to
legislate with respect to political subdivisions of a
state.
The legislative history can best be understood as
a limiting the statutory ambit to actual wrongdoers, i.e.,
a rejection of respondeat superior or other principle of
vicarious liability. There is no dispute, after Monroe at
least, that a public official can be held personally

2.

answerable in damages for his own conduct in violation of
the Constitution. The question is when can a governmental
entity be held liable for its wrongdoing. Of course, the
argument can be made that all action "under color of law"
is attributable to the governmental entity which can be
said to have authorized the conduct by clothing the
wrongdoer with public office. This position was rejected
in Monroe. And I would argue that the preclusion of
governmental liability for the tortious conduct of
individual officials which was not mandated or
specifically authorized, and indeed may be violative of
state or local law, is consistent with the rejection of
vicarious liability as an operative principle of the
statute. Since the claims in Monroe and Moor v. County of
Alameda were expressly founded on the doctrine of
respondeat superior, they would not be maintainable under
my theory.
At the other extreme, local ordinances, school
board regulations and consciously adopted policies or
practices, in the Rizzo v. Goode sense, constitute conduct
by the governmental entity qua entity. It would be absurd
to hold public officials personally liable for
implementing such laws or policies, unless, of course, the
laws were patently unconstitutional. If there is any
wrongdoing, it is in the policy itself, not in the
implementation. If there is a "wrongdoer," it is the
promulgator of the law or policy.

3.

City of Kenosha v. Bruno involved the rejection
of liquor licenses by the governing bodies of the
municipality. Under my view, that case was wrongly
decided. It was the first case to apply Monroe to conduct
which was both authorized under state law and directly
rather than vicariously -- responsible for the claimed
constitutional injury. The legislative history of the
Sherman Amendment, and the possibility that the approach
taken in Monroe might not apply outside of the respondeat
superior context, was neither briefed nor argued, for the
Court raised the jurisidictional question on its own
motion. My view, however, does not require overruling City
of Kenosha, for no individual public officials were made
party to that litigation at the outset. The Attorney
General of Wisconsin intervened as party defendant, but
the lower court had not addressed "whether the
intervention of the Attorney General as a party would cure
the jurisdictional defect which we now find to exist in
appellees' complaint." 412 U.S. at 513-14. The Court
remanded on this point. In all frankness, it should be
noted that City of Kenosha involved a claim for equitable
relief only.
One further point about City of Kenosha. That
decision will have to be disturbed no matter what the
Court does in the Monell case. Petrs have asserted a
theory that is consistent with the language of

City~

Kenosha: resp public officials are indisputably "persons"

4.
for purposes of

§

1983, and City of Kenosha counsels

against a "bifurcated application" of that term "depending
on the nature of the relief sought against them." 412 U.S.
at 513. From resps' point of view, however, the answer is
that affirmance of CA 2's decision does not mean that
public officials are not "persons" in

§

1983 damages

actions, but rather that such relief is not available
against them.
In all likelihood, Aldinger v. Howard is also at
odds with my approach. In that case, a county appointing
officer, acting pursuant to a state statute which
authorized him to "revoke each appointment at pleasure,"
discharged a clerk. Since the defendant was acting
pursuant to express state authorization, there would ~
public entity liability for the consequences of this
express policy of the public entity. It should be noted
that plaintiffs in that case conceded that the county was
not suable under the Act.
The difficult cases lie in the middle, where the
public official is exercising delegated authority in a
manner fully consistent with state and local law. I would
break these cases down into two categories. First, there
is the situation exemplified by a police chief who
announces a policy to all field officers that they are to
stop and frisk anyone they please without worrying about
"articulable suspicion" or other legal mumbo-jumbo
the type of police practice contemplated in the Rizzo
decision. The police chief would be individually liable, I

5.

would think. But is the city liable simply because it has
not acted to curb this particular exercise of the
authority delegated to the police chief? My tentative
answer would be in the affirmative. The city has allocated
its policy-making power in such a way that the police
chief acts for the city in making policy on police
matters. Accordingly, the city is responsible for its
policy, even though promulgated by a delegatee.
Second, I would distinguish the case of a police
chief who dismisses his secretary without a hearing or
because of her first amendment activity. In sucha case,
the police chief, while acting "under color of law," is
not making policy for the city. The police chief may be
personally liable, barring any defenses, but he cannot be
held liable in his official capacity.
One final note. No prior decision need be
overruled if the Court holds that while governmental
entities are not "persons" under the Act, the policies
behind the rejection of the Sherman Amendment do not
prevent retroactive or restitutionary relief against
public officials in their official capacity where the
governmental entity qua entity can be said to have worked
the constitutional injury in question.

*

*

*

*

I am not sure this discussion will persuade you
to my view, but I thought you would appreciate a more
coherent statement of this approach than is contained in
the bench memo.

7

I

.. ~:t·~JI

Dear Chief:
'·' '1'1:

As you wil l' recall, my vote to reverse in the
above case was about as tentative as a vote can be.
Since the Conference, I have devoted further time
to the case with the hope of firming up a position one way
or the other. I find this area of the law {1983 and the
related issues of immunity) to be wholly unsatisfactory.
In any event, I am not at rest, and wanted you - and
members of the Conference - to know this before assignments
are made.
~
'·
~

,.

,i,.·~

~~~;, t;;~r~-:~ ~:~.~~-.JV·.··"~,)~.• . .,
'

"'

My notes indicate that you and Potter also
passed. This suggests the absence of a Court at
time. If any Justice is disposed to circulate a
memorandum, I am sure I would find it helpful.
Sincerely,

Chief
lfp/ss
cc:

\

The

.§u:prmtt <!Jttu.rt ttf flrt ~dt .§taUs
~asfrittghm.

15.

<!J. 2ll,?'Jl.~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

November 11, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Re:

75-1914

Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of NYC

As I indicated at the Conference on the above
case, tomorrow I will assign for the writing of a memorandum,
purusant to the usual practice when we have a "no court"
situation.
Regards,

.

~uprttttt

<!fomi of tqt ~iftb ~Wts
~ltl'Ifington, ~. <!f. 2llp'!~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

November 14, 1977

RE: No. 75-1914 Monell v. Department of Social Services
of New York City
Dear Chief:
I'll undertake to prepare a memorandum along the lines
Byron, Thurgood, John and I advanced at conference.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

75-1914

MONELL v. DEPT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Argued 10/12/77
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To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Sam Estreicher

Date:

October 18, 1977

(~!,..~~)
75-1914

Monell v. Dept. of Social Services
of the City of New York

The petition presents the following question:
Whether local governmental officials
and/or local independent school boards
are "persons" within the meaning of 42
u.s.c. § 1983 when equitable relief in
the nature of back pay is sought
against them in their official
capacities?
The "school board" half of the question was reserved in
~!_._Heal!EY_School

District v. Doyle, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572 (1977).

At the outset, I would like to identify my general
outlook on this case.

In my view, Monroe's exclusion of

municipalities from the coverage of § 1 of the 1871 Civil
Rights Act, now 42

u.s.c.

§

1983, is a judicial redefinition

of the statute not supported by its text or legislative
history.
The Monroe Court premised its holding on the House's
rejection of the Sherman Amendment, an unprecedented measure
which sought to impose vicarious liability on governmental
'II

...............

~~,.....twz:A

tw=

subdivisions for riots and conspiracies of private citizens.
There was no attempt to examine the specific legislative
intent behind passage of § 1 of the Act, which in terms admits
of no exceptions and which passed both houses without
significant difficulty.

Amici in this case argue,

2.

persuasively that the sponsors of Section 1 intended the
measure to be coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment and
"nowhere indicated an intention to rein in its sweep short of
the minicipal treasury.

They knew that the prohibitions of

the Fourteenth Amendment • . . applied to municipalities, and
they knew that municipalities did not enjoy the protection of
the Eleventh Amendment."

(Amici Br., App. 15a-16a)

Only a month before the civil rights bill was
introduced, Congress enacted a "dictionary act," which
provided in pertinent part:
That in all Acts hereafter passed
• the word 'person' may extend and be
applied to bodies politic and corporate,
and the reference to any officer shall
include any person authorized by law to
perform the duties of such office, unless
the context shows that such words were
intended to be used in a much more
limited sense
Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.

J. Douglas

in Monroe dismissed the "dictionary act" definition of
"person" as "merely an allowable, not a mandatory one."

u.s.

365

167, 191.
The Court's reading of the Sherman Amendment debates

displayed little sensitivity to the context in which the
remarks were made.

The statements of opposition were

addressed to a particular proposal, one involving the feature
of vicarious liability, the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to
reach private conduct, and the imposition of police-power
responsibilities on local governments which may not have been

·.
3.

so endowed by their state legislatures.

Given the

unrestricted sweep of § 1, and the virtual absence of debate
over a measure which sought to make actionable the broad
commands of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress'
contemporaneous awareness that the term "person" cou l d be
given a special meaning to encompass "bodies politic and
corporate," the Sherman Amendment debates provide but marginal
support for any generalized intention to exclude state

~~

government subdivisions from the reach of § 1983.

.
f

My predisposition is to limit Monroe, rather than

extend it as far as logic will permit.

But if Monroe and its

progeny stand for the proposition that the 42d Congress
intended a broad exclusion for political subdivisions of a
state, whether because of a perceived constitutional barrier
to federal power or a desire to shield municipal and county
treasuries, I doubt whether a principled stopping point can be
found.
The logic of Monroe and its progeny leads to certain
ironical results.

'

~

............

First, § 1983 does not authorize

restitutionary or retroactive relief for the actions of state
and local governmental units working a constitutional
deprivation, even though such actions are fully consistent
with, or indeed mandated by~ state law.
~ state

~

The "under color of"

law debate in Monroe is stood on its head.

Section 1983

provides a monetary recovery only for unauthorized state
action, the very conduct that J. Frankfurter argued was not

..e_~

~

4.
encompassed by the "under color" language of § 1983.

Second,

and perhaps more importantly, the absence of any remedy -outside of the types of employment discrimination

proscribed

by the 1972 amendments to Title VII -- for authorized state
action in violation of constitutional requirements may very
well pressure the Court to recognize a Bivens. remedy for all
constitutional rights made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Reexamination of Monroe's

interpretation of § 1983 would seem preferable to the
predictable alternative of

judicial implication of a

monetary cause of action for all constitutional vioJ.ations
working a compensable harm.

I.

Prior Decisions of this Court
Before discussing the question presented, I think it

would be useful to set out the Court's previous rulings in
this area.
Addressing a claim that the City of Chicago "is
liable for the acts of its police officers, by virtue of
respondeat superior"

(Petrs' Br. 21), namely, a warrantless,

early morning raid and ransacking of a black family's home,
the Court in Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167, 189 (1961), held
that "Congress did not undertake to bring municipal
corportions with the ambit of [§1983] ."

In the Court's view,

the defeat of the Sherman Amendment stemmed from Congress' uncertainty
that

·· it had the constitutional power to impose "any

obligation upon county and town organizations, the

5.

mere instrumentality for the administration of state law."
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess 804

(Rep. Poland).

The

Court's ultimate conclusion was that "[t]he response of the
Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable for
certain actions being brought within federal purview by the
Act of April 20, 1971, was so antagonistic that we cannot
believe that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act
to include them."

365

u.s.

at 191..!/

Moor v. County of Alameda, 411

u.s.

693

(1973),

involved a claim of vicarious liability against a county for
injuries allegedly suffered as a result of a wrongful
discharge of a shotgun by a county deputy sheriff engaged in
quelling a civil disturbance.

Petitioners in Moor did not

challenge "the holding in Monroe concerning the status under §
1983 of public entities such as the County."

Id. at 700.

Their argument was that since the county was vicariously
liable for the sheriff's actions under state law, 42

u.s.c.

§

1988, the general civil rights "borrowing statute,"
"authorizes the adoption of such state law into federal law in
order to render the Civil Rights Acts fully effective, thereby
creating a federal cause of action against the County.

Id. at

698-99.

J. Marshall, for the Court, declined the invitation.
He reasoned that the 1871 Congress' doubts as to "its
constitutional power to impose liability on political
subdivisions of the States," 411 U.S. at 708, led it to reject

6.

in toto the Sherman Amendment although "even in 1871
municipalities which were subject to suit under state law did
not pose in the minds of the legislators the constitutional
problem that caused the defeat of the proposal,"

id. at 710.

The Moor Court refused to permit § 1988, particularly in light
of its requirement of conformity with federal law, to be used
"to accomplish what Congress clearly refused to do in enacting
§

19 8 3 • "

I d . , at 71 0

}I

In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412

u.s.

507 (1973), for

the first time, the Court applied Monroe to conduct which was
both authorized under state law and directly - rather than
vicariously - responsible for the claimed constitutional
injury.

Appellee owners of retail liquor establishments

sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the cities of
Racine and Kenosha because their governing bodies had denied
renewal of appellees' one-year liquor licenses without holding
a full-blown advisory hearing and because the local licensing
scheme was unconstitutional.
Raising the jurisdictional question as its own
motion, the Kenosha Court held that a municipality is not a
"person" under the Act regardless of the nature of the relief
sought.

J. Rehnquist stated:
We find nothing in the legislative
history discussed in Monroe, or in the
language actually used by Congress, to
suggest that the generic word "person" in
§ 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated
application to municipal corporations

7.
depending on the nature of the relief
sought against them.
412 U.S. at 513.

ll

The Court's fourth and last encounter with the
question was Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).

Aldinger

involved a discharge of a clerk pursuant to a state statute
authorizing the appointing county officer to "revoke each
appointment at pleasure."

The disappointed ex-clerk brought

suit against the appointing county officer, his wife, the
named county commissioners, and the county.

While conceding

that counties were not "persons" under § 1983, petitioners
argued that the DC could exercise "pendent party" jurisdiction
with respect to a claim brought under§§ 1343(3) and 1983.
The Aldinger Court rejected this new effort to
circumvent Monroe because "Congress has by implication
declined to extend federal jurisdiction over a party such as
Spokane County."

427

u.s.

at 19.

J. Rehnquist recognized

that the 1871 Congress was aware of the exercise of federal
diversity jurisdiction over municipal corporations, but found
that "the refusal of Congress to authorize suits against
municipal corporations under the cognate provisions of
§1983 is sufficient to defeat the asserted claim of
pendent-party jurisdiction."

Id. at 17-18 n. 12.

8.

II.

Resolution Consistent With Monroe And Its Progeny
A.

School Boards
1.

Considerations of Stare Decisis.
This Court has entertained a great many actions

ag ~ nst scho_2~oa..rds,
-

and petitioners identify at least eight L•~J.,.~•. J.IJ
w--4-t~-"-

which wer e EJ~mised_ solel y_ o__.!2J.. l ?J 3 and 28
Petrs' Br. 15 fn.**).

u.s.

§

1343 (see ~-Ar ~

However, petitioners do not dispute

~

CA 2's assumption that individual public officials were
co-defendants in every one of the cases (id. at 17; CA op., p.
A51)

.!/

Thus, there may have been an independent basis

for subject matter jurisdiction in each case.

Admittedly, at

least after Aldinger, there can be no pendent party
jurisdiction over a non-"person" for purposes of § 1983.
Misjoinder of the school board, however, would not defeat the
Court's jurisdiction over the case.

In some of the decisions,

-------------------

the Court's language is addressed to the school board
--~------ ...
defendant, qua school board.~/ This language does not

-

-

...

constitute an explicit determination of jurisdiction, and can
be reinterpreted as simply a directive to the individual
defendants, the individuals who would have been responsible
for ensuring compliance with the Court's mandate in any event.
Of course, even if there were no independent basis of
jurisdiction, the Court is "not bound by previous exercises of
jurisdiction in cases in which our power to act was not
questioned but was passed sub silentio .
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 307 (1962).

"

Brown Shoe Co.

Both in Monroe,

9.

365

u.s.

at 191 n. 50 and Kenosha, 412

u.s.

at 512, the Court

felt no compulsion to adhere to the unreflective exercise of
jurisdiction in prior decisions.
No. 75-1443

Accord, Califano v. Sanders,

(decided February 23, 1977), slip op. 6; Edelman

v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974); United States v.
Tucker Truck Lines, 344

u.s.

33, 38 (1952).

Petitioners counter that here, as in Brown Shoe Co.,
370 U.S. at 306-07, the exercise of jurisdiction over school
boards has been longstanding and notorious.

The likelihood of

an independent basis of jurisdiction undercuts the argument
that the Court may not lightly "disregard the implications of
an exercise of judicial authority assumed to be proper for
over" 20 years.
The notoreity contention enjoys somewhat more force.
Congress has not only been aware of, but has specifically
focused on, this Court's school board decisions on a number of
occasions

(see Petrs' Br. 21-23; Amici Br. 15-16).

Here, too,

the absence of an explicit prior ruling, compare Flood v.
Kuhn, 407

u.s.

258

(1972), and the likely presence of an

independent basis of jurisdiction in the school board cases
cut against considerations of stare decisis.

Of course, the

Court can take the position that § 1983 jurisdiction over
school boards has been implicitly ratified by the prevailing
sense of justice today.
(1976)

(Stevens, J.,

Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191

10.
concurring).

However, there are no "considered holdings" of

recent vintage, id. at 186-87 (Powell, J., concurring)
counseling against reexamination of precedents.
2.

Non-independent School Boards.

The Court, if it wishes to, can pretermit the
question of whether a truly independent school board, enjoying
the taxing and spending powers of an independent government
entity, is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983.

~

In this

~

case, however, the New York City Board of Education must be
considered an adjunct, a department of, the municipality, and

...

...........

...

~

thus within the express holding of Monroe.~/
Although it enjoys an independent corporate
existence, N. Y. Educ. Law § 2551, and has some

~~- ~

discretio~·~· ~

(1939), the New York City Board of Educ. lacks requisite
independence because the city controls the purse strings.

The

Board enjoys no independent taxing or bond issuing authority.
-----~

~

"-"'= ,-,

~

"'*".,

--

,.awa~

All monies appropriated to the use of the Board, regardless of
source, are paid into the municipal treasury.
§

2580.

N. Y. Educ. Law

The Board prepares an annual estimate for the fiscal

year which it submits to the Mayor.

If the budget exceeds a

predetermined point, the excess must be approved by the Board
of Estimate, City Council and the Mayor.
§

2576(5).

N.Y. Educ. Law

Thus, a damages award against the Board may

require additional, unbudgeted disbursements from the
municipal fisc.

~w

~~~~~

over spending, Davisich v. Marshall, 281 N.Y. 170, 173-74

------

1!-,1_

Moreover, the Board holds title in the name

11.
of the City.

N.Y.C. Charter § 521.

Furthermore, although

petitioners emphasize the fixed terms and day-to-day
independence of Board members, respondents point out that
members, who receive their appointments from the Mayor and
borough presidents, must make yearly reports to the Mayor and
may be removed "for cause."

N.Y. Educ. Law § 2590-b(l)

(a)~

N.Y.C. Charter §§ 522-23.
3.

Independent School Boards.

Assuming there is requisite independence, the Court
must decide the question left open in Mt. Healthy.

The

circuits are split over the issue.2/
The argument against inclusion of school boards
within § 1983 is based largely upon this Court's recognition
in Moor, by way of dicta, that "the root of the [Sherman]
~

proposal's difficulties stemmed from serious legislative
concern as to Congress' constitutional power to impose
liability on political subdivisions of the States."

411 U.S.

at 708.
Petitioners urge the Court to limit Monroe-Kenosha to
municipalities and counties, on the premise that 1871 Congress
was not concerned with immunizing all governmental entities
from liability for unconstitutional policies or practices.
They note that public school boards were not generally in
existence in 1871, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347

u.s.

483, 489-90 (1954), and that this Court has recognized that
school boards are uniquely autonomous entities, Milliken v.

12.

v. Bradley, 418

u.s.

717, 741 (1974).

Petitioners offer no principled basis for their
suggested limitation, other than the factual argument that the
Sherman Amendment addressed only municipalities, counties and
perhaps other units with general governmental powers.

Moor's

reading of the legislative history refutes their contention.
If the 1871 Congress believed it lacked the power to legislate
with respect to political subdivisions of a state, it is
unlikely that it would have drawn a distinction, relevant to
congressional power, between subdivisions with general powers
and special purpose governmental units.

And to the extent

Congress was concerned with protecting local treasuries,
school boards are likely to have limited powers to borrow and
tax, and thus are in even a less flexible position to respond
to damage and back-pay awards.

-

In essence, petrs are

c~ling

for a reappraisal of

the Sherman Amendment history.~~----~-------~-----------This is a call for a more

-

restrictive reading of Congress' rejection of the Sherman
proposal, as representing simply (1) a refusal to impose
vicarious liability on governmental subdivisions, or (2) a
refusal to interfere with a state's internal allocation of its
general police powers.
The first view is not tenable after Kenosha and
Aldinger.

Both cases involved claims for relief which were

premised on the conduct of the city and county as governmental
entities, not on a theory of respondeat superior

13,
or any other principle of vicarious liability.

In Kenosha,

plaintiffs sought relief from the denial of liquor licenses by
municipal governing bodies.

Similarly, in Aldinger,

plaintiffs sought damages against the county because its
official, acting with the authorization of a state statute,
discharged plaintiff from his clerical position without
providing a due process hearing.
The second view argues that school boards are suable
because they have no police power responsibilities, and thus
would not have been subject to the Sherman Amendment even if
it had become law.

This view, too, does not square with the

Court's language in Moor.

-

In sum, school boards, even those enjoying
independent taxing and spending powers, cannot be regarded as
" ~ rso ~th ~

the m;._aning of § 19 ~ , unless the Court is

willing to adopt a reading of the legislative history of the
Sherman Amendment which focuses on the specific features of
the Sherman proposal found odious by Congress, Monroe's
reading, however, supports a broad principle of immunity for
all governmental units.
B.

Public Officials Sued in Their Representative Capacity
1.

Prior Decisons.

Petrs place a great deal of

reliance on this Court's affirmance of judgments involving
retroactive monetary awards against public officials sued in
their representative capacity.
441, 445

See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.

(1973); Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414

u.s.

14.
632, 638 (1974).

However, the Court in these cases was not

passing on the lawfulness of the relief.

Thus, for example,

the Court's reference to "appropriate relief" in LaFleur, 414
U.S. at 638, was simply part of the statement of facts, not a
"considered decision" on the permissibility of retroactive
recovery in § 1983 suits against public officials sued in
their official capacity.
Petrs also refer to Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
677

(1974) , maintaining that the Court would not have passed

on the Eleventh Amendment issue, had there been a dispositive
statutory ground for denying recovery.

The Edelman Court may

have acted contrary to the Ashwander doctrine, but here, too,
there was no "considered decision."

The same must be said for

the language in Edelman, that "[t]hough a § 1983 action may be
instituted by public aid recipients, such as respondent, a
federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive
relief, Ex parte Young, supra, and may not include a
retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the
state treasury."
states that a

§

415

u.s.

at 677.

This language simply

1983 action may be brought against public

officials in their representative capacity; it does not pass
on the permissible scope of § 1983 relief in such a case.
Although there is no "considered decision" on point,
there are at least two decisionswhich touch on the issue.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

u.s.

In

232, 237-38 (1974), the Court held

15.
~

the Eleventh Amendment to be inapplicable in the context of a
§

1983 action against public officials in their personal

capacity.

Chief Justice Burger noted: "Analyzing the

complaints in light of these precedents, we see that
petitioners allege facts that demonstrate they are seeking to
impose individual and personal liability on the

~amed

defendants for what they claim -- but have not yet established
by proof -- was a deprivation of federal rights by these
defendants under color of state law."

Id. at 238.

The

language suggests that the Eleventh Amendment barrier to
monetary recovery from state officials is inapplicable only
where the "individual and personal liability" is sought to
imposed.
A contrary indication signal is found in Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976).

I

Justice Rehnquist stated:

Respondents, in their effort to bring themselves
within the language of Swann, ignore a critical
factual distinction between their case and the
desegration cases decided by this Court. In the
latter, segregation imposed by law had been
implemented by state authorities for varying periods
of time, whereas in the instant case the District
Court found that the responsible authorities had
played no affirmative part in depriving any members
of the two respondent classes of any constitutional
rights. Those against whom injunctive relief was
directed in such cases as Swann and Brown were not
administrators and school board members who had in
their employ a small number of individuals, which
latter on their own deprived black students of their
constitutional rights to a unitary school system.
They were administrators and school board members who
were found by their own conduct in the administration
of the school system to have denied those rights.
Here, the District Court found that none of the
petitioners had deprived the respondent classes of
any rights secured under the Constitution.

16.
~

Although neither Swann nor Brown involved retroactive monetary
awards, the public officials in those cases were sued in their
representative capacities.
suggests that a

§

Justice Rehnquist's language

1983 suit against a public official in his

representative capacity is not a suit against the governmental
entity which the officials represents, but is a suit against
the official for conduct violative of the Constitution.

On

the other hand, the language is fully consistent with the
Eleventh Amendment distinction between prospective relief
against the individual, which is permitted, and retroactive
monetary relief against the public fisc, which is barred.

See

Edelman v. Jordan.
2.

Petr's Position.

Scheuer v. Rhodes is of little

avail to petrs because, in all likelihood, resps could defeat
personal liability by interposing a reasonable, good faith
defense in the maintenance of a mandatory maternity leave
policy prior to Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur.~/
Rather, petrs argue that municipal officials are indisputably
"persons" for

§

1983 purposes, and resps may be compelled "to

exercise the power that is theirs," Griffin v. School Board of
Prince Edward County, 377

u.s.

218, 233 (1964), to remedy

their own unconstitutional, albeit authorized, conduct.
approach, which they claim

17.

We contend only that the city official who
committed the constitutional violation, and
who is thus a proper party defendant in a
section 1983 action, must use all bj s
offic'
owers to reme dy tfi at violation.
Such a rule will only enta1l mone ary relief
where the defendant who engaged in the
violation was the chief executive or policy
making body of the city or country, or some
other high ranking official authorized to
direct the expenditure of funds. The primary
application of this construction will be in
instances where, as here, the highest
officials of a city or county adopt or effect
an official policy directing, in violation of
the constitution, that money be taken or
withheld.
This issue, we contend, goes to the \
remedial authority of a court, not to its
jurisdiction. It is not denied that the
district court in this action had
jurisdiction over both the persons of the
mayor and other individual defendants, and
over the subject matter of the action . . . •
Absent some special constraint the federal
court would have plenary authority to order
the individuals to take any action within
their legal and physical abaility to remedy
the constitutional violation which occurred.

!
l

r

(Petrs' Br. 34-35).

Amici add that a public official is a

"person" under the Act, and Kenosha counsels against a
bifurcated interpretation of the statutory term depending on
the nature of the relief sought.

According to amici, CA 2's

analogy to the Eleventh Amendment principles was inapposite.
The Court's resolution of competing constitutional provisions
in the line of authority beginning with Ex Parte Young and
culminating in Edelman v. Jordan is not a line drawn from
first principles, and has no applicability to a

§

1983 action

against municipal officials where no constitutional barrier to
retroactive recovery is present.

18.
3.

Resps' Position.

Resps restate the position of

CA 2, as to which there is some division among the

circuits.~/

J. Gurfein held that retroactive recovery was

barred because such relief necessarily implicates the
municipal treasury.

Thus, the argument goes, the municipal

official is merely a nominal defendant, and the real
party-in-fact is the municipality, a non-"person" for purposes
of

§

1983.
4.

Analysis.

Petrs' position rests on the premise

that Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment represents a
refusal to impose vicarious liability on the subdivisions of a
~~~-

..-

state, and that there was no intention to shield the
"wrongdoer" from liability, even if the "wrongdoing" in
question is simply a public official's execution of a statute
or policy authorized by local law.

This view, I would argue,

is more consistent with the Congressional intent than
Monroe-Kenosha's broad rule of exclusion of state and local
government units.
Section 1 of the 1871 Act passed without significant
opposition.

And the Sherman proposal itself was not

completely discarded.

In the substitute measure, now 42

U.S.C. § 1986, Congress conditioned liability for failure to
prevent private conspiracies to violate civil rights on proof
of knowledge of the conspiracy and ability to prevent its
occurrence.

Even Representative Poland, whose remarks are

quoted in Monroe for the proposition that

19.

Congress believed it lacked the power to impose liability for
civil rights violations on local governments, was willing to
impose sanctions for actual wrongdoing.

Immediately following

the very statement quoted in Monroe, 365

u.s.

at 187, Rep.

Poland cautioned:
We would go as far as [the Senate conferees]
chose to go in inflicting any punishment or
imposing any liability upon any man who shall
fail to do his duty in relation to the
suppression to the suppression of those
wrongs.
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804.
An interpretation of the legislative history to

---

-

permit an action to recover monies withheld or appropriated in
~

,.._,

...............

....... ....-.......

........ ,-,

.-._......

...............

---

~

violation of the Constitution by local officials acting under

______

the specific____...........
authorization of local law would be consistent
with the congressional determination to rule out recovery
premised on respondeat superior or other principles of
vicarious liability, would not involve the unfairness of
imposing liability on municipalities who were without legal
authority to prevent the unconstitutional conduct, and would
be consonant with the view of some of the Congressmen that
congressional power extended only to individuals, not
governments.
treasuries.

Such a view would permit incursions into local
But given the undisputed availability of

-

prospective relief which may involve significant expenditures
(Amici Br. 15), I doubt whether Congress can be said to have
intended to erect a complete shield to

monetary

liability outside of the specific context of the Sherman
proposal.

20.
On the other hand, the legislative history as
interpreted in this Court's prior rulings supports CA 2's
Eleventh Amendment analogy.

If the 42d Congress excluded

local governments because of a perceived absence of power, CA
2 properly relied Eleventh Amendment principles to bar suits
where the municipality or the county is the party-in-fact.

In

sum, CA 2 should be affirmed unless the Court is willing to
reexamine Monroe.
III.

A Call for Reexamination of Monroe's Reading of the

Legislative History.
The National Educational Ass'n. and Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, as amici curiae, have
written a very persuasive brief that Monroe's reading of the
legislative history is in substantial measure erroneous.

~recommend

I

a perusal of the 32-page appendix to that brief.

That discussion has convinced me that Congress did not doubt
its power to remedy "wrongdoing" by public officials, whether
acting pursuant to explicit statutory direction or "under
color of" local law, and there was no general intent to
protect municipal treasuries.

The expressions of doubt as to

legislative power and of concern to limit municipal liability
were made in response to the Sherman Amendment.
was defeated because
liability;

(2)

(1)

it sought to impose vicarious

it c 0 ncer,1 ed private conduct, not state action;
- - - - -....~=-=

(3)

That proposal

=-:a:wa

~

it was unfair because many municipalities lacked general

police powers; and (4) it interfered with a state's internal
delegation of police powers.
in this case.

Those concerns are not present

21.
I was surprised to learn that a full account of the
legislative history of the 1871 Act has not been made
previously to this Court.

In Monroe, petrs argued that

Chicago should be held liable "for the acts of its police
officers, by virtue of respondeat superior."
21).

(Petrs' Br.

Petrs' only reference to the legislative history was to

the "dictionary act" and a short footnote on the Sherman
Amendment (id. at 29, 30 n. 22).

Resps, on the other hand,

simply argued that municipalities should not be held liable
"no matter how innocent of wrongdoing they might be, and no
matter what ordinances they might enact, or laws that the
state might enact to prevent."

(Resps' Br. 26) .

Moor v. County of Alameda was also a vicarious
liability case.
n. 27.

See 411

u.s.

at 693, 694, 696, 698, 700, 710

Petrs did not take issue with the holding of Monroe,

see id. at 700.

Petrs' legislative history argument was to

the effect that Congress' reluctance to impose liability on
municipalities should not result in a conferral of an immunity
not found in state law.

(Petrs' Br. 14-15).

Resps argued

broadly that Congress intended to exclude public entities.
(Resps' Br. 9) •
City of Kenosha v. Bruno was the first case not to
involve vicarious liability.

But there was no one to argue

for a limited reading of Monroe, as the Court raised the
question of jurisdiction on its own motion.

-

412 U.S. at 511.

In Aldinger v. Howard, petr did not contest Monroe's

--.........--

22.
exclusion of counties from the coverage of
at 16.

§

1983.

427 U.S.

The briefs contain no discussion of legislative

history.
I recommend a reexamination of the legislative
history of the 1871 Act.

This would not be for the purpose of

{ overruling the Monroe-Kenosha line of authority.

The results

in those decisions would not be disturbed by a reversal here
on the ground that re~~oactiy~ relief is available in a suit
against public officers in their representative capacity.
'
,......_.. ,...-..
......
...__,
Rather, reexamination is needed to permit a reformulation of
the Congressional concerns which prompted the rejection of the
Sherman Amendment.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Unless Monroe's reading of the legislative history is

reexamined, CA 2's ruling should be affirmed.

If the Court is

willing to reexamine Monroe's exposition of the reasons why
the Sherman proposal met defeat, I would reverse on petrs'
second theory.
~

any decision.

Such an outcome would not require overruling
However, it would remove some of the pressure

to extend Bivens beyond the Fourth Amendment context.

And it

would ensure the availability of complete redress from
unconstitutional conduct which violates no state or local law.

FOOTNOTES

!/Neither J. Harlan nor J. Frankfurter addressed
the municipalities issue in their separate opinions.

~/ The author of Monroe dissented, taking the
view that a county is a "person" under § 1983 for "a narrow
group of equity actions,"

411

u.s.

at 723, and that a state

action for damages could be appended under § 1988, id. at 725.

ll J.

Douglas again dissented on the same grounds

as in his Moor dissent.

!/

412

u.s.

507, 516.

I have not checked all the cases cited, but

neither petr nor amici have identified a case which was
brought against the school board alone.

It is also possible

that some of the cases involved allegations of§ 1331, e.g.,
Horne Tel. & Telegr. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913),
but I doubt if any inquiry was made as to satisfaction of the
jurisdictional amount requirement.

~/See, e.g., Davis v. Board of Cornrn'rs, 402 U.S.
33, 35 (1971); Carter v. West Feliciana School Bd., 396 U.S.
226, 228 (1969); Alexander v. Board of Education, 396

u.s.

20 (1969); Green v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430, 437-39, 441-42 (1968); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S.
103 (1965).

19,

FN-2.

~/ The lower courts have uniformly held that
state and municipal agencies are excluded from § 1983.
Municipal agencies:
(CA 2 1976)

See, e.g., Monell, 532 F.2d 259

(dept of social services); Musquiz v. City of San

Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (CA 5 1976) (en bane)

(firemen and

policemen's pension fund); Garrett v. City of Ham _tramck, 503
F.2d 1236, 1294 (CA 6 1974) (planing comm'n); United
Farmworkers of Fla. Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray
Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (CA 5 1974) (county planning board); Lehman

v. City of Pittsburgh, 474 F.2d 21 (CA 3 1973) (civil service
comm'n); Henschel v. Worcester

Police~~,

445 F.2d 624 (CA

1 197 4) (pol ice dep' t.) United States ex rel. Gi t tlemacker v.
County of Phila., 413 F.2d 84, 86 n. 2 (CA 3 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970) (city hospital).
State agencies:

See, e.g., Vick v. Texas Emp.

Comm'n., 514 F.2d 734 (CA 5 1975) (employment comm'n); Sykes v.
California, 497 F. 2d 197, 201 (CA 9 1974) (motor vehicles
bureau); Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586 (CA 5) cert denied,
419

u.s.

868 (1974) (highways dep't); Blanton v. State Univ. of

New York, 489 F.2d 377, 382 (CA 2 1973); Curtis v. Everette,
489 F.2d 516 (CA 3 1973), cert. denied, 416 F.2d 995
( 197 4) (bureau of correct ions) ; Henschel v. Worcester Pol ice
Dept., 445 F.2d 624 (CA 1 1971); Sellers v. Regents of Univ.
of Calif., 432 F.2d 493

(CA 9 1970), cert. denied, 401

u.s.

981 (1971); Bennett v. Calif., 406 F.2d 36 (CA 9), cert.
denied, 394

u.s.

966 (1969) (parole board); Clark v.

Washington, 366 F.2d 678 (CA 9 1966) (state bar ass'n).

FN-3.
]_/ "Persons" Within § 1983:

See Keckeisen v.

Indep. School Dist., 509 F.2d 1062, 1065 (CA 8), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 833

(1975); Aurora Educ. Ass'n. v. Board of Educ.,

490 F.2d 431, 435 (CA 7), cert. denied, 416

u.s.

985

(1974);

Scher v. Board of Educ., 424 F.2d 741, 743-44 (CA 3 1970); cf.
Brenden v. Indep. School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (CA 8
1973) (state high school league, a non-profit corporation
claiming membership of state's 485 public schools.
Excluded from § 1983:

See Monell, 532 F.2d at

262-64; Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield City School
Bd., 521 F.2d 1201 (CA 4 1975) (county school bd); Adkins v.
Duval County School Bd., 511 F.2d 690 (CA 5 1975); cf. Jordan
v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 498 F. 2d 514 (CA 8 1974).

~/

But see Myers v. Alabama, 238

cited in Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 237.

u.s.

368 (1915),

Myers was a§ 1983 action

against election officials who refused to allow plaintiffs to
vote because of a state law disqualifying them according to a
standard unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, see
Guinn v. United States, 238

u.s.

347

(1915).

~/ Compare ~onell, 532 F.2d 259, 264-67 (CA 2
1976), Musquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d 499 (CA 5
1976) (en bane), with Thomas v. Woods, 529 F.2d 916 (CA 4
1975) (back pay); Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield City
School Bd., 521 F. 2d 1201 (CA 4 1975) (dicta), and Incarcerated
Men of Allen County
fees) •

~

Farr, 507 F. 2d 281 (CA 6 1974) (counsel

Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Sam Estreicher
Date: October 29, 1977
Re: Monell v. Dep't of Soc ial Services of the City of New York
Petrs have filed a reply brief.

Essentially, they restate

their argument that, under state law, the Board of Education
is a separate entity from the City of New York. Petrs point
out that the Board has been vigorously litigating a serious
monetary claim against the City; that a substantial portion
of its budget comes from the state and federal governments
(out of a $2.8b budget for fiscal year 1976, Q8llm was
contributed by the state and$294m came from the feds; these
figures seem awfully high, even for the Big Apple); and tha t
the money to pay claims against the Board "co:me[s] out of the
City Treasury only in the sense that the City holds the
board's money for the latter and must pay it over upon the
latter's order."
pertinent
In my view, the

question is whether the Board

has independent taxing authority; to the best of my knowledge,
it does not.

\A

In any event, unless Monroe is reexamined,

all state and local governmental entities would seem to be

V\ excluded

from the term "person" in § 1983.
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE: No. 75-1914 Monell v. Department of Social Services

Enclosed is a revision of the proposed Court opinion
in Monell.

Parts II, III and IV are almost completely

new in an attempt to accommodate the very helpful suggestions of Byron, Lewis and John.

Part I(B) has also

been substantially revised in an effort for greater
clarity.

w.J.B. Jr.

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Sam Estreicher

Re:

Date:

April 22, 1978

No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept of Social Services--WJB's
2d Draft
I have read WJB's revised, somewhat longer(!!)

draft.

I have annotated this draft to indicate how WJB

responded to our suggestions.

In my view, WJB has

-

that we dis cerned, and

corrected most of the

~t1/r
_....,

I recommend that you join the opinion in its entirety o
J

However, I do want to point out the following:
1. There are a few lingering suggestions of the

.

"full power" point in the l a nguage of "complete remedy"

.....

(p.24) and the statement that § 1983 "provided the only
civil remedy coextensive with the Four teenth Amendment"
(p.26).

I have pointed this out to WJB's clerks, and

I believe that they will adopt the language you suggested
in your memorandum to WJB: that Congress intended t he
term "person: to include all officials and entities
within its constitutional reach, without suggesting that
other features of the statute are dictated either by the
Constitution or by 1871 understandings of constitutional
limits.
2. The discussion on p. 19, while an improvement
over the pr evious dr aft, does not clearly explain why
the Sherman Amendment is different from § 1983.

WJB's

argument i s that the opponents of the Sherman Amendment
would not have been troubled by a provision which made
municipalities liable for a constitutional violation

-2resulting from the exercise of powers they enjoyed as a
matter of state law. By contr ast, the Sherman Amendment
sought to impose a peace-keeping obligation on municipal i ties
that was not derived from state law or the Federal
Constitution .

In other words, the Sherman Amendment

sought to impose damages liability for a failure to
take action when municipalities were under no obligation
to take any action at all.
3. The word on p. 30 should be "policy," not "action. 11
4. On pp. 29-30, WJB has retained some of his "custom"
and "deliberate indifference" discussion, but in a somewhat
muted form.

I have no objection to the "custom" discussion~

as it follow from Justice Harlan's decision for the Court

J'

in Adickes , but you may wish to urge WJ B to eliminate

-

the treatment of Estelle v. Gamble in note 55.
5. WJB's new Part III on stare decisis is quite

------

persuasive, and may obviate the writing of a s epara te
opinion on our part.

I am troubled by the discussion

lr

of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976
on p.39.

I would simply say that the Act "allowed

award of attorneys' fees" even though Monroe, Kenosha
and Aldinger made the joinder of such governments
impossible.

I am a little puzzled, moreover, why

Ald' nger is mentioned in

th~context,

7

for that case

concerned a pendent state-law claim .
6. Footnote 68 (p.40) leaves open whether Monroe
was correctly decided on its facts, and whether Moor,
Kenosha and Aldinger

remain good law to the extent they

r l ied on the aspect of Monroe rejected in this decision .

-3-

Apparently JPS has insisted on this reservation, and I
doubt we could budge WJB on this point.
7.

Part IV contains absolutely no discussion of

the validity of the common-law immunity of municipal
governments, other than to say that municipalities do
not enjoy absolute immunity under § 1983.

*

*

Do you still want a

*
s ~parate

reasons for joining this opinion?

statement of our

SE
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From: Sam Estreicher

Date: April 13, 1978

Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the
City of New York
1. BRW's comments should not detain you. He
agrees with some of our points, and indicates that he
would not be opposed to a modification or elimination of
the Aldinger and municipal immmunity discussion.
2. JPS' comments are somewhat more troubling.
JPS points out that in the petitioner's brief in Monroe v.
Pape, there are two references to an alternative theory of
liability not based on respondeat superior: that the
police practice in that case "was a custom or usage" under
§

1983, and presumably the City of Chicago should be held

directly liable on that account.

As the brief

demonstrates, this point was simply tossed out without
development; the brief substantially addresses only the
respondeat superior theory.

WJB's clerk, Whit Peters, has

pointed out to be that the colloquy before the DC in
Monroe, the DC's ruling and the CA7's decision referred
only to respondeat superior.

And that was certainly the

premise of both the majority decision and Harlan's
concurrence.

See,~,

365 U.S., at 193: "Those aspects

of Congress' purpose which are quite clear in the earlier
congressional debates, as quoted by my Brothers DOUGLAS
and FRANKFURTER in turn, seem to me to be inherently
ambiguous when applied to the case of an isolated abuse of
state authority by an official. One can agree with the

2.

Court's opinion ... without being certain that Congress
mean to deal with anything other than abuses so recurrent
as to amount to 'custom, or usage.'"

It would certainly

have made Douglas' task easier had he written the opinion
for the Court as a "custom or usage" case.

Frankfurter's

dissent, however, does refer to the "custom or usage"
allegation, but he found it a merely conclusory allegation
in the face of state decisions holding such intrusions to
be unlawful.

Id., at 258.

As to one allegation

concerning a "custom or usage" of confinement on "open
charges," Frankfurter indicated that he would find that
such detention was accomplished "under color of" state
law.

Id., at 258-259.
3. Whit also tells me that WJB is troubled by our

intention to write separately on the question of qualified
municipal immunity.

It is WJB's view that the historical

antecedents are not as clear cut as we think, and that it
is the better practice to permit further percolation below
than to have three or four members of the Court announce
at the outset that they would recognize such a qualified
immunity.

~ltpuntt <!Jnnrlnf

Hrt 2lfutU~ .§httts-

'Jlfrudri:ttghtn. IB. (!}:. 20~>1-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

J. BRENNAN, JR.

April 13, 1978

/

RE: No. 75-1914 Monell v. Department of Social Services
Dear Byron, Lewis and John:
Thank you very much for your memoranda.

I'll under-

take revisions of the circulated opinion to accommodate
your views as best I can.

Because of the pressure on the

Printer it may be a few days before I get it around.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

lfp/ss """"1'/24/78

MEMORANDUM
TO:

F. Powell, Jr.

Monell

-~----

SaJly "will give you a rough draft of a propm:;ed
~ letter

to Bill Brennan.
I found your annotation of his opinion quite
and I am generally in accord wtth your thoughts.

-~ I

·beJ.ieve my proposed letter to WJB

· c~anges

j

dentifi es the only

that are preconditions to joining.

appreciate your most · c~reful advice.
''

But I wouid

I know from

experience th~t . WJB lias a demonstrated abi.lity (that I
admire) to shape future decisions by the inclusion of
general 1anguag"' unnecessary to the pr;esent opinion but
1

apparently free from serious objection.
Although Bill's revisions have substantiaJly
reduced what I would have said in a concurring opinion, I
would still like for you to try your hand at a draftperhaps no more than four or five pages.

We can

exp~ain

more clearly why the Sherman Amendment is different from
• §1983.
~ thoughts

Also, I would like to incorporate some of my
as to the choice of two lines of authority - in

discussj ng

sta.f~.

de£iSi.§.•

In addition I would like to

include the point that we made in my original memorandum to
the Conference with respect to incongruity of distinguishing

'·'

2.

between the municipality or agency thereof and the
individuals who implemen t policy as officers and
employees.

Recognizing this incongruity, it is now

widespread practice for the governmental entities to
indemnify officers and employees who suffer 1983 damage
awards for the performance of their duties.
Unless Bill Brennan changes what he has written
the Attorneys Fees , Aw~ard Act, I wJ 11 want to say
a bout that.
In gPneral, this is an h i storic case: I have given
goad deaJ of thought

an~

attention over the many

months since we granted it, with enormously helpful
assistance and i nsight •from you1 I think our views have
helped shape WJB's thinking and opinion, and possibly wjll
help put a Court

together~

I would, therefore, like to say

something if it may be useful as an additional gloss as to
what is said in the Court opinion.

concurring opinion, when we talk about the
meaning of "persons " , I will want to cite

!?~J). ot~,i,

and

quote WJB's statement on p . 26 .

,,;

~u:prmtt ~mtrl of litt~~ .§fattg
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

~- d.~d:-

9f

~

~~~~AJ.Uf~
April 24, 1978

'~~ P.s-.~.-Re: No. 75-1914 - Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of New York

~

Dear Bill,
I spent a large part of yesterday carefully reading
your circulation of April 21. Although I hope ultimately to be
able to join you, the present draft contains several statements
that cause me considerable concern. My law clerk, Bob Litt,
has talked to Whit Peters about several of these concerns, and
this is simply to let you know, without going into all the details,
that Bob is in every respect speaking for me .

B-b
i,ttt tS

" lft•"j

.Af;

S•""
.ft':'
f"

c.

w

I give specific emphasis to only two of my co
-i-r s- t.. . .
IJ!footnote 57 on page 32 seems to me a veritable ·
omb,
particularly when it is read in the lighr of the last sent ence in
the text on page 33. Although we have never decided that there
can ever be a §1983 action based on negligence alone, it seems
to me that this footnote and sentence of text amount to a virtual
invitation to not so ingenious lawyers to sue municipalities upon
the ground that the municipalities were at fault with respect to
hiring, training, or directing their erring policemen or other
agents. Secondly, I could never agree that Estelle v. Gamble,
an Eighth Amendment case involving a plaintiff who was imprisoned by the state, can be read as announcing the broad constitutional rule set out in the last part of your footnote 55 on
page 30, and incorporated by reference in footnote 60 on page 34.

,c.t"'f"l one of which may not have been conveyed by Bo

(

Ajft

c,

l-J1.

.,, ~

b•l "'+-~

...,.,I'

I
.~~~~·If!•

~

f$

~ ·-"'"
40,fe,tS

-f"h"
"C.1I !.S•-"c,
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.

Sincerely yours,

/)rtW;
{

~r. Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

) t) '
I'/

Supreme Court of the Un'ited States
Memorandum
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-------------------------------------· 19_______ _

Re: Monell
Bob Litt tells me
that PS is still troubled
by WJB's reference to
Estelle v. Gamble, even
with the disclaimer that
the Court expresses
no opinion one way or the
other. I gather from Whit
WxB that this point is
of some importance to
WJB. I am satisfied with
WJB's proposed language
on p. 3, and I would
not condition a join on
deletion of all reference
to the point.

.

\
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No. 75-1914, Monell v. Department of Social r , •
Services
..,.

~~~~--------------------------Dear Potter,
Thanks so much for your memorandum of April 24.

-r

Let me say in reply that I understand that Whit Peters
and Bob Litt have reached agreement on all the points they
discussed yesterday with the exception of three, which
are:
(1) footnote 57, which Whit and Bob did not discuss,
but which your memorandum identifies as troublesome; (2)
footnotes 55 and 60; and (3) the question of how to deal
with the claims asserted against the Mayor of New York and
the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services
given that the City and the Department were dismissed and
plaintiffs-petitioners did not appeal this dismissal.
I confess that your reaction to note 57 as a "time
bomb" surprises me.
I think it states a well-settled
principle of common law and I included it in the draft to
make sure that people understood the limited nature of the
terms "vicarious liability" and "respondeat superior" that
are used in the text, since these terms (as indicated in
the parts of Prosser and Harper & James cited in the
opinion) are often used in different ways by different
authors. Given the need for clarity, I would prefer not
to drop footnote 57, but would prefer simply to add the
follOwing to it:
"Whether fault or negligence in hiring,
training, or direction states a cause of action under §
1983 is, of course, a question we have not addressed and
we express no view on it here." Would not that meet your
concern that the footnote might be read to imply that we
are holding in this opinion that § 1983 would follow the
common law with respect to negligent hiring, training, or
direction?

-2-

As to the last part of note 55, it was meant to say
only -- and I really think it says no more than -- that
where the Constitution imposes a duty to act, § 1983
provides an avenue of redress when officials are
deliberately indifferent to that duty. It was not
intended to suggest, and I thought did not decide, when
the Constitution imposes such a duty. Moreover, I th1nk
the reference to Estelle is faithful to the jump-cited
material in that op1n1on, which is:
"We therefore conclude that deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,' Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 173 {joint
opinion), proscribed by the Eighth Amendment . • • •
Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference
to a prisoner's serious illness or InJury states a
cause of action under § 1983." {emphasis added).
Since § 1983 does not distinguish between the Eighth
Amendment and other types of constitutional violations,
doesn't the last sentence of the quote necessarily decide
that § 1983 goes as far as the Constitution with f espe ~
to deli ~ rate indiffe}"ence?L
1' Jt ee. e..ss•r~t't.. T
H ~~tt ~J ,.. e
e t:JIII ru. 1' ,.,. , ttlt _, .be. ~ • ~~
Note 55 is referenced in note 6 ~ o allow me to keep
Byron's language -- which I have unabashedly plagiarized
in the text at page 34 -- as the description of the cause
of action created by this opinion. I think Byron's
language is particularly felicitous in describing the
elements of the action in what is probably the more usual
case of "positive" official policy leading to
constitutional tort.

,r

No

14+'.

I would be willing to drop the material from note 55,
where it is somewhat cumulative of Felix's language, but
given my view that deliberate indifference is enough to
hold a city under § 1983, I feel that I must qualify the
text at note 60, which would otherwise seem to foreclose a
deliberate indifference theory. You may differ with me on
whether whether deliberate indifference is ever enough to
hold a city, but can't we agree not to cut off either of
our views in this case? This may be accomplished by
having note 60 read as follows:

-3-

.. .§.Q./In adopting this phrasing, we do not intend
to foreclose the possibility that, where the
Constitution imposes a duty on municipal officials to
act -- as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do with
respect to the medical needs of prisoners, see Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) -- and official pol1cy
is one of deliberate indifference to that duty, § 1983
provides an avenue of redress against a local
government as an entity. See id., at 104-105."
(

Would this be satisfactory to you (along with dropping the
Estelle material in note 55)?
The third problem is one I confess I have not thought
a great deal about. It seems to me that, at least outside
of the Eleventh Amendment context, a suit against an
official in his official capacity and a suit against the
entity of which the official is an agent amount to the
same thing: in either case the relief sought is not
relief against the official personally, but exercise of
the powers of his office or payment of monies from the
entity's treasury. Therefore, since we accepted for cert.
along with the question of the suability of school boards,
the question "Whether local governmental officials •
are 'persons' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when
equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought
against them in their official capacities?", Pet. 8, I
suppose I should add a footnote in an appropriate place
saying something like: "Our holding today necessarily
decides that local government officials sued in their
official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983 for all
purposes in those cases where a § 1983 plaintiff could
also maintain an action against the local government,
since official capacity suits are simply another way of
pleading an action against a corporate entity."
On the other hand, the resolution proposed above
leaves unanswered two things. First, what happens in the
situation in which the corporate entity cannot be sued,
i.e., the respondeat superior situation? I think the
answer is that suit will not lie, since the equivalence
between official capacity suits and suits against the
entity need not be tortured here as it has been in the
Eleventh Amendment context. Second, what should be the

-4-

result in this case in which petitioners-plaintiffs have
"allowed" the City and the Department to be dismissed from
the suit by failing to appeal their dismissal? I have no
ready answer for this. It may be that the District Court
can reinstate the City and Department or it may be that
the courts below will feel they can go forward and grant
relief without the City and the Department. Since we need
not decide either of these issues now, my preference would
be simply to add the footnote proposed above and leave it
to the District Court and CA2 to sort out where this case
goes from here.
I would appreciate any views you and other colleagues
might have on how to resolve the last question. I hope to
send a third draft to the printer in the next day or two,
which would include the first two changes set out above
plus other corrections we have agreed to make in response
to comments by Bob Litt and by Sam Estreicher in Lewis'
chambers.

t+"

of

e,.~ (JI lt+'l

~e~ p~J./ICI'I'f.

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

.Sincerely,
W.J.B., Jr.
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April 25, 1978

~~

No. 75-1914 Monell

{S.e.£--~
Pi ~1, 1'1'7?

Dear Bill:
I have read your revised draft (circulated April 21)
with interest, and think it is a first-rate piece of
scholarship.
Thank you for the revisions directed to the points in
my letter of April 11. The new Part III on stare decisis is
quite persuasive, and includes much of what I would have said
on this question in a concurring opinion. In sum, I believe
my previously expressed concerns have now been reduced to the
following narrowly focused suggestions:
1. As you know, I do not view §1983 as coextensive
with the full power of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A number of scholars share this view, including Gunther and
Monaghan. And the "fault" principle you recognize in Monell,
with respect to the respondeat-superior liability of
municipalities, is premised on the "cause to be subjected"
language of the statute, rather than any limit on congressional
power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. You have
substantially allayed my concerns in your revisions in pages
24-26. I would, however, suggest the following clarifications:
(a) Page 24, first sentence in full paragraph:
substitute "broad" for "complete".

I would

(b) Page 25, the long paragraph in footnote 45: Rather
than say that §1983 "represented an attempt broadly to exercise
the power conferred by §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, I would
simply say that §1983 "represented an attempt to include all
officials and entities within the constitutional reach of
Congress". It is unnecessary to suggest that other features
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of §1983 are dictated either by the Constitution or by 1871
understandings of constitutional limits.
(c) Page 26, middle of first full paragraph: I would
modify the description of §1 as the only civil remedy
"coextensive" with the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps you
could say that the section provided a "broad" or "expansive"
civil remedy to implement the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
2. Page 30, last sentence in footnote 55: The rather
sweeping generalization as to "deliberate indifference" can
be read far more broadly than my understanding of the Court's
decision in Estelle v. Gamble. There, we were talking about
the possibility - under the evidence in the case - that prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to the need of a
particular inmate for necessary medical service. There was
no indication of an officially approved policy or custom not
to provide necessary medical assistance. Moreover, it is
possible to read Estelle as an Eighth Amendment prisoner
case. The "deliberate ~ndifference" standard may be
applicable in other contexts as well, but I think we should
leave that question for another day. In short, I hope you
will be willing to eliminate this sentence.
3. Page 38, discussion of the Attorneys' Award Act of
1976: You describe this as allowing "prevailing parties in
§1983 suits to obtain attorneys' fees from the 1losing party".
We certainly should make clear, in accord with the statutory
language, that the Act merely confers discretion on the Court
to allow such fees. Also I am somewhat troubled by your
characterization of the congressional intent on page 39. I
would simply say that Congress has "attempted to allow" such
awards, not that Congress has "attempted to limit Monroe."
4. I would have dealt with the status of Moor, Kenosha
and Aldinger somewhat differently, but I view your-opin~on as
leaving open the extent to which these cases remain good law.
I can accept this.
5. Also, your revision of Part IV as to immunity leaving the issue entirely open - is quite acceptable. In
accordance with our telephone conversation, I no longer will
write on the immunity issue, although my previously expressed
view remains firm.

- 3 -

6. Finally, I agree with Potter that you should delete
footnote 57 on page 32. While the footnote does not commit
the Court to any p,articular proposition of law, it may be
read as a "signal' that we should avoid in light of our
reservation of the negligence issue in Procunier v. Navarette.

****
I appreciate your efforts to accommodate my concerns.
If you are disposed to make the modest changes suggested
above, I will be happy to join you.
Also, I still may write briefly to emphasize a point
or two where we may have shades of difference that do not go
to the essential merits of your opinion. This would not
prevent me from joining you.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WH • ..J. BRENNAN, ..JR.

April 25, 1978

Re:

No. 75-1914, Monell v. Department of Social
Services

Dear Potter,
Thanks so much for your memorandum of April 24.
Let me say in reply that I understand that Whit Peters
and Bob Litt have reached agreement on all the points they
discussed yesterday with the exception of three, which
are:
(1) footnote 57, which Whit and Bob did not discuss,
but which your memorandum identifies as troublesome; (2)
footnotes 55 and 60; and (3) the question of how to deal
with the claims asserted against the Mayor of New York and
the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services
given that the City and the Department were dismissed and
plaintiffs-petitioners did not appeal this dismissal.
I confess that your reaction to note 57 as a "time
bomb" surprises me. I think it states a well-settled
principle of common law and I included it in the draft to
make sure that people understood the limited nature of the
terms "vicarious liability" and "respondeat superior" that
are used in the text, since these terms (as indicated in
the parts of Prosser and Harper & James cited in the
opinion) are often used in different ways by different
authors. Given the need for clarity, I would prefer not
to drop footnote 57, but would prefer simply to add the
following to it: "Whether fault or negligence in hiring,
training, or direction states a cause of action under §
1983 is, of course, a question we have not addressed and
we express no view on it here." Would not that meet your
concern that the footnote might be read to imply that we
are holding in this opinion that § 1983 would follow the
common law with respect to negligent hiring, training, or
direction?

-2As to the last part of note 55, it was meant to say
only -- and I really think it says no more than -- that
where the Constitution imposes a duty to act, § 1983
provides an avenue of redress when officials are
deliberately indifferent to that duty.
It was not
intended to suggest, and I thought did not decide, when
the Constitution imposes such a d~ty. Moreover, I think
the reference to Estelle is faithful to the jump-cited
material in that opinion, which is:
"We therefore conclude that deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,' Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 173 (joint
opinion), proscribed by the Eighth Amendment . • • •
Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference
to a prisoner's serious illness or InJury states a
cause of action under § 1983." (emphasis added).
Since § 1983 does not distinguish between the Eighth
Amendment and other types of constitutional violations,
doesn't the last sentence of the quote necessarily decide
that § 1983 goes as far as the Constitution with respect
to deliberate indifference?
Note 55 is referenced in note 60 to allow me to keep
Byron's language -- which I have unabashedly plagiarized
in the text at page 34 -- as the description of the cause
of action created by this opinion.
I think Byron's
language is particularly felicitous in describing the
elements of the action in what is probably the more usual
case of "positive" official policy leading to
constitutional tort.
I would be willing to drop the material from note 55,
where it is somewhat cumulative of Felix's language, but
given my view that deliberate indifference is enough to
hold a city under § 1983, I feel that I must qualify the
text at note 60, which would otherwise seem to foreclose a
deliberate indifference theory. You may differ with me on
whether whether deliberate indifference is ever enough to
hold a city, but can't we agree not to cut off either of
our views in this case? This may be accomplished by
having note 60 read as follows:

-3-

.. .§_Q_/In adopting this phrasing, we do not intend
to foreclose the possibility that, where the
Constitution imposes a duty on municipal officials to
act -- as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do with
respect to the medical needs of prisoners, see Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) -- and official pol1cy
is one of deliberate indifference to that duty, § 1983
provides an avenue of redress against a local
government as an entity. See id., at 104-105."
Would this be satisfactory to you (along with dropping the
Estelle material in note 55)?
The third problem is one I confess I have not thought
a great deal about. It seems to me that, at least outside
of the Eleventh Amendment context, a suit against an
official in his official capacity and a suit against the
entity of which the official is an agent amount to the
same thing: in either case the relief sought is not
relief against the official personally, but exercise of
the powers of his office or payment of monies from the
entity's treasury. Therefore, since we accepted for cert.
along with the question of the suability of school boards,
the question "Whether local governmental officials •
are 'persons' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when
equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought
against them in their official capacities?", Pet. 8, I
suppose I should add a footnote in an appropriate place
saying something like: "Our holding today necessarily
decides that local government officials sued in their
official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983 for all
purposes in those cases where a § 1983 plaintiff could
also maintain an action against the local government,
since official capacity suits are simply another way of
pleading an action against a corporate entity."
On the other hand, the resolution proposed above
leaves unanswered two things. First, what happens in the
situation in which the corporate entity cannot be sued,
i.e., the respondeat superior situation? I think the
answer is that suit will not lie, since the equivalence
between official capacity suits and suits against the
entity need not be tortured here as it has been in the
Eleventh Amendment context. Second, what should be the

-4result in this case in which petitioners-plaintiffs have
"allowed" the City and the Department to be dismissed from
the suit by failing to appeal their dismissal? I have no
ready answer for this.
It may be that the District Court
can reinstate the City and Department or it may be that
the courts below will feel they can go forward and grant
relief without the City and the Department. Since we need
not decide either of these issues now, my preference would
be simply to add the footnote proposed above and leave it
to the District Court and CA2 to sort out where this case
goes from here.
I would appreciate any views you and other colleagues
might have on how to resolve the last question.
I hope to
send a third draft to the printer in the next day or two,
which would include the first two changes set out above
plus other corrections we have agreed to make in response
to comments by Bob Litt and by Sam Estreicher in Lewis'
chambers.
Sincerely,
W.J.B., Jr.

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 26, 1978

Re: No. 75-1914- Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Services
Dear Bill,
Your letter of April 25 convinces me that our differences are deeper than I had been willing to acknowledge, even
to myself. In sum, I think I take a much more restrictive
view of what we should decide or even discuss in this case
than do you.
Specifically, I would deCide only that, for the basic
reasons discussed in Part I of your opinion, it now appears
that the Court was mistaken in Monroe v. Pape: in holding
that municipal corporations can never be within the ambit of
§1983. I would hold that a municipal corporation is within its
ambit in an action at law or suit in equity, when, through the
affirmative, deliberate, knowing official action of its governing body, it is alleged to have deprived any person of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
or federal law. That, as I understand it, is the scope of the
question presented by this case.
I would not imply, even by W<iy of discussion that
leaves the matter-open, that a municipal corporation could
ever be liable under §1983 for indifference, inaction, or
through the actions of its agents when not carrying out affirmati, ly authorized municipal policy. I would not get into a

'I f-a

7

...,

.Je."e~

t "·' e

r

''"ts ,,.

"'-.3

r~e

l~os t

..........,. ..,.., c
~t. s1 1 .. -1 ,.,

"· s~,

6o

~~""" W :f 8 "'AS. I , / l U I #d ff. .. t"(. vl•w 14 ~-Ke e,f u.r +'"'~' .fl.c, VM'~
t0
~et-vc& de.etlt• .. •... -fit esc. po,,..f:s. ~ A,.,. ""
+t"•llfll.lu IJ7 w~'B '.s w~~ of=-- .. .ft~t•lf"' """''""'
G,o &-1

•"

fcl J.c

<J I * I

~"of'~+ ~e 1-ers

.fo

o

~c,a,. 1 ~I •cty

"' "cf

.b-eAt--

"tfae--IA I Mlll#l4lrl '1.111-ho, • Tit~ '' ~A• I#' "
pr-in•ip lc 0
I
5 llliL ; e #lite ':Jc,S ~~
4
e 11 ref.. I ~''!3 oF- _,.,"
I f:j •.s 1., fe vc
lu-A#or'f.
f A,.._. .SO~~WCwHA-t 'PUJ>'~ JteJ I
~we ~H'1

J,'1

PS ~·I '''!1"' e.1s

+o

JC~'"

,.,.

....

P'.., 0" 0\1 ~ rTflf I,·'!1 M 0 , N> ~ .,J • .,..,,.... +, 4ft.,_
fa.c .s .... e -h ... e, .J•'"'"J +~tc rc.sto,.de-.+
SeA pt ,.,.,. J. '~t:AISII'D"''. I
J t1 tl4ofr r-c.eo.,..,.,~
--fl..•+ y,.... .,P.tl•kJ s,;,
D

+.

;

....

fltt ~ttlt .§hrltg
~ait!rittghm, ~ . QJ. 20~'1.;l

.§u:prtmt (!Janrl ttf

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 26, 1978

Re:

75-1914 - Monell v. Department of Social
Services

Dear Bill:
Your revised opinion is really excellent .
I particularly appreciate your full treatment of
the stare decisis issue and the changes in your
discussion of Monroe v. Pape.
Nevertheless , I
am still persuaded that Parts II and IV of the
opinion are merely advisory and should not be included in an opinion of the Court until the
questions have been properly presented and argued.
As presently advised , I therefore plan to join
only Parts I, III, and V.
I do not expect to
write separately but merely to state in a sentence
my reasons for not joining Parts II and IV.

Mr . Justice Brennan
Copies to the

Con~erence
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 26, 1978

Re: No. 75-1914- Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Services
Dear Bill,
Your letter of April 25 convinces me that our differences are deeper than I had been willing to acknowledge, even
to myself. In sum, I think I take a much more restrictive
view of what we should decide or even discuss in this case
than do you.
Specifically, I would decide only that, for the basic
reasons discussed in Part I of your opinion, it now appears
that the Court was mistaken in Monroe v. Pape, in holding
that municipal corporations can never be within the ambit of
§1983. I would hold that a municipal corporation is within its
ambit in an action at law or suit in equity, when, through the
affirmative, deliberate, knowing official action of its governing body, it is alleged to have deprived any person of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
or federal law. That, as I understand it, is the scope of the
question presented by this case.
I would not imply, even by way of discussion th2.t
leaves the matter open, that a municipal corporation could
ever be liable under §1983 for indifference, inaction, or
through the actions of its agents when not carrying out affirmatively authorized municipal policy. I would not get into a
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discussion of the law of respondeat superior or the law of torts.
I would certainly not make use of the word "fault" which in the
law of many states and in admiralty law is no more than a loose
synonym for negligence.
It seems to me that, in view of the very thorough and
exhaustive opinion you have written, it would be quite unfair of
me to keep asking you to chip away at it -- a process that might
lead ultimately to the distortion of your views without the real
satisfaction of mine. Accordingly, I think the true interest of
each of us would be better served if I filed a brief statement
saying I do not join Part II of your opinion.

Sincerely yours,
())'

\'/

P. S. -- I have just read John's note, and it may be
that he has said more briefly what I have
tried to say above.

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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To: The Chief Justice
llr. Just1oe Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blaokmun
Mr. Justice Powel ~
Mr. Justice Rehnquiat
Prom: Mr. Juetioe Stevena
Circulated~

APR 2 7 1978

Recirculated: _________
I

SUPBEl\f~

COURT'0¥ THE U~TED ~T·TES
I

·,

l

:tfo·. 75-1914
I

iane Mon~ll et ~1. , Petitiop.ers,

On Writ of Certiorari to
v.
the United States Court
Dep ~rtment of Soci~tl Services' of
of Appe~tls for the Sec:..
the City of New Y orl<: et ~tl.
ond Circuit.
i(May -, 1978]'

MR. JusTICE STEVE:N"B, concurring in part.
Since Parts II and IV of the opinion of the Court are merely
advisory and are not necesf!a.ry to ex.pl~in the Court's decision,
I foin only Parts I; Ill, 1\-nd V.

.:iu:prttttt <!fcnrt l1f t4t ~ttittb ~g
'Jtaslyi:ttgtcn. ~. <!f. 20,?JI.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

April 27, 1978

Re:

No. 7 5-1914 - Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services

Dear Bill:
I have read with great interest the more recent writings
in this case, and the correspondence. As of now, I a m about
where Potter and John are in their respective letters of April 26.
It seems to me that if Monroe v. Pape is to be overruled, the
Court is striking off in a new direction and we should move cautiously, one step at a time. There is much to be said, also, for
Lewis 1 a pproach, a nd I shall be interested in what he comes up
with.
Sincerely,

J~
I

Mr. Justice Brenna n

cc:

The Conference

..§u:vuutt

~ottrl rl t!rt~ttittb ~g

'Jltrur!rittgton.tB. ~· 2ll,?J!..;l
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

April 27, 1978

Re:

No. 75-1914- Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services

Dear Bill:
I have read with great interest the more recent writings
in this case, and the correspondence. As of now, I am about
where Potter and John are in their respective letters of April 26.
It seems to me that if Monroe v. Pape is to be overruled, the Court is striking off in a new direction and we should move cautiously, one step at a time. There is much to be said, also, for
Lewis 1 approach, and I shall be interested in what he comes up
with.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc:

The Conference

Cl: .

,§tqrrtmt <(onrl of t!F ~tilt~ .§taft•.s

'J.!Ta.si1inghnt, p. <!J. ~.O~J!.2
CHt...I-1P.ERS OF

April 29, 1978

JUSTICE BYRON R WHITE

Re :

75-1914 - M?nell v. Department
of Social Services
of City of New York

Dear Bill,
As I have told you, Part II is in

general quite all right with me, and I
now think I would include it whether
there are five for it or not .

The amend-

ments to footnotes 55 and 60 suggested in
your letter to Potter of April 25 are
definitely an improvement.

I would also

prefer what you orally suggested to me
today, namely, that you drop footnote 57 .
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copie s to the Conference

.:%iup-rtm.t <!}cud of tlrt ~i:ltti:tdt ~ti:lft.a
'llJa.aJringtcn.lfl. <!}. 2ll,?Jt-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

April 5, 1978

R.e: No. 7 5-1914 - Monell v. Dept. of Social Services

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely.

;ftU.
T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

SE
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From: Sam Estreicher

Date:

April 5, 1978

~+

Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept of Social Services --WJB
1st Opinion Draft
I

I am afraid that WJB has written another weighty,
but improved draft.
the judgment of

In my view, you can certainly join

reversal~~t

there are

som~- ~~~

with

the draft that may require a separate writi ~~s~lful
negotiations with WJB's chambers.

The following points

cause me the greatest concern (the relevant passages are

--------

sidelined in red):
1. On pp. 21-22, WJB writes that "there is no Jl~
basis in holdings of this Court .. to find in the
Constitution ... a bar to Federal Government power to

~

enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against the States .••. "
The sentence, read in context, is understandable:
Congress did not believe that it lacked the power to
impose liability on the States for violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

My problem is that this sentence

may be read as suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment
presents no obstacle to § 1983 suits against the States as
entities. The implications of Edelman v. Jordan, 415

u.s.

651, 674-676 (1974), are to the contrary:
"But it has not heretofore been suggested that
§1983 was intended to create a waiver of a
State's Eleventh Amendment immunity merely
because an action could be brought against state
officers, rather than against the State itself.

2.

Though a § 1983 action may be instituted by
public aid recipients, such as respondent, a
federal court's remedial power, consistent with
the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to
prospective injunctive relief ••.• "
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427

u.s.

445, 452 (1976), makes

clear that no effective waiver of the Eleventh Amendment
was found in Edelman because "none of the statutes relied
upon by plaintiffs in Edelman contained any authorization
by Congress to join as defendant."

Under Bitzer, it would

seem that the Eleventh Amendment remains a barrier to the
extent that the legislation does not rest on an explicit
waiver of the Eleventh Amendment bar.

The

§

1983 -

attorney's fees case, No. 76-1660, Hutto v. Finney,
presents this issue.
Language in note 54 on p. 29 presents the same
problem:
"Nor is there any basis for concluding that the
Eleventh Amendment is a bar to such liability ••••
Our holding today is, however, limited to local
government units which are not considered part of
the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes."
Since no one is raising the Tenth Amendment issue, and
municipalities simply do not come within the protection of
the Eleventh Amendment, Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S.
529, 530 (1890), I do not understand the need for any
discussion that appears to deal with the general reach of
the Eleventh Amendment.

However, WJB's cite to Edelman v.

Jordan may be sufficient to allay any fears.

~

2. The first sentence on page 25 states that "the

____ debates show that Congress intended to exercise its full
power under the Fourteenth Amendment •... "

The problem

.1 ~

~
~
~!

3.

with this sentence, as it stands, is that it

appears~ o

,......,..

decisions, the negligence issue sidestepped in Procunier
v. Navarette, and Carey v. Piphus, are all premised on the
view that the scope of § 1983 and the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment are not necessarily coextensive. As
P;ofeEsor

Monag ~an

has

p~inted _9 ut,

it is important to

retain a flexibile view of § 1983 to avoid transforming
every case requiring an interpretation of §1983 into an
exercise in constitutional~xegesis.

Bob Litt and I have

spoken to WJB's clerk, Whit Peters, and Whit appears to be
willing to modify the sentence by indicating that
Congress' view of the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment
may have been unduly conservative, with a citation to
supporting language in Moor v. County of Alameda.

In my

view, WJB could simply say that Congress intended the term
"person" to reach all officials and entities suable under
the Constitution, without discussing whether other
features of the statute

--~,

the causation

requirement-- are dictated either by the Constitution or
by 1871 understandings of constitutional limits.
3.
softened.

The language on pp. 29-30 & n.55 should be
First, there is no need to

--

s~

.·

in this case

that "unwritten practices or predilections which have by
force of time and consistent application crystallized into
official policy can also, on an appropriate factual
showing, provide a basis for a suit against a local

4.

government."

The sentence is not wrong, and is supported

by Justice Harlan's reading of the term "custom" in the

-

Adickes decision cited at the top of p. 30, but it is
unnecessary dicta.

,

'~

----

Second, I also recommend deletion

------

the last seven lines of note 55.

WJB's point is implicit

in the quotation from WHR's opinion in Rizzo v. Goode.
And this passage can be read as bearing on the negligence
issue "ducked" in Procunier v. Navarette.
4.

\\ t/

On page 31, WJB states that "[s]ince City of

Kenosha is flatly inconsistent with the correct
construction of § 1983, it is hereby overruled."

It seems

~~

to be that WJB should make clear that he is simply

overruling the holding of City of Kenosha on its facts,

"

,.....

~ without disturbing the ratio decidendi, i.e., that§ 1983

does not admit of a bifurcated reading of the term
"person" depending on the nature of the relief sought.
5.

\

In note 57 on page 31, WJB advances a fairly

unpersuasive case for ignoring the doctrine of stare

-

d ecisis.

He does not make any of the points that we

suggested in our memorandum to the Conference.

Also, WJB

is being coy in stating that "we have from time to time
intimated that stare decisis has more force in statutory
analysis than in constitutional adjudication .... "

This

Court's pronouncements on that point have been explicit
and direct.
6.

<>1-~
I also do not like note 60 on pp. 33-34.

In

my view, the footnote should be substantially revised or

-~

5.

deleted.

As it stands, there is language that can be read

to undercut the force of our vicarious-liability limit on
the reach of

§

1983:

"Nonetheless, it is important to

recognize that the legal basis for such liability was not
some sort of respondeat superior theory but fault on the
part of the community in its exercise of its peace-keeping
powers."

What WJB is trying to say is that the

proponents of the Sherman Amendment viewed it as premised
on a somewhat attenuated theory of "fault."

But the

remainder of the footnote and the discussion in the text
at pp. 34-35 make clear that the successful opposition to
the Sherman Amendment was based on grounds which support a
vicarious-liability limitation on the reach of

§

1983.

The footnote can be written in a much clearer fashion to
avoid that both Bob Litt and I experienced.
7.

The discussion of Aldinger v. Howard on pp.

-

35-36 is pure dicta and should be deleted. Indeed,
although WJB introduces the section saying that "it is
necessary to comment briefly on" Aldinger, he concludes
that the question is not before the Court.

This is a

classic example of a WJB attempt "to up to ante."
8.

Finally, I am troubled by Part III {pp.
..........
........... _.,....,_,.
WJB spends too much time debunking the absolute
~

36-38).

~

immunity that had been available to municipalities at
common law.

I agree that municipalities cannot be said to

enjoy an absolute immunity under

§

1983, for that would

eviscerate the import of our decision in Monell. That is

\~

\

~·

all that need be said in this

case ~

6.

would not endorse

- -

WJB's language concerning "the largely repudiated
common-law rule of absolute municipal immunity."

If we

discard the common-law rule, then, we remove one basis
left for finding a qualified good-faith immunity.

i¥.~
~ 9 ~

~~"?

II

WJB's clerk tells me that his boss may be willing
to drop some of the language discussed above, but that in
all likelihood that will take some prompting from one of
the Brothers.

If Whit's sense is right, I would think you

could join in substantial part and attach a separate

----

opinion explaining your views. That opinion might make two

p~ int~

you may want to explain why you are willing

to join a decision overruling a statutory interpretation.
This discussion would track your memorandum to the

Conference. ~ you may wish to give some reasons why
municipalities do enjoy a qualified immunity under

§

1983.

I offer a tentative list of those reasons: (a)
municipalities enjoyed absolute immunity at common law;
(b) the Court's rejection of the justifications for
respondeat-superior liability (pp. 34-35) supports
recognition of a qualified immunity; (c) at least part of
the rationale for finding a qualified immunity for public
officials --the reluctance to deter the exercise of
official discretion-- argues in favor of a limitation on
liability for the enterprise that employs the individual

~

~

~ ·W..
1~ ~~

7.

exercising discretion: and (d) BRW's opinion in Procunier
v. Navarette offers some support for the view that
irrespective of the common-law rule,

§

1983 does not

impose liability for adverse action taken with respect to
a right not clearly defined at the time.

.§nprmtt Clfttnrl ttf flrt ~b .:%tai:t.i¥
~a,g£rhtghm. ~.

C!f. 20~~~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w ...

..J. BRENNAN, .JR.

April 10, 1978

Re:

No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social
Services of the City of New Yor~

Dear John:
Perhaps I can save you some unnecessary effort by
responding quickly to your memo on the above.
First, with respect to the "full power" argument, I
agree that this argument goes farther than is necessary
and have already planned to rewrite this section.
Second, with respect to Part II-B, I had thought my
footnote 58 on page 32 answered the concern you expressed
at conference. As I indicate there, plaintiffs in Monroe
interpreted their own complaint as stating a respondeat
superior action.
1

Finally, Parts II-C and III were at least implicit in
my earlier memorandum in which I thought a majority
joined.
I therefore included them explicitly in the draft
since each seems to follow directly from Part I. Of
course, both are open to modification, but I 1 d be better
able to make changes if I knew the views of my colleagues
concerning them. Accordingly, I confirm that I 1 d welcome
expressions of such views.

'----------------------

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

Sincerely

~

~ttpr.tmt

<!J111trl o-f ut~ ~h>h ~hrltS'

Jrrurlfinghtn. ~. c.q. 2!!.;t'1~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 10, 1978

f>~tr..,.. II -B ~
I'- ,

Re:

.J 1c,.~ r 1 J CIIS

,,., •·+1

75-1914 - Monell v. Dept. of Social~
L ~
Services of the City of New York T~rr ~

-G ~

~~·~r
tJ IJ UAJSI' ~

Dear Bill:
.

~>~,..,..

.

m: ~

A1 though I expect to J01n Parts I-A, I-B, most
of I-C, and II-A of your opinion, I do not presently 1'\ 1t
~
plan to join Parts II-B, II-C, or III.
Ab,s-ol.-...-t

f-.'"w~~~~

I plan to write a separate opinion in which I
take issue with II-B and suggest that the discussion
in Parts II-C and III is unnecessary and is not embraced within the question presented by the certiorari
petition.
With respect to I-C, I cannot accept "the full
power" argument; if that argument were valid, there
would be no room for immunity for judges or other
officials.
Respectfully,

f'"Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

j)u:prtntt <!Jcttrl cf tfrf ~1t ~tnit~

:.a,glp:nghm, lfl. QJ. 2!l~Jl.~

CHAMBE RS OF

JUSTICE

w... . J .

BRENNAN, JR.

April 10, 1978
Re:

No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social
Services of the City of N~w York

Dear John:
Perhaps I can save you s o me unn e c essa ry effort by
responding quickly to your memo on th e above.
First, with respect to the "full power" argument, I
agree that this argument goes farther than is necessary
and have already planned to rewrite this section.
Second, with respect to Part II-B, I had thought my
footnote 58 on page 32 answered the concern you expressed
at conference. As I indicate there, pla i ntiffs in Monroe
interpreted their own complaint as stating a respondeat
superior action.
Finally, Parts II-C and III were at least implicit in
my earlier memorandum in which I thought a majority
joined.
I therefore included them explicitly in the draft
since each seems to follow directly from Part I. Of
course, both are open to modification, but I'd be better
able to make changes if I knew the views of my colleagues
concerning them. Accordingly, I confi r m that I'd welcome
expressions of such views.
Sincerely

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

~

j;npumt (lf111trl qf f!r.t ~ult ~htt.ts

JragJrittghm. ~. OJ.

20.?'1.~

CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 10, 1978

Re:

75-1914 - Monell v. Dept. of Social
Services of the City of New York

Dear Bill:
Although I expect to join Parts I-A, I-B, most
of I-C, and II-A of your opinion, I do not presently
plan to join Parts II-B, II-C, or III.
I plan to write a separate opinion in which I
take issue with II-B and suggest that the discussion
in Parts II-C and III is unnecessary and is not embraced within the question presented by the certiorari
petition.
With respect to I-C, I cannot accept "the full
power" argument; if that argument were valid, there
would be no room for immunity for judges or other
officials.
Respectfully,

}k

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

l

75-19)4, ~

Monell v. Dept. of Social Services
Qf C_!_!::L£f_New York
.,

of Apr i 1 1. 0 to John, I
,fi' '

'

'
I intend to write
separately at least for the
purpose of stating the view that municipalities are
entitled to a defense, for policies promulgated in good
faith that affect adversely constitutional rights not
clearly defined at .the time of violation. The absolute
immunity accorded to governmental bodies at common 1aw
should be modified, lest we eviscerate the import of our
decision in this case, but I would not •abandon all
common-law protection. ·1, While the considerations are
somewhat different from those governing our
qualified-immunity decisions, a rule , of strict munic·pal
lfability imposes substantial costs in terms of the
~
i nhi,bi tion of,., the discretionary acti vlti es of governmental
bodies. Moreo~er, the emphasis in your opinion on the ,~.
"fau1 t" pr lnciple and your recognition of the 42d , ·
Congress' rejection of the justifications for vicaiious
liability argue against the imposition of liability for
innocent failure to predict the often uncertain course of
consti~utional adjudication.

.,

;

~

'

.

Thes~ matters aside, while I would like ver~ . much
to join your opinion, I am troubled by some of the
language in the present draft. There are some sentences
which can be worked out among the law clerks (who have
conferred), and need not be stated here. But there are
several areas that require revision before I would feel
free to join your opinion in its entirety.

2.

First, I have considerable difficulty with your
discussion in Part III. While I agree that a recognition
of absolute municipal immunity woulc1 be inconsistent not
only with our decision in Monell but also with the
considerations that were controlling i. n Imbler v.
Eachtman, Pi!"~2n- v. _g.!¥ and Brag,ley v. ~i~her, I see no
need for an extended discussion of the wisdom, or lack
thereof, of the common-law rule. The Chief's opinion in
Scheuer v. Rhodes is ample authority for the proposition
that-on occasion the absolute immunity available to a
class of defendants at common law must give way to the
poi icies of §1983. A discuss ion tha.t emphasizes modern
criticisms and dismisses the doctrine of municipal
immunity as "the largely repudiated common-law rule of
absolute immunity" is unnecessary, does not address the
question of the intention or the 1871 Congr~ss, and has
the effect of removing the historical basis for finding a
qualified municipal immunity.
Second, I am in full agreement with John that
Part II-C of your opinion is unnecessary. Sj nee ~lC!_.ng~.r.
v. Howard invo1~ed a penfent state c aim, not a cause of
action premised on § 1983 or other federal lew, I oo not
consider it proper to cast doubt on ~l'!Jn9~! in t~is case.
Third, I see no need to discuss in this case
whether "unwritten practices or. pr.ed~lections wh'ch have
by force of tfme and consistent application crysta11ized
into official policy" may "pr.ovirie a basis for a suit
against a loca~ government" (pp. ?9-30). I do not
necessarily disagree with the proposition, as such, but T
prefer to allow thene pointP to develop in a case-by-case
fashion. In a similar vein, I hope that you wiJJ delete
the last seven lines in ~ootnote 55 (p.30). Your quote
from Rizzo v. Goode is quite persuasive, and I would not
go furtherand-suggest to the reader that Rizzo ~imp . y
invoJ ved a pl Pading ~r r .OT'. The relevance o1rE:s_!~~..1.£ v.
Gamble to the matter at hand will be apparent to
practitionersr ordinaT"ily it is not our. province to
suggest legal theories for overcoming obstacles pres~nted
by our decisions.
Finally, I could not agree with the language on
pp. 24 and 25 which states that Congress in S 1983
"intended to exercise its full power under the Fourteenth
Amendment •••• " I am opposed to any view of § 1983 which

3•
., '

.
transforms every case requiring an inter.pretation of §
1983 into an exercise in constitutional exegesis. The \
qualified immunity decisions, the negligence issue raised
in Procunier v. Navarette, and my opinions in !Q9!.§ham v.
!Fight and CaJ~ v. Piph~, are all premised on the
proposition that the scope of §1983 and th'e reach of ...the
Fourteenth Amendment are not necessarily coextensive: · 'It
seems to me that you can accomplish your objective by •;
simply saying that Congress intended the term "person"
include all officials and entities within its
constitutional reach, without suggesting that other
features of the statute --~, the causation
requirement-- are dictated either by the Constitution
by 1871 understandings of constitutional limits.
' ~ '~·~

..

~

\,.

If these 'points are resoJ ved and a few additional
word changes are made, I believe I can j'oin your, ent j re ''
, opinion, although I also ·would wr i.te briefly to state my, ·
views on qualified munlcipal immunity, a.nd pe>rhaps my O\•m
sep~rate reasons fo~ being wi lli..ng to · r:,each our conclusion.
'-";t{tfl'

'

...

"

I apologize for this extended commentary,
all you have wrJ.tten 38 eloquent pages!
Sincerely,

i

.:§upuutt <lJllllrlo-f tip~ 'J!lniuh .:%tatr.tr

:.as-.frht.gtcn.lO. <!f.

2.llgt'!~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 12, 1978

Re:

75-1914 - Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of New York

Dear Bill:
With all respect, I am persuaded that you have
given the discussion of respondeat superior in
petitioners' brief in Monroe v. Pape, an unwarranted
interpretation.
The City had argued that the complaint was properly
dismissed because (1) it was not a "person," and (2) it
was entitled to immunity.
In an argument in the nature
of a rebuttal, the petitioners referred to the doctrine
of respondeat superior as an alternative basis for
supporting the conclusion that the City is a person.
See xeroxed page 25 attached.
In Part II of petitioners' brief in Monroe, which
addressed the doctrine of immunity, petitioners argued
that "all doubts as to the liability of the City under
the act should be resolved in petitioners' favor."
In
support of that position they specifically argued:
"This case portrays a standard police procedure--whose victims are often innocent.
This case is, among other things, a 'custom
or usage' case." See xeroxed page 42 attached.
It seems to me that the Court must either overrule
Monroe v. Pape, or else hold that the Monroe complaint
d1d not allege a sufficient claim for relief against the
City.
Respectfully,
Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

fL

~upr.tnu

QJ:lllttt o-f f!rt~nit.t~ ~httt.G'

~lttl'Jritt:.gfutt. ~. "'- 2.0,?'!$
C HAM BE RS OF

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL ST E V E N S

April 12, 1978

Re:

75-1914 - Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of New York

Dear Bill:
With all respect, I am persuaded that you have
given the discussion of respondeat superior in
petitioners' brief in Monroe v. Pape, an unwarranted
interpretation.
The City had argued that the complaint was properly
dismissed because (1) it was not a "person," and (2) it
was entitled to immunity.
In an argument in the nature
of a rebuttal, the petitioners referred to the doctrine
of respondeat superior as an alternative basis for
supporting the conclusion that the City is a person.
See xeroxed page 25 attached.
In Part II of petitioners' brief in Monroe, which
addressed the doctrine of immunity, petitioners argued
that "all doubts as to the liability of the City under
the act should be resolved in petitioners' favor."
In
support of that position they specifically argued:
"This case portrays a standard police procedure--whose victims are often innocent.
This case is, among other things, a 'custom
or usage' case." See xeroxed page 42 attached.
It seems to me that the Court must either overrule
Monroe v. Pape, or else hold that the Monroe complaint
did not allege a sufficient claim for relief against the
City.
Respectfully,
Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

1L

i'u:vrnn:t QJoud of tfrt ~nittb .§tareg
~agfrmgtmt. ~. QJ. 2Vc?Jl..;t
CHAMBERS OF

April 12, 1978

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

#75-1914 - Monell, et al v. Department of
Social Services of City of New
York, et al

Dear Bill,
Under your draft, as I understand it, a local governmental entity may be sued under § 1983 for its own transgressions but not for the fault purely of its employees or
agents.

The line between official policy for which the

cities may be sued and vicarious responsibility for the sins
of others is not immediately obvious.
I

I take it, however,

that the city would not be exposed to § 1983 liability where
under its policies, such as those expressed in ordinances,
its officials are given general missions together with some
or a great deal of discretion as to how to implement them
and the executing official, in good or bad faith, then invades an individual's constitutional rights.

Officers

authorized to make arrests on probable cause inevitably make
mistakes, and it may be held in such cases that the Fourth
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Amendment has been violated.

Under your draft, I would not

think the city would be responsible in such situations since
it was not its policy to make arrests except on probable
cause.
Similarly, under a city wiretap ordinance, the city
would not be liable for an officer's mistaken view that the
ordinance did not require his superior's consent before applying for a warrant; but if the ordinance itself is held unconstitutional and it is for this reason that a citizen's protected privacy is invaded, the city would be liable unless
otherwise immune from suits for damages under § 1983.
Although this oversimplifies the matter, I am sure, I
gather that a city would never be liable when its officer or
agent exceeds his authority under statute, ordinance or regulation or when he exercises discretionary authority of the
kind given to him by the city

but in good or bad faith,

exercises it so as to invade the constitutional rights of the
citizen.

It is only when the city's policy, whether made by

its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy, itself inflicts the injury
or itself authorizes or directs the specific act charged
against its officer that the city is responsible under § 1983.
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It is only then that it would be necessary to consider municipal
immunity.
You are convinced, I gather, that foreclosing suits
against a city for the wrongful acts of its officers or employees as well as shielding the city from liability for its
failure to curb the lawlessness of some of its citizens, is
required by the legislative history of § 1983.
prepared to go along with you

I am tentatively

but will be very interested in

the views of others on this matter.
I have no objection to Part III or Part II-C, but neither
would I object if you modified or eliminated them.
I am in agreement with Lewis Powell's remarks directed
at indicated matters on pages 24 and 25, on pages 29-30, and
in footnote 55.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Sam Estreicher

Re:

February 1, 1978

No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dep't of Social Services
I

WJB's tome may contain precious nuggets of
wisdom, but the mode of presentation of his ideas does not
permit of easy digestion.

His essential point is that

Monroe's holding as to municipal immunity

must be

overruled as an erroneous reading of the legislative
history.

He is willing to say that a governmental

entity should not be vicariously liable for the
unauthorized torts of its employees (Memorandum, pa47),
and suggests that liability must be premised on the
concept of fault.

As in Rizzo Vo Goode, neither the

supervisory official nor the municipal employer is
liable --whether in an action for injunctive relief or
one for damages-- for the tortious excess of a subordinate
acting "under color of" his official position.

But both

the supervisory official and the municipal employer are
subject to liability £or conduct as to which tHey bear
a "significant responsibility for the harm suffered by
a§ 1983 plaintiffo" (Memorandum, PPo 46-47)o

WJB

declines to pass, however, on the question of whether
the governmental entity may assert a "good faith"
defense (Memorandum, Po 50).
I am not going to try to give you a "road map"
to WJB's exhaustive and exhausting exegesiso

Much of

the discussion is unnecessary and confusing; I suggest
that you reread the appendix to the NEA amicus brief
and the Georgetown LoJo articleo

His "bottom line" is

-2-

that Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment, not out
of solicitude for municipal treasuries, but because
the proposal imposed a duty upon municipalities to curb
private mob violence.

This was deemed an

unwarr~nted

intrusion by the federal government into an area of
primary state competenc e because the obligation sought
to be imposed, addressed to state inaction in the face
of private lawlessness, was not based on the mandate of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

There was also concern with

the specific terms of the Sherman proposal,

~'

the

apparent imposition of liability without requiring a
showing that the municipality knew or should have known
of the riotous conduct; and the apparent breadth of the
provision for execution of a judgment lien against all
of the monies and property of the governmental subdivision,
eve~hough the law of judgments at the time recognized

an exception for public property and

~ade : prdvision

for

the continued functioning of government .
II
WHR writes a concise, persuasive piece.
Notwithstanding his superior advocacy, I adhere to my
original position.
A. Legislative History
WHR has excerpted a few passages to prove his
point that the rejection of the Sherman Am8ndment .e vidences '
an intent "to preserve the financial capacity of
municipalities to carry out basic governmental functions •••• "
(Memorandum, pp. 7-8, 10).

I have xeroxed a copy of the

pages in which these fragments appear to give you a sense
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of context. (The remarks relied upon by WHR are
boxed off in red squares (and other passages supportive
of his cause are sidelined in red).

Language which

helps to place these remarks in their appropriate setting
are sidelined in blue.) Perhaps the best spokesman
for WHR's view is Rep. Kerr (Cong. Globe 787-789), but
his words were addressed to the specific evils of
imposing liability for a municipal failure to prevent
private riots, and subjecting all of the resources of
a municipality to a judgment lien founded on the
nonperformance of this extra-constitutional obligation.
The excerpted remarks of Reps. Bingham and Farnsworth
are to the same effect.
Almost every one of the leading Republican
opponents to the measure expressed his opposition in
terms of the unprecedented imposition of a duty to
keep the peace which was without basis in the commands
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Rep. Bingham opposed the

Sherman Amendment, but he deliberat.e ly :·draft:ed
§

~l(now

1983) to overrule Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1834),

which he viewed as a case where "the city had taken
private property for public use, without compensation

•

and there was no redress for the wrong •••• " Cong. Globe
App . 84; WJB Memorandum, pp. 33-34.

See also

Rep. Burchard:
"But there is no duty imposed by the
Constitution of the United States, or
usually by State laws, upon a county to
protect the people of that county, against
the commission of the offenses herein
enumerated, such as the burning of buildings
or any other injury to property or i njury to
person." Cong. Globe 795.

•

0

'
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Rep. Blair:
11

[H]ere it is proposed, not to carry into
effect an obligation which rests upon
the municipality, but to create that
obligation, and that is the provision I
am unable to assent to. 11 Cong Globe 795.
Rep. Poland:
11

But I do agree that if a State shall deny
the equal protection of the laws, or if a
State make proper laws and have proper officers
to enforce those laws, and somebody undertakes
to step in and clog justice by preventing the
State authorities from carrying out this
constitutional provision, 1 then I do claim
that we have the right to make such interference an offense against the United States;
that the Constitution does empower us to aid
in carrying out this injunction, which, by our
Constitution, we have laid upon the States, that
they shall afford the equal protection of
t he laws to all their citizens." Congo Globe 514.
"We would go as far as [the Senate conferees]
chose to go in inflicting any punishment or
imposing any liability upon any man who
shall fail to do his duty in relat ~on to
the suppression of those wrongs." Congo Globe 804o
I have exercised selectivity in setting out these fragments,
but I believe they are representative of the views of
the oppositionistso
B. Stare Decisis
I agree with the general proposition that the
Court should be hesitant to overrule prior construction
of statutes, but this cautionary principle may be
overriden in appropriate circumstanceso

See,

~'

.3ontinental ToVo, Inc. Vo GTE Sylvania, !nco, 97 SoCto
2549 (1977)o

This is such a caseo

Stare decisis cuts in both directions.

On
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the one hand, we have a series of rulings holding that
municipalities are not "persons" for purposes of § 1983.
These were not "cons · der ed holdings," however, because
the only discussion of the legislative history appears
in cases where the plaintiffs sought recovery on
a respondeat superior theory; there was no incentive
to present a view of the legislative evidence that
would have precluded maintenance of their claims.

The

issues ventilated in the WJB-WHR interchange were simply
not briefed -on any previous occasion (aside from a
short footnote in Morris Ernst's brief for Monroe)
On

the other hand, an affirmance of CA2's

decision requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio
exercise of jurisdiction over school boards in a great
number of eases.

WHR aonoedes that at least two decisions

involved claims for money damageso Cleveland Bd. of Educo
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Disto, 393 U.So 503 (1969).
Although individual defendants were named in addition
to the school entity in several of the decisions, the
opinions of this Court often made explicit reference
to the school-board party,

particularly in the sections

discussing the relief to be awarded o WHR

s~::.ggests

that

some of these latter decisions may have involved independent
school districts (Memorandum, pp. 14,16), but the force
of this point is lost because, at a later point, he makes
clear that every school board, even one that is simply
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"the governing body of ·an incorporated school district
separate from the city," is immune from § 1983 liability.
(Memorandum, p.21).
It should be noted that the only decision that
will have to be squarely overruled is City of Kenosha v.
Bruno.

There, the Court determined sua sponte that there

was no § 1983 jurisdiction to issue an injunction against
a municipality for its own failure to hold a due process
hearing with respect to the denial of liquor licenses.
The municipality was held to be a non- "person" under
§

1983 regardless of the nature of the relief being sought.

Obviously, no discussion of the legislative history
bearing on the distinct proposition that Congress intended
liability for a city's own wrongdoing was advanced in that
case.

Moreover, Kenosha's rationale will have to be

disturbed even if CA2 is affirmed.
importation of the Ex parte Young

As WJB points out,
~pproach

requires

a "bifurcated" view of the term "person" depending on
the nature of the relief being sought.

A public official

sued in his official capacity, concededly a "person" for
purposes of injunctive relief, becomes a non-"person"
in a suit for damages.

WHR's opinion in Kenosha purports

to reject such "bifurcation,"

but he implicitly approves

this device here, in order to preserve the possibility of
obtaining injunctive relief from a constitutional violation
by state officials.
III
We should try to

encour~ge

WJB to avoid
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overruling Monroe, but rather to restrict Monroe to its
facts.

Such a tack may soften the force of WHR's

stare decisis attack.

We should say that we have

not had occasion previously to consider the availability
of a § 1983 damages remedy for constitutional violations
which are the direct result of a policy of the municipality
or school board, rather than simply its failure to curb
the unauthorized torts of its employees.

There are

line-drawing proble s, as WHR notes, but this case involves
a formal; written policy of the school board; it is the
clear case.

I would also try to encourage WJB to

recognize a defense for rights not clearly defined at the
time of violation, cf. Procunier v. Martinez.

In all

likelihood, this maternity leave case does not involve
such a clearly defined right.

I would reserve decision

on the question of whether there is available to a municipality
a defense for "good-faith" violations of a clearly
defined constitutional right.
If Monroe

is not to be reexamined, I agree

with WHR that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between
school boards and municipalities.

S.E.

~)
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1871.

~er

the ground.

It seems to me the

to ~~nt course for !he Government is for the

J:f, ,te to reject tlns report .and have a new
::;cut ittell of couference, and see if these
Cb 1111 ~ions ~rovisions cannot be changed.
0 .J'·\:c pHJJ.SIDENT pro tem11ore.
Will. the
Senate 11gree to the re~ort ot th~ committee
f conference? upon whtch questton the yeas
0
d nays have been ordered.
.
1111 Mr MOlUtiLL, of Vermont. If that is
~,.greed to, of course the motion which I
110
de to insist further and ask for another
1111
\rcrence will come up.
coMr THURMAN. Is the question on the
·woti~n of tile Senator from California, to con·
cur?
'fhe PRESIDE~T :pro temptJt·e. The ques·
tion is on concurnng 111 the report.
The question being taken by yeas and nays,
resulted-yeas 20, nays 20; as follows:
YEAS-Messrs. Bayn.rd. Blair, Casserly, Clayton,
('ole. Coov~r. Davis of Kentuckyi D1wis of West
Vir"inia.. Hn.mtlton of M:uyland, l•tchcock, John110; J{elly, Lewis, Nye, Prntt, ltamsey, Robertson,
Sauisbury~SILwyer, :Sherman, Spencer, Stevenson,
Stockton, ·.1hurman. Vickers, and Windom-26.
NAYS-Messrs. Ames. Boreman, Cald1vell, Cameron C..rpenter, Chandler, Conkling, Corbett, Ed01und•. Fenton, Ferry of Michigan, Frelingbuysen,
Hilbert, Hamilton of Texas, Hnrlan, Howe, Logl\n,
Morrill of Vermont, Osborn, l'atterson, Pomeroy,
Scotr.. Stew,ort, 'l'rumbull, Wilson. and Wright-26.
ABSENT-Messrs. Anthony, llrownlo.v, lluckingbn.m. Crn.gi;t; Ferry of Connecticu~. l!'lnno.gan,
]iumlin. H11l, Kellogg, Mornll of Mo.me, Morton 1
}'ool. lUcc, Schurz, i::ipraguc, Sumner, Tipton, ana
West-18.
So the r~port was not concurred in.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Sen·
o.tor from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL] moves that
tlie Senate further insist on its amend menta,
and ask for a second committee of conference.
The motion was agreed to-ayes thirty· three,
no~s not counted.
By unanimous consent, the President pro
tempore was authorized to appoint the second
coiUmittee of conference; and Messrs. CoLE,
ScoTT, and CoNKLIKG were appointed.
11

nNAL ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. CONKLING. I offer a resolution to
lie on the table until I call it up:
lleaolved bv the Senate, (the House of Representatil·es concurring,) That on Wednesday, the 19th pf
April insta.nt, at -o'clock, the President of the
Scunte and the Speaker of the House of Repreacutatives 1\djourn their respective Houses without
day.
EXECUTIVE SESSION.

Mr. CAMERON. I move that the Senate
proceed to the consideration of executive busiuess.
Mr. THURMAN. I move that the Senate
anjourn.
Mr. CAMERON. I have a motion before
the Senate.
The PHESIDENT pro tempore. The ques·
tion is on the motion of the tienator from Ohio,
that the Senate adjourn.
The motton was not agreed to.
The PRESIDENT p1·o tempore. The ques·
tion recurs on the motion of the Senator from
Pennsylvania.
The motion was agreed to; and after fifteen
minutes spent in executive session, the doors
were reopened, and (at eleven o'clock and fifty
minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned.

.

J
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
WEDNESDAY, April19, 1871.
The House met at twelve o'clock m. Prayer
by Rev. Dr. RANKIN!.. of Washington, D. C.
On motion of Mr. HLAIR, of Michigan, the
reading of the Journal of yesterday was dis·
Ptused with.
E:SF'ORCE11ENT OF FOURn:ENTH AMEND:UENT.

The House resumed the consideration of the
report of the committee of conference on the
disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the
amendmeuts of the Senate to the bill (H. lt.
No. 820) to enforce the provisions of the four·
teentb amendment to the Constitution of the

States, and for 'other purposes, upon
I United
which Mr. KERR was entitled to the floor.
Mr1 KEt'y Mr: Speaker, it is not my
purpose toelain the House by any very
lengt by discussion of this report, but L will as
briefly as 1 can state the reasons why I was un·
able to concur with the majority of the House
conferees. I will not stop to refer in detail to
the disposition made by the conference com·
mittee of the first point of disagreement be·
tween the two Houses. I think the action of
the committee upon that subject was not very
material, but that the provision ofthe bill, as
it is now reported to the House, is really an
improvement upon the original proposition.
From the second disagreement of the House
the two committees require the House to recede.
That disagreement relates to the time wheri
the fourth section of the bill shall cease to have
valiuity, and my objection to the action of the
committee is th1s, that it enables the dominant
party in Congress, by indirection, by a trick to
continue this obnoxious section in operation
till the first Monday ofDecember, 1872, instead
of suffering it to expire on the 1st day of
June, 1872.
This result will be accomplished by the Con·
gress, at the time of the next regular adjourn·
ment, say in· midsummer next, taking a recess,
eo nomine, until a day ·named, instead of an
adjournment without day, a recess, for exam·
ple, till'tbe 1st day of December, so that it
cannot be said that there has yet arrived an
end of'' the next regular session of Congress,''
and therefore the courts will be expected to
hold that this obnoxious section continues in
force until the first Monday of December,
1872. .
The object of this provision is manifestly to
enable the rnojorit.y, the present Administra·
tion, the Republican military candidate for
renomination and reelection to the Presidency,
to obtain a partisan advantage, and that, too,
in an unworthy manner. They want the power
this section will afford in the conduct of the
great political campaign of 1872. '!'bey want
to retain that power, not for the public welfare,
but for personal and selfish, if not utterly
unlawful, ends. I could not assent to the con·
1tinuance of such a law a day longer than by
possibility could not be prevented.
The third point of disagreement relates to
the repeal of what is called the jury test· oath,
and the result of the action of the committee
is that they recommend the repeal of the
first section of that law, which establishes cer·
tain additional causes of challenge to individ·
ual jurors in the Federal courts, gives the
right to any suitor in those courts to require
the application of those objections to jurors to
enforce the cause of challenge given in that
section, and excludes the best of men from jury
service. It is a great point gained, I agree, to
secure the · repeal of that section; but why
retain in operation the second section of that
law? Is it less obnoxious or less objectionable
than the first? Are its purposes any less
vicious or proscriptive or inhuman than the pur·
poses of the first? I submit that it is in every
sense a. mere reenactment of the first section,
with this qualification only, that it shall not
be enforced except at the discretion and pleas·
ure of the judge of the court in which the jury
is being organized. But I call attention to this
difference: that, while under the first sec·
tion the objection made by a suitor in any
one of these courts to a juror on account of
the causes alleged in this first section is personal to the single juror to whom his objection
is made, the objection, if made at all, under
the second section must be made to the entire
panel, to the venire, to all the men on the
jury, and it purges the entire box of any cit·
izen against whom these causes of challenge
can be t~;.u ly alleged. It is therefore, I say,
infinitely worse than thEI first section; more
sweepiug in its effects in the practical adrnin·
istration of justice, and I therefore object to
the action of the committee. That second

section I will read, to the end that its cruel
and offensive character may be better under·
stood:
SEc. 2. And be ;e further enacted, That at each
and ~ve~y term of nny court of the United States
the drstn~t attor"~J' •. or other person acting for and
on behalf of the UDltcd Stl\tes in said court, ma)'
move, and the court, in their di•oretion, may require
the clerk to tender to encb and every person who
may be summoned to serve as a grand or petit juror
or venireman or talesman in said court the follow·
ing oat.h or nffirmat10n, namely: "You'do solemnlY
swear (or 1\ffirm, llS the case may be) that you will
support the Constitution of the U oited States of
America; thnt you hnve not, without duress and
constraint, taken up arms, or iQined any insurreo·
tion or rebellion against the United States; thnt
you have not adhered to any insurrection or rebellion, giving it aid and comfort: that you have not,
directly or indirectly, given any assistance, in money
or n.ny other thing, to any person or persons whom
you knew, or had good ground to believe, had joined,
or wus about to join, •o.id insurrection and rebellion,
or bad resisted, or WI\S about to resist~.with force of
arms. tho execution of the laws of the u nitcd States;
and that you have not counseled or advised any
per.on or persons to join any rebellion against, or
to resist with force of 1\rms the laws of the United
States." Any person or persons declining to take
said Ol\th shall be dischnrged hy the court from
serving on the grand or petit jury, or venire, to
which be mo.y have been summoned.
Contemplate for a moment the practical
effect of tbe proscription contained in this sec·
Lion. It is true, I verily believe, that less than
one thousand white men in the Commonwealth ·
of Virginia., under this section if enforced by
the court, would be competent jurors. It is
true this day that Judge l:tives, now of one of
the district courts of the United States in that
State, could not sit upon a jury in any Federal
court because his own son was a rebel soldier
and although himself loyal, it is safe to assumJ...
that during the war the judge, directly or indirectly, gave some assistance in money or some
oth<lr thing, or in some way, to his son. So it
is throughout the South. It is impossible, if
this law be enforced, to organize competent,
trustworthy, intelligent, and respectable juries
in the South. The jury· box. must be given up
to the sole occupancy of ignorance, vicious·
ness, and incompetence. Can such mean and
wretched policy promote the public peacP., in·
terests, or harmony? Does it not do violence
to the better imrulses of all good and humane
men? Does it not mock the spirit ·or mag·
nanimit.y and decent civilization?
But it may be said that the courts will not
enforce this section. They may not; in many
cases now they do not; they ought never to do
so, and t~erefore it should be repealed at. once.
Sincerity ~n your professions demands its imme·
diate and unconditional repeal.
But, sir, without taking further time in refer· - - - - - •
ence to that section, I pass to the fourth cause
of disagreement between the two Houses. It
relates to the extraordinary section attached
by the Senate to tlie ongmar but or the House,
usually, and I believe properly, called the
"Sherman section." Gentlemen remember
what that section is as it was sent to ns by the
Senate and non·concurred in by such an emphatic vote of the Honse. What it is now, I
think I can best i.ndicate by reading it as I go
along, breaking it into paragraphs and inter·
spersi'ng my objections to it in that way. It
providesThat if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, bMn, or granary shall be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or destroyed, \Vholly or in part, by any persons riotou•ly
and tumultuously assembled to11ether; or if any person sho.ll unlawfully and with force and violence be
whipped, sc'our11ed. wounded, or killed by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together,
with intent to deprive any person of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of tho
United States or to deter him or funish bim for
exercising such right, or by rea~on o his race, color,
or previous condition of servitude, in every such
case the county, city, or parish in which any of the
said offenses shall be committed shl\lt be liable to
pay full compensation to the person or persons dnmnified by such offense, if liVID&', or to his widow or
legal represent11tivc if dead.·
I suggest, first, that the grammatical con·
struction of this part~graph is such that it is
left in extreme doubt whether the intent which
is referred to in a su bsequeut part of the sec·
tion is at all applicable to the first paragraph,
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which relates to the destruction of houses, ten·
emeuts, und other property. Let any gentle·
man read it critically and see if the intent is
not confined in i.ts. ap_Plicatio~ to the portion
which relates to InJUries to the person, not the
property. I believe that the true, legal, and
judicial. C?n~truction will entirely exempt that
class of InJUrieS to the property from the neces·
sity of establishing the intent stated in the sub·
sequent words of that I have read. The offenses
against the property will be complete without
proof of the intent. It is, therefore, an assump·
tion by Congress of power to go into a State
and punish, without such an intent, any per·
sons who riotously or tumultuously assemble
together and commit any of these offenses. To
that extent, therefore, it is entirely without
the purview of anything contained in the four·
teenth or any other amendment to the Consti·
tution, or in the text of the Constitution itself.
In reference to that part of the section which
I have read, I wish to ask the attention of the
House to the further fact that, for the first time
in the history of the United States, it is attempt·
ed by a law of Congress to punish criminally
a civil division of a State of this Union for
crimes or wrongs against the laws of the Uni·
ted States cq m rp~l ed b~ the citizenR
tj?e
. United States wd m tha mumc1paf sn IVIS·
ion of the State. It is said by gentlemen that
this is no extraordinary kind of legislation;
that it was enforced at the common law, and
that it baa been enforced in many of the States
of th\s Union, in several of the New England
States, in the State of New York and espe·
cially in the city of New York, and in the State
of Pennsylvania and especially in the city of
Philadelphia. But I assure gentlemen that
th ey will search the codes of those States in
vain to find any example for this bill. There
is none. There are some enactments that give
remote analogy for it. But they are all most
materially different in principle, altogether
better guarded in their provisions, and infin·
itely less liable to abuse. There is no attem t
a
re t uni h a citiz
e
commtsswn o an or mary cnme agamst the
person ol ht s , ef r ·man, \{ Erans{emn g the
ott ose wmch e as comml ed t 6
'
pans or c1 n
1c
e rest es an co ·
pelm a
e
1 tlie u

in such an application there is no violation by
the States either of fundnmental principles or
of constitutional law. It'is the exercise by the
State of its original police jurisdiction. The
power it obtains from that great fountain of
undelegated authority in the States. All power
not conferred upon the Federal Government
abides still in the States or the people.
It is said that this is borrowed from the com·
roon law of England. So it may be. But why go
there for power under a written constitution in
cases 1ike these? I submit, however, that even
there, and in tho dark and curious history of the
common law, you will find no countenance for
some of the provisions of this section. It is
true that the idea of unishin a comm ity
y 1ts c1ttzens IS or·
for offenses comm1 e
rowed from t he common I3!w; but 1t ortginated
many centuries ago, and was the result of a
very imperfect civilization. I am sure we are
not to-day, and under our system of govern·
ment, called upon to go back to those a.ges for
guidance in the interpretation of our constitn·
tiona\ and delegated powers.
What was the theory upon which this policy
was originally adopted? It was the very one
to which I have already referred-that where
cert.ain offenses were committed with demon·
strations of violence, noise, and tumult, they
attracted the a.ttention of the few inha.bitanta
of their small subdivisions, in those days
called "hundreds," very inconsiderable ~;~.nd
limi,t ed portions of country, almost within the
reach of a single human voice, there being
many "hundreds" in each county, so that the
people were all put upon notice, and it was
made the duty of each and every one to raise
immediate hue and cry against the felon, and,
if possible, to arrest him. And under the
operation of the earliest of this class of laws,
the chief of which was called the statute of
Winchester, (13 Edward I, chap.1,) it was pro·
vided that if the people of the hundred, called
the hundreders, did thus promptly rise and
make pursuit nnd arrest the criminal, they.
should not be held liable for the result of his
crime. Dut it should not be forgotten that
in all those cases the obligation or liability of
the inhabitants rested upon the theory that by
reason of the public and demonstrative char·,
acter and manner of the crime, they had sub)
stantial notice, and therefore, as good citizens,
it was their duty to take preventive steps at
made it is, I agree, somewhat common to once. The inhabitants were, in other words,
require the municipal organization~ created chargeable with guilty knowledge, as in the
by those States, which are part and parcel of cases of the riots in New York, Philadelphia,
the local machinery adopted by the State gov· and Baltimore, in 1854-55, for the outrages
ernmenta in the execution of their reserved of which those cities were, under their State
powers, to require them to perform certain Jaws, made to pay.
duties which are necessary in the police regu·
The practical effect of that system in those
lation1 government, and protection of society, very small territorial limits was to make each
and to punish them where they fail to execute citizen a conservator of the peace, a sort of
the duties thus imposed upon them, sometimes bailiff, to aid the public authorities in main·
by fines and penalties, to be ex acted in ways taiuing the law within those small limits. 'l'he
indicated in the laws of those States. But operation of the statute of Winchester, I know,
there is no example of the precise character was afterward much extended, and especially
involved in this bill. It is not in the cases of by the statute of 9 George I, chapter 22,
ordinary crimes, or of personal wrongs and called the " black act."
injuries, such as arson, murder, larceny, as·
But it must be remembered, in reference to
sault and battery, and mayhem, that counties this attempted application of that principle in
or cities of the Stales are required to answer our country at large, and by Congress, that
for the crimes of individual citizens. Those some counties of this country are almost as large
offenses for which the counties and other as the whole of that island from which we get
municipal organizations are required to an· our common law, and that many of our conn·
swer, are failures to keep up the public high· ties are very sparsely settled ; that the people
ways, failures to keep the bridges of the county are engaged in agricultural employments, and
in good repair, or failures of cities to keep their live remote from each other; that these comstreets in safe condition, or failures to protect binations of two or thre·e persons to comm1t
the people a~ainst mobs, against open, nnmer· cr1mes naatost one ot more or the Citizens of
oua, riotous, tumultuous uprisings of the peo· a coun mo.
on~rna e an execu e w1t ·
pie, leading to the destruction of property. out n poss1 1 infia E one other human be·
All that is generally done upon the theory, in I
OW nn ·
a.lmost always well·founded1 that all the peo· tb \n ~ a ou
e m en
1 n.
I ere 1s, tb erelore, a total an i! nbsolute
pie of those respective aubdtvisions are by the
very publicity of the manner in which these absence of nouce, COriSErucbve or Hnp hed,
crimes are committed put upon notice that Wl (U ID iby decent limitS Of law Of reason.
they are about to be committed, and thus it is And the bill itself is significantly silent ou the
made their duty to interpose every means in subject of notice to these counties and par·
their power to prevent their commission. Dut ishee or cities. Under this section it is not
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liabilit shall attach, ~ it
sha
e <nowu a 1ere was any mtent10n to
comtm£ th ese cnmes, so as to !asten ua bthty
justly upon the mu J ici_pahl.y. IE IS no t reqmred
to be proveU"!:hartliere was any previous indi·
cation of the purpose of these wrong-doers, or
that there were any rioters roaming over
the country, or thr~ugh the community, that
could put any portiOn whatever of the people
upon notice or even upon inquiry. It is arbitrarily anti defiantly assumed that they know
it, and are, therefore, guilty. Considering
the condition of our country, the habits and
pursuits of the people, I say this is simply
monstrous and 'outrageous. It punishes the
innocent for the l)uilt_y. It EKkl!s the prop·
erty of one a~td g1ves 1t to another by mere
force, without right, in the absence of guilt or
knowledge, or the possibility of either. It violates all just principles of law. It is in full
keeping with the incurably vicious character
of this entire measure.
I now come to in uire is it com etent for
the
ffiU~Il~l~C~l~R~~
O;r~a~n~l~Z~ar.l~O~n~S~O~~l~
S ~~~n~Mf.~~

way a a , WI or WI 10u no 1 ~ e ,
y JU g·
men t 1s £fiat sucli power now here exists~ that
it cannot be found within the limits of the
Constitution; that its exercise cannot be
justified by any rational construction of that
instrument. I bold that the constitutional
nower of the Feaeral Government to umsh the
Clttzens o
e me
ta es or an y o enses
ums bable by. 1t at all rna be exerCised and
ex auste agams 1e m lVI ua o en er and
!it~r~l ~rty ; but when you go one mch 1be1 t you lire comvellea, by the very
yon
necess1bes wliJCh surround you, to invade
powers which a.re secured to the States, whiCh'
are a necessary an d most esseottal part of the
autonomy of State governments, without which
there can logically be no State government.
For it must be remembered that if you can
impose these penalties at all upon the coun·l
ties, paris'fies, or e~ b es, an d can invade their
treasuries or control their ministerial officers
to any extent whatever, your power is un·
limited, it may go to any extent you please, it
may take the entire control of all these officer!!
of the State governments, and thus practically
and substantially break down those govern·
menta, putting everything and everybody under
the sovereign will and pleasure of the Congress
of the United States.
It bas been declared by Chief Justice Mar·
shall, and never questioned by the Su1Jreme
Court since, nod it is not susceptible of sue·
cessful denial, that wherever Congress, in the
exercise of any granted power, elects any
mode of execution, or adopts any instrument·
ality by which it will carry into execution any
of these powers, the instrumentalities selected
become the exclusive instruments of the Fed·
era! Government; that the power of the Fed·
eral Government over them is above all other
control; that in the very nature of things there
can be in these divisions of power no partner·
ship. The power of the Federal Government
must be exclusive. The power of the State
government within its limits, and as to the
reserved powers of the States, must be exclu·
sivc, and in an important sense sovereign.
Such is the declaration of the Supreme Court.
But what becomes of all this theory under the
practical working of this bill?
These systems of local governiD:ent by conn·
ties and cities are adopted by the States as
instrumentalities to aid them in the wise and
judicious regulation and protection of the local
and domestic interests of . their citizens. It
will never do to say that they may be tampered
with, impeded, or arrested in the discharge of
their duties, as this bill proposes. It would
be fatal to the success and very existence of
Jocalself·government. It has many times been
solemnly decided by the Supreme Court that
these ngencies adopted by the States to aid in
local administ.ration are nbove the touch or
control of any power, nrc subject only to the
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And in which action any of the parties commit·
tiog suoh acts may be joined as defendants. And any
v~>ymentofany judgment or p~>rt thereof unsatisfied,
recovered by tbe plaintiff in such action may, if not
satisfied by the individual defendant therein within
two months next Mter th11 recovery of such judl!mont, upon execution duly issued a~:ainst sucb !nd1vidual defendnnt in such judgment, nnd returned
unsatisfied in 'Thole or in part, be enforced against
such county, city, or parish, by execution. attnchmoot, mandamus, garnishment, or any other proceeding in aid of execution, or applicable to the enforcement of judgments ngainst municipal corpora.lions; and such judgment 5hall be.alien as well upon
all moneys in the treasury of such county, city, or
parish, as ut on the other \fo~ erty tb 'q,!Ql f. And the
court in kfi QUCh ifdlidfi 1£ , on mo ton, cause additional parties to be made therein J>rior to issue
joined, to the end that justice may be dono. And
the said county. city, or pari"h may recover the full
amount
said judgment
it paid,
withengaged
costs and
interest, offrom
any personbyor
persons
as
principal or accessory in such riot, in an action in
any court of competent jurisdiction. And such
county, city or parish so paying shall aloo be subrogo.tcd to all the plaintiff's rights under such judi:mont.
I would like to ask any gentleman where,
upon the most shadowy interpretation of the
Constitution, you can find power, as this bill
Mtempts to do, to declare these judgmen~s,
arising in tort, arising out of wrongs and
crimes, not out of contract, alien on all money
in the treasury of these several mu'hicipal or·
ganizations, and upon all the properly of these
organizations. If you may create such a lien,
nnd it is valid, what becomes of the power of
the State, through the agency of its neces·
snry subordinate organizations to carr o
self-government at all?
ow are ey o per·
!brm t6 e1r necessary an customary funchons
1f you may send a Federal officer to put his
nrms into the treasury of the county, or parish,
or city in this way and withdraw therefrom
all the revenues, or if you can authorize the
~~ale of a county court· house, or county jail,
or the county schools, or any other of the prop·
crty of the people? I ask you, if that can be
done, where is the security that has hitherto

W1-t t(

su m1
a 1 JS gonP. an sacn ce
er,
and it is sacrificed by gentlemen who are pur·
suing a myth and shadow. It is sacrificed for
an unsubstantial and supremely insufficient
reason. lt is to me alarming that such radi·
cal and vicious propositions should find any
defenders in an American Congress;
But my colleague on this committee says
that it is a common practice for the courts of
the United States, in the exercise of the judi·
cial powers granted to them in the Constitu·
tion, to enforce the performance of judgments
against municipalities of this kind, such as
counties and cities. I answer him that he, as
well as any other intelligent lawyer of this
Honse, well knows that that pro
· ·
is
true to this extent onl
e Federa
c
a m e exerc1se o t is grant of judicial
powers may, where they have the jurisdiction
under the Copstitution, compel these muni·
cipalities to execute their contracts, and that
is all. To execute their contracts ; but let it
be remembered that no decree of a Federal
court bas gone to· the extent of saying that
any one of these divisions should execute its
own contracts except in precise compliance
with the law of the State, in precise accordance
with its own contract and the law upon which
it was based, and not in pursua e of any law
dictated t · b Con ress
n o
s,
e ex ent o JU ICia p er hitherto exercised
in that direction has been confined to the ex·
ecution of civil contracts, such as the payment
of corporation and municipal bonds issued
under State authority where the courts of
the United States bad jurisdiction, and then
only according to the law of the State recog·
nizing and enforcing fully and kindly, and in
all respects within the precise letter of the
Constitution, the right of the State to govern
itself, to regulate its municipal interests, · to
say whether a county or State may subscribe
to a railroad, may issue or put out bonds
and securities in a particular way, bow those
securities ml\y be made payable and their
payment made certain . If any county or city
fails to perform its obligations its contracts
(can be enforced.
· Any gentleman at a glance can see that the
courts give no ground for the assumption of
my colleague on the committee, but do very
fully sustain me in my position. This novel
bill finds no refuge in the courts or the Con·
stitution. It is condemned by both, as well as
b · h
dh
·
I
Y ng t, reason, an
umamty. t may read·
ily be seen by looking into any one of ·these
cases in our courts (which if I bad time I
ld r
)
d
wou re1er to, that the court oes in all cases
· put llo mere interpl'etation on the laws of the
States and provide for the enforcement of
those laws under that construction. That is
not only true, but the court goes further and
says where those contracts, or charters affect·
b
d
ing municipal organizations, ave ba judicial
construction by the State court of last resort,
that the Supreme Court of the United States
will adopt and follow it and make such con·
struction its rule of action. The only departure
from it worth mention is in a case which arose
lately in Iowa, where there bad been . an un·
broken series of decisions sustaining an inter·
pretation of a contract, and one decision after·
ward reversing those decisions; 1\nd the Su·
pre me Court said that it would adhere to the
J?Olicy laid down by the long line of decisions.
(!Wallace R., 175.)
Bnt that was extraordinary, and has never
been done by the Supreme Court except in
some extraordinary cases. It is not pretended
to be done for the purpose of enabling the court
to go one inch beyond the true interpretation
of the State law and the State obligation.
Now, Mr. Speaker,· I will detain the House
but a moment lange~. I will not attempt again
to discuss the general provisions of this bill.
No invective, no vigor of denunciation can
fitly describe its abominable character. It is
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incurable and unamendable. There is no sec·
tion or line in it that does not deserve indig·
nant rejection.
J;Here the hammer fell J
. l'he SPE_AKER pro te;npore, (Mr. HAWL&Y
m the cha1r.) The Chair announces, as re·
quested by the gentle~an from I.lJdiana, [Mr.
KEim,] that twenty mmutes of his time Iiave
expired.
Mr. KERR. I yield five minutes to the «en·
tleman from Kentucky, [Mr. BEcK.]
.,
Mr. B~CK. Mr. §peaker, I thank my fri end
from Ind1ana [Mr. KERR] for the five minutes
allowed me to cuter my protest against this
rcp
~
rt.
f course I will not attempt to dis·
c
1erits of this bill-I beg pardon, it baa
e its. ~is simply o. surrender of despotic
~hority to the President by. the
o
s of the people, who will, I hope,
se! o it lh.A men who have thus betrayed the
tr s ~o !lfiM'd to them shall have no chance to
d o any more. But argument avails nothing.
Denunciation such as a plain man can indulge
in is cut off, parliamentary language being
wholly inadequate to a full expression of its
atrocities; nothing short of vigorous and ofi·
repeated profanity, in which, of course, I do
not indnlge, can do justice to the subject. ·
Still the bill, as it !ell; the House, bad some
regard for the private rights of men under the
despotic rule established, the most valuable
of which have been stricken out by the con·
ference committee. When the amendment of
the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GAitFIELD] was
adopted by the House, requiring all.military
office·rs who arrested citizens when the writ of
habeas co1-pus is suspended by the President
to turn them over to the civil courts for tria.!,
I felt that if a fair jury trial was allowed them
a great point was gained, as the outrages of
the President and his officials, if the arrest
was wrongful, could be exposed and the per·
petrators brought to justice, or at least held
up to public condemnation ; and when the
amendment of the gentleman from Maine,
[Mr. HALE,] which I took more interest in
than all else, repealing the infamous jury law
of July 17, 1862, was passed, I felt that the
sting was out of the bill. The restoration of
the second section of that law by the commit·
tee of conference is a surrender to the more
bitter and malignant Radicala of the Senate
and House of all that was valuable in the
amendmqnts which the House, b,y an over·
whelming majority, inserted into the original
text as a sine qua non to its passaze here.
I regard tlre right to have an honest, upright,
impartial, and intelligent jury as the only safe·
guard left to individual liberty and right when
this bill becomes a law. Strike that down as
is done in the report, and there is nothing too
monstrous that a venal or servile judge rna>'
not do in obedience to the orders of the Prcs1·
dent or those who are known or believed to
be authorized to speak for him. I care com· ·
paratively little about the Sherman amend· \
ment, either in its original or modified form.
It is too grossly and palpably unconstitutional
to receive the sanction of ,any court that even
a Radical President or Senate ~ght organize.
The Supreme Court, thank God, has yet n.
decent respect for constitutional liberty n.nd
law, and it will dismiss 'vitb th~ contempt it
merits the first case that comes before it seek·
ing to enforce the judgments provided for in
this bill, and that will be an end of the Sber·
man amendment. Therefore, I am not afraid
of the practical effect of that piece of narrow·
·minded, fanatical, and malicwus· legislation;
it overleaps itself. The old Engli~h "hue and
cry." or any other relic of barbarism, cannot
save it.
Our written Constitution, its limitations and
restrictions, were intended to put an end for·
ever to the exercise of all aucli legislative o.nd
judicial authority by the J!'ederal Government,
and leave all these matters to the severo.! States
and the people thereof. I care nothinj; o.bout
the minor charges, but I do protest ngawst the
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to tl:e Committee for the District of Columbia
when appointed.
ENFORCEllKNT OF FOURTEENTU AMEND~IENT.

The House resumed the consideration of
the report of the committee of conference on
the bill (H. R. No. 320) to enforce the pro·
visions of the fourteenth amendment, and for
other purpotes.
:Mr. SHELLABARGER. I now call the
previous question.
The previous qnestion was seconded and the
main question ordered.
1'he SPEAKER. The gentleman from Ohio
[Mr. SnELI..ABA.RGER] is entitled to the floor
for one hour to close debate.
Mr. SHELLABARGER. I do not propose
myself t.o occupy any portion of that hour. I
will yield t.he first ten minutes of the hour to
my colleague, [Mr. BrNGHA.M.]
Mr. BINGHAM. I ask the attention ofgen·
tlemen oft e - ouse, especially those on the
Republican side of it, to the statement which
I make of some facts touching this bill. I
desire, in the first place, to say that every part
and parcel of the bill as reported from the com·
mittee of conference meets my entire approval,
except the section known as the Sherman
ameudment, or the seventh section of the bill
as reported by the conference committee- I
am the freer to make that remark for the reason that, with the exception of thin seventh
section as reported, the bill is substantially the
bill that received the vote of every Republican
member of this House ..
They voted also upon the seventh ~eclion
now repor~ed by the conference committee not
without due consideration. The priuciple involved in that section was printed and before
this House for a month before we received this
measure from the Senate. ' The learned special
committee of the House ignored it, and would
have nothing to do with it, for manifest and
good reasons to them appearing. They re·
ported a bill without that section; the House
never enter·taiued it, but proceeded to pass the
bill as it is now substantially, without that sec·
tion, by the vote of every H.epublican in the
House. I stand for the bill to· day as it passed
the House originally. I stand for it with the
exception of the Sherman amendment, as it is
called, in the form in. which it is reported; for
it is substantially in law and in fact the very
bill which received the vote of every Repub·
lican member of the House, my own included.
Something was due to the judgment of the
House, under the circumstances, on the part
of the Senate. But in utter disregard of the
recorded judgment of the House, with full
knowledge of the fact that the very proposi·
tion they tender us had been presented to the
consideration of the House for months, but
had not been considered even by our committee, much less reported by it, and had not been
accepted by the House, but the bill passed
without it, the Senate ought to have considered before they undertook to throw that amendment in upon us by a vote of -Eome thirty or
thirty· two votes in the Senate against the votes
of some one hundred and forty or more in the
House who supported this bill without that
amendment. A decent respect to the judgment
of this Honse re9.uired some consideration.
But this provisiOn was sent to ns attached to
our bill; and what took place? The House
rPjected it subs.tantially as it comes back to us
lo·day; there being, on a division-118 votes
against it, and only 25 in its favor. The yeas
and nays were then called; and 132 votes (at
leastsevent.y of them cast by Republicans) were
recorded against this sectiou, and only 35 votes
in its favor. The bill went back to the Senate,
who insisted upon the amendment. I now ask
the House to reject. this report for reasons
which must be obvious to the mind of the
House; and 1 hope that the vote of every
"Republican will be cast against it. It is useless aud worse than useless to vote down this
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important mea81:.re with any doubtful voice. laws of the several States of this Union withLet the House record its vote emphatically out_ the corpor.ate organization of counties or
for the rights of all the p_eople of every State panshes thermo than there can be a United
and all the States in the Union.
States under the Constitution of the United
Gehtlemen talk about finding precedents in States without organized States· because the
the legislation of the States. With 11.1! respect, counties in the. several States are 'integral parts
I deny it. My learned and accomplished· col- of the States, JUSt as the States of tl!e Union
league fl\lr. SaELLA.BA.RGER] has referred this are integral parts of the nation. If you destroy
morning to the decision pronounced in the either you destroy the whole fabric.
State of New York by Judge Denio, than
So it comes to be written in the Constitution
whom none of the recent judges of that State thatwas superior in all the attainments of a jurist;
.. Tho United States shall guarnnty to every State
but that decision, instead of supporting an·y in this Union a republican form of government and
.
d shall protect each of them n~;ainst invasion" • •
such legislation as this, m its very text an
•
•
•· and domestic violence."
philosophy condemns it. Let gentlemen read
Instead of protecting the States against
that decision. It is on a case against the city domestic violence, instead of guarantying to
of New York, a local corporation of the State, them a republican form of government, we
and involves the exercise of the supreme au.\ have introduced here for the first time in the
thoritv reserved to the States themselves by history of the nation a proposition to takp it
the express letter of the Constitution of the im ossible to maintain a re ublican orm of
United States. There will be found under- govern men m any
ae
e 010n i!.,U
lying this decision the declaration that the only hap~ens to be tile pleasure of a mob, bzt{'ot
power to charge a municipality of a State for of t11ree or more persons, to take lrfe au
urn
the destruction of property by a mob arises property m the several counties of the several
from the laws of the State; that it rests on States. Why, sir? Because it is provided in
the positive statute of the State.
this Senate amendment that
"ud ment may
In the case of Darlington vs. The Mayor, &c., be obtained a ainst a coun
riOtof New York, (vol. 31, page 187,) referred to ~o t e extent o t e amages the jury 1n a
·
by my colleague, [Mr. SaELLADA.UGER,] Judge V nlted States cour
Denio said:
rio
the
lve
'very body knows an hon.. The act [of the Legi•lature of the State] pro- est jury m sue a case, when the rioters are
J>oses to subject tl!e people of theseverallocal divis· ·
1 d d · h h
d
·
ions of the State, consisting of counties and cities, Imp ea e Wit t e county an an mnocent
to thepaymentofdamnges to property in consequence person is slain in the sr.reet, will find, and no
of any riot or mob within the county or city."
rna~ can find fault with them, damages perWhere, sir, is the law of the State to make haps to the extent of fifty or one hundred
a whole county responsible for the killing of thonsand dollars. The count,r is to be held
a man by three persons engaged in a riot liable with the riolers 1 and arr money m its
tnmnltuously assembled?
treasury and ali lis property charged with the
Mr. BUTLER, of Massachusetts. Will the payment thereof. Such a proceeding would
gentleman allow me to ask him a question?
deprive the coun.t! ,of t~ means of ad min it.
Mr. BINGHAM. I have only a few min- J.ering justice. vv~((, M"er;to l f• -t
utes; otht>rwise I w; hid yield with pleasure. 'li"'-I~I'!'I'P. the hammer fell.]
The provision of this ~ection is:
Mr. SHELLABARGEH. I now yield to the
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop. build- geutleman from Illinois, [Mr. FARNSWORTH.]
ing. barn. or granary shall be unlawfully or felonl!.r· FARNSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I caniously demolished. pulled down. burned. or de- not gi ve my a.ssen£ to the report of the constrayed. wholly or in part, by any persons riotously
and tumultuously assembled together; or if any per- fereuce committee. I dislike what they have
son shall unlawfully and with force and violence be done, especially in two reapects. Why, sir, the
whipped, scourged. wounded. or killed by any per- . 1
h" b
1d
d h" h
·
sons riotously and tumultuously assembled together.
aw w IC we roe pea e ' an w IC requ1res
with intent to deprive any person of any right con- jurors to take an oath substantially like the
ferred u~on him by the Constit.ution and laws of the test· oath, would prevent any man sitting•on a
United States, or to deter him or funish him for
·
h
11
l"fi d h
b
e may e
exercising such right. or by reason o his race, color. JUry, no matter ow we qua 1 e
or previous condition of servitnde, in every such in other respects, and no ma>tter how well qualcase the county.city. or pariRh in which any of the ified his heart may be also, to do justice. The
said offen~es shall be committed shalt be liable to man may .be relieved of disabilities, in pursuPil.Y full compensntion to the person or persons damnified by such offense. if living. or to his widow or ance of the fourteenth amendment to the Conlegal representatives if dead.!
stitution by Congress, yet he cannot take that
I want to know where is the authority for oath as a juror. He may be ever so good a·
making a State corporation, an integral part friend of the colored man who brings sdit, but
of the ~'!tate, o. county, responsible in a court if he cannot take that oath he cannot sit on
of the United States for damages wjthout Emit the jury. It seems to me to be wiser to leave
for the destruction of the life of a citizen by it to the courts in the impanneling of the jury
\ riOt? Tbat IS. my q uesbon.
lo determine whether the juror is liable to chal--rhe gentleman trom :Massachusetts [Mr. lenge for cause·, or to the parties to challenge
BuTLER] referred to what is known as the peremptorily. The courts will see to it that
force bill, passed under the administration the rights of all parties are taken care of.
of President .Jackson. With all respect I subI do ·uot think, either, that the seventh, or
mit to the House and to the country that legis· Sherman section, has been improved by the
lation does not touch the question involved conference committee.
here all. The provision in that case was
1 anticipated some such work as this when
simply as to the mode of collecting the reve· I insisted on having the yeas and nays ot;~ that
nues of the United States and enforcing tbe section, when we voted \.'POll it and rejected i\
laws for that purpose a~ainst all persons and in this House. I expected there would be some
the process of States. rhe decision to which sort of modification, and it would he sP.nt back·
I have referred, and the same cited by my to us, and therefore I desired that the members'
colleague, [Mr. SBELLADARGER,] condemns in of the House should be on the record, "a.r"
toto such legislation as is proposed in the and "no," that the Senate and the couni.ry
Senate amendment, and shows that a county, might see it.
being the creature of the State and an mtegral
What have we now presented to us for our·
part oltt, can m no case be made res onsiblc action? We have a section which authorizes•
vi I · e save
orce o
e suits to be 6rou t a a111st count1
for
law
te creattn 1t.
in ever: case o estruct10n o property or jor. pAa er, ow can tates exist, how can jury otthe person by two or more persons in
you enforce the provisions of the Constitution a riOtous or tumultuous manner, when 1t i1
of the United States as to States, if you will done 111 derogatiOn of the exercrse of some connot maintain the corporate organizations of stitu~ional right of the person, or done on ac·
the several counties of States"/ There can no count of color, or race, or previous condition
more be a State under the Constitution and of servitude; such, for instance, Mr. Speaker,

- - - - -T
I

1871.

j

" if a Chinaman should be mobbed. by
or four mmers m Cahfornia or ~~vfda
• account of bemg a Cfi1naman li ·may
" e t 1e cou11 y m
m e
aLes cour
d
6 1
re~over
.
,
a e anot er case. of
man mohted in lllinois on accc:iu t
ace
11
or co or, suppose a co ore an a · ite per·
et in 11rnel! and some of:.the oun men ·
8011
of 1. e VI age ge · up a c arwan; not or the
purpose of preventing any right to• vote, but
bec11use of color, then the person claiming that
he js injur.z2 may sue tfie county and recover
damages.
·
The Suoreme Court of the United States has
decided repeatedly that Congress can impose
uo duty on a State officer. We can impose no
duly 011 a sheriff or any other offic~rof a county
or city. We cannot reQuire tbe she·riff to re!\d
the riot act or call out lhe osse comitatus or
per orm any o er ac or ut.y.
or can on·
gress confer any power or impose any duty
upon the county or ci~y. Can we then impose
on a county or other State municipality liability where we cannot require a dot ? Ithi
not
up pose a JU gme
we un er t is
ect.ion, a11d no property can be found to l~vy
upon except the court· house, can we levy on
the court· house and sell it? So this section
provides, a11d that too in an action of tort, in
un action ex delicto, where the county has
never e11tered into any contract, where the
State has never authorized the county to assume at:y liability of the sort or imposed any
liu.bility upon it. It is in m o inion sim ly
absurd.
n 1 you can o t 1s, J r. pea e ,
1
011 ress can thus regulate \be affairs of a
county in a State, and put the hand of the
national Goverument into its treasury, I know
not where or to what lengths we may not go,
even to the abolishing of counties and States.
[Here the l:.ammer fell.)
.Mr. SHELLABARGElt. I yield fifteen
minutes to the gentleman from New York,
[Mr. SMITH.)
Mr. t:>MlTJI, of New York. I do not think
that the construction whicl! has been put upon
tbis act by the gentleman who has just spoken
is a correct and legitimate construction. A
court· house is not the property of the county
within the meaning of this act. ft is held in
trust for a public use. There is certain prop·
erty within most of the counties of a State
which is held by the county and would be sub·
ject to levy and sale; for instance, in the city
of New York there is cert11in real estate, &c.,
that is the property of the cit_y, which is not
held and devoted to any specific use. And
that sort of property would be liable to be sold
· upon execution under the provisions of this
act. There is a legal maxim that an act shall
be so construed that it will stand and not full,
and this, it seems to me, will relieve it of the
difficulty which bas been suggested by the gen·
tleman who has just spol<en.
Now, sir, the objects sought by this act are
all-important. This House bas passed itsjudg·
ment upon that question. Certuin portions of
this bill have been subjected to criticism by
gentlemen on the other side of the House, on
the alleged ground of their putting. doubtful
powers into the hands of the President. It is
objected by our friends upon the opposite side
of the House that the citizens of the South are
to be protected by military power. We have
placed the power of redress in tb_e civil courts.
And 1 submit to the gentlemen upon the oppo·
site side of the House who object to our assum·
in!t miiitary powers that, when we refer the
inJured parties to the civil courts, they ought
t? aid us, instead of objecting to the remedy
which-is provided in this last proposed amend·
meut as it bas come from the Senate.
It is inquired where we get this power. Mr.
Speaker, 1 desire to ask gentlemen upon this
Bide of the House who voted for this bill if
tbey have not declared by their votes for the
bill that Congress has the power to suppress
these alleged outrages in the South, that Con·
.c

l
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gress hn..s the power to . make tl:e perpetrators
liable to a civil action for dambges. Now, sir,
if Congress has that power-l.he power under
the Constitution to suppress these outrages! submit that Congress has the incidental
power to adopt any means which will be con·
ducive to the end desired to be _gained, to wit,
the suppression of these outnges. And the
question is, whether this amendment, making
tbe county or the parish liable for damages
occasioned by a tumultuous assemblage, is
legislation appropriate to the end desired to
be attained. Then, sir, if in the decision of
this House, in the passage of ihis bill before it
went to the Senate, the question is foreclosed
that Congres8 has the power ;o suppress these
outrages, it has the power to adopt any appro·
priate legislation to suppress them.
Then, sir, the question remains whether
there is any consti1utional inhibition against
the exercise of this power provided in the
amendment which we are discussing. If there
be any-and the gentlemen opon the opposite
side of the House have not pointed it out-it ·
must be that cl1mse of the Constitution which
prohibits the taking of property without due process of law, or that clause of the Constitution
which prohibits the taking of private properlY.
for public use withoutjustco111pensation. Now,
sir, it has been adjudicated over and over again,
in the State cou1·ts aud in the courts of ~ng ·
land, that the makinf of a county or a parish
liable for damages caused by tumultuous asseru·
blages is not, in our country, a violation of
these constitutional provisions, and is no violation of the provisions of Magna Charta in the
old country.
I desire to call the attention of the House
to the provisions of the act in the State of New
York which have been subjected to the most
rigorous criticism and examination in our
courts of justice. The language of the act is
as follows:
Whenever any building or other real or personal
property shoJI be destroyed or injured in consequence of nny mob ur riot the city or county in
wbicb such property is •ituated shalt be li:>ble to an
action. by or in behn.lf of the party whose property
wus thus destroyed oricjured, for damages sustained
by reason thereof."
Now, ·I call the attention of the distin·
~:;uished gentleman from Vermont [Mr. PoLAND] and of the gentleman from Indiana
[Mr. KERR] to the fact that in this act of the
Legislature of New York there is no provision
that proceedings shall befirsl instituted against
the parties doing the damage, and this act has
been tested through to the court "Of last resort
in our State, and has been adjudged to be
valid and constitutional by the most _!ljstin·
guisbed judges of our State. The acts of .the
British Parliament, contrary to what I under·
stood to be the sUJ.tement of the gentleman
from Indiana, do not require that proceedings
shall first be had against the parties wbo were
the principals in the commission of the dam·
age for which redress is songht.
Now, sir, it bas been decided in my own
State, in a case to which reference has · been
made, that the power of the Legislature of
the State to make a county of the State, or a
parish, responsible-for damages occasioned by
tumultuous assemblaglls does not make the
county, parish, or city liable for the damages.
done by an individual, as stated by the gen·
tleman from Indiana. The damage must be
done by a riotous or tumultuous assemblage.
The courts of our State put the legislative
right to charge these damages upou a county
or city upon the taxation power of the Legis·
lature. Now, if the Legislature has power to
tax, then the Congress of the United States,
under the principle which is stated in the
decision in 3 Dallas, in the case of Hilton vs.
The United States, has a power commensurate
with the State power of tuxation. The court
say in that case:
•• The great object of the. Constitution was to give
Congress the power to ht.y tax adequate to the e:ri·
_genoies of the Government, but they were to observe
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two rules in imposin11: it. nn.n.~ly. the rule of uniforr.,ity. when they laid duties. impo•U!. or excises,
nnd the rule of apportionment n.ccorilinll: tn the census >Vhen they ln.id any direct tn.x. If thoro nre any
other species of tf\xation that n.re nnt direct and not
included in the,wnrds "duties, imposts. nr excises.'
tboy may be lmd by the rule of uniformity or numbers. as Con~rress.slmll think proper nnd reasonJLble.
If the fr>t.mers o! the Constitution did not contem•
plate other ta. x~s thJLn direct tuxes. nod duties,
HDf!OSts. an!l exm•es. there wns great innccurucy in
thc1r l:>ngunge.. If those four species of tu.xes were
nlt tbat were mtended, the genern.l power to lay
taxes was unnecessary.''

·

Now, sir, is it not the well settled law that
the C~ngreRs ~f ~he U uited St~tes may lay
taxes 111 the D1str1ct of Columbia which are
not laiJ upon the Union at large? And, under
this power of taxation, where it will be con·
ducive to promote the general object of the
law, to preserve the peace in the different
localities in the Union, they have the same ·
power, which is assumed in the amendment
which is now pending before the House, tolay
a tax or provide for the entry of a judgment
against the locality where the offense is com·
mitted for which redress is sought.
·
Mr. FARNSWORTH. May I ask the gen·
tleman a question?
Mr. S~llTH, of New York. Certainly.
Mr. FARNSWORTH. Do I understand
the gentleman to claim that the power of Con·
gress to levy taxes is only to be governed by
the opinion of the Congress that passes the
measure?
.Mr. SMITH, of New York. I nm glad the
gentleman has asked me that question.
Mr. FARNSWORTH. Is that so? I want
to know .
.r.fi:. SMITH, of New York. I say this: thM
there is no limit.ation or restriction, either on
the taxin:_ ~ wer of a State or on the taxing
power of the General Government. I hold in
my band a decision of the court of last resort
in the State of New York, made by a Demo·
cratic jnd.e;e of high distinction, stating and
holding that ground unqualifiedly. The right
of eminent domain is restricted; there must be
compensation i the power of taxation is utterly
unrestricted, and there is no redress except by
an appeal to the L egislature, where the power
resides to levy those taxes. And it was decided
in this case (in 3 Dallas) that taxes need not be
uniform unless they come within the definition
either of direct taxes or of imposts, duties, or
excises. Those taxes which are levied here in
the city of Washington, the taxes ·which are
levied upon property upon Pennsylvania ave·
nue, to pay for the improvement of the street,
for the laying of pavements, are not uniform; .
that is, they are not levied outside the District
of Columbia. So, sir, when it is decided, a~
it hns been settled by the entire policy of the
acts of Parliament from the time of Canute
down to the time of Edward I, and from that
tune to the twenty-seventh and twenty -eighth
years of tbe reign of Elizabeth, and down to ·
the present day, and also in the several States
of the Union, that the public policy requires,
at least justifies, the assessment upon the local·
ity where tbe crime is commmed of the dam·
age! occasioned by a tumultuous assembluge,
without any proceedings against the principal,
1 do not see the objection which is urged.
[Here the ham mer felL 1
!llr.liOAR addressed the House in remarks
which he has withheld for revision •
Mr. SHELLABARGER. I now yield the
remainder of my time to my colleague.
.Mr. PERRY, of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I find
myself entertaining opinions concerning this
bill which vary from the opinions of other
gentlemen upon this floor, with whom, when
compelled to differ, I always differ with diffi·
dence and hesitation. It appears to me that
many of the objections to this bill as origin·
ally framed, and many of the objections to it
as it now stands, are treated as unconstitu·
tional objections, when in fact they are objec·
tions of expediency alone.
When the original bill was presented in thit
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To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From: Sam Estreicher

Date: February 3, 1978

Re: 75-1914, Monell v. Dep't of Social Services
Forgive me for writing another memo in this
case.

The issue is an important one, and there is one

point which did not receive adequate treatment in my
previous effortso
WHR places considerable emphasis on a presumed
legislative intent, as of 1871, to protect municipal
treasuries.

It is important to note that the prior

decisions of this Court have not identified that purpose
as a principal reason for the rejection of the Sherman
Amendment.

It was thought by the Court in Monroe

and its progeny that the 1871 Congress doubted it had
constitutional power to impose civil obligations on
municipalities.

As I pointed out in my earlier memo,

this is an overstatement.

The opponents of the Sherman

Amendment were troubled by the pro s pect of imposing
a duty not derived from the Constitution on state and
local governments, rather than by the pro s pect of
attaching liabilityfornoncompliance with an acknowledged
constitutional obligation.

Repo Bingham drafted both

the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1 of the 1871 Act with
Barron v. Baltimore in mind, which suggests that he
was willing to hold municipalities liable for takings
of property without just compensation (Chief Justice

/

Marshall held that the Fifth Amendment did not reach
state and local governments)o

But he opposed the

-2-

Sherman Amendment because that proposal threatened
an interference with state

power ~tot

au t horized by the

Fourteenth Amendment.
Adhering closely to Monroe's understanding
of the legis lative history, the Court has declined
to recognize § 1983 jurisdiction even where a raid
on the municipal treasury, not authorized by local law,
would not result.

Thus, in Moor v. County of Alameda,

Justice Douglas, in dissent, urged that permitting
a damages action under § 1988 would not be inconsistent
with § 1983, where state law recognized liability in
damages for the conduct in questionc

The Court, per TM,

declined this invitation, however, noting that "the root
of the [Sherman] proposal's difficulties stemmed from
serious legislative concern as to Congress 1 constitut .i.onal
power to impose liability on political subdivisions of
the States."

411 UcS"' at 708.

My thesis is best illustrated by WHR's opinion
in City of Kenosha v. Brunoc

Raising the jurisdictional

question on its own motion, the Court held that a
municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief,
even though no monetary recovery was soughtc

Justice

Douglas' dissent again urged that "the legislative history
on which [Monroe's]

construction of 'person' as used

<'

in 42 UcScCo

§1983 was based related to the fear of

mulcting municipalities with damage awards for
unauthorized acts of its police officers."
516.

412 UcS c, at

The holding in Kenosha stands as a rejection of that

-3-

view of the legislative ' intent.

A municipality was

simply not a "person" because the 1871 Congress thought
it could not reach such entiti es.

The question arise s

why protection of the municipal fisc is now viewed as the
dominant reason for rejection of the Sherman Amendment,
when a suit seeking redress from authorized conduct is
brought against a public official sued in his official
capacity, whom all, including WHR, concede to be a

11

f")erson"

under the Act .

*

*

*

My "bottom line" is that the prior decisions
in this area do not require application of the usual
stare decisis principle.

There is no clear, coherent

strand of authority which Congress can be said to
have acquiesced to by its inaction .

What ever the

Court does will work an alteration of prior precedent.
Why not decide the case on an accurate reading of
the legislative history, rather than perpetuate the
misconception of funroe2

".:"./

~u:pt"tmt

Qfourt of tlrt ~tb .§tattg

Jfag!pnghm. ~. Q1. 2!lc?Jt..;t
CHAMBERS Of"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE
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February 13, 1978

Dear Bill:
Re:

75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social - Services
of the City of New York

My absence from Washington attending a series
of Judicial Conference committee meetings has prevented
me from acting on your memorandum in this case.
I have now read it, and I am in general
agreement with the position you express and would be
prepared to join an opinion along those lines.
Regards,
WEB
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference

.-----.
lfp/ss

2/20/78

No. 75-1914 Monell v. Depart of Social Services
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I have now had an opportunity to review carefully
the memoranda circulated by our two "Bills" , (\id"B and

UIIR)~

~'~
Atither could

Both are impressive and persuasive memos.

.

form the basis of a principled decision, i'ilol\e t!hi!! reageion
~ieatgs

4

f'M' ,<.c .. ~ 4
HRY I have found the case ee troublesome.

In any

"

event, being satisfied that further delay will not make~

~
decision any easier, I will now firm up the

tentative~to

reverse that I expressed at Conference.
I add the following observations.

As to the

legislative history debate, I am persuaded that Bill
Douglas' reading of i ti in Monroe was wrong.

Bill

Rehnquist' s memorand um ma kes a s t r onger argument in favor

~t,.+.o" -oP +"'c S\1~hll·ll\ A~evttlw.
of Monroe ' s

·

t I am persuaded that congressional

concern was centered on the inequity of imposing liability

fhe. D~tS7.S -of
on local units of government on

rJ .sert--r1

? '

A respondeat

some other principle of vicarious liability.

)~ke.k~

superior or

J~ ( ~ c p;e, '"'for-A
~ ,..seemf
~d-

.
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A respondeat

superior or
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some other principle of vicarious liabilit
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reasonably clear . .-My priAeip!t'>~ doubt .was~ ether the word
"person" was intended to include inanimate bodies.
hardly would seem

Its use

tc

. 1 ud ~
.(<...
way e~
n
1nc
A

~

Yet, I suppose

municipalities or similar entities.

""
"plain meaning" approach a

long sinceA been ignored

,

.I
l

~s

,,.f"A

;

Moreover, doubts about congressional power expressed
in the debates related to the attempted imposition of
'

e

'

pffi~C'l'

not dttty te

deemed not

SY.lSB

~low - :El!'em

private

la:s;~leSS!lSSS '\~hies '\i'8:S

t'Ae eemmend~

o£ -the

~

an extra-constitutional duty to curb private lawflessness,
not from

f~em

I

eae

pePee~tien

municipalities were
p

tbQ~

be~,e~e

a perception that
beyond the reach of

"---'
&9QS~essioaer

legislative authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

respect to the word "persorVr".l

'

There is the so-called

"Dictionary Ac;;" passed a month before the Civil Rights
bill was introduced, that indicates a congressional

"If

•
t( b .c. ~ p pi.~

understanding that "the word 'person' may
&f ~A 4 c-o r~ ,,.f<:.. •
Mo reover, I was painfully reminded

~

only a few weeks ag

majority of my Brothers 'HI · !If'

that the same word, used by the s ame Senator (Sherman), in
included foreign

AA;J/..

J

governmen~

as well as municipalitiesJ

~

~:tz I

With me, policy considerations weigh more heavily
A

trying to read meaning into ambiguous speeches by
'

or speculating whether the word "person" embraces
the universe.

Everyone agrees that §1983 authorizes suits

against officials of governmental units both in their
official and individual capacities.
the municipality
official

~
~t

~r

examp~

If one assumes that

will invariably indemnify an

for conduct within the scope of his

~

only a few we:k;-agd l a t a majority of my

Brothers~
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government~
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With me, policy considerations weigh more heavily
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trying to read meaning into ambiguous speeches by
'

Senators or speculating whether the word "person" embraces
the universe.

Everyone agrees that §1983 authorizes suits

against officials of governmental units both in their
official and individual capacities.
the municipality

~for

examp~

If one assumes that

will invariably indemnify an

authority, it does not really matter which way one goes on
this argument.
tl1

The municipality pays in either event·) On

...------..____

other hand,

does not indemnify

an of 'cial who
authority

a matter of fair

this is a default that

there should be indemnification, and a

unit of local govern ent that fails to afford this

~

F~t'

...... ~I~O~ J

1¥n add ieisaa:l esnO! hie!'at:iea iO!

~hat:

affirmance of thhe Second Circuit's decision means
that § 1983 does not authorize compensatory relief
for the actions of local government units bearing a
direct responsibility for a constitutional violation.
This is

~

true even though such actions are fully
~

consistent with, indeed mandat ted by state law, and

.......

individual suits against public officials are likely
'4f'•"'

to founder ia t:fte £ass g£

the assertion

a~~s~eiss ~

A

of good-faith reliance on local law. The a\ bsence of
an

effect~ve

violation .

for authorized state action in
-O'A.f-:1 rJc •f · T1f1~ VII t..Ase$-of constitutional requirements may propel
A
r~medy

this Court to recognize a Bivens

~~

remedy to fill

•

the gap.

it!

'il8~le

O!eezrr There Wfin!ld

' s.

~99m

a measure

of futility in adhering to an erroneous reading of
legislative history ia

:Jez, in the interest of

protecting the ~ municipal coffers, ~'
when the predictable consiequence may be judicial
imposition of a Bivens ~ cause of action for all
constitutional violations t•r Mf~~ working ~ compensable
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of futility in adhering to an erroneous reading of
legislative history
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in the interest of

protecting the ~ municipal coffers, ~'
when the predictable consiequence may be judicial
imposition of a Bivens ~ cause of action for all
constitutional violations 6tr-''~ working ~ compensable
harm.
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/ protection is unlikely to attract and retain competent
officers, board members and employees.

.

,

r

as;
d
In additon we have enshrined the fiction that

as 12

/

allows mandatory injunctions in §1983 acti,_ons
Bv-1)./. '~1
q1
I C·h
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i <;I.

h t/1 1-! V'
1

at the same time that we proscribe recovery of

damages.-{7~ ~eY~ ~n

this aspect of the matter before us,

1
I must say that I would find

~J--.kk•··r

it difficult to justify

A

~e~

(/")~C..,#

dist~nctions

<M!l

15e!Jeel

8PI.

eitherJ expediency or principle.

truth probably is that the local governments already
bear the financial burden of 1983 suits, whether for
a......,..~.........,

, damages .-.-. injunctive relief.

Bill Rehnquist does make an

A

arguable point when he suggests that juries may be more
likely to escalate damages if a local government itself is
named as a defendant.

I am not sure, however, that the

average juror would view his or her local government or
school board in the same light that jurors view insurance

~

companies ~

taxpayers.

railroads.

After all, most jurors are

<•"s~+

-

P· 3
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This brings me to what I suppose is the most

"
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arguable point when he suggests that juries may be more
likely to escalate damages if a local government itself is
named as a defendant.
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average juror would view his or her local government or
school board in the same light that jurors view insurance
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After all, most jurors are
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This brings me to what I suppose is the most
troublesome aspect of a reversal in this case:
on the doctrine of

stare~decisis.

its effect

But considerations of

~
stareMdecisis cut in both directions. n the one hand, we
have a series of rulings holding that municipalities and
counties are not "persons" for purposes of

k ·i

§

1983.

In the

manner that characterizes many of our
1983 decisions, cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427
0~

~.fd1
h Q)\

wM.IAt'\tCAr
~"" vl \) l ~
0

~' .J

.f.

-.t\

u.s.

§

160, 186*

(1976), we have answered a question that was never briefed
-

or argued in this Court. The claim in Monroe was that the

i"'t..J ~ ..s
~~~ q City

t\

&Ap)o e

of Chicago should be held "liable for acts of its

~J

police officers, by virtue of respondea t

0 , T· 11 '

0
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IJ '() . 3 '

p.

111~mper ior," Brief

namely, a warrantless, early morning
raid and ransacking of a Negro family's home. Although
Morris Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a
footnote reference to the Sherman Amendment, he had no
incentive to present a view of the legislative history that
would have foreclosed relief on a theory of respondeat

In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973),

Ye levA~+
the only other

r~l~ ~ ftt

..SlAbs+~r,i.~t f

case presenting a

legislative history of S 1983, petitioners
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mwfllll'
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,

footnote reference to the Sherman Amendment, he had no
incentive to present a view of the legislative history that
would have foreclosed relief on a theory of respondeat

In Moor
Ye fev~e~+

the only other r~le jf ftt case presenting a
legis lative history of

§

assert~

1983, petitioners
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did not challenge "the holding in Monroe

c once rning the status under

§

1983 of public entities such
1

U.S. 507 (1973), did the Court confront a

§

1983 claim
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based on conduct that was both authorized under state law
and directly -- rather than vicariously
the claimed constitutional injury.

responsible for

But in Kenosha we

raised the jurisdictional question on our own initiative.
Thus, the issues identified in the scholarly exchange
between Bill Brennan and Bill Rehnquist simply have not
been ventilated on any previous occasion.
On the other hand, affirmance in this case
requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio exercise
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases.
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these
decisions involved claims for monetary relief, Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414

u.s.

632 (1974): Cohen v.

Chesterfield County School Board, 414

u.s.

632 (1974):

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969): also Vlandis v. Kline, 412

u.s.

441

(1973). There was an independent basis of jurisdiction in
these cases because of the joinder of individual public
officials as codefendants.

B.u, the opinions of this Court

On the other hand, affirmance in this case
requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio exercise ·
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases.
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these
decisions involved claims for monetary relief, Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 u.s. 632 (1974); Cohen v.
Chesterfield County School Board, 414 u.s. 632 (1974);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
u.s. 503 (1969); also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973). There was an independent basis of jurisdiction in
these cases because of the joinder of individual public
officials as codefendants.

Buf't he opinions of this Court

often made explicit reference to the school-board party,
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded,
see,

~,

Milliken v. Bradley, 97 s.ct. 2749 (1977). And

Congress has focused specifically on this Court's
school-board decisions in several statutes. The exercise of

I

6.
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In my view, the only decision that we would

overrul ~ s Kenosha.

I would simply limit Monroe and Moor

to their facts. The preclusion of governmental liability
for the tortious conduct of individual officials that was
neither mandated nor specifically authorized by, and indeed
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was violative

of~state

or local law, is consistent with the
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42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act.
I would think that the rationale of Kenosha will
have to be disturbed in some fashion, whichever course the
Court adopts in this case.

Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's

view would require, if I understand him correctly,
"bifurcated application [of §1983]

to municipal

corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought
against them." 412

u.s.,

at 513. A public official sued in
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at 513. A public official sued in

his official capacity, concededly a "person" for purposes
of injunctive relief, becomes a non-"person" in a suit
seeking a monetary recovery.
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corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought
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Further impairment of
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that Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment out of a
desire to protect municipal treasuries.

Kenosha held that

a municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief
under

§

~

1983 even though no monetary •&aa:a•y was sought,

for a municipality was simply not a "person." The question
arises why protection of the municipal fisc is now viewed
as the dominant reason for rejection of the Sherman
Amendment, when a suit seeking redress from authorized
conduct is brought against a defendant who is conceded to
be a "person" under the Act.
I have concluded that the prior decisions in this
area do not require application of the usual stare decisis
principle. There is no coherence in the relevant body of
precedents.

Indeed, there is a degree of confusion in

principle that we now have an opportunity to rationalize.
Although, as indicated, I generally agree with
Bill Brennan, I differ with his memo in two respects:
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their facts,
rather than overruled.

The Court simply could say that we

conduct is brought against a defendant who is conceded to
be a "person" under the Act.
I have concluded that the prior decisions in this
area do not require application of the usual stare decisis
principle. There is no coherence in the relevant body of
precedents.

Indeed, there is a degree of confusion in

principle that we now have an opportunity to rationalize.
Although, as indicated, I generally agree with
Bill Brennan, I differ with his memo in two respects:
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their facts,
rather than overruled.

The Court simply could say that we

have had no occasion previously to consider the
availability of a §1983 damages remedy for constitutional
violations that are the direct result of a policy decision
by the government entity, rather than simply its failure to
curb the unauthorized torts of its employees. See Rizzo v .

.
I

I

8.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976) (discussi ng ~ Swann and

Bro~

There are substantial line-drawing problems, as Bill

Rehnquist notes, but this case involves a formal, written
policy of the municipal department and school board.

It is

the clear case.
Second, I would recognize a defense for policies
promulgated in good faith that affect adversely
constitutional rights not clearly defined at the time of
violation, cf. Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446; Wood v.
Strickland, 420

u.s.

308 (1975).

We have relied on the

common law in definining immunities under §1983. See,
\Jl P~c-h f~,.,.., 4 ~J. '4 \A .. .l .. '-t o~ (,,,,c. ) .
~-~.,

Imbler" The absolute immunity accorded govermental

bodies under the common law would be modified to this
rather
than an

violation, cf. Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446; Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I have now had an opportunity to review carefully
the memoranda circulated by our two "Bills".
impressive and persuasive memos.

Both are

As I think either could

form the basis of a principled decision, I have found the
case particularly troublesome.

In any event, being

satisfied that further delay will not make decision any
easier, I will now firm up the tentative vote to reverse
that I expressed at Conference.

I add the following

observations.
As to the legislative history debate, I am
persuaded that Bill Douglas' reading of it in Monroe was
wrong.

Bill Rehnquist's memorandum makes a reasonable

argument in favor of Monroe's interpretation of the Sherman
Amendment's rejection.

But I rather think that

congressional concern was centered on the inequity of
imposing liability on local units of government on the
basis of respondeat superior or some other principle of

2.

vicarious liability.

Moreover, doubts about congressional

power expressed in the debates stemmed from the attempted
imposition of an extra-constitutional duty to curb private
lawlessness, not from a perception that municipalities

~

se were beyond the reach of legislative authority under §5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

These points seem reasonably

clear.
I have had some doubt that the word "person" was
intended to include inanimate bodies.

Its use is hardly an

artful way to include municipalities or similar entities.
Yet, I suppose the "plain meaning" approach was eroded long
ago.

There is the so-called "Dictionary Act," passed a

month before the Civil Rights bill was introduced, which
indicates a congressional understanding that "the word
'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and
corporate . . • • " Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, §2, 16
Stat. 431.

While "an allowable not a mandatory"

definition, Monroe, 365

u.s.,

at 191, it is evidence of

special usage of the term "person".

Moreover, I was

painfully reminded only a few weeks ago that a majority of
my Brothers thought the same word, used by Senator Sherman
in 1890, included foreign governments, Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, No. 76-749 (decided January 11, 1978),
as well as municipalities, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. City of Atlanta, 203

u.s.

390, 396 (1960).

3.

With me, policy considerations weigh more heavily
than any attempt to read meaning into ambiguous speeches by
members of Congress a century ago or speculation whether
the word "person" embraces the universe.

Everyone agrees

that §1983 authorizes suits against officials of
governmental units both in their official and individual
capacities.

If one assumes that the municipality generally

will indemnify an official sued for conduct within the
scope of his authority, as it must if it is to attract and
retain competent officers, board members and employees, it
really does not matter which way one goes on the
fiscal-impact argument.

The municipality pays in either

event.
In addition we have enshrined the fiction that
allows mandatory injunctions, requiring the expenditure of
large sums of money, in §1983

actions,~-~·'

Milliken v.

Bradley, 97 S.Ct. 2749 (1977), at the same time that we
proscribe recovery of damages. While the Eleventh Amendment
requires application of the fiction to suits against the
States, I am not inclinded to extend it to suits against
local governments.

Local governments probably already bear

the financial burden of 1983 suits, for damages as well as
injunctive relief.

Bill Rehnquist does make an arguable

point when he suggests that juries may be more likely to
escalate damages if a local government itself is named as a

4.
defendant.

I am not sure, however, that the average juror

would view his or her local government or school board in
the same light that jurors view insurance companies and
railroads.

After all, most jurors are taxpayers.

This brings me to what I suppose is the most
troublesome aspect of a reversal in this case:
on the doctrine of stare decisis.

its effect

To my mind,

considerations of stare decisis cut in both directions.

On

the one hand, we have a series of rulings that
municipalities and counties are not "persons" for purposes
of

§

1983.

In the somewhat accidental manner that

characterizes many of our
McCrary, 427

u.s.

§

1983 decisions, cf. Runyon v.

160, 186* (1976), we have answered a

question that was never briefed or argued in this Court.
The claim in Monroe was that the City of Chicago should be
held "liable for acts of its police officers, by virtue of
respondeat superior," Brief for Petitioners, O.T. 1960, No.
39, p. 21, namely, a warrantless, early morning raid and
ransacking of a Negro family's home. Although Morris
Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a footnote
reference to the Sherman Amendment, he had no incentive to
present a view of the legislative history that would have
foreclosed relief on a theory of respondeat superior.
In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973),
the only other relevant case presenting a substantial
discussion of the legislative history of

§

1983,

5.

petitioners asserted that "the county was vicariously
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., 696,
under § 1988.

Although we reaffirmed explicitly Monroe's

reading of the debates over the 1871 Act, petitioners in
that case did not challenge "the holding in Monroe
concerning the status under § 1983 of public entities such
as the County."

Id., at 700. Technically, the holding of

Moor does not extend beyond the recognition that "Congress
did not intend, as a matter of federal law, to impose
vicarious liability on municipalities for violations of
federal civil rights by their employees," and that §1988
"cannot be used to accomplish what Congress clearly refused
to do in enacting§ 1983."

Id., at 710 & n. 27.

Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973}, did the Court confront a§ 1983 claim based on
conduct that was both authorized under state law and
directly -- rather than vicariously
claimed constitutional injury.

responsible for the

But in Kenosha we raised

the jurisdictional question on our own initiative.

Thus,

the issues identified in the scholarly exchange between
Bill Brennan and Bill Rehnquist simply have not been
thoughtfully ventilated on any previous occasion.
On the other hand, affirmance in this case
requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio exercise

6.

of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases.
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these
decisions involved claims for monetary relief, Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414

u.s.

632 (1974); Cohen v.

Chesterfield County School Board, 414

u.s.

632 (1974);

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969); also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973). There was an independent basis of jurisdiction in
these cases because of the joinder of individual public
officials as codefendants.

But the opinions of this Court

often made explicit reference to the school-board party,
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded,
see,

~'

Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S.Ct. 2749 (1977). And

Congress has focused specifically on this Court's
school-board decisions in several statutes. The exercise of
§

1983 jurisdiction over school boards, even if not

premised on considered holdings, thus has been
longstanding.

Indeed, it predated Monroe.

In my view, reversal would require the overruling
only of Kenosha.

I would simply limit Monroe and Moor to

their facts. The preclusion of governmental liability for
the tortious conduct of individual officials that was
neither mandated nor specifically authorized by, and indeed
was violative of, state or local law, is consistent with

7.

the 42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act.
The rationale of Kenosha may have to be disturbed
in some fashion, whichever course the Court follows in this
case.

Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's view would require,

if I understand him correctly, importing into §1983 the
approach of Ex parte Young, 209

u.s.

123 (1908), to

preserve the availability of injunctive relief.

While this

is an understandable position, it does entail a "bifurcated
application [of §1983]

to municipal corporations depending

on the nature of the relief sought against them." 412

u.s.,

at 513. A public official sued in his official capacity,
concededly a "person" for purposes of injunctive relief,
would become a non-"person" in a suit seeking a monetary
recovery.
Moreover, under Bill's approach, I suppose we
would have to say that Congress rejected the Sherman
Amendment because it "wished to preserve the financial
capacity of municipalities to carry out basic governmental
functions" and "to insure the security of businessmen who
traded with them."

Our previous decisions have not

identified these concerns as the principal reasons for the
defeat of the Sherman proposal.

Indeed, such

considerations were minimized in Kenosha itself, which held
that a municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief

8.

under §1983 even though no monetary award was sought
because a municipality is simply not a "person."
I have concluded that the prior decisions in this
area do not require application of the usual stare decisis
principle. There is no coherence in the relevant body of
precedents.

Indeed, there is a degree of confusion in

principle that we now have an opportunity to rationalize.
Although, as indicated, I generally agree with
Bill Brennan, I differ with his memo in two respect.
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their facts,
rather than overruled.

The Court simply could say that we

have had no occasion previously to consider the
availability of a §1983 damages remedy for constitutional
violations that are the direct result of a policy decision
by the government entity, rather than a failure to curb the
unauthorized torts of its employees. See Rizzo v.
Goode, 423
Brown).

u.s.

362, 377 (1976)

(discussing

Swann and

There are substantial line-drawing problems, as

Bill Rehnquist notes, but this case involves a formal,
written policy of the municipal department and school
board.

It is the clear case.
Second, I would recognize a defense for policies

promulgated in good faith that affect adversely
constitutional rights not clearly defined at the time of

9.

violation, cf. Procunier v. Navarette, No.
Strickland, 420

u.s.

308 (1975).

We have relied on the

common law in definining immunities under §1983.
~-~·'

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

Wood v.

76-446~

u.s.

409 (1976).

See,
The

absolute immunity accorded govermental bodies under the
common law would be modified to this extent.

But this

would be merely a modification rather than an abandonment
of the common law protection.
One further thought:

We see decisions

increasingly that extend the Bivens rationale to state
action.

Lawyers apparently have got "the word" and

complaints are being framed both under §1983 and directly
under the Fourteenth Amendment.

We will not be able much

longer to avoid confronting the question whether, Congress
having provided relief (through §1983) for state action,
parties nevertheless are free to by-pass §1983 and to rely
on federal question jurisdiction to sue municipalities for
alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations.

I do not know how

I would answer this question, but I suppose we would retain
greater flexibility under §1983 to make distinctions
between claims of constitutional dimension and those that
are not, than we would if Bivens-type remedies become
generally available in state action cases.

If we continue

to deny §1983 relief against local governmental units, we

10.

strengthen the argument for Bivens relief.

I would prefer

to avoid this pressure.
I am grateful to both "Bills" for their most
helpful contributions to our deliberations in this case.

L.F.P., Jr.

~
. I.
CHAMBERS 01"

..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,..JR .

February 21, 1978

.Yf~
No. 75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services

~~
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I have now had an opportunity to review carefully
the memoranda circulated by our two "Bills".
impressive and persuasive memos.

Both are

As I think either could

form the basis of a principled decision, I have found the
case particularly troublesome.

In any event, being

satisfied that further delay will not make decision any
easier, I will now firm up the tentative vote to reverse
that I expressed at Conference.

I add the following

observations.
As to the legislative history debate, I am
persuaded that Bill Douglas' reading of it in Monroe was
wrong.

Bill Rehnquist's memorandum makes a reasonable

argument in favor of Monroe's interpretation of the Sherman
Amendment's rejection.

But I rather think that

congressional concern was centered on the inequity of
imposing liability on local units of government on the
basis of respondeat superior or some other principle of

2.

vicarious liability.

Moreover, doubts about congressional

power expressed in the debates stemmed from the attempted
imposition of an extra-constitutional duty to curb private
lawlessness, not from a perception that municipalities per
se were beyond the reach of legislative authority under §5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

These points seem reasonably

clear.
I have had some doubt that the word "person" was
intended to include inanimate bodies.

Its use is hardly an

artful way to include municipalities or similar entities.
Yet, I suppose the "plain meaning" approach was eroded long
ago.

There is the so-called "Dictionary Act," passed a

month before the Civil Rights bill was introduced, which
indicates a congressional understanding that "the word
'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and
corporate • • • • " Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, §2, 16
Stat. 431.

While "an allowable not a mandatory"

definition, Monroe, 365 U.S., at 191, it is evidence of
special usage of the term "person".

Moreover, I was

painfully reminded only a few weeks ago that a majority of
my Brothers thought the same word, used by Senator Sherman
in 1890, included foreign governments, Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, No. 76-749 (decided January 11, 1978),
as well as municipalities, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. City of Atlanta, 203

u.s.

390, 396 (1960).

3.

With me, policy considerations weigh more heavily
than any attempt to read meaning into ambiguous speeches by
members of Congress a century ago or speculation whether
the word "person" embraces the universe.

Everyone agrees

that §1983 authorizes suits against officials of
governmental units both in their official and individual
capacities.

If one assumes that the municipality generally

will indemnify an official sued for conduct within the
scope of his authority, as it must if it is to attract and
retain competent officers, board members and employees, it
really does not matter which way one goes on the
fiscal-impact argument.

The municipality pays in either

event.
In addition we have enshrined the fiction that
allows mandatory injunctions, requiring the expenditure of
large sums of money, in §1983 actions,

e.~.,

Milliken v.

Bradley, 97 S.Ct. 2749 (1977), at the same time that we
proscribe recovery of damages. While the Eleventh Amendment
requires application of the fiction to suits against the
States, I am not inclinded to extend it to suits against
local governments.

Local governments probably already bear

the financial burden of 1983 suits, for damages as well as
injunctive relief.

Bill Rehnquist does make an arguable

point when he suggests that juries may be more likely to
escalate damages if a local government itself is named as a

4.
defendant.

I am not sure, however, that the average juror

would view his or her local government or school board in
the same light that jurors view insurance companies and
railroads.

After all, most jurors are taxpayers.

This brings me to what I suppose is the most
troublesome aspect of a reversal in this case:
on the doctrine of stare decisis.

its effect

To my mind,

considerations of stare decisis cut in both directions.

On

the one hand, we have a series of rulings that
municipalities and counties are not "persons" for purposes
of § 1983.

In the somewhat accidental manner that

characterizes many of our § 1983 decisions, cf. Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 186* (1976), we have answered a
question that was never briefed or argued in this Court.
The claim in Monroe was that the City of Chicago should be
held "liable for acts of its police officers, by virtue of
respondeat superior," Brief for Petitioners, O.T. 1960, No.
39, p. 21, namely, a warrantless, early morning raid and
ransacking of a Negro family's horne. Although Morris
Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a footnote
reference to the Sherman Amendment, he had no incentive to
present a view of the legislative history that would have
foreclosed relief on a theory of respondeat superior.
In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411

u.s.

693 (1973),

the only other relevant case presenting a substantial
discussion of the legislative history of § 1983,

5.
petitioners asserted that "the county was vicariously
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., 696,
under § 1988.

Although we reaffirmed explicitly Monroe's

reading of the debates over the 1871 Act, petitioners in
that case did not challenge "the holding in Monroe
concerning the status under § 1983 of public entities such
as the County."

Id., at 700. Technically, the holding of

Moor does not extend beyond the recognition that "Congress
did not intend, as a matter of federal law, to impose
vicarious liability on municipalities for violations of
federal civil rights by their employees," and that §1988
"cannot be used to accomplish what Congress clearly refused
to do in enacting§ 1983."

Id., at 710 & n. 27.

Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973), did the Court confront a§ 1983 claim based on
conduct that was both authorized under state law and
directly -- rather than vicariously
claimed constitutional injury.

responsible for the

But in Kenosha we raised

the jurisdictional question on our own initiative.

Thus,

the issues identified in the scholarly exchange between
Bill Brennan and Bill Rehnquist simply have not been
thoughtfully ventilated on any previous occasion.
On the other hand, affirmance in this case
requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio exercise

I

t

6.
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases.
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these
decisions involved claims for monetary relief, Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 u.s. 632 (1974); Cohen v.
Chesterfield County School Board, 414 U.S. 632 (1974);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
u.s. 503 (1969); also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973). There was an independent basis of jurisdiction in
these cases because of the joinder of individual public
officials as codefendants.

But the opinions of this Court

often made explicit reference to the school-board party,
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded,
see,~,

Milliken v. Bradley, 97 s.ct. 2749 (1977). And

Congress has focused specifically on this Court's
school-board decisions in several statutes. The exercise of
§

1983 jurisdiction over school boards, even if not

premised on considered holdings, thus has been
longstanding.

Indeed, it predated Monroe.

In my view, reversal would require the overruling
only of Kenosha.

I would simply limit Monroe and Moor to

their facts. The preclusion of governmental liability for
the tortious conduct of individual officials that was
neither mandated nor specifically authorized by, and indeed
was violative of, state or local law, is consistent with

7.

the 42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act.
The rationale of Kenosha may have to be disturbed
in some fashion, whichever course the Court follows in this
case.

Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's view would require,

if I understand him correctly, importing into §1983 the
approach of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 {1908), to
preserve the availability of injunctive relief.

While this

is an understandable position, it does entail a "bifurcated
application [of §1983]

to municipal corporations depending

on the nature of the relief sought against them." 412

u.s.,

at 513. A public official sued in his official capacity,
concededly a "person" for purposes of injunctive relief,
would become a non-"person" in a suit seeking a monetary
recovery.
Moreover, under Bill's approach, I suppose we
would have to say that Congress rejected the Sherman
Amendment because it "wished to preserve the financial
capacity of municipalities to carry out basic governmental
functions" and "to insure the security of businessmen who
traded with them."

Our previous decisions have not

identified these concerns as the principal reasons for the
defeat of the Sherman proposal.

Indeed, such

considerations were minimized in Kenosha itself, which held
that

a

municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief

-
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under §1983 even though no monetary award was sought
because a municipality is simply not a "person."
I have concluded that the prior decisions in this
area do not require application of the usual stare decisis
principle. There is no coherence in the relevant body of
precedents.

Indeed, there is a degree of confusion in

principle that we now have an opportunity to rationalize.
Although, as indicated, I generally agree with
Bill Brennan, I differ with his memo in two respect.
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their facts,
rather than overruled.

The Court simply could say that we

have had no occasion previously to consider the
availability of a §1983 damages remedy for constitutional
violations that are the direct result of a policy decision
by the government entity, rather than a failure to curb the
unauthorized torts of its employees. See Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976)
Brown).

(discussing

Swann and

There are substantial line-drawing problems, as

Bill Rehnquist notes, but this case involves a formal,
written policy of the municipal department and school
board.

It is the clear case.
Second, I would recognize a defense for policies

promulgated in good faith that affect adversely
constitutional rights not clearly defined at the time of

9.
violation, cf. Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446; Wood v.
Strickland, 420

u.s.

308 (1975).

We have relied on the

common law in definining immunities under §1983.
~-~·'

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).

See,
The

absolute immunity accorded govermental bodies under the
common law would be modified to this extent.

But this

would be merely a modification rather than an abandonment
of the common law protection.
One further thought:

We see decisions

increasingly that extend the Bivens rationale to state
action.

Lawyers apparently have got "the word" and

complaints are being framed both under §1983 and directly
under the Fourteenth Amendment.

We will not be able much

longer to avoid confronting the question whether, Congress
having provided relief (through §1983) for state action,
parties nevertheless are free to by-pass §1983 and to rely
on federal question jurisdiction to sue municipalities for
alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations.

I do not know how

I would answer this question, but I suppose we would retain
greater flexibility under §1983 to make distinctions
between claims of constitutional dimension and those that
are not, than we would if Bivens-type remedies become
generally available in state action cases.

If we continue

to deny §1983 relief against local governmental units, we

10.
strengthen the argument for Bivens relief.

I would prefer

to avoid this pressure.
I am grateful to both "Bills" for their most
helpful contributions to our deliberations in this case.

L.F.P., Jr.
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No. 75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I

have now had an opportunity to review carefully

the me.m oranda circulated by our two "Bills".
impressive and persuasive memos .

Both are

As I think either could

form the basis of a principled decision, I have found the
case particularly troublesome.

In any event, being

satisfied that further delay will not make decision any
easier, I will now firm up the tentative view to reverse
that I expressed at Conference.

I add the following

observations.
As to the legislative history debate, I am
persuaded that Bill Douglas' reading of it in
wrong.

Mcn~oe

w2s

Bill Rehnquist's me morandum makes a reasonable

argument in favor of Monroe's interpretation of the Sherman
Amendment's rejection.

In my view, however, the Sherman

Amendment was an attempt to impose vicarious liability on
government subdivisions for the consequences of ~rivate

-....- ~· --------.-- ' ·-·
,.
'

-

• -·-.·----

--~ r ·-- -- · -

..

~~

2.
lawlessness.

The legislative history can best be

understood as limiting the statutory ambit to actual
wrongdoers,

i·~·,

a rejection of respondeat superior or any

other principle of vicarious liability.
I have had some doubt that the word "person" was
intended to include inanimate bodies.

Its use is hardly an

artful way to include municipalities or similar entities.
Yet, I suppose the "plain meaning" approach was eroded long
ago.

There is the so-called "Dictionary Act," passed a

month before the Civil Rights bill was introduced, which
indicates a congressional understanding that "the word
'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and
corporate. • • • " Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, §2, 16
Stat. 431.

While "an allowable not a mandatory"

definition, Monroe, 365 U.S., at 191, it is evidence of
special usage of the term "person".

Moreover, I was

painfully reminded only a few weeks ago that a majority of
my Brothers thought the same word, used by Senator Sherman
in 1890, included foreign governments, Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, No. 76-749

(decided January 11, 1978),

as well as municipalities, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396

Wo~ks

(1960).

With me, other considerations weigh more heavily
than an attempt to read decisive meaning into speeches by
members of Congr ess a century ago or speculation whether

~

-

..

·.

~

.... . ···
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.
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....

-~~

.,

3.
the word "person" embraces the universe.

Everyone agrees

that Sl983 authorizes suits against officials of
governmental units both in their official and individual
capacities.

If one assumes that the municipality generally

will indemnify an official sued for conduct within the
scope of his authority, as it must if it is to attract and
retain competent officers, board members and employees, it
really does not matter which way one goes on the
fiscal-impact argument.

The municipality pays in either

event.
In addition we have enshrined the fiction that
allows mandatory injunctions, requiring the expenditure of
large sums of money, in §1983 actions,

e.~.,

Milliken v.

Bradley, 97 s.ct. 2749 (1977), at the same time that we
proscribe recovery of damages. While the Eleventh Amendment
requires applicati?n of the fiction to suits against the
States, I am not inclinded to extend it to suits a gainst
local governments.

Local governments probably already bear

the financial burden of 1983 suits, for damages as well as
injunctive

r~lief.

Bill Rehnquist does make an arguable

point when he suggests that juries may be more likely to
escalate d a mages if a local government itself is na me d as a
defendant.

I am not sure, however, that the average juror

would view his or her local government or school board in
the same light that jurors view insurance companies and
railroads.

---~--

-

. - -··· .··

After all, most jurors are taxpayers.
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4.
This brings me to what I suppose is the most
troublesome aspect of a reversal in this case:
on the doctrine of stare decisis.

its effect

To my mind,

considerations of stare decisis cut in both directions.

On

the one hand, we have a series of rulings that
municipalities and counties are not
of

S 1983.

"p~rsons"

for purposes

In the somewhat accidental manner that

characterizes many of our § 1983 decisions, cf. Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 186* (1976), we have answered a
question that was never briefed or argued in this Court whether a municipality is liable in damages for injuries
that are the direct result of its policies. The claim in
Monroe was that the City of Chicago should be held "liable
for acts of its police officers, by virtue of respondeat
superior," Brief for Petitioners, O.T. 1960, No. 39, p. 21,
namely, a warrantless, early mornin~ raid and ransacking of
1

a Negro family's home.

Although Morris

1. Respondents' brief in Monroe identified the
implications of petitioner's position for the
municipalities of the nation:
"If this court • • . adopts petitioners' theory
that the act of respondent Pape, no matter how
wrongful and how violative of the Constitution and
laws of Illinois and the ordinances of Chicago,
binds Chicago and makes it directly liable therefor, then Chicago and every other
municipality in the United States is open to Civil
Rights liability through no action of its own and
based on action contrary to its own ordinances and
the laws of the state it is a part of." Brief for
Respondents, supra, p. 26.
No attempt was made, however, to relate these concerns to
the rejection of the Sherman Amendment.

.;.:

..

- . ..

-· ·- ----~- ...,.---~

-· .

----

..
I

s.
Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a footnote
discussion of

the Sherman Amendment, he had no incentive

to present a view of the legislative history that would

,

have foreclosed relief on a theory of respondeat superior.

!

In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973),
the only other relevant case presenting a substantial
discussion of the legislative history of § 1983,
petitioners asserted that "the county was vicariously
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., 696,
under § 1988.

Although we reaffirmed explicitly Monroe's

reading of the debates over the 1871 Act, petitioners in
that case did not challenge "the holding in Monroe
concerning the status under § 1983 of public entities such
as the County."

!d., at 700. Technically, the holding of

Moor does not extend beyond the recognition that "Congress
did not intend, as a matter of federal law, to impose
vicarious liability on municipalities for violations of
federal civil rights by their employees," and that §1988
"cannot be used to accomplish what Congress clearly refused
to do in enacting§ 1983."

Id., at 710 & n. 27.

Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973), did the Court confront a§ 1983 claim based on
conduct that was both authorized under state law and
directly -- rather than vicariously
cl a i me d con s titutional injury.

responsible for the

But in Kenosha we raised

.I
the jurisdictional question on our own initiative.

~

....

·..·

.•::·

..

· ~

Thus,

.. .. .....
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6.

·.
the issues identified in the scholarly exchange between
Bill Brennan and Bill Rehnquist simply have not been
thoughtfully ventilated on any previous occasion.

,. ,

On the other hand, affirmance in this case

:'
:i

requires a rejection.of this Court's sub silentio exercise
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases •

• !
; i

As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these

. '

decisions involved claims for monetary relief, Cleveland

~

'

Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 {1974); Cohen v.
Chesterfield County School Board, 414 U.S. 632 {1974);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 {1969); also Vlandis v. Kline, 412

u.s.

441

{1973). There was an independent basis of jurisdiction in
these cases because of the joinder of individual public
officials as codefendants.
often made explicit

But the opinions of this Court

refe~ence

to the school-board party,

particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded,
see,

~'

Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430,

437-439, 441-442 {1968).

And Congress has focused

specifically on this Court's school-board decisions in
several statutes. The exercise of § 1983 jurisdiction over
school boards, even if not premised on considered holdings,
thus has been longstanding.

Indeed, it predated Monroe.

In my view, reversal would require the overruling
only of Kenosha.

--.---:::--

.·- -·- . - ... - -.-...

I would simply limit Monroe and Moor to

·. .

--

--.-- - ·.~

11· •.
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7.
their facts. The preclusion of governmental liability for
the tortious conduct of individual officials that was
neither mandated nor specifically authorized by, and indeed
was violative of, state or local law, is consistent with
the 42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act.
The rationale of Kenosha may have to be disturbed
in some fashion, whichever course the Court follows in this
.· ·;

case.

Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's view would require,

if I understand him correctly, importing into §1983 the
approach of Ex parte Young, 209

u.s.

123 (1908), to

preserve the availability of injunctive relief.

While this

is an understandable position, it does entail a "bifurcated
application [of §1983]

to municipal corporations depending

u.s.,

on the nature of the relief sought against them." 412

at 513. A public official sued in his official capacity,
concededly a "person" for purposes of injunctive relief,
would become a non-"person" in a suit seeking a monetary
recovery.
Moreover, under Bill's approach, I suppose we
would have to say that Congress rejected the Sherman
Amendment because it "wished to preserve the financial
capacity of municipalities to carry out basic governmental
functions" and

~to

traded with them."

insure the security of businessmen who
Our previous decisions have not

identified these concerns as the principal

.

reason~

for the

'

-- -----

...

.,

--~.- - -~~ ~

8.
defeat of the Sherman proposal.

Indeed, such

considerations were minimized in Kenosha itself, which held
that a municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief

.

,.,

under §1983 even though no monetary award was sought

.I

because a municipality is simply not a "person."

.

'

I have concluded that the prior decisions in this
area do not require application of the usual stare decisis
principle. There is no coherence in the relevant body of

. ;

precedents.

Indeed, there is a degree of confusion in

principle that we now have an opportunity to rationalize.
Although, as indicated, I generally agree with
Bill Brennan, I differ with his memo in two respects.
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their facts,
rather than overruled.

The Court simply could say that we

have had no occasion previously to consider the
availability of a §1983 damages remedy for constitutional
violations that are the direct r e sult of a policy decision
by the government entity, rather than a failure to curb the
unauthorized torts of its employees. See Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 {1976)
Brown).

{discussing

Swann and

There are substantial line-drawing problems, as

Bill Re h n quist not e s, but this case involves a formal,
written policy of the municipal department and school
board.

It is the clear case.
Se cond, I would rec ogni z e a d e f e n s e for policies

promulgated in good faith that affect a dversely

.

1

r '

:: ::-:-- -~ - --- ~ !
\
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9.
constitutional rights not clearly defined at the time of
violation, cf. Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446; Wood v.
Strickland, 420

u.s.

308 (1975).

We have relied on the

common law in defining immunities under §1983.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).

See,~-~·,

The absolute

immunity accorded govermental bodies under the common law
would be modified to this extent.

But this would be merely

a modification rather than an abandonment of the common law
protection.
One further thought:

We see decisions

increasingly that extend the Bivens rationale to state
action.

Lawyers apparently have gotten "the word" and

complaints are being framed both under §1983 and directly
under the Fourteenth Ame ndment.

See,~-~·,

Lowell School

Dist. No. 71 v. Kerr, No. 77-688, March 3, 1978,
Conference.

We will not be able _much longer to avoid

confronting the question whether, Congress having provided
relief (through §1983) for state action, parties
nevertheless are free to by-pass §1983 and to rely on
federal que stion jurisdiction to sue municipalities for
alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations.

I do not know how

I would answer this qu e stion, but I suppose we would retain
greater flexibility under §1983 to make distinctions
between claims of constitutional dimensic , and those that
are not, than we would if Bive ns - type r eme di e s be come
generally available in state action cases.

If we , continue

, or II

··,. : .,...,- ·•

. I

: ~--·------ ·--·- -~·~~ ...........7

I
I

10.
to deny §1983 relief against local governmental units, we
strengthen the argument for Bivens relief.

..

-

I would prefer

to avoid this pressure.
I am grateful to both "Bills" for their most
helpful contributions to our deliberations in this case.

L.F.P., Jr.
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F ebr uar y 23, 1978

No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services
Dear Chief,
In light of Lewis Powell's memorandum
of t oday, might it not be a good idea to discuss
t hi s case at our Conference tomorrow?
Sincerely yours,
/ 1 ,,

' '
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T he Chi ef J ustice
Copies to the Conference
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February 23, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

75-1914 - Monell v. Dept. of Social Services

Like Lewis, I found the two memoranda especially
valuable.
I am persuaded by Bill Brennan that Monroe
misconstrued the actual intent of Congress on the
question whether a municipality can be a person.
Until
I received Lewis' memorandum this afternoon, I was persuaded by Bill Rehnquist's discussion of stare decisis
that we should probably not overrule the Monroe holding.
Lewis now has be back in something of a quandary, and I
would welcome further discussion of the case at Conference.
I thought I should let you know that my views
are not as settled as I had thought at the time of our
original conference.
I should add that I do have a great deal of difficulty with Lewis' suggestion that the good faith
defense should be extended to municipal corporations.
Such an extension could hardly be justified on the
rationale that we need to encourage people to accept
public employment and to discharge their duties in a
fearless manner.
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.J. BRENNAN, .JR.

February 23, 1978

No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services
Dear Lewis:
I very much appreciate your helpful and welcome
comments on the Monell memoranda. I certainly cannot
disagree with the first reservation you voice to my
position, namely that we need not overrule Monroe and Moor
but might simply restrict those cases t~ their facts. See
my Memorandum at 8. I find your second suggestion--that
in this case we should "recognize a defense for policies
promulgated in good faith that affect adversely
constitutional rights not clearly defined at the time of
violation"--a bit more troublesome. What particularly
bothers me about it is that the question of what type of
immunity should be afforded municipal or quasi-municipal
bodies if such bodies are suable directly under § 1983 has
not been briefed in this case. I'd not like to repeat
here the earlier errors of rushing to decision without
adequate briefing. The possible confusion that can arise
from such lack of briefing is painfully evident from the
treatment given the question of the "personhood" of
municipalities under § 1983 in Monroe, Moor, and Kenosha.
Although I have a good deal of sympathy for affording
municipal bodies the type of good faith defense you
propose, I really do believe that the lower courts should
grapple with the issue first, so that when the issue
returns here, it will have been fully considered and fully
briefed. I am not adverse, however, explicitly to direct
the attention of the lower court on remand to the
qualified immunity question, and provide the court with
our views on the contours of the issue.

...
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Monell v. Dept. of Social Services
Page 2

Parenthetically, I would like to voice my agreement
with your observation, at pp. 9-10 of your memorandum,
that "[i]f we continue to deny § 1983 relief against local
governmental units, we strengthen the argument for Bivens
relief [against these bodies]."
Sincerely,

f3u;
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

Re:

February 23, 1978

75-1914 - Monell v. Department of Social Services

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Of course Monell or any pending case can be
discussed by anyone who desires. Since I received
the several memos rather late today, I am prepared to
listen but not to discuss.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

February 23, 1978

No. 75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I have now had an opportunity to review carefully
the memoranda circulated by our two "Bills".
impressive and persuasive memos.

Both are

As I think either could

form the basis of a principled decision, I have found the
case particularly troublesome.

In any event, being

satisfied that further delay will not make decision any
easier, I will now firm up the tentative view to reverse
that I expressed at Conference.

I add the following

observations.
As to the legislative history debate, I am
persuaded that Bill Douglas' reading of it in Monroe was
wrong.

Bill Rehnquist's memorandum makes a reasonable

argument in favor of Monroe's interpretation of the Sherman
Amendment's rejection.

In my view, however, the Sherman

Amendment was an attempt to impose vicarious liability on
government subdivisions for the consequences of private

2.

lawlessness.

The legislative history can best be

understood as limiting the statutory ambit to actual
wrongdoers,

i·~·,

a rejection of respondeat superior or any

other principle of vicarious liability.
I have had some doubt that the word "person" was
intended to include inanimate bodies.

Its use is hardly an

artful way to include municipalities or similar entities.
Yet, I suppose the "plain meaning" approach was eroded long
ago.

There is the so-called "Dictionary Act," passed a

month before the Civil Rights bill was introduced, which
indicates a congressional understanding that "the word
'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and
corporate. •
Stat. 431.

" Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, §2, 16
While "an allowable not a mandatory"

definition, Monroe, 365

u.s.,

at 191, it is evidence of

special usage of the term "person".

Moreover, I was

painfully reminded only a few weeks ago that a majority of
my Brothers thought the same word, used by Senator Sherman
in 1890, included foreign governments, Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India, No. 76-749 (decided January 11, 1978),
as well as municipalities, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1960).
With me, other considerations weigh more heavily
than an attempt to read decisive meaning into speeches by
members of Congress a century ago or speculation whether

3.

the word "person" embraces the universe.

Everyone agrees

that §1983 authorizes suits against officials of
governmental units both in their official and individual
capacities.

If one assumes that the municipality generally

will indemnify an official sued for conduct within the
scope of his authority, as it must if it is to attract and
retain competent officers, board members and employees, it
really does not matter which way one goes on the
fiscal-impact argument.

The municipality pays in either

event.
In addition we have enshrined the fiction that
allows mandatory injunctions, requiring the expenditure of
large sums of money, in §1983 actions,

~.g.,

Milliken v.

Bradley, 97 S.Ct. 2749 (1977), at the same time that we
proscribe recovery of damages. While the Eleventh Amendment
requires application of the fiction to suits against the
States, I am not inclinded to extend it to suits against
local governments.

Local governments probably already bear

the financial burden of 1983 suits, for damages as well as
injunctive relief.

Bill Rehnquist does make an arguable

point when he suggests that juries may be more likely to
escalate damages if a local government itself is named as a
defendant.

I am not sure, however, that the average juror

would view his or her local government or school board in
the same light that jurors view insurance companies and
railroads.

After all, most jurors are taxpayers.

3.

the word "person" embraces the universe.

Everyone agrees

that §1983 authorizes suits against officials of
governmental units both in their official and individual
capacities.

If one assumes that the municipality generally

will indemnify an official sued for conduct within the
scope of his authority, as it must if it is to attract and
retain competent officers, board members and employees, it
really does not matter which way one goes on the
fiscal-impact argument.

The municipality pays in either

event.
In addition we have enshrined the fiction that
allows mandatory injunctions, requiring the expenditure of
large sums of money, in §1983 actions,

~.g.,

Milliken v.

Bradley, 97 s.ct. 2749 (1977), at the same time that we
proscribe recovery of damages. While the Eleventh Amendment
requires application of the fiction to suits against the
States, I am not inclinded to extend it to suits against
local governments.

Local governments probably already bear

the financial burden of 1983 suits, for damages as well as
injunctive relief.

Bill Rehnquist does make an arguable

point when he suggests that juries may be more likely to
escalate damages if a local government itself is named as a
defendant.

I am not sure, however, that the average juror

would view his or her local government or school board in
the same light that jurors view insurance companies and
railroads.

After all, most jurors are taxpayers.

4.

This brings me to what I suppose is the most
troublesome aspect of a reversal in this case:
on the doctrine of stare decisis.

its effect

To my mind,

considerations of stare decisis cut in both directions.

On

the one hand, we have a series of rulings that
municipalities and counties are not "persons" for purposes
of

§

1983.

In the somewhat accidental manner that

characterizes many of our
McCrary, 427

u.s.

§

1983 decisions, cf. Runyon v.

160, 186* (1976}, we have answered a

question that was never briefed or argued in this Court whether a municipality is liable in damages for injuries
that are the direct result of its policies. The claim in
Monroe was that the City of Chicago should be held "liable
for acts of its police officers, by virtue of respondeat
superior," Brief for Petitioners, O.T. 1960, No. 39, p. 21,
namely, a warrantless, early morning raid and ransacking of
1

a Negro family's home.

Although Morris

1. Respondents' brief in Monroe identified the
implications of petitioner's position for the
municipalities of the nation:
"If this court . • • adopts petitioners' theory
that the act of respondent Pape, no matter how
wrongful and how violative of the Constitution and
laws of Illinois and the ordinances of Chicago,
binds Chicago and makes it directly liable
therefor, then Chicago and every other
municipality in the United States is open to Civil
Rights liability through no action of its own and
based on action contrary to its own ordinances and
the laws of the state it is a part of." Brief for
Respondents, supra, p. 26.
No attempt was made, however, to relate these concerns to
the rejection of the Sherman Amendment.

5.

Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a footnote
discussion of

the Sherman Amendment, he had no incentive

to present a view of the legislative history that would
have foreclosed relief on a theory of respondeat superior.
In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411

u.s.

693 (1973),

the only other relevant case presenting a substantial
discussion of the legislative history of § 1983,
petitioners asserted that "the county was vicariously
liable for the acts of its deputies and sheriff," id., 696,
under § 1988.

Although we reaffirmed explicitly Monroe's

reading of the debates over the 1871 Act, petitioners in
that case did not challenge "the holding in Monroe
concerning the status under § 1983 of public entities such
as the County."

rd., at 700. Technically, the holding of

Moor does not extend beyond the recognition that "Congress
did not intend, as a matter of federal law, to impose
vicarious liability on municipalities for violations of
federal civil rights by their employees," and that §1988
"cannot be used to accomplish what Congress clearly refused
to do in enacting§ 1983."

Id., at 710 & n. 27.

Only in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973), did the Court confront a§ 1983 claim based on
conduct that was both authorized under state law and
directly -- rather than vicariously
claimed constitutional injury.

responsible for the

But in Kenosha we raised

the jurisdictional question on our own initiative.

Thus,

6.

the issues identified in the scholarly exchange between
Bill Brennan and Bill Rehnquist simply have not been
thoughtfully ventilated on any previous occasion.
On the other hand, affirmance in this case
requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio exercise
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases.
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these
decisions involved claims for monetary relief, Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414

u.s.

632 (1974}: Cohen v.

Chesterfield County School Board, 414

u.s.

632 (1974):

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393

u.s.

503 (1969): also Vlandis v. Kline, 412

u.s.

441

(1973). There was an independent basis of jurisdiction in
these cases because of the joinder of individual public
officials as codefendants.

But the opinions of this Court

often made explicit reference to the school-board party,
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded,
see,

~'

Green v. County School Board, 391

437-439, 441-442 (1968).

u.s.

430,

And Congress has focused

specifically on this Court's school-board decisions in
several statutes. The exercise of

§

1983 jurisdiction over

school boards, even if not premised on considered holdings,
thus has been longstanding.

Indeed, it predated Monroe.

In my view, reversal would require the overruling
only of Kenosha.

I would simply limit Monroe and Moor to

7.

their facts. The preclusion of governmental liability for
the tortious conduct of individual officials that was
neither mandated nor specifically authorized by, and indeed
was violative of, state or local law, is consistent with
the 42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act.
The rationale of Kenosha may have to be disturbed
in some fashion, whichever course the Court follows in this
case.

Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's view would require,

if I understand him correctly, importing into §1983 the
approach of Ex parte Young, 209

u.s.

123 (1908), to

preserve the availability of injunctive relief.

While this

is an understandable position, it does entail a "bifurcated
application [of §1983]

to municipal corporations depending

on the nature of the relief sought against them." 412

u.s.,

at 513. A public official sued in his official capacity,
concededly a "person" for purposes of injunctive relief,
would become a non-"person" in a suit seeking a monetary
recovery.
Moreover, under Bill's approach, I suppose we
would have to say that Congress rejected the Sherman
Amendment because it "wished to preserve the financial
capacity of municipalities to carry out basic governmental
functions" and "to insure the security of businessmen who
traded with them."

Our previous decisions have not

identified these concerns as the principal reasons for the

8.

defeat of the Sherman proposal.

Indeed, such

considerations were minimized in Kenosha itself, which held
that a municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief
under §1983 even though no monetary award was sought
because a municipality is simply not a "person."
I have concluded that the prior decisions in this
area do not require application of the usual stare decisis
principle. There is no coherence in the relevant body of
precedents.

Indeed, there is a degree of confusion in

principle that we now have an opportunity to rationalize.
Although, as indicated, I generally agree with
Bill Brennan, I differ with his memo in two respects.
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their facts,
rather than overruled.

The Court simply could say that we

have had no occasion previously to consider the
availability of a §1983 damages remedy for constitutional
violations that are the direct result of a policy decision
by the government entity, rather than a failure to curb the
unauthorized torts of its employees. See Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976)
Brown).

(discussing

Swann and

There are substantial line-drawing problems, as

Bill Rehnquist notes, but this case involves a formal,
written policy of the municipal department and school
board.

It is the clear case.
Second, I would recognize a defense for policies

promulgated in good faith that affect adversely

9.

constitutional rights not clearly defined at the time of
violation, cf. Procunier v. Navarette, No. 76-446; Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).

We have relied on the

common law in defining immunities under §1983.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

u.s.

409 (1976).

See,

~.g.,

The absolute

immunity accorded govermental bodies under the common law
would be modified to this extent.

But this would be merely

a modification rather than an abandonment of the common law
protection.
One further thought:

We see decisions

increasingly that extend the Bivens rationale to state
action.

Lawyers apparently have gotten "the word" and

complaints are being framed both under §1983 and directly
under the Fourteenth Amendment.

See,

~.g.,

Lowell School

Dist. No. 71 v. Kerr, No. 77-688, March 3, 1978,
Conference.

We will not be able much longer to avoid

confronting the question whether, Congress having provided
relief (through §1983) for state action, parties
nevertheless are free to by-pass §1983 and to rely on
federal question jurisdiction to sue municipalities for
alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations.

I do not know how

I would answer this question, but I suppose we would retain
greater flexibility under §1983 to make distinctions
between claims of constitutional dimension and those that
are not, than we would if Bivens-type remedies become
generally available in state action cases.

If we continue

10.

to deny §1983 relief against local governmental units, we
strengthen the argument for Bivens relief.

I would prefer

to avoid this pressure.
I am grateful to both "Bills" for their most
helpful contributions to our deliberations in this case.

L.F.P., Jr.

j;utm>nu <lJaurl nf t4e 'J!fuitth j;ta.fts
'Jlfaslrhtstnn, :!B. <!}. 20~J.~2
CHAM BERS OF

February 25, 197 8

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

75-1914 - Monell v. Dept.
of Social Services

Dear Bill,
As Lewis has indicated, we are indebted
to both you and Bill Rehnquist for educating your Brethren as you have.
I am
grateful.
I also appreciate Lewis' memorandum.
I
agree with you and with him that school
boards are persons for the purpose of
§1983 but share his preference for not
overruling Monroe and Moor. At this
juncture, however, I am not at rest as
to the possible immunity of school boards
and prefer not to decide the issue. At
least, that is my tentative view.
Sincerely,

11~
Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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Who Should Pay for Civil Wrongs?
Cities and towns r eceived an unexpected jolt last
week when the Supreme Court rul ed that they were
subject to lawsuits for violations of civil rights. The
decision, which reversed a 1961 case, stripped away the
blanket immunity long enjoyed py local governments
in such cases . Previously, the only recourse for viet ims
of misconduct by police officers or discrimination by
city officials was to sue them individually. The Court's
decision makes sense as a general principle of public
policy. But it raises troublesome questions about municipal liability ancl who should bear the cost- questions that Congress must now confront.
The Supreme Court case arose from a sex discrimination charge brought by a group of women employees
of the New York City Department of Social Services. In
1971, they had been forced by the city's dated personnel
policies to take unpaid pregnancy leaves before they
were medically necessary. The women filed an action
under the Civil Rig hts Act of 1871, which allowed suits
against any "person" who, while acting in a governmental capacity, violated a citizen's federally protected rights. In 1961, the Warren Court ruled that Congress could not have intended a "person" to mean a
municipality. Last week, the Burger Court announced
that a more meticulous review of the legislative background compeJled it to reach the opposite conclusion.
Will the 1:emoval of this shield of immunity deter

official lawlessness? The exposure of local treasuries
to damage claims should certainly help to di~suade
public officials from ordering or tolerating behavior
that violates citizens' rights. But the trouble wi th mak. ing municipalities liable is that it exposes the tnx p~tye r
to a vast array of damage claims in situations where
public servants acted in good faith or where individual
officials broke the Jaw entirely on their own init iative.
Some public responsibility for the conduct of public officials is desirable; it should encourage people to monitor their governments still more c!osely. But some
limits on liability are needed to protect the ta>:payer
when, for instance, a police unit engages secretively in
illegal wiretapping or when a local board of education
is found to have violated legal principles in its allocation of funds or in its disciplinary poli cies.

•
Should taxpayers have to pay damage claims even
when all reasonable precautions have been observed in
the conduct of public business? The Supreme Court's
latest decision is silent on this question. The categori.c al doctrine of municipal immunity was bad public
policy. But the issue.cannot be allowed to rest where
the Court left it. Federal legislation will be needed to
define the degree of municipal liability in difierent
situations. The nation's mayors have a strong interest
in getting Congress-to face up to a problem that everyone has been.only too happy to leave to the judiciary.
J
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Wide Application Seen for Ruling
-Opening Cities to Civil Right Suits
.
By ROGER
When the Supreme Court deci ded rccently that local governm ent bodi es "'.·ere
not immune from suit<; seekin;; ·non"y
damages under one of the oldes t c;v il
rights laws in the country, r ivil rights and
civil liberties lawyers were jubilant.
"The limitation s that e<1rfier · decisions had placed on
Urban
that legislation were so:ne
Affairs
of the longest nails in th~
coffin," Drew S. Days 3d,
the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, said after the dccision was handed down.
The history of the statute is intriguing
and the implications of the decis·ion for
cities and other loC!al governing bodies
are enormous, according to lawyers who
have followed the issue through the
courts.
·
The recent case, Monell v. Depa'rtment
of Social Services, was brought by a
group of female employees of the New
York City Department of Social Services
and the Board of Education. They alleged
that they ha4d been victim s of uncon st itutiona! discrimination because they had
been forced to take unpaid m a t~rnity
leaves before the leaves were med1cally
necessary.
· Statute Passed In 1871

WILKINS
Unde r the 1961 decisio n, the only
rer1rdy for people who s<~ id that their
consti tutiOnal n ghts .ha•d been v10latrd
wa~ to sue for an InJUnct ion preventmg
t he uncon stitutio nal behavior, . unless
Co n;::rcss ha d passed . special legislation
provid:ng for awards ot money.
Thus. while complaioatnts in empl oyment di scrimination cases could get back
pay under Titl e VII of the Civil Ri ghts
Act of 1964, prisoners ' who had suffered '
"cruel and inhuman punishment" in local
jai!s could get only wh a tever relief the
in r,enuity of a Fcdera!l district judge could
provide under an injunction.
"In tha t situation," Eric Schnapper of
the NAACP Legal Defen se and Educational Fund Inc. said recently, "municipali ties
could enga ge in a long course of unconstitutional conduct until somebody sued and
[!Ot a Federal judge to enjoin that conduct. Th•en you'd still have the problem
of the local gr: vernment being able to
continue a course of unconstitutional
conduct just outside the exact borders
of t he injun•ct ion."
Mr. Schnapper al so said that though I
the 1961 d ecision did perm it plaintiffs
to seek dama.ges against individuals acting in behalf of the munici pality, t ha:t
remedy was an ineffective brake on municipal behavior and was often an unsatThe statute under which they sued, isfactory mean s of providing redress for
passed in 1871 to enforce the 14th the victim of discrimination.
Amendment, adopted three years earlier,
gave people ~ whose constitutional r ights
Victims Could Not Recover
were violated the right to s ue the " perThus, if the official who had been
sons" who had violated those rights.
responsible for the violation had no
The plaintiffs lost at their tria'! and money, had left the jurusdiction or could
on the first level of their appeal because not be identified, the victim couid not
the courts followed a 1961 ' decision- recover for losses he or·Slhe had suffered.
The Monell case changes all that. Unironically, written by former JJustice WilIiam 0. Douglas, who was considered by constitutiom•l harms inflicted en citizens
civil rights forces as one of their staunch- under the official policy of a city or a
est supporters on the Court-holding tha't oounty or other local governing body will
municipal governing bodies were not now subject that body to financial li:lobil~
"persons" who could be sued for money ity.
1
damages for violations of constitutional . Justice William J. Brennan Jr. was
rights.
careful, however; ' to distinguish be tween
One of the mos.t' remarkable things conduct carrrired out under the policy of
about the judicial history of the 1871 the local government. which would sub- I
staltute, according to civil rig~hts lawyers, ject that government to liability, and the
is that after its passage it remained virtu- unauthorized co'n.duct ) of a single emally ·unused for almos.t three-quarttors of pioyee.
·
a cen~ury.
An Exception Is Noted
Purpose of Legislation
In announcing the decision from the
It wa'S pa!Ssed to enforce the rights bench, he said, that no municipality
of newly freed slaves, but shortly after would be liable, for example, for dam ages
its passage, the spirit of liberalism that inflicted by an ambulance driver who
foHowed the war gave way to a long drove on the sidewalk and hit a pedes.
·
period C1f repression of b ~a·cks. It wa:s trian .
not until the beginnring of the civil rights
The deci-sion would cover, according
movement in the 1950's that lawyers to William CaldweN of the Lawyers'
began attempting to assert the riglhts that Committee for Civil Ri ghts :Under Law,
the statute purported to provide.
the kinds of viol ations of prisonbers'
Wh€in a case under the s:tatute--involv- rights that forc ed the clo sing of the
in~ police bruta lity in Chicago-finally Tombs :md c.f similar violations of ri r.•h ts
did reach the S'up reme- Court in 1961, that h11vc frequently been found to occur
Justice Douglas re jecte-d a.rgumen:ts that in oublic mental inst itution s.
would have made t he statute virtually
"This case w Lll be of tremendous im·
a dead 'etter. Hcwevf:r, ·he seriously un- portamce in non:racial case s," Mr. Schnap. dercut its force by deciding that money per of uhe Legal Defense Fund said. ''Peadama-ges could nc:t be awarded in such ple will be able to ge t redress for v iolacases, according to civil rights lawyers . tion.s of the First Amendment rights or
These latwyers ar gue that the 1961 for illegal searches and seizures conductdecision made constitutional-rights claim- ed by local po!•ice in violation of the
ants "second-class ci tizens" before the J Fourth Amendment or for viola ti ons of '
common law. since money dama ges have the Eighth Am endment prohibition of
been, under the common law, the estab- cruel and unusual nunishment.
"And I don't think any mayor w ill
lished way for civil wron gs to be deterre d. They sa<y, for exa m pl e~ th at money lightly issue the kinds of 'shoo t to kill'
damages in contract and neglige nce law orders that Mayo·r Da ley did dur.ng the
serve as powerful deterrents to behavior peace demonstrat:ions in Chicago in
that injures othe·r people or institutions.
1968."
;

I

1
I

~

l

'\f

.............. -·.·

New York University
A private university in the public service

School of Law
Faculty of Law

OCT 2 0

t~t~U

40 Washington Square South , Room 350
New York, N .Y. 10012
Telephone : (212) 598-2564
Professor Samuel Estreicher

PERSONAL
October 13, 1980
Mr. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C.
20543
Dear Justice Powell:
It is always a source of great pleasure to receive a
letter from you.
Aleta and I are particularly pleased that
our Michael serves as the standard by which the recent products
of the Comfort and Stephan households will be judged.
In our
modest view, you have chosen (as always) the appropriate
standard of review.
Susan Weiner told me that she very much enjoyed meeting
you.
Although I hoped you might select her, I anticipated
that her clerkship on the district court might prove a barrier.
I do wish to note that this year's editor- in-chief of the
law review, Nancy Morawetz, who will be clerking for Pat Wald
on the D.C. Circuit, is an impressive individual.
She is in
my constitutional law seminar, and I am delaying an official
letter of recommendation until I see her written work.
If
her work is as impressive as her bearing and intelligence, I
intend to bring her application to your attention.
By the way,
Eliot Polebaurn, an N.Y.Q/. graduate, is clerking for Justice
Brennan this year, andVSohn Sexton, the Chief's clerk,will be
joining our faculty next fall.
One of our projects here is
to enhance the N.Y.U. presence on the Court.
I am delighted that you shared David Stewart's memorandum
with me.
I take up the gauntlet in the enclosed memorandum.
Sometime this fall Norman Dorsen and I (perhaps accompanied
by Bill Nelson, a former White clerk, who recently joined
our faculty) will be making our annual pilgrimage to the
Court. As soon as the date is firmed up, I hope to be able
to schedule a meeting with you. Gerald Gunther beat me to it
last year, and I do not intend to let that happen again.

October 9, 1980
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As always, my best wishes and warmest regards to you,
the Powell family and the Powell chambers. Aleta and I
miss you all.
Sincerely,

SE:fo

October 15, 1980
PERSONAL
Monell and the Rejection of the Sherman Amendment

Given the Court's penchant for extending the reach of
Section 1983 far beyond the expectations of even the Radical
Republicans, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, No. 79-838, and the
refusal to extend a "good-faith" defense to municipalities

in Owen v. City of Independence, No. 78-1779, I can appreciate
your sense of disquiet on reading David Stewart's memorandum.
As I understand David's position, it is (i) that the
rejection of the Sherman Amendment is persuasive evidence
of the intention of the 42nd Congress to exclude municipalities
from the reach of §1983, and, moreover,

(ii) that the use of

the word "person" in the eventual compromise that became
42 U.S.C. §1986 demonstrates conclusively ''that Congress in
1871 did not think it was creating municipal liability."
I quote from page 11 of David's memorandum:
Thus, my argument is simple. When the
Forty-Second Congress wished to exclude
municipal liability for the failure to
act, it used the phrase "any person or
persons." The repeated references to
"citizen," "individual," and the use
of personal pronouns buttress the inescapable conclusion that "any person or
persons" did not include local governments.
Since the term "any person"
was used in the predecessor to Section 1983,

October 15, 1980
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17 Stat. 13, it is logical that that phrase
also excludes municipal liability.
In my view, David has simply restated the argument that
prevailed for a time in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
but was properly overturned in Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
I deal first with David's second argument, that when
Congress used the word "person" in what is now §1986 to
exclude municipal immunity, it must have intended to exclude
municipal liability when it used the word "person" in §1983.
Aside from the surface appeal of this point, little illumination is derived from the use of the term "person" in §1986.
One would hope that legislators drafted with greater precision, and avoided
meanings.

the use of words capable of several

This was one reason for the Dictionary Act,

passed only months before the Civil Rights Act was enacted,
to clarify that "in all acts hereafter passed ... the word
'person' may extned and be applied to bodies politic and
corporate ... unless the context shows that such words were
intended to be used in a more limited sense [ ] ."
Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, §2, 16 Stat. 431.

Act of

I think it likely

that members of the 42nd Congress intending to preserve
municipal liability for municipal action under §1983, while
excluding municipal liability for private rioting under §1986,
agreed

to the use of the word "person" without focusing on

the effect

this would have on the far less controversial pro-

vision that earlier had passed both houses with little debate.

October 15, 1980
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Great consequences should not attach to careless draftsmanship, absent substantial evidence of an intention to save
local governments from liability for their own wrongdoing
under §1983.

Thus, David's argument ultimately rests on

his first premise.
As David himself recognizes, there are good reasons for
proceeding with caution before equating the rejection of the
Sherman Amendment with a decision to immunize local governments from liability for their own conduct under §1983.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the predecessor to
§1983, was the subject of only limited debate and was passed
without amendment.

The purpose of the measure was to impose

liability on those committing constitutional violations
causing compensable injury.

The literal reach of Section 1983

is quite broad and comprehensive.

The statements of its

proponents suggest that such a reach was indeed intended.
The Sherman Amendment, by contrast, elicited much debate
and several revisions.

The theory of the first two versions

was that local governments should be held liable not only for
their

CMn

unconstitutional wrongdoing, but for their inaction in

failing to prevent private rioting.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Monell canvasses
the arguments presented by the opponents of the Sherman
Amendment.

As you stated in your Monell concurring opinion:

"Of the many reasons

for the defeat of the Sherman proposal,

none supports Monroe's observation that the 42d Congress was

October 15, 1980
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fundamentally 'antagonistic,' 365 U.S., at 191, to the
proposition that government entities and natural persons alike
should be held accountable for the consequences of conduct
directly working a
706

constitutional violation."

436

u.s.,

at

(Powell, J., concurring).
I suppose that fragments of the legislative history

can be marshalled in favor of either position on the "meaning"
of the rejection of the Sherman Amendment.

What counts for

me is that Congress in 1871 intended §1983 to serve as a
broad remedial measure for violations of constitutional
rights; that Congress knew municipalities were capable by
their own conduct of committing violations causing compensable
wrong, e.g.,

Representative Bingham's manifest intention

to overrule Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1834), and make
takings by cities without compensation redressable under the
Fourteenth funendment and its implementing legislation,
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., at 84-85 (1871);

*

*

In Barron v. Baltimore, petitioner had sued the city for
making his wharf in Baltimore harbor useless.
The trial
court awarded petitioner $45,000, but the state appellate
court reversed.
Barron then claimed in the Supreme Court
that his private property had been "taken for public use,
without just compensation" in violation of the fifth
amendment.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion held that
no federal question was presented because the fifth amendment did not apply to relations between the individual and
a state.
In a speech on the floor of the House, Representative
Bingham explained that he drafted §1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment with Barron in mind:

October 15, 1980
Page 5.

and that unambiguous evidence of a

legislative intention to

save municipalities from the rule of accountability established
in §1983 is

lacking.

As you observed in y our Monell con-

currence, adherence to Monroe had the effect of standing the
Douglas-Frankfurter debate on its head:
The Court correctly rejects a view of the
legi s lative history that would produce
the anomalous result of immunizing local
government units from monetary liability
for action directly causing a constitutional deprivation, even though such
actions may be fully consistent with, and
thus not remediable under, state law. No
conduct of government comes more clearly
within the "under color of" state law
language of §1983.
It is most unlikely
that Congress intended public officials
acting under the command or the specific
authorization of the government employer
to be exclusively liable for resulting
constitutional injury.
436 U.S.,at 707.

*

I had read--and that is what induced me to
attempt to impose by constitutional amendment new limitations upon the power of the
States --the great decision of Marshall
in Barron vs. the Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, wherein the Chief Justice
said, in obedience to his official oath
and the Constitution, as it then was:
"The amendments [to the Constitution] contain no expression
indicating an intention to apply
them to State governments.
The
court cannot so apply them."
7 Peters, p. 250
In this case the city had taken private property
for public use, without compensation as alleged,
and there was no redress for the wrong in the
Supreme Court of the United States; and only
for this reason, the first eight amendments
were not limitations on the power of the States.
Globe App. 84.

October 15, 1980
Page 6.

Your concluding remarks in the Monell concurrence state
the best argument for overturning Monroe.

Adherence to Monroe

would not obviate a decision on municipal liability in the context of a constitutional tort action under Bivens, and the
"difficulty" would remain of "inferring from §1983 'an explicit
congressional declaration' against municipal liability for -the implementation of official policies in violation of the
Constitution."

436 U.S., at 713.

*

*

*

As your dissent in Owen demonstrates with great force,
the decision in Monell did not lead inexorably to the outcome
in Owen.

The force of the

~

dissent is ultimately strengthened

by the fact that your position has never been one of reflexive
opposition to the claims of §1983 plaintiffs.

~
S.E.

October 25, 1980

Dear Sam:
How good of you to go to the trouble of providing
another memorandum for the Powell Chambers!
It is, as can be said of all Estreicher products,
well written and persuasive. Although I think David makes a
good lawyer-like argument, I am not convinced that we were
wrong in Monell.
I do feel a bit like I was •taken" in some of the
conversations that then occurred - not by you, of course.
Even so, I continue to think Monell was decided correctly.
You always will be welcome to use our facilities
when you are here recruiting. I look forward to seeing you.
Sincerely,

Professor Samuel Esctreicher
School of Laws
New York University
40 Washington Square South, Room 350
New York, New York 10012
lfp/ss

The Supreme Court Rewrites A Law:
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER § 1983
By David 0. Stewart ~
The Supreme

Court

executed

one of

the

most

striking

reversals in judicial history when it decided Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Services, 436

u.s.

658 (1978).

The decision

in Monell held municipalities liable for damages under 42
§

1983 for the unlawful deprivation of civil rights.

seventeen years before,

in Monroe v.

Pape, 365

u.s.

u.s.c.

But only
167

(1961),

the Supreme Court had decreed that municipalities were completely
immune to damage actions under
cases provides a fascinating
judicial

decision-making

in

§

1983.

The story of these two

illustration of the limitations of
response

to

d i ver s e

1 eg a 1 ,

intellectual and political concerns.
In both Monroe and Monell, the Supreme Court's decision
was

based

on

its

interpretation

of

the

deliberations

of

the

-*I J.D. Yale University, 1978; B.A. Yale University, 1973; 1\lember
of District of Columbia bar •

..!/

The Monell Court attempted to soften the impact of its
reversal of Monroe v. Pape by limiting municipal liability to
those injuries suffered due to municipal policies and thereby
excluding liability for injuries caused by unauthorized actions
by municipal officers.
Nevertheless, Monell has had direct and
serious consquences for local governments. Moreover, in 1980 the
Supreme Court denied to municipalities the "good-faith" defense
avc.lilable to individuals in S 1983 cases.
See Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 u.s. 622 (1980).
In response to appeals from
local governments, Congress is considering restoration of goodfaith immunity for local governments, but has taken no such
action yet •
See S • 5 8 5 , 9 7th Con g • , 2 d S e s s • ( 19 8 2 ) ; Mu n i c i p a 1
Liability Under:-42 u.s.c. 1983, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th
Co ng • , 1 s t s e s s • ( 1 9 81 ) •

Forty-Second

Congress

y

1871.

Monroe

in

approving

concluded

that

the

Civil

Rights

the

Forty-Second

Act

of

Congress

squarely excluded municipal liability; Monell explained that the
Forty-Second Congress meant to create such liability.
Court

issued,

decisions

within

based

on

seventeen

exactly

the

years,

Thus, the

diametrically

opposing

same legislative history.

That

performance certainly weakens any claim to predictability in the
legal system.
A careful review of the legislative history of
demonstrates

that

Monroe

v.

Pape was

right:

§

1983

The Forty-Second

Congress did not intend to subject local governments to liability
for

constitutional

considerations
Court

found

evident

beyond

pure

it necessary

intent

of

But,

deprivations.
statutory

to skirt,

Congress.

In

so

due

apparent

to

construction,

the

Monell

somewhat uncomfortably,
doing,

however,

the

the Court

raised at least as many questions as it answered.

I.
James Monroe, his wife Flossie, and their six children
were awakened one evening by thirteen Chicago police officers who
broke into their home and

made them stand naked

in the living

room while the of fie ers ransacked their house for evidence of a
recent murder.

Mr.

Monroe was then interrogated at the police

station for ten hours,

and ultimately was relased.

Y

Section 1983 was enacted initially as Section l
Civil Rights Act, and was codified as § 1979 of
Statutes.
- 2 -

The

~1onroes

of the 1871
the Revised

sued

the

City

of

Chicago,

Detective

Frank

Pape,

and

twelve

unknown police officers, alleging that the police acted illegally
and

without

demanded
police

either

damages
of

an

under

rights,

Constitution.

The

arrest

or

warrant.

for

the

privileges

and

immunities

District

Court

§

1983

search

denial

by

The
the

secured

dismissed

the

suit

Chicago
by

the

complaint,

however, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
In
the

a

Supreme

The

Court

Court
ruled

undertaken
which

landmark decision
reinstated
that

therefore

constitutional

the Monroes'

the

"under color of"

alleged

a

even

by Justice
claim

police

state law

provided

injuries

announced

for

rememdy
though

under

actions

for

the

ilfegal

1983.

§

had

purposes of

those

contrary to formal governmental policy.

Douglas,

§

been
1983,

Monroes'
acts

were

The Court then turned to

the claim by the City of Chicago that it was immune to actions
brought under

1983.

§

Justice

Douglas's

discussion

of

municipal

immunity

focused on an amendment proposed by Senator John Sherman of Ohio
to the bill

that became

Sherman

Amendment,

Senate,

derived

proposed

that

which

from

all

the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
was

introduced

the English

individuals

in

damages to anyone injured by

on

the

"riot acts."
a

floor

of

The
the

Senator Sherman

locality be held

riots or mob

11

violence.

liable in

Y

The

Senate adopted the Sherman Amendment, but the House refused to do

11

See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 663 (1871).

-4/ Id., at 663.
-

3 -

so.

A Conference Committee then reported a revised version would

have

imposed

liability on

"the county,

city or parish in which

any of the said offenses shall be committed" for injuries due to
mob violence.

21

But the House refused to accept that version,

too.
Justice Douglas placed great weight upon the refusal of
the House to adopt the first Conference bill.

He emphasized Rep.

Poland's

had

assertion

that

the House Conferees

then

told

the

Senate Conferees "that that section imposing liability upon towns
and

counties

second

must

go

Conference

out or we

should

Committee heeded

Sherman Amendment was revised

fail

Rep.

to

Y

agree."

Poland's

A

advice.

The

to impose liablity on any "person

or persons" depriving an individual of his civil · rights, and was
en a c t ed a s

§

7 of t he Ci vi 1 Rig h t s Ac t

now is codified as 42

u.s.c.

of 18 71.

That provision

1986.

§

Although Justice Douglas did not completely explain the
significance
liabilty
direct.
If

a

must

of

the

under

1983,

§

Section 1983,

municipality
be

because
The

statute.
Congress
Sh~rman,

Sherman

a

the

episode

connection

for

between

municipal

the

two

is

by its terms, applies only to "persons."
to be held

local

Sherman

rejected
and

is

Amendment

liable under that statute,

government

Amendment

municipal

is

episode

liability

because Congress

expressed

a

"person"
is

as
that

under

important
proposed
rejection

it

that

because
by
in

Sen.
the

~ Id., at 749 (emphasis added).
365 u.s.
804 (1871).

!/

at 190, citing Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., lst Sess., p.

- 4 -

final

legislation

by

using

the

terms

"person

or

persons"

describe those parties who would be liable for damages.

to

Thus,

Congress excluded municipal liability by using the terms "person
or

persons"

in

the

provision

now

codified

as

1986.

§

Accordingly, the word "person" in the predecessor to § 1983 -- a
provision

which

was drafted

and

same Congress -- simply cannot
Forty-Second

Congress

could

enacted

simultaneously

by

include local governments.

not

have

intended

--

without

the
The
any

explanation -- that "person" would include municipalities in one
section of the C i vi 1 Rights Act at the s arne time the identical
term excluded local governments in another section of the bill.
As Justice Douglas concluded in a holding that drew no
dissenting comment on the Court, the "response of the Congress to
the proposal to make municipalities liable for certain actions •
was

so

antagonistic

that we

cannot believe

that

the word

'person' was used in this particular Act to include them."

21

I I.

In

several decisions

reaffirmed or

~xtended

after Monroe,

the

Supreme Court

its finding of municipal immunity under§

1983.

Thus, Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Moor v.

County

of

Alameda

Y

reviewed

the

legislative

history

of

the

21\365 u.s. at 19.
A peripheral issue in the interpretation of§
1983 is presented by the Dictionary Act of 1871.
That statute
stated that "the word 'person' ~ extend and be applied to
bodies corporate and politic."
16 Stat. 431 (emphasis added).
The provision
therefore provides no firm guidance on the
municipal liability question under § 1983.
~ 411

u.s.

693, 709-710 (1973).
-

5 -

Sherman

Amendment

and

concluded
~

could not be liable to

.21

Bruno,

the Court

again

1983 actions.

extended

that

local

governments

And in City of Kenosha v.

municipal

immunity

to

injunctive

actions with the following statement:
\ve find nothing in the legislative history
discussed
in Monroe,
or in the language
actually used by Congress, to suggest that the
generic word 'person' in ~ 1983 was intended
to have a bifurcated application to municipal
corporations depending on the nature of the
relief sought against them.
At the same time,
of cases brought under
named

however,

the court decided a series

1983 in which local school boards were

§

for

defendants

injunctive

relief.

lO/

included

as

Moreover,

the Court handed down at least two decisions involving

plaintiffs who sought money damages from a school board. ll/

In

none of those decisions, most of which concerned volatile school
desegregation
Pape

granted

boards.

issues,

did

immunity

the Court consider whether Monroe v.

from

§

1983

actions

to

those

school

The Court's failure to apply Monroe to the school board

cases was unexplained.

That failure may have been the result of

the strong feelings surrounding the school desegregation effort,
perhaps

combined

desegregation

-9/ 412

u.s.

with

suits

on

a
a

judicial

unwillingness

"technical"

ground.

to

cut

But

by

off
that

507 ( 1973).

\

10/ E.g. Green v. County School Board, 391 u.s. 430 (1968),
Milliken v. Bradley.
For a full listing of such cases see
Mo n e 11 , supra, 4 3 6 U. S • a t 6 6 3, n • 5 •
ll/ Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 414 u.s.
(1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393
503, (1969).
-

6 -

632

u.s.

desegregation

suits

on

a

"technical"

ground.

But

by

that

failure, the Court painted itself into a corner.
There is no principled basis for distinguishing school
boards from municipalities under
government
Sherman

and

creatures of

Amendment

by

the

§

1983.

Both are local units of

the State.

The

rejection

of

the

Forty-Second Congress could hardly be

interpreted as a rejection of liability for some units of local
government

but

a

simultaneous

units of local government.

approval

of

suits

against

other

Sooner or later, the tension between

Monroe and the school board cases had to be resolved.
The
Monell.

resolution

in

1978,

when

the Court decided

The case involved a class action by female employees of

the City of New York,
take an

came

who challenged the requirement that they

unpaid leave of absence during the last four months of

pregnancy.

The suit,

brought under

§

1983, demanded injunctive

relief along with backpay for prior periods of forced leave.

The

Supreme Court used the occasion to reexamine municipal liability
under

§

1983, focussing largely on the legislative history of the

Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Justice Brennan approached the legislative history from
an

oblique

ang 1 e.

Rather

Justice Br e:nnan concentrated

than

focus

on what

on

what

Congress

did,

certain congressman said.

Several congressman opposed the Sherman Amendment on the ground
th~t

Congress could not impose liability on local governments for

failing to control mob violence when Congress lacked the power to
impose on local governments, as creatures of the State, the

- 7 -

obligation to keep the peace. 12 /
Sherman

Amendment,

Congress's

according

refusal

to

to

impose

Thus,

Justice

the opposition to the
Brennan,

liability

for

a

was

based

on

municipality's

failure to perform acts that Congress could not directly require
it to perfonn.
Justice

Brennan

reasoned

that

the

predecessor

of

~

1983, unlike the Sherman Amendment, did not impose liability for

a local government's failure to act; rather, the provision made a
"person"

liable

rights.
duties

for

affirmative

actions denying

Because the predecessor of
on

a

articulated

"person,"

Justice

for opposing

Amendment

did

predecessor to

not

§

apply

to

1983 imposed no affirmative

Brennan

municipal

constitutional

wrote,

the

liability under

municipal

grounds

the Sherman

liability

under

the

19 83.

§

Justice Brennan's analysis of

the legislative his tory

is accurate in some respects, but it is largely irrelevant to the
municipal

immunity question.

13 /

The Sherman Amendment episode

is significant not for the theories stated by a few congressman,
but

for

the

municipal

of

liability

predecessor
challenges

use

to
the

§

the
in

terms
the

final

Nothing

1986.

analysis

"person or persons"

that

1 2 ( See Monell, supra, 436

if

u.s.

legislation,

to

which

in Justice Brennan's
"person

or

persons"

exclude
was

the

opinion
does

not

at 673-683.

13 1
One
symptom
of
the
weakness
of
Monell's
statutory
interpretation is its length.
A persuasive read1ng of a statute
and 1 egi slat ive history rarely requires twenty-five pages and
forty-four footnotes, but Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
resorted to such extreme length to try to explain away Monroe.
The effort, though resourceful, was unavailing.

- 8 -

include

local

governments

inc 1 ud e t h em i n

§

1986,

§

the

term

"person"

cannot

19 ~ 3 •
only

Nevertheless,
Monell.

in

And

all

of

two

Justices

the Justices who

dissented

joined

in

the Court's

opinion had at some point in the past joined a Court opinion that
held municipalities immune under S 1983.
remarkable

mass

changing

of

minds

What accounts for this

especially

when

Justice

Brennan's view of the legislative history was so unconvincing?
As

suggested

before,

the most

likely

explanation

for

the Court's switch concentrates on the conflict between Monroe v.
Pape

and

Education

the

Court's

15 /

to

hear

Justice Brennan's
under

§

1983

willingness
§

opinion

1983
cites

since

cases

Brown

against

twenty-three

v.

Board

school

boards.

'

decisions

in which school boards were defendants.

of

brought

16 1

The

Court even attempted to find support for municipal liability fro1n
the fact that Congress had not, as a result of those decisions,
"striplped]

the

federal

courts

of

jurisdiction

over

school

most

fully

boards," and from other congressional actions. 17/
The

Court's

dilemma,

however,

was

articulated in the concurring opinion of Justice Powell 18 1:
This line of cases -- Monroe to Kenosha -- is
difficult to reconcile on a principled basis

14 /

Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented.

15/ 347

u.s.

483 (1954).

16/ 436

u.s.

at 6 63, n.5.

17/ Id. at 696-699.
18/ Id • at 711 (Powe 11, J. , concurring).

- 9 -

with a parallel series of cases in which the
Court has assumed sub silentio that some local
government entities- could be sued under §
1983.
If now, after full consideration of the
question, we continued to adhere to Monroe,
grave doubt would be cast upon the Court's
exercise of ~ 1983 jurisdiction over school
boards.
See ante, at 663 n. 5
Since "the
principle of blanket immunity established in
Monroe cannot be cabined short of school
boards,"
ante,
at
696,
the
conflict
is
squarely presented.
Justice
outright reversal
cases

as

claims.

Powell
of

primarily

noted

that

the

Court

Monroe by distinguishing
injunctive,

and

not

could

the school board

involviny

monetary

He suggested that this approach would roughly follow the

treatment by Ex Parte Young, 19 / 209
Amendment

issues,

governments.

by

allowing

u.s.

123 (1908), of Eleventh

injunctive

But that approach,

suits

against

local

Justice Powe 11 reasoned,

would

only resurrect the "bifurcated application" of
Court had

rejected in City of Kenosha v.

Bruno.

§

1983 that the
Justice Powell

1983 would only

also suggested

that municipal

immunity under

result

in

recognition of

a direct

action

against local governments under the theory of

Six

avoid

the

Unknown

Named

circumstances,

Fed.

Narcotics

to recognize municipal liability under

19/ 209

u.s.

123 (1908).

20/ 403

u.s.

388 (1971).
- 10 -

constitutional

Agents.

Justice Powell concluded,
§

§

cause of
Bivens v.
In

these

"the better course" was

1983.

I II.

The choice
difficult one.
doubt"

on

To

facing

the

Supreme Court

in

Monell

was

a

follow Monroe would indeed have "cast lJrave

the Court's

jurisdiction in

its school desegregation

cases, a course that must have been both alanning and unappealing
to

many

would

Justices.

have

been

The

political

substantial.

consequences

As

a

of

political

such

an

act

institution,

the

Court could ill afford to confess that its most controversial and
prominent line of decisions over the preceding twenty-five years
-- insisting on desegregated education -- had occurred in cases
over which the Court had
reduction

of

public

improperly taken jurisdiction.

confidence

in

the

Court,

and

in

21 /

Tt1e

public

perceptions of the legitimacy ot the Court's actions, could have
been substantial.
But the course chosen by the Court, though possibly the
"better course" as Justice Powell put it, carried real costs of
its

own.

In

essence,

the

Court proclaimed

an

intellectually insupportable interpretation of

a

irrational

and

major statute.

The Court simply rewrote the Civil Rights Act of 1871, reversing
the intent of the Forty-Second Congress.

There can be no dispute

that the Court exceeded its constitutional role.
Some justification for the Monell decision may be drawn
from

the fact

that it was,

and

remains,

subject to reversal

by

21 1 'l'here is little question that a school desegregation suit
could be brought directly under "federal question" juri sd ict ion
by asserting a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The
plaintiffs in the school board cases had not, however, followed
that course for the most part, but had brought ~ 1983 suits.
- 11 -

Congress.

And

the Court can perhaps take some solace from the

fact that there has been, as yet, no legislative restoration of
municipal immunity under
Nevertheless,
Court

did

Justice

not

adopt

Powell's

injunctive

~

19 83.

it

is

difficult

the

middle

opinion

to

actions

only,

to

course
relax

following

understand

considered
municipal

the

example

Amendment jurisprudence of Ex Parte Young.
would

not

have

recognized

the true

why

briefly
immunity
in

the
in
for

Eleventh

Such a course still

intent of

the

Forty-Second

Congress,

since

immunity.

But the usurpation of legislative powers achieved by

such

a

course

the

surely

1371

Act

would

presumed

have

been

complete

less

severe

municipal

than

that

accomplished by the eventual decision in Monell.
Moreover,

the

legislative

history

of

the

Sherman

Amendment more nearly supports such a "bifurcated" outcome than
it does
Second
damages

the decision
Congress
on

Amendment.

refused

local
Thus,

actually
to

approve

governments
Congress

reached

as

plainly

the

imposition

proposed
intended

not be liable for such money damages.

The

in Monell.

by
that

the

Forty-

of

Qoney
Sherman

muncipalities

The legislative history

might, however, be construed to be silent on the question whether
equitable relief was to be avail able against local governments.
That silence might be stretched to recognize equitable actions
\

against muncipalities, since by 1871 the federal courts had

- 12 -

established

their power

to

enforce the Contract Clause against

municipalities. 22 /
Although this

over~owering,

may not be
Brennan's

inter~retation

version

in

of the legislative history

it is at least as plausible as Justice

Monell,

and

has

the

additional

virtue of

preserving at least some of the original congressional intent to
exempt

muncipalities

from

liability.

Those

few

pre-Monel!

decisions in which plaintiffs sought money damages against school
boards

might

majority

of

have

been

school

board

called

into

question,

cases

under

1983

§

but

would

the

vast

have

been

undisturbed.

'··

IV.

But
Monell.
the

the

Instead,

late

Court

reflecting

twentieth

intent of

did

century,

Congress.

not

adopt

the civil
it

middle

course

in

rights sensibilities of

boldly

That decision,

a

overrode

it may

distorted the Supreme Court's perspective on

the

apparent

be argued,
1983.

§

briefly

For a short

time, Monell seems to have cast the Court adrift from traditional
methods of judicial decision-making in

§

1983 cases.

For example, in Owen v. City of Independence, the Court
denied to local governments the "good-faith"
actions
\

available

incontestable

to

evidence

individuals.
that

The

immunity to

Owen

municipalities

in

See Monell, supra,
436 u.s.
at 673,
Committees v. Aspinwald. 24 How. 376 (1861).
- 13 -

1982

Court

confronted

the

nineteenth

century enjoyed some fonn of immunity fro10 tort actions.

2 L./

~

citing

In view

Board

of

of

that

evidence,

and

those pre-existing
intended
legal

to

acknowledging

fact

that Congress did

not abrogate

immunities Congress must be presumed to have

accord

defenses

the

to

those governments

they

1983 actions

the

Instead

of

truth in interpreting§ 1983,

the

already

this historical

in §

enjoyed.

Court wondered which outcome, based on current economic theory,
would

best

"serve

constitutional
decision

as

a

as

violations."
one

that

24 /

The

"properly

injuries,

constitutional

deterrent

25/

not

against

Court

then

allocates
as

the

the

future

trumpeted
the

decision

its

costs"

of

mandated

by

Congress.
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448

u.s.

1 (1980), marked the high-

water point of the Court's erratic interpretation of
that decision,
"and laws"

in

the Court faced
§

under color of

§

1983.

In

the question whether the phrase

1983 creates a cause of action for deprivations
state

law of

any

federal

statutory right.

The

critical point in Thiboutot was that the Civil Rights Act of 1871
did not include the phrase "and laws" in the section that became
42

u.s.c.

§

1983.

Rather, the original version provided a cause

of action for deprivation under color of state law only of rights

23 1
There is an Alice-in-~Jonderland suality to the exchange in
Owen, since the entire case is based on a false premise: that
local governments could be liable to ~ 1983 suits.
Since the
Forty-Second Congress did not intend to create such liability,
discussions
of
partial
municipal
immunity
are
necessarily
somewhat speculative and fanciful.

24 / See Owen v. City of Independence, supra, 445

25 / Id., at 657.
- 14 -

u.s.

at 651.

"arising

under

Co~stitution."

the

The

words

"and

laws"

were

inserted when the federal statutes were codified in 1874.
In
in

an opinion virtually devoid of analysis,

Thiboutot

action

ruled

under

that
for

1983

§

the

codification

the

loss of

created

federal

a

the Court
cause

of

statutory rights,

even though for no such causes of action had been recognized the
preceding

10 4 years.

principle

that

a

In so ruling,

codification

does

the Court ignored both the
not

alter

the

substantive

statutes, and the express statements in Congress in 1874 that the
codification did not change existing law. 2 6/
There have been
the

Supreme

Court

that

indications in the past two Terms of
the

disorienting

impact

evident in Owen and Thiboutot -- is wearing off.

of

Monell

The Court has

taken substantial steps to cut back the dramatic expansion of S
1983 achieved by

Maine v. Thiboutot. Within a year of Thiboutot,

the Court reached out in Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l
27 /

Sea Clammers,

to restrict Thiboutot even though the parties

had not even discussed

§

1983.

Justice Powell, writing for the

Court in Sea Clammers, emphasized that a
maintained
remedial

to

vindicate
in

devices

comprehensive."

28 1

fedE:ral

a

1983 action may not be

§

statutory

particular

rights
are

act

"(w]hen

the

sufficiently

Because the federal statutes at issue in

Sea Clammers had ample remedial provisions, the Court found that

26/ Maine v.
dissenting).

'l'h ibou tot,

27/ 4 53

(1981).

28 /

u.s.

l

supra,

448

Id. at 20.
- 15 -

U.S.

at

17

(Powe 11,

J. ,

a

§

1983 action was foreclosed.

by which courts can prevent

This analysis provides a means

1983 from supplanting great chunks

§

of the United States Cod e.
Still,

when legal historians review the Court's heady

adventures with

§

1983 over the past few years,

conclude that Monell was a critical

they may well

turning point.

In Monell,

the Court turned its back on congressional intent as a guide to
applying

§

of

proper

the

rights.

1983, preferring rather to consult its own perceptions
ways

to

provide

redress

for

constitutional

That decision, however well-intentioned, must be seen as

gravely flawed and its unsettling effect on the jurisprudence of
§

1983

perhaps,

must

I:Je

recognized.

through decisions

That

effect

can

like Sea Clammers,

be

contained,

which make clear

tnat ~ 1983 is not some sort of super-statute, providing an allpur.POse

federal

remedy

for

all

grievances

against

government

action.
But,
expected

to

irnrnmunity.

realistic ally,

confess

its

error

the
in

Supr erne
Monell

and

Court

cannot

be

restore municipal

To correct that mistake, local governments must look

to Congress.
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To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From: Sam Estreicher

DAte: March 5, 1978

Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services--Reply
to WHR Missive Dated March 6, 1978
In the event you get into a debate with WHR over
Monell, you might find useful the following observations.
1. The technique of avoiding overruling by
refashioning the rationale of a previous decision is not
foreign to WHR.

WHR's memo refers to the per curiam in

United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216 (1973), as
"dicta" not entitled to substantial protection from the
doctrine of stare decisis.

The Court's language and the

headnote in Indrelunas, however, make clear that the Court
was of the view that "whatever may be the appropriate
sanctions available in a particular case for capricious
conduct on the part of a litigant, we do not believe that
a case-by-case tailoring of the "separate document"
provision of Rule 58 is one of them.

That provision is,

as Professor Moore states, a 'mechanical change' that must
be mechanically applied in order to avoid new
uncertainties as to the date on which a judgment is
entered."

Id., at 221-222.

Bob tells me that WHR's

position in Bankers Trust v. Mallis

minimizes the

"mechanical" nature of the Rule 58 provision, in favor of
a case-by-case approach.
Another example is WHR's opinion in Paul v.
Davis, 424

u.s

693 (1976).

Paul altered substantially the

2.

rationale of Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
(1971).

u.s.

433

The headnote from Constantineau states: "The

label or characterization given an individual by
'posting.' though a mark of serious illness to some, is to
others such a stigma or badge of disgrace that procedural
due process requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard." That headnote is faithful to Justice Douglas'
process of reasoning. WHR's opinion in Paul recasts the
rationale of Constantineau to require that there be some
"alteration of legal status which, combined with the
injury resulting from the defamation, justified the
invocation of procedural safeguards."
708-709.

424 U.S., at

WHR explained that he was merely interpreting

the language in Constantineau, but it is hard to read
Douglas' opinion other than as resting on "stigma" alone.
WHR is quite right, as Professor Telford Taylor
told us at Columbia, that much of the language in Marbury
v. Madison was unnecessary. But there have been numerous
decisions since then in which the rationale of Marbury was
absolutely essential to justify what the Court was doing.
In this case, City of Kenosha v. Bruno is the one decision
which can be explained only in terms of Monroe's exclusion
of municipalities from the reach of

§

1983. And the issue

was neither briefed nor argued in that case.
WHR says that stare decisis should not depend on
whether counsel in briefs and oral argument fully explored
the issue.

It is surely a factor that the Court is

3.

entitled to consider, and it is a factor that WHR
considers relevant in dismissing the precedential value of
"an unargued

~curiam

.••• " (WHR Memorandum, p.6).

2. On the school-board cases, WHR states that the
most that can be said is that the school-board defendants
"did not raise a possible defense which was available to
them, and the Court therefore did not pass upon or discuss
such a defense."

But as City of Kenosha v. Bruno points

ll

~

(}

,,

~

out, the inclusion of a municipality as a defendant in a

,

...

amount-in-controversy requirement, is a jurisdictional

a....

question that the Court must raise on its own motion.

I~of

I

~4o'K~-e~ s1l,.~

§1983 action, absent satisfaction of the

----

.

~

Kenosha itself is not terribly

Ll

tilt~ ~

~

._

different~

from the school-board cases because the Attorney General
of Wisconsin intervened as a party-defendant. 412

,

---~ 1 " '
~~

u.s., at q'- ~
~

~

513-514.
Also with respect to City of Kenosha, WHR offers
no rebuttal to our point that whatever the Court does in
this case, it will have to disturb the rationale of City
of Kenosha to some extent.

»-L
3. I do not agree that if the Court holds that a ~
~v..

municipal corporation is a "person," then "it is
doctrinally very difficult to say they [it is] not liable
on a respondeat superior because Congress rejected the
Sherman Amendment" (WHR Memorandum, p. 12).

As we state ~

in our memorandum, Congress was concerned with imposing
liability on "wrongdoers."

----------~-~-------------

11{~3~

~., • .. t_ d. •-v

Absent authorization or the

~

~
~

-Wv,'YJ. ~~'

4.

kind of recklessness from which one may infer
authorization, see Rizzo v. Goode, the City of Chicago
could not be held at fault for the tortious excess of its
employees in Monroe. What troubled the Republican
~c~·· J-~

Congressmen about the Sherman Amendment was that it
imposed liability on a municipality for private

violence !~

for which the municipality was simply not responsible.
Whatever the state of the common law of respondeat

'J&il6~

~

~

superior in 1871, there is no difficult in holding that ' '~
even though a municipality is a "person,• Congress did

no~~

intend respondeat-superior liability. This type of
approach is not terribly different from

WHR's opinion in

Edelman v. Jordan, where the Court held that even though a
state official sued in his official capacity is a
"person," the Eleventh Amendment prevents a retroactive
award.
By the way, the concept of liability for
conspiratorial violence was not entirely scrapped by the
42d Congress. Section 1986 of Title 42, which emerged in
response to the Sherman Amendment's rejection, imposes
liability on "[e]very person who, having knowledge that
any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in
section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and
having power to prevent or aid in preventing the
commission of the same, neglects or refuses to do so, if
such wrongful act be committed .••. "Unlike the Sherman
Amendment, this measure requires a showing of knowledge of

5.

the wrong and power to prevent its commission.
4. As to practical considerations, I do not
understand WHR's point that if Monroe's reading of the
legislative history is rejected, "those who join in that
holding but wish to incorporate a good faith defense for
municipal corporation have given up whatever bargaining
chips they have when the availability of the defense
actually comes before us in an argued case."

There will

be no need for, and no occasion to "cash in," "bargaining
chips" if the Court votes, as WHR suggests, to retain
Monroe's reading.

Moreover, I think that Justice Brennan

would be willing to hint strongly that municipalities
cannot be held liable for violations of a constitutional
right which was not clearly defined at the time of the
deprivation.

As JPS pointed out in his dissent, BRW's

v

opinion in Procunier v. Navarette finds such a qualified
immunity in the case of a jailer without even attempting
an exploration of _protection accorded to such an offical
at common law. At the very least, this issue can be raised
in a paragraph directing the lower court to consider it on
remand.

When the issue comes back up here, there should

be five votes to find such a qualified immunity.
The other practical consideration identified by
WHR is that the Court will be removing an incentive to
curb lawless conduct by the "head honcho."

This is a

little difficult to understand because WHR states that
"[i]n a case like the present one, where the municipal

6.

corporation would probably not be liable under Monroe,
and the officials sued have a good faith-reasonable
immunity defense under Wood v. Strickland (until that is
overruled) , there simply will be no judgment against
anyone upon which plaintiffs may collect" (WHR Memorandum,
pp. 13-14).

That is precisely the problem.

of authorized conduct, a core concern of

§

In the case
1983, it is

hard to find a defendant who can be held liable in damages.

S.E.
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 76-1914 - Monell v. Department of Social Services

This memorandum replies to Lewis' circulation of

February 23rd; the pressures of preparation for oral argument

and Conference have prevented me from circulating it sooner.

As to the sense of what the Congress meant by the word "person"

when it enacted § 1983 HH in 1971, I think issue is pretty

well joined between Bill Brennan and me.

I would quite frankly

concede that if at the time of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,

the same thorough canvass of the l e gislative history had been

made as we have done this Term, the Court should have concluded

that the word "person" in 1983 did not exclude municipal

- 2 -

corporations.

But it seems to me that the exchange of memoranda

has likewise shown that this is by no means an open and shut

question, and that the balance is about sixty-forty -- a
/
balance which I do not regard as meeting the requirement for

overruling an issue of statutory construction stated by John

Harlan in his concurring opinion in Monroe, supra, that "it

appear beyond doubt frpm the legislative history ofXkX the

statute" that previous Courts "misapprehended the meaning

of the controlling provision

II

365

u.s.

167, 192.

But this simply brings us to the meaning and importance

of stare decisis in statutory cases, and that is where I take

issue with much of Lewis' memorandum.

Some parts of his memorandum suggest that because the

•arties may not have argued the "person" defni tional issue

ell Monroe, the doctrine of stare decisis is less applicable

) Monroe than it would be to a case where counsel in £ briefs

\

- 3 -

and oral argument had fully explored the issue.

Since only

Bill Brennan and Potter were on the Court at the time of Monroe,

I suppose it is idle for the rest of us to speculate as to

what went on in Conference at that case; but I had never

understood the principle of stare decisis to depend on how

..

well counsel presented to the Court the issue which it undertook

a nd did decide.

There surely is no question but what Bill Douglas'

opinion for the Court in Monroe does decide the question that

•

a municipal·corporation is not a "person" for purposes of

§

1983.

Indeed, one need only to look at the last headnote

to the case, on page 168, to find the holding that "the city

of Chicago is not liable under § 1979 [predecessor to § 1983)

because Congress -did not intend to bring municipal corporations ,·

within the ambit of that section."

The headnote indicates that

- 4 five pages of the Court's opinion NNMXN were devoted to that

point.

There is a certain parallel here between stare decisis

and the doctrine of immunity which we discussed at Conference

on Friday.

One does not logically reach the question of a

defendant's immunity until one assumes or decides that the

plaintiff has stated or proved a claim for relief.

Likewise,

one does not reach theq1estion of whether a doctrine should be

retained because of the principle of stare decisis

until

one concludes that the case was wrongly decided in the first

place.

There is no need of a doctrine of stare decisis

to preserve the
presently

si~ting

h~ldings

or the reasoning of opinions which a

Court concludes were correct.

In this

connection, I recall ' sitting around the Conference table
two years ago where several of us wished to overturn another

- 5 -

part of the decision in Monroe v. Pape deciding that there was

no requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under

§

1983.

The headnote to the case lists this, too, as one of

fue holdings, but indicates that only one page was devoted to

its discussion; reference to that page (365 U.S., at 183)

shows that one paragraph of very conclusionary analysis was

devoted to the point.

~

Nonetheless, in spite of what I thought

the time a majority felt were serious practical drrficulties

WLth the rule, a majority nonetheless refused to overturn it

because of stare decisis.

Lewis' memorandum says that we should not "overrule"

Monroe but justify its result for other reasons.

I think

this represents only a semantical difference from Bill Brennan's

approach.

Here we are not being asked to disavow dicta, in

the sense that in my memorandum in Bankers Trust v. Mallis

- 6 -

I have urged the Court to disregard dicta in United States v.

Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216

(1973}.

I think dicta, particularly

in an unargued per curiam, have always stood on a different

footing with respect to stare decisis than the process of

reasoning necessary to reach the Court's result.

To say that

by now holding that a municipal corporation is a "person"
§

within the meaning ofL1983 would not be to overrule that

part of Monroe v. Pape because the same result could be

justified ona doctrine that § 1983 does not permit imposition

of respondeat superior

liability would be somewhat arialogous

to deciding that the doctrine of judicial review enunciated

in Marbury v. Madison is no longer the law, but saying at the

same time that we were not overruling Marbury becaus

the rule

/

- 7 to show cause could have been discharged on a different ground.

I also _disagree with Lewis' statement in his memorandum

that the cases on this subject are in confusion, and that this

case presents an opportunity to clarify the law.

In my opinion,

the cases are in no confusion whatsoever as to whether a

municipal corporation is a ''person" for purposes of § 1983.

On every one of the four occasions which this Court has addressed

that issue, it has concluded that it was not:

Monroe v. Pape,

Moor v. County of Alameda, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, and
Mt.
MN»K±/Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, we have said

that it was not.

The cases which Lewis'refers to as creating

confusion, and which Bill Brennan and I both discussed at

length in our memoranda, are the school board cases.

But

-

8 -

none of the results in these cases would have come out

differently had the Court in them expressly addressed the

question of whether a municipal corporation is a "person"

under § 1983; and since the Court did not address that issue

in any of the school board cases referred to in the memoranda,

there is nothing in any of them that would have to be overruled.

Thus, to my mind, there simply is no "confusion" in the cases;

the most that can be said is that in some cases involving school

board defendants, those defendants did not raise a possible

defense which was available to them, and the Court therefore

did not pass upon or discuss such a defense.

This is surely

not tantamount to a holding that if the factual elements

necessary to establish the defense were made out, it nonetheless

- 9 -

did not exist as a matter of law.

Lewis also expresses greater satisfaction with the

practical consequences that would result from adoption of

his position than would from retaining the reasoning of

Monroe.

While there probably is a good deal to be said

for his position if the Court in this case were willing to

~ate

that municipal corporations had the same good faith-

reasonable defense to liability as was established for municipal
[sic]
officials in Wood v. Sxx:i:Idd: Stricland,L42.0 U.S. 308 (1975).

To me, that is a rather large "if".

Byron, who wrote Wood

and who recently authored Procunier v. Navarette for the Court,

is unwilling to commit himself in this case to such a defense,
has
and HxLexpressly joined in circulating memoranda in that unwilling-

ness by Bill and John, I foresee some doubt as to whether

there would be five votes to impose it.

And of course,

once the holding of Monroe as to "person" is overruled,

- 10 -

those who join in that holding but wish to incorporate a

good faith defense for · municipal corporations have given up

whatever bargaining chips they have when the availability

of the defense actually comes before us in an argued case.

Lewis suggests that Monroe and Moor could be justified

as to result by the "42d Congress' rejection of vicarious

liability as an operative principle of the 1871 Civil

Act".

LFP memo, page 7.

Righ~s

I think Bill's memorandum, too,

although I am not certain, makes the statement that municipal

corporations still could not be held on a theory of respondeat

superior for acts of low level officials under § 1983.

As I

understand it, the justification for this rejection of

respondeat superior liability is that although the 42d Congress/

-

11 -

rejection of the Sherman Amendment is not an adequate basis

for excluding municipal corporations from the definition of

"person" under the Act, it is an adequate basis for saying

fuey may not be held on a respondeat superior theory for

actions of lower-level employees.

But if Bill's version

of the legislative history, which as I have stated above

is I think a somewhat more careful and accurate version

I
jl

than that contained in Monroe, is correct, it affords no

basis for saying that although cities are "persons" within

fue Act they are not liable on a respondeat superior basis for

actions of their numerous employees.

The Sherman Amendment

was not an effort to impose vicarious liability on cities

and counties for acts of their employees; it was a far more

drastic measure, intended to impose liability on "persons"

I
I

- 12 -

as defined in § 1983 for mere failure to prevent private

vandals from conuni tting crimes against· persons or property

within the municipal jurisdiction.

Just as Congress could

quite consistently have rejected it and still intend that

municipal corporations be "persons" within § 1983, Congress

could have rejected the amendment and still intended that

"persons", including municipal corporations if they are to

~

hcluded within that definition, are liable for affirmative

acts of their employees under a respondeat superior theory.

In short, I think that once municipal corporations are

included within the definition of "person" in § 1983, it is

doctrinally very difficult to say that they are not liable

on a respondeat superior because Congress rejected the

Sherman Amendment.

- 13 -

I guess we have all been judges long enough to know

that practical considerations may influence us to a greater

or lesser extent, and that if one feels the practical results

of a prior statutory holding are outrageous, he will find

some reason to vote to overrule it notwithstanding stare decisis.

But it seems to me this is an area where the doctrine of

stare decisis itself is an important practical argument

against taking the position that Lewis does.

In the first

place, it is not, as I believe he suggests at one point in his

memorandum, a question of "six of one, half a dozen of the

other" so far as practical results are concerned.

In a case

like the present one, where the municipal corporation would

probably not be liable under Monroe, and the officials sued

have a good faith-reasonable immunity ·defense under Wood

-----

v. Strickland {until that is overruled), there simply will be

- 14 no judgment against anyone upon which plaintiffs may collect.

Additionally, where one confronts the quite different situation

of police officers breaking down doors at night, cities and

counties retain a good deal more authority to control the

conduct of their employees under Monroe than they would if

Monroe were overruled.

As matters now stand, cities and

counties may themselves provide for indemnity in cases of

good faith and reasonable conduct on the part of individuals

against whom judgments are rendered, or they may seek state

laws to that effect.

This requirement in order to qualify

IDr indemnity constitutes some pressure on individual officials

to comply with the Constitution and the laws.

But if

Monroe is to be overruled on the definition of "person",

/

- 15 -

and a doctrinally difficult "no respondeat superior liability"

substituted in its place, serious inequities will result.

The middle level municipal official will find himself at the

close of all the evidence being the sole defendant in many

cases, since the municipal corporation will have been dismissed

on the "no respondeat superior" theory.

The top dogs in the

municipal hierarchy, however: for example, the school board

members in this case, because of their very broad discretionary

authority over all of the municipal corporation's affairs,

and because of the fact that the corporation can act only

through them, will through their acts invariably subject the

rorporation in itself to liability if the proposed overruling

is to have any practical consequence.

The result will be

that in many cases a low level municipal employee has a judgment

- 16 -

against him without a counterpart judgment against his city

employer, while the city council men against whom judgment

is rendered will all but invariably have a counterpart judgment

rendered against the city itself.

None of us who have

practiced need tobe told that the plaintiff in such a case

will first pursue the municipal corporation, rather than the

ndividual (however prosperous he may be).

Thus the middle

level employee will frequently have to respond to a judgment

by himself, subject only to such insurance protection or

indemnity protection as the city or state has chosen to give

him, while the head honcho will as a practical matter never

have to respond because every time a judgment may be rendered

against him it may also be rendered against the city.

In conclusion, I think Lewis' memorandum suggesting

that we would not be violating the policy of stare decisis

- 17 -

nor actually overruling the holding of Monroe . is wrong.

I

say this with genuine deference and respect, since I know

that he has devoted as much if not more time and thought to

the matter than I have.

But I cannot believe that countless

arrangements by way of indemnity ordinances and statutes,

insurance policies and rates, and the like, have not been

made in reliance on headnote 4 of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,

168:
"The city of Chicago is not liable under
§ 1979, because Congress did not intend to
bring municipal corporations within the
ambit of that section."

And we have reaffirmed that statement of the law three times

in fue intervening sixteen years -- in Moor, City of Kenosha,

and Mt. Healthy.

Whatever conclusion the Court reaches in

this case, it must overrule Monroe on this point and

admit that other factors have prevailed over the doctrine

of stare decisis to reach the result which Lewis and Bill
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support.
Sincerely,

<!fltltrl qf tlrl' ~ttittb ~mug
'Jla:gJfinghm. Ill. <!f. 2!l,?'!~

..§uputttt

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 75-1914 -

I have read with g at in rest the very helpful memoranda
of our two Bills and the ensuing correspondence from others.
Although I indicated at our initial conference of November 4 that
I was inclined to affirm (with a question mark), that inclination
was dominated by the holdings in Monroe, Kenosha, and Moor to
which I felt, as is usually (although not always) the case for all of
us, some sense of stare decisis deference.
I think that the research that has been done as a result of
the present case has proved to be most worthwhile. I have concluded that although we should not so indulge every day, we must
now concede that the decision in Monroe is questionable. My
inclination is to overrule it, but perhaps I could be persuaded,
as are others, not to overrule it but to "confine it to its facts, 11
even though that device so often is a euphemism for overruling.
I prefer to refrain from deciding now any school board
immunity is sue although I would not at all object, as Bill Brennan
suggests in his letter of February 23, to a statement that that
question remains open for consideration.
In sum, I now vote to rever·s e.

fUfi-

lfp/ss

3 ~/78

March 6, 1978

75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services

At the special Conference today at which the Court
took a final vote on the above case, I raised the question
as to possible disqualification because of the ownership by
my wife and me of municipal bonds.
I reminded the Conference that in a case last Term
(I believe) written by Harry, involving a Contract Clause
question that could have affected the enforceability of
every municipal bond in the country, both Justice Stewart
and I recused ourselves.
as being quite different.

I view Monell and similar cases
The Code of Judicial Conduct

does not require disqualification for the ownership of
government securities unless the particular government
issuing the securities is a party to a
affect it.

~on

that may

I therefore have not disqualified myself in the

many cases that come to the Court involving suits by or
against municipalities, school boards and other agencies or
entities of government.

These involve a broad spectrum of

cases from damage and injunction claims to the validity of
tax measures, zoning ordinances, the applicability of
federal statutes

(~-~.,Equal

Employment Opportunities
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75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services

At the special Conference today at which the Court
took a final vote on the above case, I raised the question
as to possible disqualification because of the ownership by
my wife and me of municipal bonds.
I reminded the Conference that in a case last Term
(I believe) written by Harry, involving a Contract Clause
question that could have affected the enforceability of
every municipal bond in the country, both Justice Stewart
and I recused ourselves.

I view Monell and similar cases

as being quite different.

The Code of Judicial Conduct

does not require disqualification for the ownership of
government securities unless the particular government
issuing the securities is a party to a
affect it.

~on

that may

I therefore have not disqualified myself in the

many cases that come to the Court involving suits by or
against municipalities, school boards and other agencies or
entities of government.

These involve a broad spectrum of

cases from damage and injunction claims to the validity of
tax measures, zoning ordinances, the applicability of
federal statutes

(~.~.,

Equal Employment Opportunities

A

'

I

•

2.

Act, etc.) and the like.
It was the unanimous view of the Chief Justice and
other Justices that there was no occasion to consider
disqualification in cases of this kind, including Monell

ss
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CHAMBERS OF

.J USTI C E WILLIAM H . RE HNQUIST

March 6, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 76-1914

- Monell v. Department of Social Services

This memorandum replies to Lewis' circulation of February 23rd;
the pressures of preparation for oral argument and Conference have
prevented me from circulating it sooner.

As to the sense of what

the Congress meant by the word "person" when it enacted § 1983 in
1971, I think issue is pretty well joined between Bill Brennan
and me.

I would quite frankly concede that if at the time of

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S . 167, the same thorough canvass of the
legislative history had been made as we have done this Term, the
Court should have concluded that the word "person" in 1983 did
not exclude municipal corporations.

But it seems to me that the

exchange of memoranda has likewise shown that this is by no means
an open and shut question , and that the balance is about sixtyforty -- a balance which I do not regard as meeting the requirement
for overruling an issue of statutory construction, as stated by
I

- 2 John Harlan in his co ncurring opinion in Monroe, that "it appear
beyond doubt from the legislative history of the

statute"

that previous decisions "misapprehended the meanin9 of the controlling provision • • • " 365

u.s.

167, 192.

There is a certain parallel here between stare decisis and
the doctrine of immunity which we discussed at Conference on
Friday.

One does not logically reach the question of a defendant's

immunity until one assumes or decides that the plaintiff has
stated or proved a claim for relief.

Likewise, one does not reach

the question of whether a doctrine should be retained because of
the principle of stare decisis until one concludes that the case
was wrongly decided in the first place.

There is no need of a

doctrine of stare decisis to preserve the holdings or the reasoning
of opinions which a presently sitting Court concludes were correct.
But this simply brings us to the meaning and importance of
stare decisis in statutory cases, and that is where I take issue
with much of Lewis' memorandum.
Some parts of his memorandum suggest that because the parties
may not have argued the "person" definitional issue well in Monroe,
the doctrine of stare decisis is less applicable to Monroe than it
would be to a case where counsel in briefs and oral argument had
fully explored the issue.

Since only Bill Brennan and Potter were

-

3 -

on the court at the time of Monroe,

I suppose it is idle for the

rest of us to speculate as to what went on in Conference at that
case: but I had never understood the principle of stare decisis
to depend on how well counsel presented to the Court the issue
which it undertook and did decide.

Rather, the principle recog-

nizes that the law should be settled, even though wrongly, so that
persons and their counsel can govern their actions accordingly.
In this regard, while municipal counsel cannot predict this
Court's future views on the quality of advocacy in prior cases,
they can certainly tell the difference between dictum and holding.
There surely is no question but what Bill Douglas• opinion for the
court in Monroe clearly holds that a municipal corporation is not
a "person" for purposes of § 1983.

Indeed, one need only to look

at the last headnote to the case, on page 168, to find the holding
that "the city of Chicago is not liable under § 1979 [predecessor
to § 1983] because Congress did not intend to bring municipal
corporations within the ambit of that section."

The headnote

indicates that five pages of the Court's opinion were devoted to
that point.
In this connection, I recall sitting around the Conference
table two years ago where several of us wished to overturn another
part of the decision in Monroe v. Pape deciding that there was no

- 4 requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under § 1983.
The headnote to the case lists this, too, as one of the holdings,
but indicates that only one page was devoted to its discussion;
reference to that page

(365 U.S., at 183) shows that one paragraph

of very conclusionary analysis was devoted to the point.

Nonetheles~

in spite of what I thought at the time a majority felt were serious
practical difficulties with the rule, a majority nonetheless refused
to overturn it because of stare decisis.
Lewis' memorandum says that we should not "overrule" the
holding of Monroe, but justify its result for other reasons.

I

think this represents only a Eemantical difference from Bill
Brennan's approach.

Here we are not being asked to di$avow dicta,

in the sense that my memorandum in Bankers Trust v. Mallis urges
the Court to disregard dicta in United States v. Indrelunas, 411
U.S. 216 (1973). I think dicta, particularly in an unargued per
curiam, have always stood on a different footing with respect to
stare decisis than the process of reasoning necessary to reach
the Court's result.

To say that to now hold

that a municipal

corporation is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 would not
be to overrule that part of Monroe v. Pape because the same result
could be justified on a doctrine that § 1983 does not permit
imposition of respondeat superior liability would be somewhat

- 5 -

analogous to deciding that the doctrine of judicial review
enunciated in Marbury v. Madison is no longer the law, but saying
at the same time that we were not overruling Marbury because the
rule to show cause could have been discharged on a different ground.
Preserving only the result of Monroe does nothing to protect the
settled expectations of municipalities which have fashioned their
indemnity ordinances and their insurance coverage in reliance on
this Court's holding that they are not "persons" under § 1983.
I also disagree with Lewis' statement in his memorandum that
the cases on this subject are in confusion, and that this case
presents an opportunity to clarify the law.

In my opinion, the

cases are in no confusion whatsoever as to whether a municipal
corporation is a "person" for purposes of § 1983.

On every one

of the four occasions which this Court has addressed that issue
Monroe v. Pape, Moor v. County of Alameda, City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, and Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle -- we have
said that it was not.

The cases which Lewis refers to as creating

confusion, and which Bill Brennan

and I both discussed at length

in our memoranda, are the school board cases.

But none of the

results in these cases would have come out differently had the
Court in them expressly addressed the question of whether a municipal corporation is a "person" under §

. ,,

1983~

and since the Court

- 6 -

did not address that issue in any of the school board cases
referred to in the memoranda, there is nothing in any of them
that would have to be overruled.

Thus, to my mind, there simply

is no "confusion" in the cases; the most that can be said is that
in some cases involving school board defendants, those defendants
did not raise a possible defense which was available to -......the school
corporation, and the Court therefore did not pass upon or discuss
such a defense.

The Court's silence in this regard, unlike its

holding in Monroe, cannot have given rise to any false expectations.
Since 1954, every school board has known it is subject to the
equitable relief granted by our cases, but, since Monroe in 1961
no municipal corporation has had any reason to believe it could
be held liable in damages.
Lewis also expresses greater satisfaction with the practical
consequences that would result from adoption of his position than
would from retaining the reasoning of Monroe.

There may be a

good deal to be said for his position if the Court in this case
were willing to state that municipal corporations had the same
good faith-reasonable defense to liability as was established for
municipal officials in Wood v. Strickland,
(1975).

To me, that is a rather large "if".

420

u.s.

308

Byron, who wrote

Wood and who recently authored Procunier v. Navarette for the

·-

- 7 Court, is unwilling to commit himself in this case to such a
defense.

Since Bill and John have expressed that same view in

circulating memoranda, I foresee some doubt as to whether there
would be five votes to impose it.

And of course, once the holding

of Monroe as to "person" is overruled, those who join in that
holding but wish to incorporate a good faith defense for municipal
corporations have given up whatever bargaining chips they have
when the availability of the defense actually comes before us in
an argued case.
In the meantime, municipalities will have no clear guidance
from this court as they attempt to insure against the financial
consequences of their officers' good faith inability to predict
this Court's applications of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The

magnitude of the consequences of indecision in this area of the
law can be grasped by a brief glance at the number and variety of
cases being held for Monell, which was itself held for Mt. Healthy.
I guess we have all been judges long enough to know that
practical considerations may influence us to a greater or lesser
extent, and that if one feels the practical results of a prior
statutory holding are outrageous, he will find some reason to vote
to overrule it notwithstanding stare decisis.

But it seems to

me this is an area where the doctrine of stare decisis itsetf is
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an important practical argument against taking the position that
Lewis does.

In the first place, it is not, as he suggests at

page 3 of his memorandum, a question of "six of one, half a
dozen of the other," so far as practical results are concerned.
In a case like the present one, where the municipal corporation
would not be liable under Monroe, and the officials sued have a
good faith immunity defense under Wood v. Strickland (unless that
is overruled), there simply will be no judgment against anyone
upon which plaintiffs may collect.
Lewis suggests that the results in Monroe and Moor could be
justified

by the "42d Congress' rejection of vicariou

liability as an operative principle of the 1871 civil Rights Act".
LFP memo, page 7.

Bill's memorandum, too, at pp. 46-47, makes

the statement that municipal corporations still could not be held
on a theory of respondeat superior for acts of
under § 1983.

16~

leveL officials

As I understand it, the justification for this

rejection of respondeat superior liability is that although the
42d Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment is not an ade-

quate basis for excluding municipal corporations from the definiti•
of "person" under the Act, it is an adequate basis for saying they
may not be held on a respondeat superior theory for actions of
lower-level employees.

But if Bill's version of the legislative

- 9 history, which as I have stated above is in my opinion a somewhat
more careful and accurate version than that contained in Monroe,
is correct, it affords no basis for saying that, although_ cities
are "persons" within the Act, they are not liable on a respondeat
superior basis for actions of their numerous employees.

The

Sherman Amendment was not an effort to impose vicarious liability
on cities and counties for acts of their

employees~

it was a far

more drastic measure, intended to impose liability on "persons"'
as defined in § 1983 for mere failure to prevent private vandals
from committing crimes against persons or property within the
municipal jurisdiction.

Just as Congress could quite consistently

have rejected it and still intended that municipal corporations
be "persons" within § 1983, Congress could have rejected the
amendment and still intended that "persons", including municipal
corporations if they are to be included within that definition,
are liable for affirmative acts of their employees under a
respondeat superior theory.

In short, I think that once municipal

corporations are included within the definition of "person" in
§

1983, it is doctrinally very difficult to say that they are not

liable on a respondeat superior because Congress rejected the
Sherman Amendment.
When one considers the situation, quite different from that

f -

- 10 presented here but at the core of congressional concern in enacting
§

1983, of police officers breaking down doors at night, serious

inequities will result if Monroe is to be overruled on its definition
of "person" and a doctrinally difficult exclusion of respondeat
superior liability substituted in its place.

The middle level

municipal official will fi nd himself at the close of all the evidence being the sole defendant in many cases, since the municipal
corporation will have been dismissed
superior theory.

for lack of a respondeat

However, the top dogs in the municipal hierarchy,

(for example, the school board members in this case) because of
their very broad discretionary authority over all of the municipal
corporation's affairs, and because of the fact that the corporation
can act only through them, will through their acts invariably
subject the corporation

itself to liability if the proposed

overruling of Monroe is to have any practical consequence.

The

result will be that in many cases a low level municipal employee
has a judgment against him without a counterpart judgment against
his city employer, while the city councilmen against whom judgment
is rendered will all but invariably have a counterpart judgment
rendered against the city itself.

None of us who have practiced

need to be told that the plaintiff in such a case will first pursue
the municipal corporation, rather than the individual, however
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prosperous he may be.

Thus the middle level employee will

frequently have to respond to a judgment by himself, subject only
to such insurance protection_or indemnity protection as the city
or state has chosen to give him, while the head honcho will as a
practical matter never have to respond because, every time a
judgment may be rendered against him, it may also be rendered
against the city.
Finally, like Lewis, I would prefer to avoid the pressure
inherent in having to decide whether a Bivens remedy should be
implied against municipalities under the Fourteenth Amendment.
But that aversion is no reason for disregarding ordinary principles
of stare decisis and disrupting the settled expectations of
municipalities.

Congress is empowered to enforce the Fourteenth

Amendment through appropriate legislation, and it is presently
considering a bill to provide precisely the relief sought by these
plaintiffs.

Through hearings and investigations, Congress is

in a far better position than this Court to assess the practical
impact of the overruling of Monroe.
In conclusion, I think Lewis' memorandum suggesting that
we would not be violating the policy of stare decisis nor actually
overruling the holding of Monroe is wrong.

I say this with

genuine deference and respect, since I know that he has devoted

l
- 12 as much if not more time and thought to the matter than I have.
But I cannot believe that countless arrangements by way of
indemnity ordinances and statutes, insurance policies and rates,
and the like, have not been made in reliance on headnote 4 of
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168:
"The city of Chicago is not liable under
§ 1979, because Congress did not intend to

bring municipal corporations within the
ambit of that section."
And we have reaffirmed that statement of the law three times in
the intervening sixteen years -- in Moor, City of Kenosha, and
Mt. Healthy.

Whatever conclusion the Court reaches in this case,

it must overrule Monroe on this point and admit that other factors
have prevailed over the doctrine of stare decisis to reach the
result which Lewis and Bill support.
Sincerely,

I

.iu.prtm.t Clfourl of tqt ~b .ibtftg
Jl'as4i:nghtn. ~. <!J. 2ll,?ll'
CHAMI!IER8 0,-

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

March 13, 1978

Re:

75-1914 - Monell

v.

J

Dept. of Social Services

Dear Bill:
With a large investment in this case, I suspect
you won't mind changing your memo into a dissent.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

~tqrrtntt
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CHAMeERS 0,-

..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,.JR.

May 1, 1978

No. 75-1914 Monell
Dear Bill:
I now have had an opportunity to read your revised
draft, circulated April 21.
Thank you for the revisions directed to the points
raised in my letter of April 11. The new part III on stare
decisis is quite persuasive, and includes much .of what I
would have said on this question in a concurring opinion.
Moreover, if I could persuade you to accept my suggestions
below, I can join Part II. It contains a helpful - and I
think correct - explanation of why §1983 does not impose
liability on government entities for the unauthorized
misconduct of employees. In view of the fact that our
previous cases - with the exception of Kenosha v. Bruno primarily involved claims of respondeat superior liability
against municipalities and counties, I think it appropriate
for the Court to make clear thpt that theory does not
support a §1983 claim against entities of government.
In sum, I believe my previously expressed
concerns have now been reduced to the following narrowly
focused suggestions:
1. As you know, I do not view §1983 as
coextensive with the full power of Congress under the
Fourteenth Amendment. A number of scholars share this
view, including Gunther and Monaghan. I would therefore
appreciate your considering the following clarifications:
(a) Page 24, first sentence in full paragraph: I
would substiFute "broad" for "complete".
(b) Page 25, the long paragraph in footnote 45:
Rather than say that §1983 "represented an attempt broadly
to exercise the power conferred by §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment", I would simply say that §1983 "represented an

.

.
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attempt to include all officials and entities within the
constitutional reach of Congress". It is unnecessary to
suggest that other features of §1983 are dictated either by
the Constitution or by 1871 understandings of
constitutional limits.
(c) Page 26, middle of first full paragraph: I
would modify the description of §1 as the only civil remedy
"coextensive" with the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps you
could say that the section provided a "broad" or
"expansive" civil remedy to implement the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Pag~ 30, last sentence in footnote 55 & page
34, proposed footnote 60: I concur in Potter's view that

explicit reference to Estelle v. Gamble is undesirable in
this opinion. There may well be several tenable ways to
read our decision in Estelle, but I am unwilling to suggest
in this case that the "deliberate indifference" standard
has application in contexts other than that of prisons,
where the inmate is wholly dependent on prison officials
for the satisfaction of basic human needs. Your discussion
on pp. 29-30 makes quite clear that official policy can be
expressed as ·unwritten, informal "custom." I can accept
this where the custom is unmistakably sanctioned by the
municipality. And your language at the top of p.34 does
not foreclose a "deliberate indifference" theory in an
Eighth Amendment context, where a prison department's
established policy or "custom" with regard to prisoner
medical needs "itself inflicts [constitutional]
injury •••• " In short, I hope you will be willing to drop
the Estelle sentence in note 55 (or proposed note 60) as
unnecessary, reserving all mention of the reach of Estelle
until we have a specific case.
3. I also agree with Potter that footnote 57 on
page 32 (with respect to "fault") is unnecessary and
touches on an issue yet to be resolved. While the
footnote, as amended in your letter of April 25 to Potter,
does not commit the Court to any particular proposition of
law, it may be read as a "signal". In light of our
reservation of the negligence issue in Procunier v.
Navarette, I would remain silent here. We wi'll have to
confront the negligence-issue soon enough without inviting
it.

4.

Act of 1976:

Page 38, discussion of the Attorneys' Award
You describe this as allowing "prevailing

....
-3parties in §1993 suits to obtain attorneys' fees from the
losing party". I am sure you intend only to state, in
accord with the statutory language, that the Act merely
confers discretion on the Court to allow such fees. Also,
in light of Hutto v. Finney, I am somewhat troubled by your
characterization of the congressional i ntent on page 39. I
would simply say that Congress has "attempted to allow"
such awards, not that Congress has "attempted to limit
Monroe."
5. Your revision of Part IV as to immunity leaving the issue entirely open - is quite acceptable.
no longer will write on the immunity issue, although my
previously expressed view remains firm.

I

* * * *
I appreciate your efforts to accommodate the
various suggestions from other Brothers and me. This is,
however, a major new precedent and I am strongly disposed
to move cautiously. If you will make the changes suggested
above, I will be happy to join you - although I do not
foreclose the possibility of having minor editing
suggestions as I reread your comprehensive opinion.
Also, I still may write briefly to emphasize a
point or two where we may have shades of difference that do
not go to the essential merits of your opinion. This would
not prevent me from joining you.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

cc:

The Conference

Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum
-------------------------------------, 19 _______ _

LIL ~
k

-r

f,..:- t
A&fL..-!'"- ~ d'"- L.r;
I

~4-L- '7.Jf
lu J =« L-wt J~.:_ ') 2

cJ /-._.___

rt..,v/-

!£J

~ "-'~vC..

~~ ~ rt~>

fL Su....:«-

-r ~&2~

1.;_ ~.:; h .f......_f .._f,

~

'

lfp/ss

5/1/78

No. 75-1914 Monell
Dear Bill:
I now have had an opportunity to read your revised
draft, circulated April 21.
Thank you for the revisions directed to the points
raised in my letter of April 11.

The new part III on stare

decisis is quite persuasive, and includes much of what I
would have said on this question in a concurring opinion.
Moreover, if I could persuade you to accept my suggestions
below, I can join Part II.

It contains a helpful - and I

think correct - explanation of why §1983 does not impose
liability on government entities for the unauthorized
misconduct of employees.

In view of the fact that our

previous cases --with the exception of Kenosha v. Bruno-primarily involved claims of respondeat superior liability
against municipalities and counties, I think it appropriate
for the Court to make clear that that theory does not
support a §1983 claim against entities of government.
In sum, I believe my previously expressed
concerns have now been reduced to the following narrowly
focused suggestions:

2.

1.

As you know, I do not view §1983 as

coextensive with the full power of Congress under the
Fourteenth Amendment.

A number of scholars share this

view, including Gunther and Monaghan.

I would therefore

appreciate your considering the following clarifications:
(a)

Page 24, first sentence in full paragraph: I

would substitute "broad" for "complete".
(b)

Page 25, the long paragraph in footnote 45:

Rather than say that §1983 "represented an attempt broadly
to exercise the power conferred by §5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment", I would simply say that §1983 "represented an
attempt to include all officials and entities within the
constitutional reach of Congress".

It is unnecessary to

suggest that other features of §1983 are dictated either by
the Constitution or by 1871 understandings of
constitutional limits.
(c)

Page 26, middle of first full paragraph:

I

would modify the description of §1 as the only civil remedy
"coextensive" with the Fourteenth Amendment.

Perhaps you

could say that the section provided a "broad" or
"expansive" civil remedy to implement the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

3.

2.
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Page 30, last sentence in footnote
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I concur in Potter's view that explicit

reference to Estelle v. Gamble is undesirable in this
opinion.

There may well be several tenable ways to read

our decision in Estelle, but I am unwilling to suggest in
this case that the "deliberate indifference" standard has
application in contexts other than that of prisons, where
the inmate is wholly dependent on the prison officials for
satisfaction of basic human needs. Your discussion on pp.
29-30 makes quite clear that official policy can be
expressed as unwritten, informal "custom."

I can accept

this where the custom is unmistakably sanctioned by the
municipality.

And your language at the top of p.34 does

not foreclose a "deliberate indifference" theory in an
Eighth Amendment context, where a prison department's
established policy or "custom" with regard to prisoner
medical needs "itself inflicts [constitutional]
injury .... "

l4.c-

In short, I hope you will be willing to drop
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Qi~unnecessary,

reserving all mention of the reach

of Estelle until we have a specific case.
3. I also agree with Potter that footnote 57 on
page 32 (with respect to "fault") is unnecessary and

4.

touches on an issue yet to be resolved.

While the

footnote, as amended in your letter of April 25 to Potter,
does not commit the Court to any particular proposition of
1 aw, it may be read as a "signal".

In 1 ight of our

reservation of the negligence issue in Procunier v.
Navarette, I would remain silent here.

We will have to

confront the negligence issue soon enough without inviting
it.
4.

Page 38, discussion of the Attorneys' Award

Act of 1976:

You describe this as allowing "prevailing

parties in §1983 suits to obtain attorneys' fees from the
losing party".

I am sure you intend only to state, in

accord with the statutory language, that the Act merely
confers discretion on the Court to allow such fees. Also,
in light of Hutto v. Finney, I am somewhat troubled by your
characterization of the congressional intent on page 39.

I

would simply say that Congress has "attempted to allow"
such awards, not that Congress has "attempted to limit
Monroe."
5.

Your revision of Part IV as to immunity -

leaving the issue entirely open - is quite acceptable.
no longer will write on the immunity issue, although my
previously expressed view remains firm.

I

5.

* * * *
I appreciate your efforts to accommodate the
various suggestions from other Brothers and me.

This is,

however, a major new precedent and I am strongly disposed
to move cautiously.

If you will make the changes suggested

above, I will be happy to join you - although I do not
foreclose the possibility of having minor editing
suggestions as I reread your comprehensive opinion.
Also, I still may write briefly to emphesize a
point or two where we may have shades of difference that do
not go to the essential merits of your opinion.
not prevent me from joining you.
Sincerely,

This would
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Dea'i.· Bill:
I now have had an opportunity to read your revised
draft, circulated ApriJ 2J.
...
Thank you for the revisions directed to the points
raised in my letter of April 11. The new part III on stare
decisis is quite persuasive, and includes much of what_!___ _
would-have said on this question in a concurring opinion.
Moreover, if I could persuade you to accept my suggestions
below, I can join Part II. It contains a helpful - and I
think correct - explanation of why §1983 does not impose
liability on government entities for the unauthorized
misconduct of employees. In view of the fact that our
previous cases - with the exception of Kenosha v. Bruno primarily involved claims of !~ndeat-!~P~!!9! Jiability
against municipalities and counties, I think it appropriate
for the Court to make clear that that theory does not
support a §1983 claim against entities of government.
to·"'~'

In sum, I believe my previously expressed
concerns have now been reduced to the following narrowly
focused suggestions:
,;. 4~~

_,l!

1. · As you know, I do not view Sl983 as
coextensive with the full power of Congress under the
Fourteenth Amendment. A number of scholars share this
view, including Gunther and Monaghan. I would therefore
appreciate your considering the following clarifications:

r,;
·;~

-r
(a) Page 24, first sentence in full paragraph:
would substitute "broad" for "complete" • . ~.
.. •r;

(b) Page 25, the long paragraph in footnote 45:
Rather than say that §1983 "represented an attempt broadly
to exerclse the power conferred by ss of the Fourteenth
Amendment"_, I would simply say that §1983 "represented an

!

<;'

•

o',

attempt to include all officials and entities within the
constitutional reach of Congress". It is unnecessary to
suggest that other features of §1983 are dictated either by
the Constitution or by 1871 understandings of
constitutional l imits.
'
(c) Page 26, middle of first -full paragraph: · · I
would modify the description of §l as the only civil remedy
"coextensive" with the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps you
could say that the section provided a "broad" or
"expansive" civil remedy to implement the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment •
Page 30, J ast sentence in footnote 55 & page :.¥
footnote 60: I concur in Potter's view that 4
explicit reference to Estelle v. Gamble. is undesirable in
this oplnion. There may well be several tenable ways to
read our decision in Es!ell_e, but I am unwilJ i ng to suggest
in this case that the "deliberate indifference" standard
has application in cont~xts other than that of prisons,
where the inmat~ .,. is wholly dependent on prison officials
for the satisfaction of basic human needs. Your discussion
on pp. 29-30 makes quite clear ,t hat official policy can be
expressed as unwritten, informal "custom." I can accept
this where the custom is unmistakably sanctioned by the
municipality. ,And your language at the top of p.34 does
not foreclose
"deliberate indifference" theory in an
Eighth Amendment context, where a prison department's
established policy or "custom" with regard to prisoner
medical needs "itself inflicts [constitutional]
•
injury •••• " i~!n short, I hope you wi 11 be willing to drop
the Es!~ll~ s'entence in note 55 (or proposed note 60) as
unnecessary, · :reserving all ment5 on of the ; each of Estel:.!! .~;
until we have ~\ specific case.
t...
,...,_ ,,,~.~~:. "[
. ··

2.

34, ~ proposed

a

ill

""""

3:·_;:r-1;\~~ so agree with Potter that footnote 57 on

'

'

page 32 (with respect to "fault") is unnecessary and
touches on an issue yet to be resolved. While the
footnote, as amended in your J etter of April 25 to Potter,
does not commit the Court to any particular proposition of
law, it may be read as a "signal". In light of our
reservation of the negligence issue in Procunier v. ·
Navarette, I would remain silent here. We will have to
confront-the negligence issue soon enough without inviting
it
•. •m'
C!;,,
'"'-·
•

I'

··<lk&..l:li:
~y,,~ll'~

'"·~·

.. ·;).t~.

""'

··.

""

;~.~".· ·"'''""

~

~

4. Page 38, discussion of the Attorneys' '' Award
Act of 1976: You describe this as allowing "prevailing

I'
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parties in §1983 suits to obtain attorneys' fees from the
losing party". I am sure you intend only to state, in
accord with the statutory language, that the Act merely
confers discretion on the Court to allow such fees. Also,
in light-of-!fiittQ-V. ~.!EE~.Y, I am somewhat troubled by your
characterization of the congressional intent on page 39. I
would simply say that Congress has "attempted to allow"
such awards, not that Congress has "attempted to limit
Monroe.~
•

-----·

. " , ~, 5.
revision of Part IV a's to immunity leaving the issue entirely open - is quite acceptable.
no longer will write on the immunity issue, although my
previously expressed view remains firm.

A

I

!

·'I: appreciate your efforts to accommodate
various sugge~tions r. from other Brothers and me. T~i.s is ri(
however, a maJor new precedent and I am strongly d1sposed
to move cautiously. If you will make the changes suggested
above, I will be happy to join you - although I do not
foreclose the possibility of having minor edjting
suggestions as I reread your comprehensive opinion.
;>f"

r

'"rn·''

•!\!

.

1.lil!'

~lso, r s~ill may write briefly to emphasize a
point or two where we may have shades of difference that do
not go to the essential merits of your opinion. This would
not prevent me from joining you.

t:t.
\1 +''1-;
~

Sincerely,

;

' '

i
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR.

May 2, 1978
Re:

No. 75-1914, Monell v. Department of Social
Services

Dear Lewis,
Thank you for your memo on this case. As you know, my
clerks have been meeting informally with the clerks from a
number of chambers (including your own) to hammer out
rough spots in the second draft of my opinion for the
Court. I think that this process has produced new
language which meets all but two of the points raised in
your memorandum, although in some cases the language
adopted is slightly different from that you have suggested.
The two remaining points are footnote 57 and Estelle.
As Byron's recent memorandum indicated, I have agreed to
delete note 57. And, although I must say that I am quite
reluctant to drop the Estelle point, in the interest of
avoiding a flurry of opinions I will drop the last part of
note 55 as well as any attempt to resurrect the point in
note 60. I have also gone through Part II with care to
remove the word "fault" whenever it might, by negative
implication, indicate that we are creating a negligence
cause of action under § 1983. To accomodate the dropping
of Estelle and references to municipal fault, I will
recast the last paragraph of Part II as follows (replacing
what is now the carry-over paragraph on pp. 33-34):
~ J

.

I

I

j

.J

"We conclude, tKerefore, that 1a local government
may not be sued for 1the tort pu~ely~ its employees
or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly
be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under § 1983. Since this case unquestionably involves
official policy as the moving force of the
constitutional violation found by the District Court,
see pp. 1-2 and n. 2, supra, we must reverse the
judgment below. In so doing, we have no occasion to

-2-

address, and do not address, what the full contours of
municipal liability under § 1983 may be. We have
attempted only to sketch so much of the § 1983 cause
of action against a local government as is apparent
from the history of the 1871 Act and our prior cases
and we expressly leave further development of this
action to another day."
The suggested text will require both footnotes 59 and 60
to be deleted.
Rather than attempt to make any more detailed response
to your memorandum, I will send our well marked-up copy of
Monell draft 2 to the printer for a third draft. I agree
with you that "it [is] appropriate for the Court to make
clear that [respondeat superior] does not support a §1983
claim against entities of government," and, accordingly,
will keep Part II in the third draft. If it appears that
we cannot attract a fifth vote for that Part, I will
convert it into a plurality opinion in the fourth draft.
Sincerely.,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

''

To:
From:
Re:

Mr. Justice Powell
Sam Estreicher

Date:

May 2, 1978

No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dpt of Social Services
WJB's proposed language is open-ended

("we have no occasion to address, and do not address,
what the full contours of municipal liability under
§

1983 may be"), but it may be innocuous because it

says nothing.

In light of his willingness to drop

the last sentence in note 55, note 57, note 59 & note
60,

we should permit him a measure of author's

lic ense.
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CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE W-.. . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR.

May 2, 1978
Re:

No. 75-1914, Monell v. _. Department of Social
Services

Dear Lewis,
Thank you for your memo on this case. As you know, my
clerks have been meeting informally with the clerks from a
number of chambers (including your own) to hammer out
rough spots in the second draft of my opinion for the
Court.
I think that this process has produced new
language which meets all but two of the points raised in
your memorandum, although in some cases the language
adopted is slightly different from that you have suggested.
The two remaining points are footnote 57 and Estelle.
As Byron's recent memorandum indicated, I have agreed to
delete note 57. And, although I must say that I am quite
reluctant to drop the Estelle point, in the interest of
avoiding a flurry of opinions I will drop the last part of
note 55 as well as any attempt to resurrect the point in
note 60.
I have also gone through Part II with care to
remove the word "fault" whenever it might, by negative
implication, indicate that we are creating a negligence
cause of action under § 1983. To accomodate the dropping
of Estelle and references to municipal fault, I will
recast the last paragraph of Part II as follows (replacing
what is now the carry-over paragraph on pp. 33-34):
"We conclude, therefore, that a local government
may not be sued for the tort purely of its employees
or agents.
Instead, it is when execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly
be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under § 1983. Since this case unquestionably involves
official policy as the moving force of the
constitutional violation found by the District Court,
see pp. 1-2 and n. 2, supra, we must reverse the
judgment below.
In so doing, we have no occasion to

-2a
ess
o not address what the full contours of
munic1pal liab1 1
We
attemp ted
of action against
~ocal government as is apparent
from the history of the 1871 Act and our prior cases
and we expressly leave further development of this
action to another day."

a

The suggested text will require both footnotes 59 and 60
to be deleted.
Rather than attempt to make any more detailed response
to your memorandum, I will send our well marked-up copy of
Monell draft 2 to the printer for a third draft.
I agree
with you that "it [is] appropriate for the Court to make
clear that [respondeat superior] does not support a §1983
claim against entities of government," and, accordingly,
will keep Part II in the third draft.
If it appears that
we cannot attract a fifth vote for that Part, I will
convert it into a plurality opinion in the fourth draft.
Sincerely.,
I
I

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom" even though such a custom hns not received formal
approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels.
As Mr. Justice Harlan recognized: "Congress included custom
and usage [in § 1983] because of persistent and widespread
discriminatory practices of State officials. . . . Although not
authorized by \\Titten la"·, such practices of state officials could
well be so permanent and \Yell settled as to constitute a
'custom or usage' with the force of law." Adickes v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167- 168 (1970).~
On the other hand. the language of § 1983, read against
the background of the same legislative history, compels the
conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be
held liable unless official municipal aetion of some nature
caused a constitutional tort. In particulnr, we conclude that
a municipality cannot be held liable soldy beca use it employs
a tortfeasor- or. in other "·orcls, a municipality cannot be held
liable under § 1983 on a. respondea t superior theory.
We begin with the language of § 1983 ns passed:
"[A]ny person who, under color of any hw, statute,
5

55

See also Justice Fr:m kfur1e r'~ ~ta trment in Nashuille, C. & St. L. R.

p'o. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 36~, 369

(19-!0):

·"It would be a narrow concept ion of jmisprurlencr to C'Onfinc the notion of
.'Jaws' to what is found \\Tittrn on the statutr books, anrl to rli s r t>g:~ rd the
.gloss which life has written upon it. Settled st:1 tr practice . . . can
establish what is state hw. The Equal Prot{'c tion Chu~r did not write an
,empty formali 3m into the Con~titution. Deeply emucudcd traditional wa.ys
,of carrying out s t:~te policy, :::uch as tho ~c of which petitioner complains,
l:.!w th:m the dc:~d word,
· n text."
1 oreover, mH-not in gonrr"l crr:JtP 'I yjoht..io.ll of the Cil.l.l::dit.ut.iOJ.J'as we
affirmed t\yo Terms :1go, where the Con,.:titution impo~e;:; a duty on st.'1te
officials to act, :~nd th'cy are driibcr:Jtt'ly indifTcrcnt to th:1t duty-n form
of inaction which by it s nature will ~rldom be offiri:llly adoptrd or writ.t en
Jock!! policy-§ 19S3 pro,·idcs an aYcnuc of redress. Sec Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 104- 105 (19/G) .

...
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ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall
subject, or cause to be subjected, any person . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the
party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress . . . ." Globe App., at 335
(emphasis added ).
The italicized language plainly imposes liability on a government that, under color of some official policy, "causes" an
employee to violate another's constitutional rights. At the
same time, that language cannot be easily read to impose
liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of
the existence of an employer-employee relationship \vith a
tortfeasor. Indeed, the fact that Congress did specifica11y
provide that A's tort became B's liability if B "caused" A to
subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend
§ 1983 liability to attach where such causation " ·as absent. 56
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 370-371 (1976).
~6

l

Support for such n ronc lu ~ ion ran br found in thr lrgisbtiv!' history.
As we have indicated, there is Yirtually no discussion of § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act. Again, hO\H'\·er, Congrrss' treatment of the Sherman amendment giYes a clue to wh ether it would have desired to impose respondeat
superior liability.
The primary constitu.tional ju;:tific:1tion for the Sherm:m amendment. \\·as ·
that it was a nc·ce.::: ~a ry :md proper rrmrdy for thr failure of lor:1lit ic;:; to
protect cidzcns a.;; the Pri,·ilrgcs or Immunities Clau~r of the Fourt ernth
Amendment required . See pp . 10-13, supra. And according to Sherman,
Shellabarger, and EJmunds, the :mwndmrnt. came into play only when a
locality was at Ln!lt or had ncglrcted it s duty to prm·ide prot rct.ion. See
Globe, at. 761 (Sen. Sherman): id .. at 75G (Sen. Edmunds); id., at 751 -752
(Rep. Shellabarger). But other proponen1 f; of the :llncndmrnt. apparently
viewed it as a form. of Yi ca rious liability for thr unlawful nets of the
citizens of the loc:1lity. See id., at 792 (Rep. Butler). And whether
intended or not., the amendment :~s dmfted did impose a species of
vicarious liability on municipalities since it could be construed to impose
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Equally important, creation of a federal law of respondeat
superior where state law did not impose such an obligation
would raise all the constitutional problems associated with the
obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress chose not
to impose because it. thought imposition of such an obligation
unconstitutional. To this day, there is disagreement about
the basis for imposing vicarious liability on an employer for
the torts of an employee ''"hen the employer itself is not at
fau1t. 57 Sec \V. Prosser, L::nY of Torts, § 69, at 569 (4th ed.
1971). Nonethel ess, two justifications tend to stand out.
First in the commonsense notion that no matter how blameliability even if a municipality did not know of an impending or ensuing
riot or did. not have the whcrcwithall to do anything about it-. Indeed, the
statute held a municipality liable eYen if it h:1d done everything in its
power to curb the riot.. Sec p. 8 , supra; Globe, at 761 (Sen. Ste\'ens); id.,
at 771 (Sen. Thurman); id., at 783 (Rep. Kerr); id., at 791 (Rep. \Villard).
'\\'bile the first conference substitute was rejected principally on constitutional grounds, see id., at 804 (R ep. Poland), it is plain from the text of
the second conference substitute--which limited liability to those who,
having the power to intervene agn inst Ku Klux violence, "neglect [ed] or
refuse[d] so to do," see Appendix, infra, at. 41, and which was enncted as
§ 6 of the 1871 Act and is now codified as 42 U.S. C.§ 1986- that Congress
a1so rejected those elements of vicarious liability contained in the first
conference subst.itute even while accepting the basic principle that. the
inl1abitants of a community were bound to provide protection against the
Ku Klux Klan. Strictly speaking, of cour~e. the fact that Congre~s refused·
to impose vicarious liability for the wrongs of a few privnte citizens does
not conclusively cstnblish that it would simibrly have refused to impose
vicarious liability for the torts of a municipality's employees. Nonetheless, when Congress' rejection of the only form of vicarious linbility
presentro to it is combined with the absence of any bnguage in § 1083
which can easily be cm1strued - to create respondeat supe n~r liability, the
inference that. Congre,;s did not intend to impose such liability is quite
st,Tona.
e note, however, that where there is fault in hiring, training, or
direction, that fault is the b~is for liability under the common law, sec 2
F. Harper & F. Jnmes, The Ln" of Torts, § 26.1, at 1362-1363 (1956), not
the fault of the employee-tortfe:~sor vicariously applied to the employer.
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less an employer appears to be in an individual case, accidents
might nonetheless be reduced if employers had to bear the cost
of accidents. See, e. g., ibid.; 2 F. Harper & James, ·The Law
of Torts, § 2G.3, at 1368-1369 (105G). Second is the argument
that the cost of accidents should be spread to the community
as a whole on an insurance theory. See, e. g., id., § 2G.5;
W. Prosser, supra, at 459.~ 8
The first justification is of the same sort that was offered for
the Sherman amendment: "The obligation to make compensation for injury resulting from riot is, by arbitrary enactment of
statutes, affirmatory law, and the reason of passing the statute
is to secure a more perfect police regulation." Globe, at 777
(Sen. Frelinghuysen). This justification was obviously insufficient to sustain the amendment against perceived constitutional difficulties and there is no reason to suppo~e that a more
general liability imposed for a similar reason \Yould have been
thought less constitutionally objectionable. The second justification was similarly put forward as a justification for the
Sherman amendment: "we do not look upon [the Sherman
amendment] as a punishment. . . . It is a mutual insurance."
/d., at 792 (Rep. Butler). Again, this justification \\'aS insufficient to sustain the amendment.
In sum, a local government may be sued for monetary,
declaratory, or injunctive relief under § 1983 \\·hen it is at
fault, but not for the fault purely of its employees or agents. 59

L.

~ 8 A third justification, often cited but which on examination is nppar-

ent.ly insufficient to justify the doctrine of respondeat supen"or, see, e. g.,
2 F. Harper & F. James, supra, n. 61, § 26.3, is that liability follows the
right to control the actions of a tortfeasor. By our deci5ion in Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U . S. 362 (1976), we would .1ppear to haYe drriclcd th11t the
mere right to control "·ithout nny control or direction having been rxcrcised
and without any fnilnre to suprrYisc i~ not rnough to support. § 1983
liability. See id .. nt. 370-371.
59
Given the variety of "·ays thnt offiria] polir~' mn~' be drmonstrntrd. we
do not today attempt to cst.1blish any firm guidelines for d<.'trrmining when
individual action executes or implement~ official policy. However, given

I
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It is only when the government's policy, whether made by its
la,vmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official 11olicy, itself inflicts the injury or itself
authorizes or directs the specific act charged against its officer 60
that the government is responsible under § 1983. In all other
cases, a § 1983 action must be brought against the individual
officers whose acts form the basis of the § 1983 complaint.

J.

III
Although we have stated that stare decisis has more force in
statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication because,
in the former situation, Congress can correct our mistal,:es
our conclusion that Congress did not intend to enact a. regime of vicarious
liability, whntenr offirial action is involved must be sufficient to support a
conclusion that a local government itself is to blame or is at fault.
For example, in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), we recognized
that fault is a crucial factor in determining whether relief ma.y run against
a party for its alleged participation in a constitutional tort. Di:;tinguishing
the relief approved by the lower courts in Rizzo from that sanctioned
by this Court in school desegregation cases, the Court explained:
"Respondents . . . ignore a critiral factual distinction between their case
and the desegregation cases decided by this Court. In the latter, segregation imposed by law had been implemented by state authorities for varying
periods of time, whereas in the instant case the District Court found that
"the responsible authorities had played no affirmative part in depriving any
members of the two respondent classes of any constitutional rights. Those
against whom injunctive relief was directed in cases such as Swann [v.
Charlotte-M ecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 ( 1971) ,] and
Brown [ v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 ( 1954),] were not administrators arid school board members who had in their employ a small number
·of individuals, which latter on their own deprived black students of their
constitutional rights to a unitary school system. They were administrators
and school board members who were found by their own conduct in the
administration of the school system to have denied those rights. Here, the
·District Court iound that none of the petition~rs had deprived the
TP..Spondent cb~ses of any rights secured under the Constitution. 423 U. S., ·
at 377 (emphasis in original).
(;OSee, however, n. 55, supra.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE

w .. .

J . BRENNAN, JR.

May 4, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE: No. 75-1914 Monell v. Department of Social Services
·
of the City of New York

Enclosed is completed draft revised primarily to
accommodate the suggestions of Potter, Byron and Lewis.
Those appear at pages 25, 26, 27, 30-35, 38-39 and 41.
The changes at 11, 13-14 and 20- 22 are for purposes
of clarification and organization only.
I hope that this circulation can be the basis for a
final resolution of the Court's opinion.

W.J.B. Jr.

5/4/78
WJB has made all the changes that we a ked
him to make. You should not feel any relu tance
in joining this opinion. I wonder if you ould
point out a problem ~
ha ~ave with the
irst
sentence at the tap o
• r.:L. Although :JB does
not intend such a me
·n
t he phrase " ere state
law did not impose such n obligation" ould
lead to an interpretation that respond at-superior
liability is possible where state law imposes such
liability. I would prefer that the phrase be
deleted. I recognize that this langua~ a peared in ~
. )
previous drafts, but I just noticed/tor the first t~me
~t

A

•

~

~!ay

I

5, 1978

•

Dear Bill:
As your 3rd draft substantially accommodates my
concerns (for which I thank you), I am glad to join you.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

B '11:

There ls one anguage chang that I waul
your ak ng. Th phrase "where tat~ Jaw did
uch an obligation• (p. 33) cou,d ead to n
jnterpret~tion th t re pondeat-superior liability is
pas ib e here tate la impos .s such l abi i.ty. I wou l d
prefer that the ph~ se be deleted. I recogn ze that this
language appeared ·n previou drafts, but I just noticed
it.
apprec'at
not
pas

L.P.P., Jr.

§u:prtmt <!fottrt of tltt ',IDttittb ~tat.cn
'lllaslfiugton, JD. <!f. 2ll,?Jl-~
C~A~BERS

OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

Re:

May s, 1978

No. 75-1914 - 1-bnell v. Depa.rt:rrent of Social
Services of the City of New York

Dear Bill:
I am still with you and hope you will not have
to nake any further changes.

Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc:

The Conference

<)vk '
LFP/lab

Rider A, pg. 1, Monell

5/8/78

Few cases in the history of the Court have been
cited more frequently than

Mo~

v.

Pa;p~,

(1961), decided less than two decades ago.

light on

§ 1983,

365 U.S. 167

Focusing new

the decision offered wider access to the

federal courts to redress wrongs far beyond those
contemplated in 1871.

It enlarged the concept of "color

of law", and made clear that exhaustion of state remedies
was not a precondition to the federal remedy.

But Monroe

curiously exempted local government entities from
liability at the same time it opened wide the courthouse
door to suits against officers and employees of such
entities - even when they had acted pursuant to express
authorization.

The illogic of this result, and the

unsoundness of the historical reason asserted by the
MonrQ~

Court in support of it, have been well demonstrated

by the Court's opinion today.
Yet, the seriousness of overruling a portion of
so famous a decision where the Congress by its inaction
apparently has accepted that portion, prompts me to write.

~

LFP/lab

5,_ /78

To:

From:

Over the weekend, I
'\

,,

draft ( 5/1/78) of a concurring opinion.

~""?.if.~

1

,

the opinion and am inclined to render

l'~'l ike

It would be ostentatious,

however~,

.,

i(et~. "\*/~

for me to repeat the
,:\ '

substance of points or

arguments\ii alr.:~ady

Justice Brennan.

have not had his opinion with me, I

As

~

well made by "'-

have not been able 1 to check back to see whether
llfti

r

'

p,

undue repetition in my concurrence.

.:r: :x

intim.C!!=~.~~lmiliar i
~

In view of your own

ty with this whole subject, including

the Brenn~'n opinlon, I would like your considered judgment
on this question •.
"11w,

,, ~1

Also,

I ~1 have

some lingering doubt as

appropriateness of including the paragraph on Bivens.
like the paragraph, and you ar~ famiiia ~ with
'

about

Bi~!,

but I would like your view as to whether

inclusion of the paragraph weakens
the concurrence.

'·

I

r'

2.

hesitant to add a ten or twelve
page concurrence to the long opinions already written by
Justices Brennan and Rehnquist.

I therefore suggest that

1

you consider possible marginal statements both in the
and notes that could be omitted .

For example, I have

marked portions of pagesi,3 and 4 to be cut from the
and placed in a note.

On second thought, I believe the

Brennan opinion quotes. so elaborately from the debate on
the Sherman Amendment, we need not include the quotations
from Burchard and Blair.

Perhaps the note could simply

make a reference to their ...'~statements.

I also invite your

thought as to whether the paragraph on

Moor~

(p. 7) can be

summarized in a conclusory sentence without loss of
impact.

My recollection, however, is that the Brennan

opinion does not deal adequately with

Mo~.

~nvrmu <!J!!ud of tqt ~tb' .:§taUs
~~t.sfringhm..1tJ. <!J. 20gtJ!.~

CHAMBERS OF"

May 8, 1978

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

75-1914- Monellv. Department of
Social Services of the
City of New York

Dear Bill,
I

am content with your circulation

of May 4, 1978.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.§u:p-r.em~ <~Jcu:rf cf t.Ir~ ~b ~ta-Us

'JII'aglfhtgtcn, ~· <IJ. 2D.?J!.~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE POTTER

STEWART

May 15, 1978

Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services
of the City of New York
Dear Bill,
I have now carefully read your revised opinion
from beginning to end and I am glad to join. Many
thanks for your generous and effective efforts in meeting the recalcitrant quibbles from your obstinate
colleagues.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

M(To:

&J-_;:c_i?

~u~-

d.- /~~J. ~~,~ .

Mr. Justice Powell

From: Sam Estreicher

Date:

May 15,

197~~

Re: No. 75-1914, Monell v. Dept of Social Services
1. I have incorporated your editorial changes with
some minor exceptions.

I

expl~in

my actions in notational

c omments .on pp. 7 and 9 of your draft.

With respect

to the question you raise on p . 8, the Young fiction
is that the public official is

enjoin~d

even though the

relief in substance operates against the State.

As the

Court explained it in Ex parte Young, an individual
enfor cing an unconstitutional state statute is shorn
of a ny of ficial authority derived from that statute and
may be sued as an ordinary person.

In later usage, the

Ex parte Young fiction has been extended to officialcapacity suits.
2.
own.

I have also made some additional changes of my
Most are self-explanatory, if diff icult to read

on my copy.

Insert 5-A is in response to Jim's point

that the language on p. 5 was unduly critical of the
Court .

Insert 6-A offers language that is more precise

than the prior text.

I have deleted the joinder discussion

on p. 7 because in rethinking the point, I hve concluded
that misjoinder does not raise a juri sdictional question
if individual public officials are codefendants.

cqcmt of tltt ~nitcb- ~ta'!ts
2lli~Utltitt¢:ott. ~· cq. 20gi~$

.:§lt}lrtnu

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

May 17, 1978

Re:

No. 75-1914

-

Monell v. Department of
Social Services

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc:

The Conference

..

j

~utrrtnte

QJMtrt ttf tip~ 'Jllttibb $5htftg
~a£rltin.ghnt, ~· <q. 2.0~,~~

CHAMBERS OF

~JLE

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR .

May 24, 1978

COPy

PLEASE RETURN
TO FfLE

No. 75-1914 Monell v. Dept. of Social Services

MEMORANDUM TO CONFERENCE:
I propose to substitute the attached for present
footnote 6 on page 6 of my concurring opinion in the above
case.

'L. f. fl.
L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss

S/24/78

6.

75-1914 Monell v. 15ept. of Social Services

The doctrine of stare decisis advances two

important values of a rational system of law:
(i) the certainty of legal principles, and (ii) the wisdom
of the conservative vision, that existing rules should be
presumed rational and not subject to modification "at any
time a new thought seems appealing," dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, post, at 5; cf. 0. Holmes, The
Common Law 36 (1881).

But, at the same time, the law has

recognized the necessity of change, lest rules "simply
persist • • • from blind imitation of the past."

Holmes,

The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).

Any

overruling of prior precedent, whether of a constitutional
decision or otherwise,
of certainty.

disse~ves

to some extent the value

But I think we owe somewhat less deference

to a decision that was rendered without benefit of a full
airing of all the relevant considerations.

That is the

premise of the canon of interpretation that language in a
decision not necessary to the holding may be accorded less
weight in subsequent cases.

I also would recognize the

fact that until this case the Court has not had to confront
squarely the consequences of holding

§

1983 imapplicable to

official municipal policies.
Of course, the mere fact that an issue was not
argued or briefed does not undermine the precedential force
of a considered holding.

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137

2.

(1803), cited by the dissent, post, at 5, is a case in
point.

But the Court's recognition of its power to

invalidate legislation not in conformity with
constitutional command was essential to its judgment in
Marbury.

And on numerous subsequent occasions, the Court

has been required to apply the full breadth of the Marbury
holding.

In Monroe, on the other hand, the Court's

rationale was broader than necessary to meet the
contentions of the parties ana to decide the case in a
principled manner.

The language in Monroe cannot be

dismissed as dicta, but we may take account of the fact
that the Court simply was not confronted with the
implications of holding
municipal policies.

§

1983 inapplicable to official

It is an appreciation of those

implications th a t has prompted today's reexamination of the
legislative history of the 1871 measure.
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it is a part of lsicl.'' Brid for Hcspondcnts, snwa, p. :20.
Thu~ the• ~l'OlliHI of decision in J/omoe was nnt aciYanccd by
eithrr party aiHl \\"UP broad('l' than nec<'~sary to r<'solvc the
ronkntio11~ mach- in that case•.':
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ln7'2. Xo. 7:2- 10. p. n.
Only ill City uj Kenosha V. Bruno, 412 e. S. 507 (HJ73),
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011 our U\\"11 i11itiativc. 7
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to reconcile 011 a principlrcl basis \\"ith a parallel sPrics of cases
in \Yhich the Court has assunwcl sub silellt.io that some local

---

- --- --

'' \\'(' owe• ~onH'\I'hnt If'~,.; ddt'I'!'IH'I ' Io :1 clc-C'i~ion 1lint wa ~ n'tHIPn·cl withuut IJ!'nc·Jit of a ftdl airing: of :dl till' n·lc·,·:tnl c·oJJ~i<IPration" Thr fac·t that
11nl il Ihi,; c·a.'<' t liP Conrt h:J.' not h:1d 1o c·onfront .•qu:1 n·l~· I ht• c·on"c'(llH'tlr-c•,.; )
of holding § HJ~:) in:tpplil':tblc· to oflic·i:d n!unil'ipal polic·ic·~ nta~· hl' c·on.-;ickrl'd in :t~~<'"~in~ till' 'Jltalit~· of tlic· pr~~·~· ~-~ that \H' an'-2~~
J'~l'X;tlllin~
~7rlill!/l'l" \. 1/ou·urd. -1:2i 1·. S. J (l!tili), II"<' n·:dlirmpd .1/onro!'.
Int t pl'tll iotH•r did not c·onl c•.•t till' propo~ i t Hill 1h:i! c·ounl ic·:< \I"C'J'(' t•xc·l udt'd
from tlic• n•ac·h of§ HlS:l nndc·r .1ln111"ur•. irl .. at Hi, aJH!IIic• <Jtl!',.;tion bdon•
tJ..; c·otH·c·mPd thc• ,.;c·tl}W of pc•J!dt•JJt-party .iuri;-:dil'tion with rc•spc•c·l to a
~I:IIP-I:J\1' C'laim. Simtlarlr, tlic· p:trlic·~ i11 .1ft.IIC'IIIih!l C'it!l 13unrrl of Hd. \'.
/)oy/c •. -1:2U t '. :-;, li-1 (Hlii). did IIIII ·'L'C' k :1- 1'< '-<'X: IInin:ttion of our ruling
111

.11 II/I/"(/('.

;%u:.pt"mu

"'--'

C!Icnrl of tltt ~b .§taftg

:.ag!pttghnt, ~. C!I· 2ll.;JJ!.~
CHAMBERS Of"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 31, 1978

Dear Bill:
Re:

75-1914 - Monell v. Dept. of Social Service

Please join me in your dissent.
Regards,

W.E.B/JI'Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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Re: No. 75-1914, Jane Monell v. Dept of Social Services
Dear Potter,
As you know, I am very troubled by this case.

I

have always thought that, in some respects, this Court's
rulings in the

§

1983 area have been unfortunate.

This

Court has construed the delphic terms of the 1871 measure
to create a cause of action for all adverse actions
affecting federal rights undertaken by state and local
officials, even where an adequate remedy may exist under
local law, and administrative procedures may be available
to provide swifter, more certain relief in a manner that
is faithful to the values of cooperative federalism.
Moreover, in the understandable urge to narrow the
occasions for federal court supervision of local
government, we have submitted occasionally to the
temptation to read major areas of human conduct out of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976).
While I am not predisposed to extend

§

1983's

reach, this case presents the issue of the proper
treatment of conduct which lies at the core of the
considerations that animated the 42d Congress. Affirmance
of Judge Gurfein's ruling for the Second Circuit means
that

§

1983 does not authorize compensatory relief for the

actions of local governmental units bearing a direct

2.

responsibility for a constitutional deprivation, even
though such actions are fully consistent with, indeed
mandated by, state law. Suits against the public official
in his private capacity are likely to be defeated by the
assertion of good-faith reliance on state law. Thus, the
"under color of" state law debate in Monroe v. Pape, 365

u.s.

167 (1961), is stood on its head. A monetary recovery

will be possible only for unauthorized state action, the
very conduct that Felix Frankfurter argued was not
encompassed by the "under color of" wording of the statute.
A second consideration is that the absence of any
remedy -- outside of the types of employment
discrimination proscribed by the 1972 amendments to Title
VII

-- for authorized state action in violation of

constitutional requirements may propel this Court to
recognize a Bivens remedy for all constitutional rights
made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.

In light of accepted principles of sovereign

immunity, it is unlikely that a Bivens action will be
recognized for authorized federal action.

But I doubt if

we can avoid for long recognition of similar claims
against local government entities. See, e.g., Lowell
School District No. 71 v. Ker, No. 77-688, March 3, 1978
Conference. Reexamination of Monroe's interpretation of

3.

§1983 would seem preferable to the predictable alternative
of judicial imposition of a Bivens cause of action for all
constitutional violations working a compensable harm.
I am fairly convinced that Bill Douglas' reading
of the legislative history in Monroe was wrong, and I do
not understand Bill Rehnquist's memorandum to present a
defense of that interpretation.

Section 1983 was enacted

as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. That section
passed both Houses virtUally without debate.
Representative Bingham, a leading supporter, had drafted
§1 of the Fourteenth Amendment with the case of Barron v.
Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1834), in mind.

As he explained

during the debates over the 1871 Act, "[i]n that case the
city had taken private property for public use, without
compensation ... , and there was no redress for the wrong
" Cong. Globe App. 84. He viewed §1983's predecessor
as an appropriate vehicle for seeking redress from takings
by municipalities that Barron had held to fall outside of
the reach of the Fifth Amendment. Id., at 84-85.

Bill

Brennan is quite right in saying that "it beggars reason
to suppose that Congress would have exempted
municipalities from suit, insisting instead that
compensation for a taking come from an officer in his
individual capacity rather than from the government unit

4.

that had the benefit of the property taken."

While the

term "person" may be a unusual way of expressing an
intention to reach units of government, the passage of the
so-called "Dictionary Act," a month before the civil
rights bill was introduced, evinces a congressional
understanding that "the word 'person' may extend and be
applied to bodies politic

" And the same language in

Senator Sherman's antitrust measure, enacted 19 years
later, has been construed to include municipalities,
Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203
U.S. 390, 396 (1906), and even foreign governments,
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, No. 76-749 (decided
Janaury 11, 1978), slip op. 7-10.
Representative Bingham and other Republican
members of the House broke ranks with their party over the
Sherman Amendment.

That proposal was rejected because it

sought to impose a duty upon municipalities to curb
private mob violence.

This was deemed an unwarranted,

extra-constitutional Federal intrusion into an area of
primary State competence because the obligation sought to
be imposed -- one addressed to State inaction in the face
of private lawlessness -- was without basis in the
commands of the Fourteenth Amendment.

As Representative

Burchard explained: "But there is no duty imposed by the

5•

Constitution of the United States, or usually by State
laws, upon a county to protect the people of that county,
against the commission of the offenses herein enumerated,
such as the burning of buildings or any other injury to
property or injury to person."

Cong. Globe 795. And

Representative Blair added: "[H]ere it is proposed, not to
carry into effect an obligation which rests upon the
municipality, but to create that obligation, and that is
the provision I am unable to assent to."

Ibid.

Although the matter is not entirely free from
doubt, as are few things in the realm of legislative
history, I submit that Republican opponents of the Sherman
proposal perceived no similar difficulty with

§

1 of the

1871 Act because it sought to impose directly upon the
official wrongdoer constitutional obligations derived from
the Fourteenth Amendment. Given the unrestricted sweep of
§

1, the virtual absence of debate over its intended

reach, and Congress' contemporaneous awareness that the
term "person" could include "bodies politic," the Monroe
Court was wrong to read the Sherman Amendment debates as
definitive evidence of a generalized intention to exclude
local government units from the reach of

§

1983. The

legislative history can best be understood as limiting the
statutory ambit to actual wrongdoers, i.e., a rejection of

6.

respondeat superior or other principle of vicarious
liability.
As a general proposition, the Court should be
hesitant to overrule prior construction of statutes or
common law rules, but this cautionary principle may be
overriden in appropriate circumstances. See,

~'

Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S.Ct. 2549
(1977); State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,
429 U.S. 363 (1977); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court
of Ky., 410

u.s.

u.s.

484 (1973); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403

88 (1971); Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,

Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).

This case presents a

similar occasion to apply Felix Frankfurter's epigram,
which you quoted in Boys Market: "Wisdom too often never
comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it
comes late." Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595,
600 (1949) •

f~~ rations

directi~n

of stare decisis cut in both

the one hand, we have a series of rulings

holding that municipalities and counties are not "persons"
for purposes of

§

1983.

In the somewhat accidental manner

that characterizes many of our
Runyon v. McCrary, 427

u.s.

§

1983 decisions, cf.

160, 186* (1976), we have

answered a question that was never briefed or argued in

7.

this Court. The claim in Monroe was that the City of
Chicago should be held "liable for acts of its police
officers, by virtue of respondeat superior," Brief for
Petitioners 21, namely, a warrantless, early morning raid
and ransacking of

a~

family's horne. Although Morris

Ernst's brief for petitioners in Monroe contains a
footnote reference to the Sherman Amendment, he

~

had no incentive to present a view of the legislative
history that would have foreclosed relief on a theory of
respondeat superior:Wrn Moor v. County of Alameda, 411

~
U.S. 693 (1973}, the only otherAcase presenting a
discussion of the legislative history of § 1983,
petitioners asserted a claim of vicarious liability
against a county under § 1988 and, moreover, did not
challenge "the holding in Monroe concerning the status
under§ 1983 of public entities such as the County," id.,
at 700. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), did not
involve a claim based on § 1983, and petitioners conceded
that Spokane County was not a "person" under the statute.

~

Only in City of Kenosha v.

~rune,

412

u.s.

507 (1973), did

the Court confront a § 1983 claim based on conduct that
was both authorized under state law and directly -- rather
than vicariously

responsible for the claimed
I

constitutional injury.

But

'

~

Kenosha

~

A

raised the

~ . wW~

jurisdictional question

on A~ . own{mo ~~~.
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-h~v~ ~o { been . ventilate

. o&;.t

R~~~

on any

previous occasion.
On the other hand, affirmance in this case
requires a rejection of this Court's sub silentio exercise
of jurisdiction over school boards in a great many cases.
As Bill Rehnquist acknowledges, at least three of these
~ ~h&&~ 8oa~~

decisions involved claims for monetary

relief, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974); Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, 414

u.s.

632

(1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community

School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); also Vlandis v. Kline,
412

u.s.

441 (1973).

~~~
-+ e<5rTbeee "Ehe pFeeel"lee e£

aRt

1\

independent basis of jurisdiction in these cases because
of the joinder of individual public officials as

-

codefendants. I do not understand, however, Bill
point that some of the decisions involved
independent school districts, for he also contends th
"the governing body of an incorporated school distric
separate from the city" is immune to

§ 1983

damages

of this Court often
made explicit reference to the school-board party,
particularly in discussions of the relief to be awarded,

9.

see,

Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S.Ct. 2749 (1977). And

~,

Congress has specifically focused on this Court's
school-board decisions in several statutes. The exercise
of

§

1983 jurisdiction over school boards, even if not

.£.. ,. t..~

premised on considered holdings, has been longstanding,~
I\
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~.
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to ~

~

I would _.. 1 imi t
,,

Monroe and Moor to their facts. The preclusion of
governmental liability for the tortious conduct of
individual officials that was neither mandated nor
specifically authorized by, and indeed
violative

of ~ tate

~

'lftl!l~

havoe bE@n

"

or local law, is consistent with the

42d Congress' rejection of vicarious liability as an
operative principle of the 1871 Civil Rights Act.
stand, unless we adopt the view,
suggested by
case simpl /

Be

their official capacity.

offici

~ri-

use I )rould

limitation on

--

· d not

~blic

::z
ainst

11 Rehnquist's decision in that

§

•••.,

s~

4rt(

recognize a vicarious-liability

1983 relief in such actions, I do not

J

fashion) , Acceptance of Bill Rehnquist's

r ..,, ~~~~ J

"bifurcated application to municipal corporations
t\

--

depending on the nature of the relief sought against
them." 412

u.s.,

at 513. A public official sued in his

official capacity, concededly a "person" for purposes of
injunctive relief, becomes a non-"person" in a suit
seeking a monetary recovery.
Kenosha's reasoning

Further impairment of

~
~ 1 be necessary because, as Bill

Rehnquist's memorandum illustrates, we

~
~1

have to say

that Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment out of a
desire to protect municipal treasuries.

Kenosha held that

a municipality could not be sued for injunctive relief
under

§

1983 even though no monetary recovery was sought,

for a municipality was simply not a "person." The question
arises why protection of the municipal fisc is now viewed
as the dominant reason for rejection of the Sherman

7

Amendment, when a suit seeking redress from authorized
conduct is brought against a defendant who is conceded to
be a "person" under the Act.

~ L..,..~ ~~~. ~ ~

~ the prior decisions in this area do not require

application of the usual stare decisis principle. There is
~

4l~ "

tk;

;,...J~/4L J ~··~- '4r
j

~ ~ ~ ~~~ J ~.fj, ....... ll.
tA
,r ~ 1- .-....,. 1""4 .... r1.-..o ~ ~ , •s+ .-.z...
ave acquiesced by 1ts 1na
the Court does will work some alteration of precedent. I

---

'de""" this case
eading

history,
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may compel the constitutionalization of a

re are at least two conditions that I
before joining an opinion by Bill Brennan.
First, Monroe and Moor should be restricted to their
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facts, rather than overruled. 1\ We !I!Aswl&
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the availability

of a §1983 damages remedy for constitutional violations
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that are the direct result of a policy

.ef
~

the government

entity, rather than simply its failure to curb the
unauthorized torts of its employees. See Rizzo v. Goode,
423

u.s.

362, 377

(1976), discussing

.ae Swann and Brown

~ ~ isR~ . There are substantial line-drawing problems, as

Bill Rehnquist notes, but this case involves a formal,
written policy of the municipal department and school

board~Jft
~~ L

is the clear

case~Second,

I would

w•~• ~A~

recognize a defense for policies promulgated in

good faith that affect adversely constitutional rights not
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